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Over the relatively short period of the last three decades, an extensive body of law, 
both penal and regulatory, has developed in order to prevent and to control th1s 
seemingly burgeoning phenomenon of money laundering. Initial examination of this 
body of law immediately reveals that it is a legal order that pushes against the 
traditional frameworks of criminal justice. For example, this new legal order 
persistently rings "alarm bells" regarding its compatibility with such fundamental 
principles as the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality, the immunity 
against double jeopardy, and the rights to privacy especially financial privacy. It also 
blurs the public nature of policing, the prosecutorial burden of proof and the 
jurisdictional territoriality of criminal law. Its formation at the international level 
shows strong signs of supranationalism that challenges State sovereignty and the 
principle of consent in international law. 
This tension between money laundering law and traditional legal principles 
poses two related questions: (1) What is the reason for this apparent exceptionality of 
money laundering law?; and (2) How could the tension between law and principle be 
resolved? As conventional wisdom has it, understanding the law can-not be 
disassociated from its social context. Certainly, understanding money laundering law 
is only possible through an understanding of the process of social change that shaped 
it. 
During these past three decades "globalisation" characterised the process of 
social change that has been gathering momentum. It is this context that has instigated 
and shaped money laundering law. Globalisation has been propelled by both rapid 
technological innovation that rendered massive instantaneous communication possible 
as well as extensive processes of de-regulation and liberalisation. The combined effect 
of these developments was the emergence of non-state actors that operate across 
national borders and master substantial economic and informational power. 
Meanwhile, the State, as the primary agency of governance, has remained 
jurisdictionally territorial while becoming less dominantly powerful. Both features 
have resulted in a "governance crisis" and has turned globalisation into a "legal 
problematic. " 
The core thesis that emerges from this contextual analysis is that money 
laundering law is a response to globalisation as a legal problematic. As a solution, it 
employs six modalities of governance: de- glob alisation, extraterritorialisation, 
harmonisation, co-operation, privatisation and supranatinl-l-, q-]-i---,, q-tion, which are 
characterised by deviation from traditional legal principles. In terms of its modalities 
and their characteristics, money laundering law is not a unique response to the legal 
problematic. It is part of a current and general trend in legal governance. Resolving 
the tension between this trend and traditional legal principles is a two-way process 
that involves revising both the law and the principles. 
In presenting this thesis, the volume will be organised into seven chapters. 
Following ail introductory Chapter, Chapters Two and Three will analyse the 
legislative policy underlying money laundering law by conducting contextual and 
historical analysis. Chapters Four, Five and Six will expound upon the six modalities 
utilised by money laundering law to address the governance problem posed by 
globalisation. Finally, Chapter Seven will sum up the argument and suggest some 
direction for the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: MONEY LAUNDERING LAW IN CONTEXT 
Chapter Outline 
1. THE EVOLUTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL REGIME 
2. "THE FALL OF PRINCIPLE" 
3. THE ROOTS OF CHANGE 
4. THEME AND STRUCTURE 
The phrase "money laundering" brings to mind thoughts of an intriguing but 
reprehensible underworld as described in scores of sensational investigative 
journalism. It conjures up images of the Italian and Russian Mafia, the Colombian 
Cartels, terrorist groups, illegal gambling operations and white slave traders. This 
phrase, however, does not Portray the sophistication, the breadth and incongruities of 
the legal regime that bears this name. 
Money laundering law is a complex legal field. It is a juncture point amongst 
criminal law, regulatory law, banking law, international criminal law and 
administrative and criminal procedure. Each of these branches of the law has its own 
concepts, problems, theories and methods. In approaching the subject-matter of 
money laundering, one can be viewed as having two choices: either to treat the subject 
as a sui generis law or to approach it from within one of the areas of the law that it 
touches upon. The first approach tends to generate technical studies that are useful for 
their purposes. ' The second approach tends to produce technical or in depth analysis 
of certain aspects of the law in terms of the field concerned. ' While these approaches 
to the study of the subject remain useful, current analysis of money laundering law 
falls short of providing a conceptual framework that permits a better understanding of 
' See, e. g., the collection of studies in Rider, B., and Ashe, M. (eds. ), Money Laundering Control 
(1996); Rider, B. and Nakajima, C., Anti Money Laundering Guide (1999); Bosworth-Davies; R., 
Money Laundering: A Practical Guide to the New Legislation (1994). 
2 For a criminal justice perspective including substantive criminal law, criminal law enforcement and 
international criminal co-operation see Stessens, G., Money Laundering: A New International Law 
Enforcement Model (2000); Fisse, B., Fraser, D., and Coss, G. (eds. ), The Money Trail: Confiscation of 
Proceeds of Criine, Money Laundering and Cash Transaction Reporting (1992). For a corporate and 
commercial law perspective see Birks, P. (ed. ), Laundering and Tracing (1995); Salva, S., Money 
Laundering and Financial Interniediaries (2001); For a discussion from an international law angel see 
Gilmore, W., Dirty Money. - The Evolution of MoneY Laundering Co un ter- in eas tires (2 nd ed., 1999); 
Simmons, B., "International Efforts against Money Laundering", in Shelton, D. (ed. ), Coininitinent and 
Conipliance: The Role oJ'Non-Binding Norms in The International Legal 5ýyStein (2000). 
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money laundering law in terms of the relationship between its various parts. Absent 
such a conceptual framework, the study of money laundering law will remain 
fragmented. This fragmentation of the subject-matter is prohibitive of coherent 
evaluation thereof. 
This volume is an attempt to fill this gap in the study of money laundering 
law. It endeavours to provide a policy explanation that helps explain the relationships 
between its various parts and to its underlying government policies. It is only through 
such systematic analysis that the contours of money laundering law can be evaluated 
properly. 
1. The Evolution of a Comprehensive Legal Regime 
Despite attempts at tracing the origins of the term "money laundering" to the practices 
of New York Mafia in the 1920s when they opened Laundromats as fagades for their 
criminal activities, ' it was not until 1970s that "money laundering" became part of 
everyday speech and journalistic reporting. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, this use of the word launder emerged out of the Watergate inquiry in the 
United States 1973-4. ' The Watergate investigation had uncovered the attempts by 
Nixon's Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP) to hide the origin and the receipt 
of anonymous campaign contributions and to sever the financial "paper trail" between 
the CRP and the intruders that broke into the Democrat's campaign headquarters at the 
Watergate office building. ' These processes, which were perceived in hindsight as 
naYve, were described by the press as laundering. The legal use of the term had to wait 
somewhat longer. In the mid 1980s, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Two, "money laundering" entered legal usage. A leading authority on the subject' 
traces this development to a 1982 U. S. Supreme Court case, US v. $4 255 625,39, 
concerning the civil forfeiture of two large sums of money. ' It was the Court's 
conclusion that the financial transfers that took place constituted "more likely than 
not, a money laundering process[J"' These words by the U. S. Supreme Court 
3 Robinson, J., The Laundi-yinen: Inside the Worlds Third Largest Business (1994), at 3. [This book 
offers an interesting anecdotal account of some of the leading money laundering cases. ] 
-'The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VIII (2 nd ed., 1989) at 702. See infra Chapter Two, Section 
5 Robinson, J., supra note 3, at 6 et seq. 
6G- 
jilmore, W., supra note 1, at 23. 
7 551 F Supp. 314 (1982). 
8 Id., at 325. For more details on the case, see infra, Chapter Two, Section 3.1. 
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represent the first recorded use of the term money laundering in a primary legal 
document. ' 
No sooner had the concept of money laundering emerged and took hold, than 
an extensive body of law began forming rapidly. The decisive starting point in this 
history is the enactment of the United States Bank Secrecy Act 1970 (BSA). " The 
BSA is a federal statute that imposes and authorises the Secretary of the Treasury to 
impose, a series of duties to report and record certain transactions that are of use for 
criminal, tax and regulatory enforcement. Since that date, the evolution of money 
laundering law has gone through different phases and a myriad of national, 
international and regional instruments have constituted its mosaic. During the 1970s, 
money laundering law was in its incipient stage. During this period there was an 
increasing awareness of the problem of hiding ill-gotten assets from law enforcement, 
which was later on to acquire the label of "money laundering. " The emphasis in the 
1970s was regulatory and preventive in nature, stipulating the banks' duties to keep 
records and report transactions that might assist law enforcement agencies in carrying 
out their functions. Seven years after the United States BSA, a self-regulatory but 
similar instrument came into being in Switzerland. In 1977 Swiss bankers signed an 
agreement "on the Observance of Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and on the 
Practice of Banking Secrecy. "" In addition to these domestic regulatory measures, 
limited developments in international co-operation also began to take place, mainly, 
the U. S. -Switzerland Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT)1973 .2 
The second phase of the evolution of money laundering law and by far a more 
rigorous one started in the 1980s. In terms of money laundering law, this decade has 
brought about the criminalisation and internationalisation. In the 1980s, money 
laundering law ceased to be merely regulatory. A number of money laundering 
offences came into being. This development took place in the United States and the 
United Kingdom almost simultaneously. " In 1988, this trend towards criminalisation 
took a major leap. At the end of that year, the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter, The Vienna 
9 Supi-a note 1. 
10 the Bank Secrecy Act (1970), Pub L 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114. 
'' See infra, Chapter Two, Section 2.2. 
12 12 ILM 916 (1973). See below, Chapter Two, Section 2.3.2. 
13 UK Drug Trafficking Offences Act (1986). United States Money Laundering Control Act (1986). See 1.1 infl-a, Chapter Two, Sections 3.2. and 3.3. 
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Convention 1988) was adopted. " Without actually using the term "laundering" the 
Convention defined a very broad offence of handling the proceeds of drug trafficking 
in any conceivable manner and imposed on State Parties a duty to crimInallse this 
conduct. The Convention's definition continues to be the paradigmatic definition of 
the offence of money laundering. At around the same time, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision" issued a Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal 
Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering. " While the Vienna 
Convention intemationalised the penal aspects of money laundering, this instrument 
has intemationalised the principles of financial regulations against the use of the 
financial sector for money laundering. 
By the end of the 1980s, a core consensus started to form amongst countries in 
North America, Western Europe and a few other countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand. Money laundering of large sums of criminal money through the channels of 
global financial markets was viewed as a serious threat that needed to be stamped out 
through collective effort. The basic components of this effort, as defined in the penal 
provisions of the Vienna Convention and the preliminary regulatory recommendations 
of the Basel Committee, were now becoming a matter of common agreement. In 
1989, money laundering law entered a third phase, the phase of suprallationalisation. 
The Group of Seven established a Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The purpose 
of the FATF was to develop and co-ordinate the efforts to counter money laundering. 
This ad hoc informal inter- governmental body was later on to become the institutional 
centre of a global supranational legal regime. During its relatively short life, this 
international body has succeeded in placing money laundering as a priority item on 
the policy agendas of all the leading international financial institutions including the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. The FATF, in fact, was to become a part of a 
transnational financial regulatory system co-ordinated by the Financial Stability 
14 28 ILM 493 (1989). 
15 it is committee of central bank Governors of the Group of Ten established at the end of 1974. Its 
membership include central bank governors and representatives of the prudential supervisory 
authorities of the following countries: Belgium, Canada, France. Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg. 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
Committee issues non-binding principles and standards and it does not have supranational supervisory 
authority. See The Basel Committee, "About Basel Committee" at www. bis. org. 
16 The Basel Committee, The Basel Committee-Compendium of Documents, Chapter 111, Vol. I (May 
200 1) available at \\,, \\ \\. [)is. qrLý. (Last Visited on February 12,2002). See infra, Chapter Two, Section 
3.4. 
II 
Forum. " Using methods of inducement and coercion (i. e., "carrot and stick"), this 
regime has catalysed the incorporation of money laundering laws and regulations in 
the statute books in many jurisdictions around the world. 
On II September 2001, money laundering law appears to have entered a new 
phase. In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States, money laundering law 
was called upon to provide an apparatus to control terrorist financing. The novelty 
does not lie in the extension of the subject-matter. It lies instead in the impact of the 
particular nature of terrorism, as a violent threat to peace and security, on the 
principle-based and due process limitations to money laundering law. In terms of due 
process and legal principles, money laundering law has always been a challenge. 
September 11 events take this challenge a step further. " 
2. "The Fall of Principle"? 
No degree of rationality could have quieted the hearts of some scholars who perceived 
money laundering law as a threat to a number of the basic and cherished principles of 
criminal justice and constitutional law. One prominent criminologist entitled his 
commentary on the Australian Proceeds of Critne Act (1987) "The Proceeds of Crime 
Act: The Rise of Money Laundering Offences and the Fall of Principle. "" In his 
analysis, the Proceeds of Crime Act and its set of money laundering offences 
constituted "a new despotism in Commonwealth criminal law. "" He described the 
trend embodied in the Act as "regrettable" and as one that is marked by "a totalitarian 
bent. "" These proclamations, while not necessarily an accurate description of the 
practice under money laundering law, are useful in giving an immediate impression of 
the degree of its particularity as a body of law in the perception of some legal 
scholars. 
The number of basic legal principles challenged, to varying degrees under 
different jurisdictions, by the offences of money laundering is large. This is 
particularly disquieting in view of the fundamental character of these principles. The 
17 Giovanoli, M., "A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects of International 
Financial Standard Setting", in Giovanoli, M. (ed. ), International Monetaq Law: Issuesfor the New 
A, fillenniunz 3 (2000). 
" Norton, J., and Shams, H., "Money Laundering Law and Terrorist Financing: Post-September II 
Responses-Let Us Step Back and Take a Deep Breath", Int. Law. (Forthcoming, Spring 2002). 
19 Brent Fisse, "The Proceeds of Crime Act: The Rise of Money Laundering Offences and the Fall of 
Principle", 13 Crim. L. J. 5 (1989). 
20 Id., at 5. 
21 Id., at 23. 
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list of concerns is long and it includes, but not limited to, such basic principles as the 
principle of legality, the presumption of innocence, the immunity against double 
j. eopardy, and the right to privacy. The challenges imposed by money laundering law 
has either been direct, through the substantive characteristics and definitions of the 
offences, or indirect through the loosening of due process requirements as the 
safeguards that guarantee the principles. 
One of the dictates of the principle of legality is that there is no crime or 
punishment without law. This aspect of the principle is highlighted in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that: "No one shall be held 
guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it 
was committed. "" Article 7(l) of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), establishes the same principle 
using identical wording. " This principle is one of fairness. Criminal law poses a 
substantial threat to the basic rights and liberties of individuals and fairness requires 
that individuals should be sufficiently informed of the law and warned of its precepts 
before they can suffer loss of basic rights for contravening it. " A corollary of the 
principle of legality is the need for maximum certainty in the definition of crimes and 
penalties. Absent such certainty, sufficient warning of the law cannot be achieved. " 
The definition of money laundering offences leaves much to be desired in 
terms of the requirements of certainty. The actits reus of money laundering as defined 
in the Vienna Convention (1988) is particularly crafted to encompass any possible 
transaction involving criminal proceeds. Similar approaches are adopted in national 
laws. The vagueness of money laundering offences is inherent in the fact that such 
offences aim at capturing activities that are ordinary and commercial in nature. The 
illegality of the act, therefore, hinges entirely on the purpose of the Act and on the 
mens rea of the accused. One commentator has characterised this as a shift in criminal 
legal policy away from the objective dangerousness of the act to the personal 
22 The International Covenant on Civil and political Rights, 999 U. N. T. S. 171 (entered into force 233 
May 1976), art. 15. 
23 ETS No. 005 (entered into force 3 September, 1953). 
2" Ashworth. A., Principles of Critninal Law (3 rd ed., 1999), at 70. On the importance of the principle of 
legality in the context of criminal justice see Allen, F., The Habits of Leguality: Crinzinal Justice and the 
Rule of Law (1996), at 5-6. 
rd " Ashworth, A., Principles of Critninal Law Q ed., 1999), at 76-78; Emmerson B., and Ashworth, A., 
Hianan Rigghts and Critninal Justice (200 1), at paras. 10-0 1 et seq. 
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dangerousness of the person. " The vagueness of these offences is reflected in the 
number of challenges, albeit unsuccessful, to the constitutionality of the U. S. Money 
Laundering Act as "void for vagueness. " 27 
The presuniption of innocence is another traditional cornerstone of modem 
criminal justice systems. " This presumption means that "a person should be presumed 
innocent unless and until proved guilty[. ]"" This principle is a procedural safeguard of 
fairness and its basis lies in the coercive nature of criminal law and the need to protect 
the accused against the extensive power of the state. " This principle is translated into 
the procedural requirement that the onus of proving the offence lies on the prosecutor. 
This principle of criminal justice, however, has suffered substantial erosion in recent 
years. One study of the presumption under English law has found that 40% of the 
most serious offences under English law appear to place the burden of proof on the 
defendant, thus violating the presumption. " Money laundering law represents an 
alarming evidence of this trend. 
Money laundering is a derivative offence in the sense that its harm is derived 
from the harm of the "predicate offence" that generated the money involved in it. 
Money laundering in essence is not but an after-the-fact act of complicity in a 
previous criminal conduct. In view of the breadth with which it is defined, the 
boundaries between money laundering and the predicate offence are not clear-cut. 
Inasmuch as a person could be prosecuted for laundering the proceeds of one's own 
criminal activity, the prosecution authorities could use money laundering as a 
"surrogate offence. "" This means that the vagueness of the boundaries between 
money laundering and the predicate criminal conduct gives the prosecution the 
discretion to prosecute for money laundering when the prosecution for the predicate 
offence is less likely to succeed because of lack or inadmissibility of evidence. In the 
former case, money laundering law becomes a blatant breach of the presumption of 
innocence and in the latter it becomes a way to circumvent the procedural 
26 Abrams, N., "The New Ancillary Offenses", I Criminal Law Forum 1 (1989), at 7. 
27 U. S. v. Monaco 194 F. 3d 381 (1999); U. S. v. McLamb 985 F. 2d 1284 (1993); U. S. v. Kaufmann 985 
F. 2d 884 (1993); U. S. v. Jackson 983 F. 2d 757 (1993); U. S. v. Awan 966 F. 2d 1415. 
)8 
ý Art. 14 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that "everyone 
charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law. " Supra note 22. Similar principle is stated in Art. 6(2) of The European Convention 
on Human Rights, supra note 23. 
29 Ashworth, A., supra note 25, at 85. 
30 id. 
31 Id., at 86. 
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requirements of due process. The vagueness of the boundaries and the absence of 
restrictions on the prosecution of money laundering in concurrence with the predicate 
offence also pose a threat to the immunity against double jeopardy. U. S. case law 
testifies to the fact that this threat is far from theoretical. " 
Money laundering law further erodes the procedural safeguards of the right to 
privacy that are encompassed in the common restrictions on the police rights to search 
and seizure. The regulatory reporting requirements that are imposed on a growing 
category of business generate an immense personal amount of data to which 
enforcement authorities increasingly have ready access. " In the US Supreme Court 
case of California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, " these due process concerns were the basis 
for a challenge of the constitutionality of the BSA. The plaintiffs' main contention was 
that the Act and its implementing regulations violated the U. S. constitutional Fourth 
Amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable search and seizure. " The Court 
dismissed the challenge on the basis that "both the legislative history and the 
regulations make specific reference to the fact that access to the records is to be 
controlled by existing legal process. "" 
Justice Marshall, dissenting from the majority opinion, emphasised the 
vulnerability of this procedural safeguard when he stated: "This attempt to bifurcate 
the acquisition of information into two independent and unrelated steps is wholly 
unrealistic. As the Government itself conceded, 'banks have in the past voluntarily 
allowed law enforcement officials to inspect bank records without requiring issuance 
of a summons. ' [ ... ] The plain fact of the matter is that the Act's recordkeeping 
requirement feeds into a system of widespread informal access to bank srecords by 
Government agencies and law enforcement personnel. [... ] once recorded, [cutomer's] 
checks will be readily accessible without judicial process and without any showing of 
probable cause[. ]"" 
These are only selective examples of the threats to basic legal principles that 
are present in current money laundering legal regime and which cause some scholars 
great alan-n. Other rights as basic and as well -established in the operation of criminal 
justice have also raised concern. One example is the right to counsel. The breadth of 
32 Abrams, N., supra note 26, at 29 et seq. 
33 Seefor exaniple U. S. v. Conley 37 F. ed 970 (1994); U. S. v. Jackson 983 F. 2d 757 (1993); 
3' For more discussion on this point see infra Chapter Five, Section 3.4. 
35 39 L Ed 2d 812. 
36 Id., at 835. 
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the money laundering offence technically captures the conduct of a lawyer who 
receives a fee for defending a person charged of drug trafficking or any other criminal 
conduct that constitutes a predicate offence for the purpose of money laundering law. 
Absent statutory or judicial limitations or restrictive prosecutorial policy, such a 
conflict could constitute a serious obstacle to the defendant's exercise of the right to 
counsel. 
In the early days of money laundering laws, one might have hoped that stricter 
judicial interpretation and discriminate prosecutorial policy would tame money 
laundering law and reconcile it with the dictates of principle. The practice has not 
always met these expectations with substantial variations amongst different 
jurisdictions in this regard. The events of "September 11" further undermine the 
attempts at reconciliation: in this sense money laundering law has entered a new 
phase. Whatever timidity the implementation of money laundering law has displayed 
prior to these events now seems to be eroding.. 
The questions that this substantial deviation from principle combined with the 
near sudden birth of money laundering law compels the observer to ask are why did 
money laundering law emerge with such force and why does it possess such 
exceptional deviational features? 
3. The Roots of Change 
The speed with which money laundering law has emerged and spread and the 
exceptionality that characterises its arrangements leads one to examine the context in 
which the process of evolution has taken place. At the same time that money 
laundering law was taking shape, a number of other phenomena could be observed. 
Instantaneous communication was becoming a household facility for many. Financial 
services were being transformed by these new developments in information 
technology. Money "as information" was beginning to move instantaneously and in 
bulks around the globe. Categories of private actors that possessed unprecedented 
infon-national and economic power were rising. These categories included both 
legitimate enterprises and criminal enterprises among others such as non- 
governmental organisations, multinational corporations and organised criminal 
, groups. D 
31 Id., at 860-861. 
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As people became aware of these changes in their surrounding, another word 
gained currency. It became common to describe these signs of change as 
globalisation. Understanding this contextual change provides a good place to start the 
search for an understanding of money laundering law and its rationales, underlying 
policies, goals and boundaries. Achieving the type of understanding that provides an 
explanation for changes in legal institutions requires answering a number of 
questions, such as: What is globalisation? Why did it happen? How did it happen? 
When did it start? What is its extent? Is it reversible? And how does it intervene with 
and impact the money laundering legal regime? 
"Globalisation" is a multi-disciplinary subject. " A number of disciplines have 
taken serious academic interest in the subject. These included Sociology, " 
International Relations, " EconomicS, 4' Political Geography" and Communication 
Studies . 
4' The term globalisation has been used synonymously with other existing 
concepts such as liberalisation, intemationalisation, homogenisation, interdependence, 
or transnationalisation. There are common elements amongst these various concepts. 
Globalisation, however, remains distinct both as a concept and as an analytical tool. 
Close analysis of "globalisation" reveals that as a term it is used to denote two 
characteristics of the present social context either simultaneously or interchangeably. 
The first feature that this term describes is geographic in nature. It refers to the de- 
territorial nature of present social and economic interactions. The second feature is 
political. It describes the retreat of the State vis-ci-vis other actors in society. 
Therefore, references to globalisation are often geographic referring to the increase in 
cross border activities. They are also not infrequently political. The use of the 
adjective "global" to describe a certain activity frequently denotes that this activity 
38 See infra Chapter Three, Section 2.1. 
39 See Waters, M., Globalization (1995); Robertson, R., Globalization: Social Theol-y and Global 
Culture (1992); Giddens, A., The Consequences ofModernity (199 1); Featherstone, M. (ed. ), Global 
Culture: Nationalisn7, Globalization, and Modernity: A Theory, Culture &Society (1990). 
40 See Scholte, J., Globalization. - A Critical Introduction (2000); Baylis, J., and Smith, S. (eds. ), The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (1997); Rosenau, J., 
Turbulance in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (1990). 
41 See Retch, R., The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves For 21st Century Capitalisin (1991); Hirst. 
P., and Thompson, G., Globalization in Question: The International Econoiny and The Possibilities of 
Governance (1996). 
42 Harvey, D., The Condition of Postinodernit - y: 
An Enquhy Into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(1990); Harvey, D., Spaces ofHope (2000). 
43 McLuhan, M., Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964)-, Ferguson, M., "Electronic 
Media and the Redefining of Time and Space" in Ferguson, M. (ed. ), Public Conzinunication: The New 
linperatives: Future Directionsfor Media Research (1990); Ferguson, M., "The Mythology of 
Globalization", 7 Eur. J. Comm. 69 (1992). 
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involves non-state actors. One can therefore define globalisation as a process of social 
change of both geographic and political dimensions. In the geographic sense 
globalisation describes compression in the space within which we conduct our social 
relations and a growing consciousness of this compression. In the political sense, 
globalisation denotes a shift in the balance of power and the pre-eminence of actors 
away from the state and in favour of non-state actors. 44 
The primary causes of this profound change in the social context are, to a large 
extent, technological. Telecommunication and infori-nation technologies have had two 
effects that were of crucial significanc. e for the materialisation of globalisation. First, 
instantaneous telecommunication technologies, such as the telephone and the Internet 
have developed so rapidly and became cheaper. The impact of their availability to an 
increasing number of people is the elimination of distance to the extent that it is 
measured by time. The total effect of this is a sense of the compression of the space 
within which we conduct our social activities. Second, the unprecedented 
technological capacity to store infori-nation and the growing availability of this 
capacity to individuals and private parties have empowered private actors in 
disproportion to the state. According to this analysis, information technology was 
instrumental to both the political and the geographic dimensions of global isati on. " 
Without rational regulatory intervention, technological innovation could not 
have brought globalisation about. Several regulatory policies were instrumental to the 
process of globalisation. These include standardisation, liberalisation, de-regulation 
I and privatisation. Standardisation was a preconditlon for the effectiveness of 
technology. " Variations in earlier national telegraphic systems have resulted in 
situations whereby the telegraph operator had to physically cross the border in order 
to deliver a message to the telegraph operator on the other side of the border. " Global 
technological trends have systematically bred regulatory standardisation. 
The roles of libralisation and privatisation were equally important. " While 
liberalisation, as the removal of regulatory barriers to the movement of goods and 
services across borders, affects directly the geographic aspect of globalisation, 
privatisation bears directly on its political one. Extensive privatisation programmes 
44 See infi-a, Chapter Three, Section 2.2. 
45 See infi-a, Chapter Three, Section 3.1. 
" See infra, Chapter Three, Section 3.2.2. 
47 Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P., Global Business Reggidation 332 (2000). 
" See infi-a, Chapter Three, Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. 
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that were implemented by some countries around the world in the 1980s and the 
1990s have resulted in massive transfer of property to the private sector. Depending 
on the extensiveness of the privatisation programme, any large-scale transfer of 
property is bound to result in a shift in the balance of power in favour of the 
transferee, in this case the private sector. 
4. Theme and Structure 
The relationship between globalisation and money laundering is widely acknowledged 
by writers in this field. Globalisation, in this context, is typically understood as the 
liberalisation of financial markets and the instantaneous movement of capital flows 
across borders. The discussion of the relationship between money laundering and 
globalisation stops at the immediate link between this integration of financial markets 
and the sophistication of money laundering operations as well as the link between this 
sophistication and law enforcement efforts. The cursory nature of this analysis fails to 
show, in a systematic way, how money laundering law purports to address these 
difficulties that are created by globlisation. In fact, it fails to show the definitive 
causal link between money laundering law and globalisation and the implications of 
this link for defining the boundaries of money laundering law. 
This volume argues that money laundering law is a specific response to the 
governance vacuum that globalisation creates as it manifests in the area of crime 
control. Globalisation creates both a geographic and a political mismatch between the 
State as the primary agency of governance and the activities that it purports to control 
and regulate. While the State is territorial in nature, social activities including their 
criminal forms are becoming increasingly transnational. Also, private actors including 
criminal organisations are gaining immense informational and economic powers, 
while the State is losing its relative power pre-imminence. Money laundering law, as 
this volume argues, deals with the challenge of criminal law enforcement against 
powerful and transnational criminals as one manifestation of the governance crisis. In 
order to re-enforce order, money laundering law employs a number of "modalities": 
de-globalisation, extraterritorialisation, harmonisation, co-operation, privatisation 
and supranationalisation. 
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These modalities, the study will reveal, are not unique to money laundering 
law but are equally used in other spheres of global governance. The resulting order is 
one that pursues effectiveness and in this pursuit tends towards informality, relaxes the 
hold of traditional principles, suffers an accountability deficit and fuses the public and 
private spheres. Innovative legal and policy approaches are required to redress the 
balance between the effectiveness of governance and its fundamental legal principles. 
Chapters Two and Three of this volume aim to conduct a policy analysis of 
money laundering. The analysis starts in Chapter Two, which conducts a systematic 
analysis of the evolution of money laundering law and its main instruments. This 
analysis seeks to introduce the reader to the notions of money laundering law as it 
provides a thematic account of its evolution. This historical account is followed by an 
evaluation of the scope of money laundering law as, it is reflected in the definition of 
the harm that it seeks to curb. This discussion reveals that there are discrepancies 
between the scope of the law as it should be defined according to the legislative 
history of the various instruments and its scope as defined in the legislative instrument 
and reflected in implementation and enforcement policy. Generally speaking, money 
laundering law has been applied to categories of actions that depart starkly from those 
that triggered legislative intervention. Resolving these discrepancies and tackling the 
problems of over-breadth requires a clear understanding of the functions that the law 
seeks to serve. This can only be achieved by an understanding of the context in which 
money laundering law has evolved and the relationship between money laundering 
law and its context. Chapter Three is dedicated to this task. It argues that money 
laundering law occurred as a response to globalisation and sets out to establish a 
coherent understanding of globalisation as a social process. It will also explain the 
ways in which globalisation represents a problem for legal order. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six explain critically how money laundering law 
purports to respond to the legal problematic of globalisation. The response is 
categorised into the six modalities referred to above. Chapter Four deals with de- 
globalisation, extraterritorial i sation , 
harmonisation and co-operation as state-oriented 
modalities. The common element in these modalities is their focus in resolving the 
governance crisis on strengthenin the State as opposed to searching for another 9 
governance agency. Chapter Five and Six, on the other hand, will focus on the use of 
other agencies including private actors and supranational organisations and bodies to 
solve the problem. The analysis of the response in terms of specific set of modalities 
-ý 0 
serves to provide a framework for evaluating this form of legal governance 
systematically by reference to general principles. These modalities also serve to 
conceptualise the nature of the departure from traditional state-based forrns of legal 
governance. 
The discussion of each of the modalities in Chapters Four, Five and Six are not 
restricted to their utilisation within money laundering law. Instead, an overview of the 
use of the modalities in other areas of the law precedes the discussion in the context of 
money laundering law. An analysis that is narrowly focused on money laundering law 
was judged by the author to be limited and to an extent distortive, in that it might 
suggest that the modalities are unique to money laundering law. This broader view 
perrnits reaching conclusions that may be generalised to apply to the emerging 
structure of global governance. 
Chapter Seven concludes by drawing on the analysis of the previous Chapters 
highlights the trends that seem to be manifest in the current model of global 
governance, emphasises the challenges and suggests some direction for the future. 
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1. Introduction 
In the early 1970s, "money laundering" as a concept came into being. During the 
following three decades an elaborate legal regime of very particular characteristics has 
developed with the explicit aim of controlling, preventing and penalising money 
laundering in all its forms. First in the United States and later on elsewhere, 
goverru-nents became aware of the growing financial power of criminal organisations. Cý 
In an attempt to curb this power, penal policies shifted towards the emphasis on 
removing profit out of crime. In their pursuit to achieve that aim through forfeiture 
and confiscation laws, governments faced the challenge of the cross border character 
of criminal activities and the cross border character of criminal money flows. 
In response to the challenge of criminal money transfers, "money laundering" as 
an activity acquired its independent criminal status and an elaborate set of rules were 
developed to control it, to prevent it and to penalise it. For the purpose of the 
following discussion, one can here accept as a working definition that money 
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laundering means "the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal 
origin. "I 
This Chapter is concerned with a discussion of the history and scope of money 
laundering law. This historical expose is essential for the contextual analysis in 
subsequent chapters. Its purpose is to introduce the reader to the notions and elements 
of money laundering law as it thematically shows how the money laundering legal 
order has rapidly developed in the span of three decades. This historical account will 
also serve as a summary of the policy discussions that have shaped the main legal 
instruments of money laundering law. Building on this legislative history, a final 
section will be dedicated to the discussion of the scope of money laundering law in 
terms of the hann it seeks to prevent, as this is envisioned in the policy discussions, 
explicit policy definitions, legal definition and implementation approaches. On the 
basis of this analysis, it will be argued that the boundaries of money laundering law 
are poorly defined and that there are core discrepancies at the various policy levels. 
As will gradually become apparent in this Chapter and volume, money-laundering 
law is a complex and a very legal regime. Mapping its history can be an elusive 
process. The brief account presented in this Chapter, therefore, will focus on 
deciphering the trends and highlighting crucial legal developments rather than on 
comprehensive chronicling. 
The evolution of money laundering law can be neatly organised in four phases. 
The First Phase starts with the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act in the U. S. in 1970. 
This is a phase of incipience when money laundering as a term had not yet entered the 
legal lexicon and the system that was later on to grow into great complexity and to 
spread worldwide was still taking its initial form. The Second Phase was one of 
criminalisation and internationalisation. It starts in 1980 with a reconunendation on 
the matter of money laundering issued by the European Commission. The Third Phase 
starts with the formation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) by the G7 in 
1989. This phase, as will be argued in this Chapter, have transformed the money 
laundering legal regime into a supranational one and expanded it both geographically 
and in tenns of its subject-matter. The Fourth Phase is an unfolding one that started 
abruptly with the 11 th of September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New 
FATF, Basic Facts about Money Laundering, available at kywNx. oecd. orý, Y/fat (Last visited 9 May 
2002). 
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York City. 2 At this stage the money laundering legal regime that has been growing in 
detail over the past three phases has been put into full play. As a system that was 
developed in peacetime, it so alarmingly proved most fitted to address the 
exceptionality of war. This indirectly confirms the potential of money laundering law 
as a tool of an efficient rather thanprincipled legal order. 
2. The Early Signs of Money Laundering Law in the 1970s 
Searching for the term "money laundering" in the legal documents of the 1970s, II 
whether primary or secondary, would render no results. The term "money laundering" 
had to wait for another decade before entering the legal language and becoming 
accepted as a ten-n of art. The use of the word laundering in that sense in common 
parlance was, however, a development of the 1970s. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, this use of the word launder to mean "to transfer funds of dubious or 
illegal origin, usu[ally], to a foreign country, and then later to recover them from what 
seem to be 'clean' (i. e., legitimate) sources" emerged out of the "Watergate" inquiry in 
3 the United States in 1973-4. The Dictionary refers to the Guardian's reporting of the 
4 
scandal as the earliest evidence of the term "laundering" in the press. 
Money laundering law started predominantly at a domestic level. The earliest 
legal development took place in the U. S. when what is conu-nonly known as the Bank 
Secrecy Act was passed on Oct 26,1970. The Federal Act was regulatory in nature, 
and in hindsight could be described as geared towards preventing money laundering 
rather than controlling or repressing it. Seven years later, a similar development, albeit 
a private one, took place in Switzerland when the Swiss banks, the Swiss Union of 
Banks and the Swiss National Bank signed the "Agreement on the Observance of 
Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice of Banking Secrecy. " Each 
of these legal initiatives was highly influential in shaping the future of money 
laundering law. The concepts and the mechanisms that were introduced in these two 
initiatives continue to form part of money laundering law through today. It is for this 
2 On II September 2001, four American civilian aeroplanes were hijacked. Two of the hijacked 
aeroplanes were crashed deliberately into the World Trade Centre at the heart of the financial district of 
New York City. To the shock of the entire world, the crash resulted in the collapse of the monumental 
twin towers and the loss of thousands of lives. The third aircraft targeted and hit the Pentagon while the 
fourth crashed in an open plane in Pennsylvania as a result of its passengers' resistance. 
3 The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VIII (2 nd ed., 1989) at 702. For brief summary of this scandal 
and its relevance to money laundering see szipra Chapter One footnote 3 and accompanying text. ID 
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reason that they merit attending to in some detail in this historical overview. This will 
be followed by a discussion of I'mited but in 1 relevant developments at the i ternational 
level. 
2.1. The U. S. Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) 1970 
The U. S. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 represents the first legislative sign of the meeting 
of minds between the various member agencies of the law enforcement community 
that is characteristic of the money laundering legal regime as we know it today. 
During a period of extensive hearings before the Committee on Banking and It) It) 
Currency, law enforcement agencies including: "the Justice department, the United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the Treasury Department, the 
Internal Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Defense 
Department and the Agency for International Development"' submitted concurring 
testimonies in support of a law imposing certain record-keeping and reporting 4- 
requirements on the financial community. 
During these hearings, the U. S. Congress was presented with a number of 
problems relating to the enforcement of the United States criminal, tax and regulatory 
laws. First, law enforcement agencies argued, to the conviction of the Congress, that 
the growth of financial institutions during the 1960s had been accompanied by ail 
increase in their use by a wide range of criminals including petty criminals, white- 
collar criminals and tax evaders. ' Second, while this meant that crime prevention had 
become more dependent on good financial record-keeping, banks' record-keeping 
practices had become more lax and many such procedures had been abolished or 
limited. ' Third, there had been an increasing use by American citizens and residents of 
foreign financial facilities located in "secrecy jurisdiction" for the purpose of 
frustrating the enforcement of U. S. law. 
On basis of these findings, the Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act, which 
imposed record-keeping and reporting requirements on a wide range of financial 
institutions for the explicit purpose of maintaining and providing evidence that has "a 
4 On April 19,1973 the Guardian reported "Suitcases stuffed with 200,000 dollars of Republican 
campaign ftinds; money being 'laundered' in Mexico. " The Oxford English Dictionary, Id. I- H. R. Rep. No. 91-975,9 1" Congress, 2 nd Session (1970) as reprinted in U. S. Code Cong. & Adnuin. 
News, Vol. 2,4394 (1970), at 4-3397. 
6 
Id. 4395. 
7 Id 
. 
43395-4396. 
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high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax and regulatory investigations and 
proceedings. "' 
Record Keeping Requirements: 
One of the Act's most enduring and now universally accepted requirements is 
the "Know Your Customer" provision, which required financial institutions to 
maintain records of the identity of each individual account holder at the bank as well 
as each individual authorised to use the account. Financial institutions are also 
required to keep a record of the identity of any individual who engages in any 
transaction that is required to be recorded or reported under the Act. ' 
Title I of the Act further required financial institutions to keep a copy of each 
cheque, draft or similar instrument drawn on the bank. The bank must also keep a 
record of any such instrument when it is submitted to it for deposit or collection. In 
the latter case the bank is not required to keep a copy of the instrument. The 
implementing regulations were amended in 1973 limiting the copying requirement to 
cheques in excess of $ 100. " 
The record-keeping requirements of the Act were supported by civil and 
criminal penalties. " It is an aggravating factor to wilfully violate the requirements of 
the Act in furtherance of a Federal felony. This factor raises the offence from a 
misdeameanour to a felony punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years or 
a fine not more than $ 109 000 or both. 12 
Reporting Requirements 
According to Chapter 2 of Title II of the Act and its implementing regulations, It:, 
financial institutions are required to report any domestic transaction involving any 
payTnent or transfer in currency of more than $10,000. " This is probably the most 
well known provision of the Act. While this approach to reporting remains one of the 
' Bank Records and Foreign Transactions, Pub. L. 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114 (hereinafter, The Bank 
Secrecy Act, 1970), §§ 10 1& 202. 
9 Id., § 10 1. Note, however, that the actual formulation of the KYC regulations has been problematic 
and approaches varied in different countries. 
10 31 CFR § 103.34 (b) (3) as amended, 37 Fed. Reg 23114 (1972), 38 Fed. Reg 2174 (1973), cited ill 
The California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 39 L Ed. 2d 812 (1974) footnote 5. 
11 The Bank Secrecy Act (1970), supra iiote8, §101. 
12 id. 
13 Id., §221; 31 CFR §1033.22, cited ill The Califorma Bankers Association v. Shultz, supra note 10. 
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alternative approaches available under the current money laundering prevention 
regime, it is not widely accepted. 
Chapter 3 of Title II requires persons to report transportation of monetary 
instruments into or out of the United States, or the of such instruments in the United 
States from places outside the United States, if either involves instruments of a value 
in excess of $5000.14 
Finally, Chapter 4 of Title II requires United States cItIzens, res, Idents and 
others who are conducting business within the United States to file reports of their 
relationships with foreign financial institutions. 15 This provision, as the legislative 
history indicates, was a direct response to the frustration of tax enforcement officers 
by the use of affluent persons of financial facilities in bank secrecy jurisdictions to 
keep their assets beyond the reach of United States tax enforcement. In the hearings 
before the House Committee in connection with this provision, "the former U. S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York has characterized the secret foreign 
bank account as the largest single loophole permitted by American Law. " " 
Response and Controversy 
The requirements and the novelty of the BSA proved too difficult to accept 
without challenge. " In June 1972 various plaintiffs including: several bank customers, 
the Security National Bank, the California Bankers Association and the American 
Civil Liberties Union brought a case to the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California challenging the constitutionality of the BSA. One of 
the results of this challenge was that the reporting provisions of Title II of the act were 
subject to a "temporary restraining order" by the District Court which enjoined their 
enforcement. It was not until the final decision of the Supreme Court in April 1974, 
upholding the constitutionality of the Act in its entirety, that the Act enjoyed full 
enforcement. 
14 
Bank Secrecy Act (1970), supi-a note 8, §23 ) 1. 
15 
Id., §241. 
16 H. R. Rep. No. 91-975, supra note 5, at 4398. 
17 See California Bankers Association iý. Shultz, sup; -a note 10, especially dissenting opinions 851-862; 
See also Case Comment, "Recordkeepin2t; and reportmig Requirments of the Bank Secrecy Act", 88 
Hai-vai-d Law Review 188 (Nov. 1974). 
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Two features of the Act proved particularly controversial. First, the Act 
represents in both its record-keeping and reporting requirements an extensive 
delegation of power from the Congress to the executive. According to §101, the 
Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to prescribe regulations requiring the 
maintenance of appropriate type of records where the Secretary detennines that they 
have a "high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, or regulatory investigation. "" The 
Act also delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to determine the time, 
the manner and the detail in which currency transactions are to be reported under 
§221. " These are only two examples of the extensive delegation of power 
characteristic of the BSA. In the California Bankers Association v. Shultz, Justice 
Douglas indicated in a dissenting opinion that "This legislation is symptomatic of the 
slow eclipse of Congress by the mounting Executive power. " 2' He further argued that 
because of the potential implications of the BSA to the constitutional rights of the 
citizenry, the provisions of the BSA exceed the Congress'power of delegation. 21 
Second, the record-keeping and reporting requirements give the government a 
sweeping access to private information and transforms the role of financial institutions 
into government agents. This aspect of the Act has raised great controversy. It has 
been argued by a number of plaintiffs in California Bankers Association v. Shultz that 
compulsory record-keeping and reporting by financial institutions amounts to search 
and seizure and lacks the procedural safeguards mandated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 22 The plaintiffs, dissenting judges and 
commentators on the case were particularly disturbed by the absence of any obligation 
on the recording institution to infon-n the customer of any government request for 
information. In view of the amount of private information that a study of a person's 
financial transactions can reveal, this sweeping and unregulated search and seizure 
was feared and argued to be profoundly detrimental to the constitutional privacy 
rights of the citizens. 23 
18 The Bank Secrecy Act (1970), supra note 8, § 10 1. 
19 Id., §22 1. 
20 California Bankers Association v. Shultz, supra note 10, at 857. 
21 Id., at 859. 
22 Id., For example at 829,836,836 and 840. 
See in particular Justice Douglas dissenting opinion. Id., at 851-857. 
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In sum, the BSA constitutes an important piece in the history of the money 
laundering legal regime. Some of the concepts and rationales, which were established 
in that legal instrument continue to apply and form the basis of anti-money laundering 
law as we understand it today. According to its legislative history, the Act was passed 
as a response to certain difficulties in criminal, fiscal and regulatory enforcement 
resulting from cross-border financial activities. The controversy surrounding the 
enactment and implementation of the BSA in its early days is extremely telling of the 
exceptional nature of this legal regime. We are increasingly taking for granted this 
exceptionality thirty years after the enactment of the Act. 
The U. S. Congress and the U. S. Supreme Court in passing this legislation and 
in upholding its constitutionality were particularly conscious of wider changes in the 
social context. The Supreme Court in arguing for the constitutionality of the Act 
against challenges of established constitutional principles said: "While an Act 
conferring such broad authority over transactions such as these might well surprise or 
even shock those who lived in an earlier era, the latter did not live to see the time 
when bank accounts would join chocolate, cheese, and watches as a symbol of the 
Swiss economy. Nor did they live to see the heavy utilization of our domestic banking 
system by minions of organized crime as by millions of legitimate businessmen. " 24 
2.2. The Swiss BanksAgreement on the Observance of Care (1977) 
While this reputation of the Swiss financial sector was viewed with appreciation by its 
growing and often foreign clientele, other countries viewed it with suspicion. 
Countries, whose law enforcement efforts came repeatedly crashing against the Swiss 
financial secrecy walls, had grown in resentment during the 1960s and 1970s. It was, 
however, the embarrassment resulting from the "Chiasso Affair" that finally prompted 
25 
a Swiss reaction. In 1977 , it was revealed that the 
director of the Chiasso, Tessin 
branch of Credit Suisse had abused his capacity by accepting over 2.2 billion Swiss 
francs constituting the proceeds of violation of Italian currency restrictions and 
reinvested them through a Liechtenstein finance company. 26 
'4 
Id., 823. 
25 Giovanoli, M., "Switzerland", in Cranston, R (ed. ) Etiropean Bmiking Law. - The Banker-CLIStomer 
Relationship 183, (1993) at 189; Peters, R., "Money Laundering and its Current Status in Switzerland: 
New Disincentives for Financial Tourism", II Noi-thwestei-n Joumal of Intei-national Law mid 
Business 104,105 (Spring 1990). 
26 
Peters, R., id., at Footnote 3. 
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In a private self-regulatory response, all the banks in Switzerland entered into 
an "Agreement on the Observance of Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and on 
the Practice of Banking Secrecy. "2' The original objective of the agreement was "to 
ensure the careful clarification of the identity of bank customers and to prevent that 
transactions contrary to the Agreement are made possible or facilitated through an 
abuse of the right to banking secrecy. 112' The agreement's primary achievement was 
imposing upon banks the duty to identify their customers and the beneficial owners of 
assets deposited with them. The impact of this obligation was effectively to outlaw 
anonymous bank accounts. 29 
The first version of the agreement was understandably rigorous in attempting 
to stamp out any symbiosis between the Swiss financial sector and the under-world as 
to dubious and criminal funds, however, later amendments in 1982,1987 and 1992 
diluted significantly this rigour. " The objective of the agreement was redrafted in the 
more neutral terms of "confirming, defining and laying down in a binding way the 
established r-ules of good conduct in bank management. "" The revised versions of the 
Agreement, until 1992, deliberately left out obligations such as investigating the 
origin of funds, or refraining from entering into transactions involving criminally 
derived funds. 32 
The significance of the 1977 Agreement, however, should not be 
underestimated. Similar self-regulatory instruments continue to bind Swiss banks up 
until today and some of the obligations that were first established in this agreement 
eventually found their way into Swiss law. " In 1982, the Swiss Supreme Court 
confirmed that the requirement to identify the economic origin of funds, which was 
originally established in the agreement, has become part of Swiss law. " 
27 Sansonetti, R., "Money Laundering: An International Perspective from Switzerland", in Rider, B., 
and Ashe, M., Money Laundering Control 251 (1996), 265-267. The author characterises the agreement 
as a "private law agreement which also indirectly protects the public interest", id at 265. 28 Id., at 111. 
29Glovanoll, M., supra note 25; Peters, R., id., 112-120. 
30 Stessen, G., Money Laundering. - A New International Law Enforcement Model (2000), at 10 1. 
3131 Peters, R., supra note 25, at 112. Note that in the 1998 version of the Agreement, fighting money 
laundering was stated in the preamble as one of the objectives of the Code. Agreement on the Swiss 
Banks' Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise of Due Diligence (January 28,1998), available at 
the Swiss Bankers Association's website wwA,. swissbank-injý),. orQ/en/liome, /alljemein. htm (last visited 
January 10,2002). (Hereineafter, CDB) 
32 Stessen, G., supra note 30, at 101. 
33 See CDB, supra note 3 1. This private regulation has inspired subsequent criminalisation of money 
laundering. Sansonnetti, R., supra note 27, at 265. 
34 si wiss Supreme Court AFT 109 lb 146 (1982), cited in Stessen, G., Supra note 30, at 102-103. 
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2.3. Relevant International Legal Development 
2.3.1. Overview 
A depiction of the early signs of the money laundering legal regime is not complete 
without addressing the 1970s developments in inter-state co-operation in penal 
matters, particularly in its more recent modality of mutual legal assistance. 35 In 1973, 
the United States and Switzerland signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) 
thus bringing to a fruitful end four years of strenuous negotiations. " So far, as in the 
case of the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(195 9), 37 mutual legal assistance was confined to arrangements between countries 
sharing both common legal tradition and geographic proximity. The U. S. - Switzerland 
MLAT marked an obvious departure from both these features of earlier arrano'ements. 
This MLAT was particularly significant in that it was the first such legal arrangement 
to be concluded between a country belonging to the civil law tradition and another 
belonging to the common law tradition. In this regard, its negotiations were described 
by one commentator as "a fascinating exercise in comparative law. '13' The geographic 
disparity between the two parties to the treaty is also a blatant example of the growing 
complexity of transantional criminality. 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties impose obligations on each party to the 
treaty to provide assistance to other parties in criminal investigations and 
proceedings. " This modality of inter-state co-operation in penal matters emerged as a 
direct response to the increasing cross-border character of criminal activities and the 
corollary problem of gathering evidence abroad. The purpose of this modality was to 
provide efficient and effective assistance in securing evidence that lies outside the 
territory of the investigating or prosecuting State. Efficiency is primarily achieved 
35The literature identifies six modalities for inter-state co-operation in penal matters: extradition, 
recognition of foreign penal judgements, transfer of penal proceedings, transfer of prisoners, mutual 
legal assistance in penal matters and seizure and forfeiture of the illicit proceeds of crime. Bassiouni, 
C., and Gualtieri, D., "International and National Responses to the Globalization of Money 
Laundering", in Savona, E. (ed. ), Responding to Money Laundering. - International Perspectives 107 
(1997), at 112. 
36 United States- Switzerland: Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 12 ILM 916 (1974). 
(herienafter, U. S. -Switzerland MLAT). 37 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Europ. T. S. No. 30 (1959). 
38 Nadelmann, E., "Negotiations in Crirninal Law Assistance Treaties", 33 The AnIericall Journal of 
Coinparative Lait, 467, at 474 (1985). 
39 Knapp, J., "Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy", 20 Case Western 
Resei-veJOIII-77al of International Laiv 405, at 405 (1988). 
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through establishing direct links between relevant central authorities thus 
circumventing the slow processes of diplomatic channels. Effectiveness, on the other 
hand, is facilitated by MLAT through their provisions on the authentication of 
documents and records and the supply of assistance in a manner that generates 
evidence admissible in the courts of the requesting State as a pre-condition for an 
effective prosecution. 
MLAT's provide for a number of forms of assistance in criminal matters. 
While such forms vary amongst instruments, they have been summarised to include: 
(1) executing requests relating to criminal matters; (2) taking testimony; (3) 
production and authentication of documents, records and articles of evidence; (4) 
serving judicial documents; (5) effecting the appearance of witnesses before the courts 
of the requesting State; (6) locating parties; and (7) effecting seizure and forfeiture of 
assets. This latter form of assistance is a feature of the more recent MLATs rather 
than the earlier ones. 40 
Because of the historical significance of the U. S. -Switzerland MLAT in the 
development of the money laundering legal regime, this treaty will be discussed in C; 
brief detail with a view to highlighting the aspects that are relevant to money 
laundering control. 
2.3.2. U. S. -Switzerland MLAT 1973 
41 
Mutual assistance in legal matters between the U. S. and Switzerland was proposed by 
the U. S. out of domestic concern over the use of the Swiss financial sector to hide 
assets from U. S. law enforcement. 42 The frustration of law enforcement agencies in 
the U. S. by the impact of the Swiss secrecy on their law enforcement efforts have 
triggered an agreement amongst officials in State, Justice and Treasury Departments 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission to formally seek mutual assistance 
4() Ellis, A., and Pisant, R., "The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: A 
Comparative Analysis", 19 International Lawyer 189, at 198 (1985). 
4tU. S. -Switzerland MLAT, supra note 36. For a thorough analysis of the negotiation of this treaty the 
excellent article by Nadelmann, E., supi-a 38. For a background and comparison to other U. S. MLATs 
see Ellis, A., and Pisant, R., supra note 40. For discussion of the Treaty with particular reference to its 
impact on Swiss bank secrecy laws see Knapp, J., supra note 39; and Field, B., "Improving 
International Evidence- Gatherin a Methods: Piercing Bank Secrecy Laws From Switzerland to the 
Caribbean and Beyond", 15 Loy-ola of Los Angeles International and Coinparative Law Journal 691, 
(1993). 
42 This was reflected in the legislative history of the Bank Secrecy Act 1970, which was discussed 
above. Supra Section 2.1. 
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arrangements with the 
SWiSS. 41 In other words, one may conclude in retrospect that the 
U. S. -Switzerland MLAT was a direct response to money laundering operations and an 
enforcement tool against it although the concept and the ten-n describing it had not yet 
publicly emerged at that stage. 
According to one commentator on the negotiations the objective of the 
Amencans in the negotiations was to create international legal obligations piercing the 
veil of secrecy created by the Swiss domestic law and facilitating the collection of 
evidence by American authorities. " In view of the fact that Swiss law allowed broad 
disclosure of infon-nation to Swiss investigative authorities, achieving the objectives 
of the negotiations hinged on securing a treaty obligation binding Switzerland to grant 
similar access to information to U. S. investigators. It is in those ten-ns that the 
"piercing of the veil of secrecy" took place. Paragraph I of art. 10 provides that "A 
Person whose testimony is requested under this Treaty shall be compelled to appear, 
testify and produce documents, records and articles of evidence in the same manner 
and to the same extent as in criminal investigations or proceedings in the requested 
State. "" Swiss negotiators remained jealous of the Swiss banking secrecy laws and 
this was reflected in various treaty provisions restricting access to financial 
information where such information pertains to an innocent third party. " 
There has been a meeting of minds amongst the parties to the Treaty with 
respect to the threat of organised crime. This common concern was reflected in the 
willingness of the Swiss to offer more assistance in this context and to impose fewer 
restraints on the rendering of such assistance. These concessions were incorporated in 
a separate Chapter entitled: "Special Provisions Concerning Organized Crime. " The 
most important concession made under this Chapter relates to assistance in 
investigations or proceedings involving violations of provisions on income taxes 
subject to certain stringent conditions. " This constitutes an exception to the general 
rule regarding the non-applicability of the Treaty to investigations or proceedings 
concerning tax violations. " 
43 Nadelmann, E., supra note 38, at 470. 
44 Id. at 472-4733. 
45 U. S. -Switzerland MLAT, supra note 
36. 
46 Seefor example, id., art. 10 paragraph 2, and art. 12 paragraph 2(d). 
47 Id., art. 7 Paragraph 2. 
48 Id., art. 2 paragraph Lc (5). 
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The Swiss Treaty was generally celebrated as a success. Throughout the 
history of the Treaty it has been used by both parties for the purpose of securing 
evidence in the other's territory. A ratio of three to one appears to be maintained in 
favour of the United States. " According to a U. S. government study published in 
January 1983, the evidence obtained under the Treaty during the first six years if its 
life has contributed to around 145 convictions at both federal and state levels. " 
These international developments have been significant. Later commentators 
on the MLATs and money laundering control have indicated that this modality of co- 
51 
operation is indispensable for curbing money laundering as a transnational crime. 
Further, it was in the context of these treaties that the early formulation of money 
laundering legal regime took shape. 
3. Criminalisation and Internationalisation in the 1980s: 
1. Overview 
It was in the 1980s that money laundering control and prevention acquired its 
distinctive form as a legal policy. It was also in the 1980s that legal instruments 
dealing with money laundering explicitly started proliferating. The developments in 
the 1980s were substantial and certain enduring trends in money laundering control 
and prevention began to be set. 
The first development to be noted in this period is the adoption of the term 
"money laundering" in legal language. According to a leading authority on the 
subject, " This particular development is pinned back to the 1982 court decision in US 
v. $4 255 625,39. '3 This was a case of "civil forfeiture" brought by the Government 
against two sums denominated in U. S. Dollars. The facts of the case involved the 
delivery of large sums of money from a money exchange business (Molina) in 
Colombia to another such business (Sonal) in Miami- Florida, which then deposited 
the sums into the company's bank account in Capital Bank in Miami. In deciding for 
the Government the court concluded that "Molina to Sonal to Capital Bank was, more 
49 Knapp, J., supra note 39, at 414. 
50 Id. at 415. 
51 On the use of MLAT to curb money laundering see Kriz, G., "International Co-operation to Combat 
Money Laundering: The Nature and Role of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties", CoInnionwealth Law 
Bulletin 723 (April, 1992). 
52 Gilmore, W., Dirty, Moiieýw The Evolution of Money Laundering Cowiter-measures, 23" (1995). 
53 US v. S4 255 625,39,551 F Supp. 314 (1982). 
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likely than not, a money laundering process[. ]"" The court used the term "laundering" 
repeatedly in its decision. Although the court did not explicitly defte the term, it 
could be seen from the wording and the context that the term has been used with a 
degree of precision and legal clarity regarding its connotation. 55 
Concern for money laundering since its early legislative inception in the 1970s 
has always been a cross-border one. When the United States enacted the BSA in 
1970s, the Congress was primarily concerned with financial assets held abroad and 
criminal proceeds roaming the interstate channels of commerce. It, therefore, is not 
surprising that the legal response to money laundering should soon become In 
international. The first truly international concern with the problem of money 
laundering emerged within the Council of Europe, which set in 1977 a Select 
Committee of Experts on Violence in Present-Day Society vested, at its first phase of 
operation, with the task of examining "the serious problems raised in many countries 
by the illicit transfer of funds of criminal origin frequently used for the perpetration of 
further crime. "" The work of the Select Committee has resulted in the adoption by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 June 1980, of 
Recommendation R(80)10, "Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds 
17 of Criminal Origin". This Recommendation is the first international instrument, 
albeit an unbinding one, to address explicitly the problem of money laundering and to 
use the term "laundering" in its wording. 
The Recommendation proceeded from assumptions, established principles and 
proposed a number of measures that continue to apply under the money laundering 
legal regime to date. According to the Explanatory Memorandqm to the 
Recommendation, the motivation behind this initiative was the assumption that 
organised violent criminality and the magnitude of its financial resources is on the 
increase. " It has also been assumed that these organised criminals are dependent in 
perpetuating their conduct on money laundering practices through normal banking 
54 Id., at 325. 
55 Id. at 322,3324 and 325. 
56 "Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds of Crirruinal Origin: Recommendation No. 
R(80) 10 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 June 1980 and 
Explanatory Memorandum". Reproduced in Gilmore, W. (ed. ) h7ter'lational Efforts to Collibat Molley 
Lawiderbig 169 (1992) at 171. (Hereinafter, CoE Recommendation 1980), 
57 Id., at 169. 
58 Id., 17 1. 
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operations. " Further, it was assumed that the prevention and control of these practices 
cannot succeed without international co-operation. " The Explanatory Memorandum 
expresses repeatedly and emphatically the importance of the role of Banks in this 
process. The key measure proposed by the Recommendation is a "Know Your 
Customer" requirement. Paragraph (a) recommends that banks should establish 
measures to identify their customers who: open an account, rent safe-deposits, 
conduct cash transactions or make bank transfers of certain magnitude. " The 
Recommendation was progressive in that it warned against the breaking down of 
transactions as a way of avoiding the identification requirement. 62 The Explanatory 
Memorandum also offered a definition of the term "customer" that expands it beyond 
61 the client of the Bank to the person who actually owns the funds. 
This was only the beginning of internationalisation in the area of money 
laundering prevention and control. The definitive step of internationalisation, 
however, did not take place until 1988 with the signing of the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(hereinafter, the Vienna Convention 1988). The significance of this instrument lies in 
the fact that it imposed an obligation on all parties to criminalise the laundering of 
drug proceeds. Although the Convention did not use the term "money laundering", its 
definition of money laundering offences became the accepted definition in all the 
subsequent instruments. This instrument is dealt with in more detail below. 
The criminalisation of money laundering however did not start at the 
international level. Parallel developments in the United Kingdom and the United 
States had led to the introduction of a crime of money laundering into their respective 
domestic law. The year 1986 has witnessed legal development on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In the United States, the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA)64 was 
passed, making it a criminal offence to engage in the laundering of criminal proceeds, 
to willingly handle assets that are the fruits of criminal activity, or to use structuring 
methods in order to evade reporting requirements. ' In addition, the Act imposed 
59 Id. 
60 id. 
61 Id., at 170. 
62 Id., paragraph a-(0, at 170. 
63 Id., 174. 
64 Pub. L. No 99-570,100 Stat. 3207 (1986), codified at 18 U. S. C. §§1956-57 and 31 U. S. C. §§5324- 
26. (Hereinafter, MLCA 1986). 
65 18 USC §§ 1956 & 1957. 
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harsher civil and criminal forfeiture laws on money launderers and financial 
institutions who assist them in their practices. " In England, the Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986 (DTOA) rendering it a criminal offence to enter an arrangement 
whereby the proceeds of another's drug trafficking activities are laundered . 
61 Similar 
provisions were enacted with regard to terrorist funds under the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. " 
It is important to note that until 1986, the focus of the legal developments with 
respect to money laundering has been on prevention through financial regulation. In 
1986, with the criminalisation of money laundering in the United Kingdom and the 
United States a new control or repression component has been added to the legal 
approach to the problem. The money laundering legal regime that evolved out of these 
developments places equal emphasis on both aspects of the strategy and reflects the 
principles and mechanisms already introduced by them. It is for this reason that the 
key legal instruments of the 1980s at both the domestic and the international level will 
now be dealt with in more detail. 
3.2. United States Money Laundering Control Act 1986" 
The Bank Secrecy Act was introduced in 1970, but it was not vigorously applied. 
Enforcement was lenient and banks' co-operation was lacking. In 1981, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study evaluating the implementation of the 
BSA to that date. The study concluded that the lack of co-operation and compliance 
by the financial institutions unden-nined the usefulness of the reporting requirements 
of the Act. 70 It was the frustration by this state of affairs and the sense of the 
seriousness of the problem that grew in the 1980s, which led to the second main 
Congressional intervention and the enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act 
66 31 USC §5324. 
67 Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, s. 24. 
68 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, s. 11. 
69 MLCA 1986, stipra note 64. For the legislative history see S. Rep. No. 433,99 th Cong., 2 nd Sess 
(1986); H. Rep. Report No. 746, q9th Cong., 2 nd Sess. (1986). For background see President's 
Con=ission on Organized Crime, The Cash Connection. - Organized Criine, Financial Institittions and 
inone Laundering (1985). For discussion of the legislative history see Adams, T., "Tacking on Money Y 
Laundering Charges to White Collar Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What are the Courts 
Doing? ", 17 Georgia State University Law Review 531 (Winter 2000), at 545-558. 
70 GAO, Bank Secrecy Act Reporting Reqitiretnents Have not yet Met Expectations, Sliggesting Need 
for Ainendinent (July 23,198 1), at 11. Cited in. Orr, M., "The Currency Reporting Laws and the War 
on Organized Crime", 20 Stiffiolk University Law Revieiv 1061 (1986) at footnote 126 and 
accompanying text. 
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1986. The spirit that prevailed since the beginning of the 1980s and this criticism of 
the implementation of the Act by the GAO have resulted in a spree of enforcement 
measures by the U. S. Treasury Department and the U. S. Justice Department. As part 
of a large enforcement operation conducted by the Treasury in Florida, Great 0 
American Bank of Dade County was indicted, pled guilty and was charged a criminal 
fine of $500,000. " Since the beginning of this operation in July 1980 and over the 
period of the next five years, several banks and financial institutions across the United 
States were inspected and fined for non-compliance with the reporting of the BSA. " 
The main shift in compliance and enforcement attitude, however, is normally 
related back to the Bank of Boston case in February 1985. " The Bank of Boston was 
indicted for failing to report around $1.2 billion of currency transactions. Also, further 
investigation revealed that the Bank abused the exemption provisions by granting 
exemptions to senior members of a well-known organised crime family in Boston. 
Following a guilty plea, the Bank was fined $500,000 for its failings. It was mainly 
the result of this case that financial institutions' attitude to compliance shifted 
drastically. Also, it was the sense of moral neutrality of the offence of failure to report 
that was expressed during the proceedings of this indictment that induced the 
Congress to Act. The decision, therefore, was made to introduce money laundering by 
financial institutions as a primary offence instead of relying on the secondary nature 
of the offence of failure to report and with the Money Laundering Control Act 
(MLCA) coming into being. " 
As already indicated, the primary development under the MLCA was the 
criminalisation of a number of money laundering and related acts. The main 
provisions of the Act are sections 1956 and 1957. These two provisions create a 
number of laundering offences with certain variations in their actus reus, mens rea or 
some other related factual elements. 75 Section 1956(a) offences could be described 
liberally as the laundering offences in strict sense. The Section is entitled "Laundering 
of monetary instruments. " The offences created by this section could be categonsed 
71 Id., 1077. 
72 Id., at 1077-1078. 
73 Id., at 1078. 
74 Id., at 1080-1081. 
u-n 5 For a brief description of the offences created by the Act see Rlder, B and Nakaj a, C. 4n ti o e, 
Laundering Guide, US-85011 (2000) at TIT 92-200 to 92-450. 
") 
according to their actus reus into "transaction offences" and "transportation 
offences. "" 
The act criminalised in § 1956 on "transaction offences" is the act of 
conducting or attempting to conduct a financial transaction involving a property that 
represents the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity as defined in §1956(c)(7). 77 
This is provided that this act is carried out with knowledge of the nature of the 
property involved as representing the proceeds of "some fon-n" of unlawful activity. 
The knowledge need not extend to the exact nature of the unlawful activity that 
generated the proceeds . 
7' The section provides two different "transaction offences, " 
differentiated on the basis of the mental element required. The first involves 
conducting the transaction described above with the intention of promoting "the 
carrying on of specified unlawful activity. "7' The second variation involves 
conducting the transaction merely knowing that the transaction is designed to "(1) 
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control 
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting 
requirement under State or Federal Law. " 80 
Section 1956 on "transportation offences, " on the other hand, criminalises the 
act of transporting "a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States 
to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from 
a or through a place outside the United States. "" According to this Section, there are 
two types of "transportation offences": the first involves a monetary instrument or 
funds, regardless of their legal or illegal origin, that are being transported "with the 
intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. 1182 The second, on the 
other hand, pre-requires that the monetary instrument or the funds transferred 
"represent the proceeds of some forrn of unlawful activity. " 83 In this second case, the 
transportation is criminal under this Section only if the person carrying it out has the 
knowledge of the nature of the monetary instrument or the funds as proceeds. Further, 
the offender must possess either the knowledge that the transportation is designed to Z) 
76 This categorisation is made by G. Richard Strafer in his now classic article "Money Laundering: The 
Crime of the 90's", 27 American Critninal Law Review, 149 (1989) at 161. 
77 18 USC 1956(a)(1) (1986). 
78 For a critique of this approach see Strafer, R., slipra note 76, at 166. 
79 18 USC 1956(a)(1)(A) (1986). 
80 18 USC 1956(a)(1) (B) (1986). 
81 18 USC 1956(a)(2) (1986). 
82 18 USC 1956(a)(2)(A) (1986). 
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conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control 
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; 
1184 
or the specific intent "to avoid a 
transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law[. ]"" 
Section 1957 creates a "trans action-b ased" offence. It criminalises any 
engagement in a monetary transaction involving a property of a value exceeding 
$10,000 that is derived from a specified unlawful activity. The offence of §1957 is a 
broader offence in that it does not require any mental element apart from the mere 
knowledge of the origin of the property involved. The Section does not require any 
specific intent. 
Prior to the MLCA, the courts narrowly interpreted the Currency Transaction 
Reporting (CTR) requirements of the BSA, thus permitting the "structuring" of 
transactions as a way of avoiding the reporting requirements of the BSA without 
reprehension. " According to some commentators, blocking this loophole was the 
primary reason for the Congress' intervention. In addition to §1956(a)(B)(ii) and 
§ 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) that prohibit the carrying out of the prescribed act with the specific 
intent of avoiding any legal transaction reporting requirement under, Section 5324 of 
the MLCA deals directly with this problem. " This Section renders it illegal to cause a 
domestic financial institution to fail to file a report, to file a required report that 
contains "material omissions or misstatement of facts, "" or to structure any 
transaction with one or more domestic institution. 
Like the BSA, MLCA disturbed the legal commentators in its challenge of 
many ideas and principles that they held true. One author writing within two years of 
the passage of the Act argued that the Act poses serious potential interpretation 
problems for the courts. " In this context, this author elaborated that the Act runs 
afoul of a number of constitutional and criminal justice principles. The list of 
principles arguably breached by the Act was staggering in terms of the essentiality of 
the principles. It included amongst others: the presumption of innocence, the 
83 18 USC 1956(a)(2)(B) (1986). 
8' 18 USC 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (1986). 
85 18 USC 1956(a)(2)(B)(11) (1986). 
86 Strafer, G., supra note 76, footnote 72 and accompanying text. 
S7 31 USC 5324 (1986). 
88 31 USC 5324(2) (1986). 
" Strafer, G., SlIP7-a note 76,149. 
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constitutional doctrines of vagueness and "overbreadth" and the legal parameters of 
vicarious liability. " 
3.3. The British Laundering Statutes in the 1980s 
Prior to 1986, laundering activities in the UK were prosecuted under a number of 
statutory provisions with certain limitations. Section 22(l) of the Theft Act 1968 
provided one tool for the prosecution of launderers who dishonestly handle stolen 
goods. One of the most famous cases of what would be described today as money 
laundering, which was prosecuted under s. 22 of the Theft Act 1968, is the Brinks Mat 
bullion robbery case. Ex-solicitor Michael Relton was successfully prosecuted under 
this section for the offence of handling large quantities of gold representing the 
original stolen property. The scope of this provision, however, was limited in two 
respects. First, it applied only to theft-related money laundering; and second, it 
required the handling of the actual stolen property or other goods representing the 
stolen property. " 
The history of money laundering law in the United Kingdom can be traced 
back to the House of Lords decision in R. v. Cuthbertson in 1980. " This ruling 
revealed the failure of forfeiture laws, as they were at the time, to deprive the offender 
of the proceeds of one's criminal conduct once they have taken an intangible form. 
The facts of the case were that the defendants were engaged in long-ten-n lucrative 
criminal enterprise involving the supply of controlled substances. Over the period of 
their conspiracy, their criminal activity generated assets of total value of 050,000, 
some of which were placed in bank accounts in France and Switzerland. Pleading 
guilty to charges of conspiracy, they were convicted and the court ordered their assets 
to be forfeited. The appellants appealed to the House of Lords against their sentence 
and the forfeiture orders. The question of law presented to the House of Lords 
pertained to the interpretation of s. 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971" and partially 
concerned what it is exactly that this section empowers a court to order to be 
'0 See above Chapter One. 
91 Jason-Lloyd, L., TIze Laiv on Money-Lalindering: Stattites and Convnentaiy (1997), at 3-4. 
9' R. v. Cuthbertson, [1980] 2 All ERý401. 
93 Misuse of Di ugs Act 197 1, s, 27. "[... ] the court by or before which a person is convicted of an 
offence under this Act may order anything shown to the satisfaction of the court to relate to the offence, 
to be forfeited and either destroyed or dealt with in such other manner as the court may order. " 
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forfeited. " In answering this question, the court concluded that the powers of the court 
under s. 27 were restricted to the forfeiture of tangible property and did not extend to 
choses in action or other intangibles. 
In reasoning its decision the court relied on the textual interpretation of the Act 
and specifically excluded any reliance on any wider or implicit parliamentary intent. 9' 
The court specifically relied on the Act's use of the word "destroy" to describe the 
manner in which the forfeited property could be disposed of On these basis, the Court 
concluded that the scope of the Act extends only to property that is capable of being 
destroyed to the exclusion of any intangible property that is not suited for such 
disposal. 9' The court also referred to the difficulties inherent in extending the scope of 
the Act to intangible property referring specifically to the problems of tracing the 
assets into bank accounts. " In dismissing the argument that the purpose of Parliament 
was to "strip the drug traffickers of the whole of the profits of their crime[J" the court 
rejected that the section could authonse the courts to "follow the assets[. ]"9' 
The Court's reasoning illustrates the difficulties that led to the expansion of the 
concept of forfeitable property under forfeiture law and also to the corollary 
development of money laundering law. This reasoning reflected and stipulated the 
status of English law at that stage of its development in the early 1980s. It also 
revealed its impotence against new forms of continuous enterprise crime that 
generates large wealth. Despite its conclusive ruling, the Court was aware of the 
frustrating limitations of the law. This was reflected in Lord Diplock's statement that 
"it is with considerable regret" that he allows the appeals and discharges the forfeiture 
orders. " 
The House of Lords decision and the inadequacy of the law that it revealed 
raised substantial public concern. The government was called upon to close the 
legislative loopholes that permitted offenders to retain the gains of their crimes. In this 
context, an independent Committee chaired by Justice Hodgson was formed, 
specifically to consider the law relating to the forfeiture of property associated with 
crime in light of the House of Lords decision and also to study other related matters 
94 R. v. Cuthbertson, supra note 92. 
95 Id., at 403. 
96 Id., at 405. 
97 Id., at 406. 
98 Id. 
99 Id., at 402. 
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such as victim restitution and compensation. "' The work of this Committee 
constituted the first methodical study of the idea of confiscation, understood as "the 
depriving of an offender of the proceeds or profits of an offence or their monetary 
equivalent[j'"" in the context of English law. After thorough examination, the 
Committee concluded that "Criminal courts should have the power to order the 
confiscation of proceeds of an offence of which the defendant has been 
convicted[. ] 11102 The Committee, however, did not address any aspect pertaining to the 
question of money laundering by the offender or by third parties. 
In 1986, the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 was passed. This Act 
constitutes a shift in LJK criminal justice policy, in that it introduces the concept of 
"confiscation orders, " which permits stripping drug traffickers of all the proceeds of 
their criminal activity. Section 24 of the Act creates the offence of assisting another to 
retain the proceeds of drug trafficking, i. e., money laundering. The incriminated acts 
include entering any arrangement that (1) facilitates the retention of the offender of 
his/her own proceeds; (2) secures that funds relating to the criminal proceeds are 
placed at the offender's disposal; and (3) secures that the offender's proceeds are used 
for the offender's benefit. Intent is the requisite mental element for the offence. The 
launderer must know or suspect that the owner of the property has been engaged in 
drug trafficking or has benefited from drug trafficking. Another feature of the offence 
is that the terni "proceeds" is defined broadly to include any property which in whole 
or in part directly or indirectly represented the proceeds of drug trafficking. 
The offence created by s. 24 of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986, as 
the title of the Act indicates, is a limited one restricted to drug offences only. This is 
consistent with the history of the Act as a remedy to the defects of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971. In 1988, the wide ranging Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of that year 
was passed and extended the scope of confiscation orders to "relevant criminal 
conduct, " defined as including all indictable offences as well as a list of less serious 
offences. While it remains relevant, the CJA of 1988 did not introduce a money 
laundering offence involving the proceeds of "all relevant conduct. " This development 
did not take place until the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which is 
100 The Hodgson Committee was formed by the Howard League for Penal Reforms, an 'dependent In in 
body concerned with the reform of the criminal justice system. See Howard League for Penal Reform, 
PI-ofits of Crhne and their Recovery: Report of a Coinmittee chaired by Sir Derek Hodgson (1984). 
101 Id., at 5. 
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beyond the historical scope of the present discussion. The only extension of the scope 
of laundering offences in the 1980s was introduced by the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, which introduced an offence similar to that of s. 24 
of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1988 with respect to terrorist funds. " 
By the end of 1989, there was a general perception that anti-money laundering 
laws needed to be strengthened. The Home Affairs Committee of the House of 
Commons started a review of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 in February 
1989, which was completed in November 1989. "' The study was triggered by concern 
over the increase of drug abuse in the UK and was directed towards investigating this 
matter and the suitability of the law. There is also evidence in the Report of the 
Committee that the study was also initiated in order to address North American 
concerns that the United Kingdom was being used as an offshore financial centre by 
money launderers. `5 The Report also reveals that even at the end of the 1980s the 
U. K. financial sector was still reluctant to assume further responsibilities in the fight 
against money laundering. This has led the Committee to recommend that "the 
Govenu-nent should instruct the Bank of England, as a matter of urgency to examine 
the scale of the threat to the banking community posed by money laundering and any 
legislative measures required to counter it. [ ... ] The government should then come 
forward with the necessary amending legislation as a matter of priority. ""' It was not 
until 1993 that regulatory requirements were finally put into place imposing specific 
record-keeping and know your customer duties on the financial institutions. "' 
102 Id., Recommendation 9, at 15 1. 
103 For a brief review of these developments see Bosworth-Davies, R., and Saltmarsh, G., Money 
Laundering. - A Practical Guide to the New Legislation (1994), at 107 et seq.; Jason-Lloyd, L, supra 
note 9 1. 
104 Bosworth-Davies R., and Saltmarsh, G., id., at 115. 
105 During the preparation of the report, members of the Comnuttee visited Washington and liased with 
relevant agencies. Also, at various part of the Report the Committee addresses directly the concerns of 
the Unites States and Canadian authorities. See excerpts in Bosworth-Davies, R., and Saltmarsh, G, id., 
at 115-119. 106 Id., at 117. 
107 Money Laundering Regulations, S. I. No. 1933 (1993). 
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3.4. The Vienna Convention 1988"' 
As the full title of this Convention indicates, it is an international legal instrument 
against drug misuse. In its approach to the problem, this instrument constitutes a 
departure from the previous approach adopted by the main international instruments 
that had dealt with it. Prior to 1988, the international drug control system was based 
on two main instruments: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs"' and its 
1972 Amending Protocol, "' and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. "' 
The approach to the drug misuse problem under these two instruments was based on 
controlling the production of illegal drugs and regulating the use of drugs for medical 
purposes in a manner that prevents their diversion to the illicit market. 
In 1984, the UN General Assembly recognised that the drug control system 
that existed under these two instruments was insufficient to deal with the malti- 
faceted nature of the drug problem and that a new more comprehensive international 
convention was now needed. "' One of the key features of the new approach as 
adopted by the new convention and envisioned in the preparatory resolutions that led 
to it is the emphasis on strengthening the enforcement of anti-drug trafficking laws 
and the international co-operation mechanisms in this regard. '" 
In the chain of evolution of money laundering law, this convention proved to 
be the most important step in the internationalisation of money laundering law and the 
introduction of the concept worldwide. The most important contribution of this 
Convention to money laundering law is the creation of an international obligation 
upon State Parties to criminalise a series of laundering offences. "' While, the 
'0' United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988), 28 ILM 493 (1989). (Hereinafter, the Vienna Convention 1988). For a discussion of this 
instrument see Gilmore, W., Combating Drugs Trafficking: The 1988 United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Explanatory Memorandum 
(199 1); and Stewart, "Internationalising the War on Drugs: The UN Convention against Illicsit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances", 18 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 
387(1990). 
109 UN Treaty Series, Vol. 5 20,15 1. 
110 UN Treaty Series, Vol. 976,106. 
111 UN Treaty Series, Vol. 10 19,176. 
112 A/Res/139/141. 
113 General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/40/122 (December 13,1985), ý4(d); United Nations 
International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking: Comprehensive OutlMe of Future 
Activities in Drug Abuse Control (1987), TT223 & 225. (Hereinafter, UN Comprehensive Outline 
1987). 
114 The Vieruia Convention 1988, supra note 108, art. -3)(b) and (c)(1). 
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Convention does not use the term "laundering", its definition of the offences remains 
the prototypical definition of money laundering as a crime. "' 
The Convention defines money laundering offences broadly and the definition 
of the various offences is not clearly delineated. The definition includes conversion or 
transfer of drug-derived property for the purpose of concealing the origin or evading 0 
the legal consequences of a person's drug-related activities. It also includes the mere 
concealment or disguise through any process of any fact regarding the drug-derived 
property such as its nature, location, dispositions movement and rights with respect to 
it. "' The Convention further requires the criminalisation of knowing use, acquisition 
or possession of drug-derived property. "' The latter obligation is however made 
subject to the constitutional principles and the concepts of the legal system of each 
country. Whether the mere handling of drug money is or is not a form of money 
laundering is arguable. The drafting has also been largely influenced by the U. S. 
legislative definitions incorporated in Sections 1956-57 of the U. S. Code, as it applied 
during the negotiations of the Convention. "' 
It is important to note that the Convention does not address the preventive 
aspects of money laundering law. It, however, was aware of the importance of 
financial information for the effective enforcement of drug control systems. This 
recognition is reflected in the text of the Convention where countries are explicitly 
precluded from denying assistance to other countries merely on the basis of bank 
secrecy. '" The preventive aspects of money laundering law were discussed in detail in 
a UN soft law instrument that preceded and lead on to the Convention namely "1987 
United Nations International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking: 
Comprehensive Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control. ""' It was also 
referred to with detail in the official "Commentary on the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 ...... These 
115 According to the Official Commentary on the Convention, the use of the word "money Laundering" 
was abandoned because of its novelty and on account of translation difficulties. Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention against Illict Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, 17 
E/CN. 7/590 (1998), at ý3.5 1. (Hereinafter, the Official Coriu-nentary). 
116 The Vienna Convention 1988, supra note 108, art. 3(b)(1), 
117 Id., art. 3(c)(1). 
118 Id. ý3.4 1. 
119 The Vienna Convention 1988, slipra note 108, ar-t. 5(3) & Art. 7(5). 
120 UN Comprehensive Outline 1987, supra note 113. 
121 The Official Commentary, SUPM iiote 115, at ýý, 3.5 5 -3.62. 
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non-binding references should not be neglected in terms of its impact on building an 
international consensus in this area of the law. 
Although the Vienna Convention 1988 was limited in its scope strictly to drug 
offences, the Convention did provide great impetus for the internationalisation of 
money laundering law. Introducing such a novel concept for the first time in the 
context of drug trafficking was probably strategic in view of the worldwide consensus 
on the dangerousness of this form of criminality. 
3.5. Basel Principles1988 122 
At the same time as Vienna Convention 1988 was being negotiated and signed, a 
parallel legal development was taking place in Basel-Switzerland. In December 1988, 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision"' issued a Statement of Principles on the 
Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering (hereinafter, The Basel Principles 1988). 124 While the Vienna Convention 
1988 focused on money laundering control and left out the preventive aspect of 
money laundering law, this parallel development bridged this gap by attempting to 
develop some consensus on the preventive money laundering law within the narrower 
context of the Basel Committee. 
The Basel Principles of 1988 are based on the assumption that banks are being 
used unwittingly for the purpose of money laundering and that the co-operation of 
financial institutions with law enforcement agencies will be very useful for the 
purpose of preventing this use. 12' The Principles encourage the banks to put in place 
effective procedures that (1) ensure the identification of any customer that enters a 
relationship with the bank; (ii) prevent the engagement of the bank in transactions that 
appear illegitimate; and (Ili) secure close co-operation with law enforcement. 126 
122 Basel ConuTuttee, The Basel Committee- Compendium of Documents, Vol. I, Chapter III (May 200 1) 
available at www. bis. ora. (Last Visited February 12,2002. ) 
123 It is committee of central bank Governors of the Group of Ten established at the end of 1974. Its 
membership includes central bank governors and representatives of the prudential supervisory 
authorities of the following countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
Committee issues non-binding principles and standards and it does not have supranational supervisory 
authority. See Basel Committee, About Basel Committee, available at www. bis. org. (Last visited 
February 12,2002. 
124 The Basel Principles 1988, Supra note 122. 
125 Id., Preamble, ýI and Section I. 
126 Id., Preamble, ý6. 
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Prior to this instrument, supervisory authorities were ambivalent about their 
role in the fight against money laundering. While some countries imposed direct 
responsibility in this regard on its financial supervisory authorities, others did not 
impose any such responsibility or duty. In the latter case, supervisory authorities 
lacked jurisdiction to play a role in the suppression of money laundering through the 
financial system. The value of the Basel Principles 1988 was, therefore, that it 
established some convergence in approach amongst its members by attempting to 
create a prudential interest in suppressing the use of the financial system for money 
laundering purposes. 
The "Preamble" to these Principles acknowledge that "the primary function of 
[banking supervision] is to maintain the overall financial stability and soundness of 
banks rather than to ensure that individual transactions conducted by bank customers 
are legitimate. ""' It then goes on to argue that a bank's association with criminals is 
bound to result in adverse publicity that might undermine public confidence in banks 
and hence their stability. It also argues that association with criminals exposes banks 
to the possibility of fraud by those undesirable customers as well as by their own 
employees, whose integrity may be undermined by this inopportune association. 128 
This logic of the Principles has resulted in tying the money laundering 
suppression goal with the broader purposes in bank supervision and gradually led to 
the regulatory aspect of money laundering law becoming a core element of this legal 
regime as a whole. The influence of the Basel Principles did not remain confined to its 
limited membership. This extension is typical of the operation of the Basel Committee 
and was explicitly envisioned in the preamble to the Principles. "' In terms of 
interriationalisation of money laundering law, the Basel principles 1988 were to the 
regulatory/preventive side of this regime what the Vienna Convention 1988 was to the 
criminal/control side of it. 
4. Supranationalisation in the 1990s 
Following a decade of rapid national and international developments in money 
laundering law, sufficient consensus began to evolve and the political context became 
127 Id., ý3. 
128 Id., Preamble, ý4. and Section I. 
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opportune for more aggressive growth. The 1990s brought an end to the thirty-year 
old "Cold War. " With the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the world shifted to a 
"unipolar" world order. This created the chance for the development of forms of what 
could be described as supranationalism in the ordering of world affairs. This is the 
feature that this section will argue most characterises money laundering law in the 
1990s. 
In the present context, supranationalism is measured by the degree to which 
the ordering of a certain aspect of social life is conducted by an agency in a manner 
that derogates from States' sovereignty and the principle of consent in the 
international order. In the context of money laundering, this supranational regime 
centres around the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as a body, which was created 
by the G7 Summit in Paris in 1989 and given the specific task of studying the money 
laundering phenomenon and ways to deal with it. 
Following its creation by the Suminit, the FATF has assumed a life of its own, 
without any limitations of mandate or time-frame. The FATF was called into meeting 
by France and it produced it-s-11-r-st report ahead of the deadline in February 1990. 
The most important feature of the 1990 Report is its Forty Recommendations for 
action. These recommendations as amended and interpreted over the past decade 
constitute the present blueprint of money laundering law. The FATF and its regime 
bear many supranational features especially vis-a-vis non-members. Its mission is 
geared towards achieving the highest degree of convergence and harmonisation not 
only amongst its limited members but worldwide. This regime, its supranational 
characteristics and harmonisation efforts will be subject to detailed analysis in 
Chapter Six of this volume. 
5. Post-September 11: The Exceptionality of Money Laundering Law Confirmed 
The I 11h of September attacks have produced a legal response at national, regional and 
international levels. Confronted by a very sophisticated form of cross-border terrorism 
against the most powerful State in the world, the states' responses were frantic. The 
size of the attacks and the amount of resources appear to have been pooled in order to 
129 Id., Preamble, T7. On the way Basel Committee operates and spreads its norms beyond its 
membership see Norton, J., Devising Bank Supei-visoiy Standards (1995), at 229 et. seq.; Walker, G., 
International Banking Regulation: Law, Poliqy and Practice (200 1), Chapter 1. 
130 FATF, Report 1990 (February 7,1990). 
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carry them out serves to explain the concern for terrorist financing that predominated 
the legal response at all these levels. A consensus immediately emerged, or rather 
seemed to exist, that going after the terrorist money is a key instrument in this war. 
Such consensus translated into amendments to money laundering laws in the form of 
extending criminal liability and expanding financial institutions policing duties and 
obligations. 
In the domestic sphere, the U. S. Congress naturally took to action and the 
result was the enactment of the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism" Act. "' The Act's 
deliberately designed acronym "USA PATRIOT ACT" 132 calls upon the patriotism of 
every American to play his/her part in fending against the terrorist threat. Title III of 
the Act "International Money laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorism Financing 
Act, " amends U. S. money laundering laws in a manner that capitalises on the inherent 
draconian character of money laundering law, confirms it and takes it a step further. 
A parallel development and one that is significantly influenced by the 
PATRIOT Act was taking place in the United Kingdom. On 15 October 2001, the 
Home Secretary and the Chancellor announced proposals to introduce urgent 
measures giving the Government additional powers to enable it to counter the threat 
of international terrorism. On 12 November 2001, the "Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security" Bill was introduced to the House of Commons and passed into law on the 
14'1' of December 2001. The Act, like the U. S. PATRIOT Act, places primary 
emphasis on the financing of terrorism as a key to the fight against this international 
threat. The Act deals with this problem in Part I under "Terrorist Property. " It defines 
terrorist cash as "cash which (a) is intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism, 
(b) consists of resources of an organisation which is a proscribed organisation, or (c) 
is, or represents property obtained through terrorism. ""' Schedule I grants a wide 
range of seizure and forfeiture powers with regard to this type of property. 
At the regional level, the European Union perceived itself to be one of 
the leading partners in the U. S. -led coalition against terrorism. "' On 21 September 
131 P. L. 07-56 (October 26,2001). 
132 This acronym is included in the Act's official short title. 18 USC §1 Note. 
133 Anti-Terrorisrn, Crime and Security Act 200 1, s. 1 (1). 
134 For an overview of this response see Ovei-view of EU Action in Response to the Events of the II 
Septenibei- and assessinent of their Likely Econoinic In7pact (Conurussion of the European 
Communities, Brussels, 17 October 2001) COM(2001) 611. 
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2001, the European Council held an extraordinary meeting and adopted a Plan of 
Action against terrorism. "' Like other domestic and international instruments, the 
Council's Plan of Action focuses on: interstate co-operation in penal matters, 
criminalisation of terrorism, combating terrorist financing and exchange of 4D 
information for intelligence purposes. The Council has placed particular emphasis on 
the funding of terrorism and described combating it as a "decisive aspect. ""' The 
Council also emphasised the importance of extending the EU instruments on money 
laundering and on the freezing of assets to terrorists' financing. 
At the international level, only seven days after the attacks, the Security 
Council adopted a comprehensive Resolution 1373 affirming its condemnation of the 
attacks and elaborating steps and strategies to be adopted for the purpose of 
combating international terrorism. 137 Like other domestic and international responses, 
the Resolution focused on terrorist financing as the primary target for suppressing this 
phenomenon. 13' The Security Council envisioned the implementation of its resolution 
through various mechanisms including the criminalisation of terrorist financing and 
the freezing of terrorist assets. States were also specifically required to extend 
maximum assistance to other states in their criminal investigations or proceedings 
relating to the financing of terrorist acts. This assistance is particularly required with 
respect to obtaining material evidence in their possession. 
One of the most important international legal responses to the attack came 
from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Following the terrorist attacks in the 
United States, the FATF held an extraordinary Plenary meeting in Washington, D. C. 
on 29-30 October 2001 for the purpose of launching an initiative to combat terrorist 
financing. The extraordinary meeting resulted in developing a set of eight 
recommendations on terrorist financing to complement the FATF 40 
Recommendations on money laundering. "' These recommendations commit the 
members of the body to the following actions: 140 
135 The European Council, Conclusion and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council 
Meeting on 21 September 2001 (SN 140/01). 
136 Id., Under "Putting an end to the funding of terrorism. " 
137 Security Council Resolution 1373,28 September 2001 (SC/7158). 
138 Id., ý1 (a). 
139 FATF, Special Reconinzendations on Te7-1-01-iSt Fh7aiiciiig (October 3 1,200 1), available at 
-, --ww. oecd. org/fat (Last visited in May 12,2002). 
140id. 
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(i) To ratify and implement fully the United Nations instruments including 
particularly the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
(ii) To make the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist 
organisations a criminal offence. And to designate such offences as 
predicate offences for money laundering. 
(iii) To freeze and confiscate terrorist assets. 
(iv) To report suspicious transactions related to terronsm. 
(v) To co-operate as extensively as possible with other countries' 
enforcement efforts relating to terrorist financing investigations. 
(vi) To impose anti-money laundering requirements on alternative 
remittance systems. 
(Vii) To Strengthen customer identification measures in international and 
domestic wire transfers. 
(viii) To Amend laws and regulations to ensure that non-profit organisations 
are not abused for the purposes of terrorist financing. I 
The convergence amongst these various responses to the II th of September events is 
evident but not surprising. It is largely the result of a moment of "shock-induced" 
consensus. The main feature that characterises these instruments is that they represent 
further deviation from fundamental principles that were already challenged money 
laundering law. 
For example, the U. S. resorts in the PATRIOT act to more aggressive fonns of 
extraterritoriality. The U. S. PATRIOT Act granted United States agencies extensive 
direct and indirect extraterritorial powers vis-a-vis foreign financial institutions and 
individuals. The Act seems to establish the holding of an account by a foreigner in a 
U. S. financial institution as sufficient nexus for territorial jurisdiction for a variety of 
purposes. "' This poses obvious challenge to the sovereignty of other countries in 
addition to the threats to due process and the principle of legality since it threatens 
certain economic actors by extraterritorial laws. 
14 ' Norton, J. and Shams, H., "Money Laundering Law and Terrorist Financing: Post-September I tl ig 2002). Responses- Let Us Step Back and Take a Deep Breath", Int'l Law. (Forthconung, Sprin 
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Also, all the instruments discussed above are invariably also characterised by 
encouraging informal access to financial information. They mandate more fluid flow 
of infon-nation amongst financial institutions, regulators, the police and investigators, 
and intelligence agencies. Due process and privacy inhibitions to such unrestricted 
flow are marginalised. 
These features are not a unique response to the terronst attacks. Such trends 
have always been a feature of the extraordinary legal mechanisms of money 
laundering law. But, the amendments to money laundering law that emerged out of 
the 11 th of September attacks are significant. They amount to a "new phase" in money 
laundering law on account of two facts: first, they water down the due process 
constraints that somewhat restricted the application of money laundering law; and 
second, they reveal starkly the extraordinariness of money laundering law, thus 
creating a compelling need and opportunity for a systematic and balanced revision of 
this body of law. 
6. Shifting Boundaries: The Scope of Money Laundering Law 
Money laundering law could be defined as "a set of domestic and international legal 
norms and provisions designed to control and to prevent" money laundering by 
creating a number of criminal offences and imposing a series of regulatory measures. 
The historical account of money laundering law in the previous sections reveals the 
diversity of this area of the law. What are designated as "money laundering offences" 
under the Vienna Convention and different domestic laws are varied. Also, the 
regulatory measures and the transactions that these measures seek to prevent are 
multifarious. The only common feature of this diversity is its stated purpose of 
combating the evil phenomenon of money laundering. 
Money laundering as a concept is not a natural one. The language describing it 
is metaphoric in character, which creates an illusion of ordinary meaning. The legal 
usage of the word "money laundering" departs from the common understanding. The 
concept of money laundering is, therefore, a legal concept and the definition thereof 
is, therefore, normative in nature and reflects policy preferences. It is for this reason 
that examining the scope of money laundering law is better conducted through an 
examination of what money laundering means at the various policy levels. 
The definition of money laundering, as the harin that money laundering law 
seeks to control, can be found in various sources. At one levelý there is the definition 
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implicit in the historical events that triggered the legislative intervention as well as the 
policy discussions that informed this intervention. At another level, there is the 
explicit policy definition of money laundering that can be found in certain policy 
documents. The third level of defining money laundering is the actual legislative 
definition of money laundering offences. Finally, there is the definition implicit in the 
enforcement and implementation of money laundering law. The following analysis 
will start from the explicit definition of money laundering provided by some domestic 
and international policy documents. This definition will be deconstructed into its 
constituent elements. Each element will then be analysed by contrasting the policy 
description with the legislative history, the legislative definition of money laundering 
offences and the case law, which reveals how money laundering law actually applies. 
It will become apparent that the boundaries of money laundering law are continuously 
shifting at these various levels and that internal discrepancies and contradictions exist. 
Resolving this tension is contingent on explicit policy honesty regarding the nature of 
the harm that money laundering law seeks to overcome. 
6.1. The Policy Definition ofMoney Laundering 
Governmental and intergovernmental documents addressing the problem of money 
laundering with a view to designing future solutions often start by defining the 
problem, i. e., defining money laundering. In this part of the analysis, reference will be 
made to the policy definition offered in four such documents. The definitions will 
show conu-non elements but also some variations. 
In its first report, the U. S. President's Commission on Organized Crime"' 
defined money laundering as "the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal 
source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it 
appear legitimate. ""' The Commission went on to offer two examples of money 4- 
laundering operations: one involving a narcotic trafficker who wants to disguise his 
cash from street-level sales into some legitimate form, 144 and the other involves 
142 The President's Cornmission on Organized Crime was established on July 28,1983 by Executive 
Order 12435 with the mandate of studying comprehensively the organized crime problem and advising 
the President and the Attorney General on appropriate admirustrative and legislative amendments to 
improve the federal enforcement measures against orgarnsed crime. President's Commission on 
Organized Crime, The Cash Connection. - 07-ganized 047ne, Financial Institutions, and Money 
Lalindering (1985), at. 1. (Hereinafter, The Cash Connection) 
143 Id., at 7. 
144 id. 
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legitimate corporate earnings, which are then channelled to pay bribes or unlawful 
political contributions. "' 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) did not define money laundering in 
its first Report on the matter in 1990. Its definition appears in its document on "Basic 
Facts about Money Laundering. " It defines money laundering as "the processing of 
[ ... ] criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. " In elaborating on this 
definition, the FATF referred to the criminal's incentive to "'legitimise' the ill-gotten 
gains through money laundering, " and to "disguising the sources, changing the form, 
or moving the funds to a place where they are less likely to attract attention. 11146 
The U. S. Financial Crime and Enforcement Network (FinCEN)" provides 
that: "Money Laundering involves disguising financial assets so they can be used 
without detection of the illegal activity that produced them. Through money 
laundering, the criminal transfers the monetary proceeds derived from criminal 
activity into funds with apparently legal source. ""' 
Of the four policy documents consulted for the purpose of this analysis, the 
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention was the most explicit 
on the matter of defining money laundering. In its commissioned study on "Financial 
Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering, " it is stated that: "Strictly speaking, 
money laundering should be construed as a dynamic three-stage process that re- 
quires: firstly, moving the funds from direct association with the crime; secondly, 
disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and, thirdly, making the money available to the 
criminal once again with its occupational and geographic origin hidden from view. In 
that respect, money laundering is more than merely smuggling or hiding tainted funds, 
although those acts may constitute essential constituents of the process. " 14' This 
Report emphasises the importance of "legitimation" as an element of money 
145 id. 
146 FATF, "What is Money Laundering? " In FATF, Basic Facts about Money Laundering, available at 
ww-, v. oecd. or. 2/fat (Last Visited 13 February 2002). 
147 It is a network linking law enforcement, financial and regulatory communities. It was established in 
April 1990 by Treasury Order Number 105-08. It provides intelligence and analytical work for the 
purpose of law enforcement in addition to bearing regulatory responsibility. 
14' FinCEN, "What is Money Laundering? " In FmCEN, Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
www. Ustreas. gov/fincen. (Last Visited at February 13,2002). 
149Blum et. al, Financial Havens, Banking Secreqy and Money-Laundering (New York: LTNDCP, 
1998), at 4. 
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laundering in strict sense. "' Any processing of ill-gotten funds that falls short of 
actually legitimising its source "can scarcely be described""' as laundering. 
There are subtle variations between these definitions that reflect significant 
differences in policy. There are also common discernible elements. Each of these 
definitions refers to a process; the subject of the process is always funds or money; the 
money is invariably linked to a criminal activity; and finally the process has a purpose 
which is often to legitimate the funds and sometimes just to hide it, disguise it or 
conceal some fact relating to it. It is on basis of these common elements that the 
analysis will proceed. 
6.2. Deconstruction and Analysis 
In this section, each of the four elements of the policy definitions will be analysed by 
contrasting the explicit policy approach with the legislative history and actual 
implementation in legislative instruments and case law. 
6.2.1. Laundering as a Process 
All the policy definitions reviewed above perceive "money laundering" as a process 
delimited only by its purpose. The documents provide examples of laundering 
techniques. The examples range from the very simple, e. g., merely changing to larger 
denominations street-level drug money to reduce the bulk and enhance portability, to 
the very complex involving multiple electronic fund transfers, use of false 
documentation and use of shell companies in offshore jurisdictions. According to 
these studies, the degree of sophistication is determined by the purpose that the 
launderer is seeking to achieve. The undefined scope of laundering as a process is 
reflected in the observations of the President's Commission that "the degree of 
sophistication and complexity in a laundering scheme is virtually infinite, and is 
limited only by the creative imagination and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs 
who devise such schemes. " 152 
The LTNDCP and the FATF breakdown the process of laundering into three I 
constituent steps. Each step is again delimited by its purpose. According to the FATF 
150 "if money is given the appearance of legitimate provenance in a place where sanctions against its 
illegal origins do exist, then and only then can it be said to be truly laundered-it has its nature 0 disguised. " Id., at 5. 
151 Id., at 4. 
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terminology, the first step is placement. This initial step involves severing the direct 
association between the funds and the crime by, for example, introducing the money 
into the financial system. The second step is layering. This means converting and 
moving the funds through a series of transactions in order to obscure the money trail. 
The third stage is integration where the funds are reintroduced into the legitimate 
economy. "' 
Policy documents on money laundering typically proceed from certain case 
studies and typographies of money laundering. The cases analysed and proffered as 
examples often have the following characteristics: (1) a cross border-element; (2) 
large amounts of money often generated by drug trade; (3) sophisticated transactions; 
and (4) use of financial institutions including banks and securities 
firmS. 154 
These characteristics are also implicit in the policy discussions that informed 
the legislative drafting of the various instruments discussed in the previous section. 
For example, the U. S. BSA as the first money laundering instrument emerged out of 
concern for the use of offshore financial centres for the purpose of evading U. S. law 
enforcement. "' I[n the UK, money laundering law developed out of the failure of the 
law to deprive drug traffickers of their substantial proceeds which they placed in bank 
accounts and assets abroad. The Swiss Agreement on observance of Care 1977 
came as a response to a case involving billions of Swiss Francs earned in 
contravention of foreign laws in crossing the borders for refuge. "' It is, therefore, 
clear that the legislative intervention in all these cases and others has occurred in 
response to large criminal proceeds crossing borders and utilising the financial 
system. 
The legal definitions of the process of money laundering are to be found in the 
provisions defining the actus reus of money laundering offences. As indicated in 
various parts of this Chapter, the most universally accepted definition of money 
laundering as an offence is that of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention 1988. "' This 
152 The Cash Connection, sitpra note 142, at. 8. 
153 Blum et. al, supra note 149, at 4; FATF, supra note 146. 
154 See the BCCI case, the Franklin Jw-ado case, Ainerican Express Bank International case and others 
discussed in Blum et. al, supra note 149, at 34-46. See also the cases discussed in The Cash 
Connection, supra note 142, at 31-48. These include The Pl'-: a Connection, Great American Bank and 
Pan Ainerican Intemational Bank. 
155 The Bank Secrecy Act (1970), sitpra note 8. Discussed in Section 2.1. above. 
156 R. v. Cuthbertson, supra note 92, discussed above in Section 3.3. 
157 See above Section 2.2. 
158 Supra note 108 
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Article does not delimit the process of money laundering. The Article refers to 
"conversion or transfer of property" and to "concealment or disguise. " The latter 
designation is clearly based on the purpose of the process and does not provide any 
hint as to what type of process is envisioned. The former description, without being 
restrictive, provides more suggestions regarding the process that the State Parties had 
in mind. "conversion" suggests an alteration in the fonn of the property and "transfer" 
suggests physical movement of the property or legal change of title. The Official 
Commentary is silent on this matter. "' 
The relevant U. S. Law is more detailed in this regard. "' Section 1956 (18 
USC) criminalises as laundering certain financial transactions and certain acts of 
transportation, transmission and transfer of monetary instruments. The Act defines a 
transaction to include any "purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or 
other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, 
withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of 
credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond certificate of deposit, or other monetary 
instrument., use of safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, 
through, or to a financial institution by whatever means affected ...... The transaction 
acquires its financial character if it affects in any way or degree interstate commerce 
and involves transfer of funds, a monetary instrument or the use of a financial 
institution. 
A "financial institution" for the purpose of this provision does not have the 
ordinary meaning that would automatically come to mind. Instead, it has a much 
broader and expanding definition based on section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United 
States Code. This naturally includes banks along with over twenty other forms of 
business. For example, section 5312(a)(2) includes within the definition of financial 
institution brokers and dealers, pawnbrokers, travel agencies, car dealers, and dealers 
in precious metals. The section further authorises the Secretary of the Treasury to 
expand this category to other types of business carrying out similar or substitute 
activities or any cash transactions that has high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax 
and regulatory investigations. Section 1956 of title 18, United States Code extends the 
definition of financial institution to these additional categories that might be added by 
159 Supra note 115, at ýJT3.41 etseq. 
160 18 U. S. C. § 1956. 
161 18 U. S. C. §1956a(c)(3). 
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Treasury regulations. While the definition of the United States Code is seemingly 
more detailed, it does not offer any delimitation of the process Of money laundering. It 
simply gives more detailed examples of what is essentially a process of "conversion 
or transfer of property" in the language of article (3) of the Vienna Convention 1988. 
In the U. S. case law, money laundering counts anse more often than not from 
simple transactions such as, purchasing a vehicle, 
162 
cashing stolen casino chips, 
163 
cashing cheques, 
16' buying a cabin, "' simple wire transfers, 
166 depositing in bank 
accounts and drawing cheques on those accounts 
16' 
and using safe deposits. 
168 In one 
case, the court held that paying the cash bond of $2500 to ball his co-conspirator out 
of prison was a "financial transaction" within the meaning of money laundering 
statute and upheld the Defendant's conviction for money laundering on basis of this I= 
act. "' In the cases referred to here, the acts of money laundering were simple acts that 
do not bear the mark of sophistication and professional characteristic of the cases that 
informed the policy discussion behind money laundering statutes. 170 It is relevant to 
mention in this connection that using sophisticated laundering techniques is an 
aggravating factor according to the U. S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines. 171 
With regard to the transactions that more commonly constitute the basis for 
money laundering counts and convictions in the United States, it could also be 
observed that many of these transactions do not transcend the boundaries of a single 
state let alone the federal boundaries of the United States. Although section 1956 
contains an "interstate nexus" in the definition of "financial transaction" discussed 
above, this nexus has been treated as merely jurisdictional concerning the "Commerce 
Clause" of the U. S. Constitution as basis for the Congress legal jurisdiction to regulate 
money laundering processes. In this context, it was held that a minimal effect on 
interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary requirement in this 
regard. 172 In responding to the Defendant's challenge in the cash bond case referred to 
162 United States. v. Cruz, 93 F. 2d 164 (1993). 
163 United States. v. Manarite, 44 F. 3d. 1407 (1995). 
164 United States v. Hairston, 46 F. 3d 361 (1995). 
165 United States v. Rockelman, 49 F. 3d 418 (1995). 
166 United States v. Herron, 97 F. 3d 234 (1996); United States v. Torres 53 F. 3d 1129 (1995). 
167 United States v. Kunzman, 54 F. 3d 1522 (1995). 
168 United States v. Bownan, 235 F. 3d 1113 (2000). 
169 United States v. Laurenzana, 113 F. 3d 689 (1997). 
170 See the cases discussed in The Cash Connection, SuP7-a note 142. 
17 1 2001 Federal Sentencing Guidelines (U. S. Sentencing CoMnUssion, Effective Nov. 2001), §2SL 1. 
(b)(2)(C), available at www. ussc., Pov (last visited 13 February 2002). 
172 United States v. Koller, 956 F. 2d 1408 (1992); United States v. Kelley, 929 F. 2d 582 (1991). 
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nu above, the court held that the transaction had an effect on interstate commerce 
because "[t]he money Laurenzana delivered to the officers did, and in the ordinary 
course of business would be expected to, enter the flow of commerce. ""' It is 
important however to note that using offshore financial accounts is an evidence of 
sophistication for the purpose of sentencing according to the U. S. Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines. "' 
In the United Kingdom, the legislative approach to the definition of the 
process of money laundering is equally open-ended. Money laundering offences are 
spread over various statutory provisions. "' Generally, the process is defined in some 
provisions as "entering an arrangement" that has a specifically proscribed purpose. 
This arrangement could involve "concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer 
to nominees or otherwise. )"' In other provisions, it is described as concealing or Z: D 
disguising, and converting or transferring for a specifically proscribed purpose. "' The 
language of "conceal and disguise, convert and transfer" reflects the language of 
Vienna Convention 1988. The cases of laundering as reflected in the U. K. case law 
often concern conversion of Sterling pounds into another currency and removal from 
the jurisdiction by means of transportation. "' 
This analysis confirms that the acts of laundering are so varied that they do not 
admit to a clear and unitary definition. While the policy analysis of money laundering 
has always proceeded from very sophisticated case studies involving transnational 
features and professional launderers, the law was cast so broadly in order to cover all 
possible laundering processes. This could result, as the case is in the United States, in 
the application of the law to cases that are often fundamentally different from those on 
which the criminalisation was based. 
173 United States v. Laurenzana, 113 F. 3d 689 (1997) at 693. 
174 Application Note (5), Commentary to §2S 1.1. (b)(2)(C), 2001 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, stipra 
note 17 1. 
175 Crirninal Justice Act 1988; s. 93A & C; Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, 
ss. 11,12 & 13; Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ss. 49,50 & 54. 
176 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 93A; Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions Act 1989, s. 12; 
Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 50. 
177 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 93C, Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 49. 1 178 See for example R. v. Conrad [2001] WL 1347101(CA, Criminal Division); R. v. Eveson [2001] 
WL 1346987 (CA, Criminal Division); R. v. EI-Kurd [2001] WL 1212927, (CA, Criminal Division). 
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6.2.2. Money or Assets 
The subject of any money laundering operation is obviously money or assets of some 
fon-n- This element is described in many different ways. In the definition of the 
president's commission it is described as "income, " in the FATF's definition it is 
"criminal proceeds" in the FinCEN's definition it is "financial assets. " The Vienna 
Convention 1988 uses the term "property" to refer to the subject of conversion or 
transfer and concealment or disguise. This is the same term used by sections 1956 & 
1957 of title 18 of the United States Code. Regardless of the nuances of all these 
variations, the drafters of all these definitions are struggling with one basic problem, 
which is how to find a term that encompasses all the forms that wealth can take in 
order to prevent any possibility for evasion. 
Despite this widely cast net, the primary concern behind money laundering 
law was not tangible property that is the direct proceed of crime, such as a stolen 
vehicle or a stolen gem. It was rather a concern relating to money as a fungible asset 
or as a value on a balance sheet. "' Money laundering law is not concerned with 
tracing and retrieving a particular property it is rather concerned with identifying 
value for the purpose of detecting criminal activity, depriving the criminals of the 
value of their illicit efforts, or preventing this value from being used to promote 
further criminal activity. These purposes will be discussed in more detail shortly. 
One reason for opting for this broad definition and leaving out any restrictions 
relating to the type of asset is the fact that a money laundering operation could consist 
of a number of transactions. One of these transactions could involve using money or 
other means of payment to purchase a tangible property, which would subsequently be 
resold. Narrowing the definition of money laundering to exclude dealings in tangible 
property would exclude this type of transaction from the scope of money laundering 
law. 
Two questions that are pertinent to the arguments presented in this volume are: 
does the value of the property constitute a material element in the definition of money 
laundering?, and does money laundering law confine its application to laundering 
large amounts of money? 
179 For this understanding of money as value with some references to its implications for money 11 
laundering see Hudson, A., "Money as Property in Financial Transactions", 14(6) JIBL 170 (1999). 
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The answer to these questions are in the negative. Despite the fact that all the policy 
documents on money laundering focus on discussions of cases of high economic 
value, and despite the fact that all the preambles to the international instruments are 
primarily concerned with organised crime, the legal provisions themselves do not 
include any qualification on the value of the money involved. 
One explanation for this approach could again be expediency. In order to 
mitigate the prosecutorial burden of proof, the criminal law of money laundering 
defines money laundering as "a single act offence" rather than a "continuous offence. " 
In this sense, a single transaction satisfying the conditions described in the law is 
sufficient for conviction of money laundering. Money laundering operations are 
non-nally gradual in nature involving the division of large sums of money into smaller 
amounts and manipulation of these small amounts in separate transactions for the 
purpose of laundering them. Imposing a value limitation on the definition of money 
laundering will result in rendering money laundering law ineffective unless money 
laundering is approached as a continuous offence. The latter approach would increase 
the prosecutorial burden of proof substantially. 
This "wide net" approach to the definition again leaves the law open for 
application in cases that do not necessarily reflect the policy or even the legislative 
history of the legal instruments. This point could be illustrated by U. S. v. Ward, "' a 
case in which the Court of Appeals specifically criticised the District Court stating 
that "The district court erroneously focused on the nominal value of the concealed 
assets in concluding that the funds at issue were not laundered. The value of the funds 
at issue should not be confused with the government's burden of proving that the 
funds involved were proceeds of a crime. ""' The case concerned a bankrupt 
businessman who concealed bank accounts that contained amounts of $200 and 
$14,000, which he used as collateral for loans to keep a hidden business running. He 
was accused of bankruptcy fraud and of laundering the proceeds of this fraud. This 
case stands in clear contrast with the $3.5 million case of Carlos Marcello, the $11 
million case of Deak-Perera and the $25.5 million case of Lockheed Aircraft, which 
informed the recommendation of the President's Commission on Organized Crime 182 
180 U. S. v. Ward 197 F. 3d 1079 (1999). 
181 Id., at 1083. 
182 The Cash Connection, supra note 142, at. 10- 13. 
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and the enactment of section 1956 of Title 18 
U. S. C.. 183 It is relevant to note in this 
context that the implementation of money laundering law In the United Kingdom 
seems to be more in keeping with the problems of powerful criminals that informed 
the legislation. The U. K. case law seems to indicate that prosecutions for money 
laundering are directed towards operations of "high value. " 
184 
6.2.3. A Criminal Activity 
The term "money laundering, " in itself, implies that the asset or the property involved 
in the process is tainted. The taint could be a result of the source from which the asset 
is derived, i. e.; the asset is the proceed of a criminal activity, or it could be a result of 
the purpose for which the asset is to be used. Narrow definitions of money 
laundering, such as the FATF's definition, only envision the taint of the money to be 
derived from the source. This is reflected in their use of the term "criminal proceeds" 
to refer to the property subject to laundering. This narrow definition would, on ots 
face, exclude from the scope of money laundering legitimately derived funds that are 
subject to concealment or disguise and conversion or transfer for the sake of hiding 
their ultimate criminal use. This could include legitimately earned assets that are 
directed to financing terrorism"' and such assets when they are directed to paying 
bribes. "' 
On basis of this distinction, one can identify in the money laundering legal 
instruments two types of money laundering offences: the first type involves proceeds 
of criminal activity. "' Criminal liability cannot be established unless the prosecution 
has proved that the money subject to the transaction is derived from criminal activity. 
The second type involves proceeds regardless of their source, which could be 
legitimate or illegitimate. "' 
In the language of money laundering law, when the money is derived from a 
criminal activity, this original criminal activity is referred to as "the predicate 
183 18 U. S. C. §1956. 
184 See supra note 178. 
185 Mr. Bin Laden provides a case in point. The ftinds that he pooled into his terrorist activity originated 
from well-established and legitimate family wealth. Under the FATF's original definition strictly 
applied, his use of concealment or disguise vehicles to direct his money to committing terrorist acts 
would remain outside the scope of money laundering law. 
186 For example, in the early 1970s, Lockheed Aircraft used false accounting entries and other 
laundering mechanisms to disguise their illicit payments to foreign public officials. 
187 The Vienna Convention 1988, si'Pra note 108, art. 3(b); 18 U. S. C § 1956 (a)(1) & (2)(B). 
188 18 U-S-C §1956 (2)(A). 
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offence. " With regard to this element, the legal instruments do qualify the breadth of 
the policy definitions. Not every criminal conduct is a predicate offence for money 
laundering. In other words, not all the proceeds of criminal activity are subject to 
money laundering prohibition. The approaches of the legal instruments to this matter 
vary. 
The Vienna Convention 1988 was a narrow instrument in this regard by virtue 
of its scope as a drug control instrument. Money laundering offences under the 
Convention were therefore confined to the laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking 
activities. "' The FATF starts from the definition of the Vienna Convention but 
recommends that the scope be extended to all serious economic activity. "' The 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime (hereinafter, the European Laundering Convention 1990)"' 
leaves the scope unqualified including any criminal activity that generates proceeds. "' 
National laws adopt one of two approaches. The first approach is to adopt a general 
provision criminalising the laundering of the proceeds of any criminal conduct that 
satisfies certain degree of gravity defined by the law. The second approach is a "list- 
based" approach, where the predicate offence is one of a list of offences that is 
continually expanding through legislative amendments. This aspect of the definition 
of money laundering is an aspect that permits expression of policy preferences. 
6.2.4. The Purpose or the Outcome of the Process 
This is the most important element of the definition of money laundering. So far, the 
constituent elements of money laundering have been broad and encompassing any 
handling of criminally tainted assets. The scope of money laundering as a concept, 
therefore, is contingent on the delineation of this element. In common parlance, as it is 
captured in the Oxford English Dictionary's definition, laundering must involve 
turning the illegal funds seemingly clean, i. e., legitimate. This element of legitimation 
as an ultimate outcome or purpose of the laundering process persists in all the policy 
definitions discussed in this section. The most vocal about legitimation as an element 
was the UNDCP study indicating that short of legitimation the process can hardly be 
189 TheVienna Convention 1988, art. 3. 
190 FATF, The Fbrzý, Reconn7iei7datioiis (June 28,1996 as amended), Recommendation No. 4. 
191 The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime, Eur. T. S. No. 14 1. (Hereinafter, the European Laundering Convention) 
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described as laundering. The question in this regard is again whether the legislative 
history, the legal instruments and their implementation reflect this policy definition, 
fall short of it or go beyond it? 
The first observation to be made in this regard is that the word "legitimation" 
or "legitimate" do not appear in the main legal instruments concerning money 
laundering. This does not mean that the idea itself is absent. Reading various 
instruments, one finds a number of purposes or outcomes that are proscribed by one 
instrument or another. The list includes the following: 
(1) Concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the asset. "' This 
fonnulation of the purpose is probably the closest stipulation of the 
concept of legitimation; 
(ii) Assisting the person involved in the predicate offence to evade the 
legal consequences of his actions; "' 
(iii) Concealing or disguising the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, right with respect to ownership of property; 
195 
(iv) Promoting the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity; 
(V) Engaging in conduct in violation of tax laws; "' 
(vi) Avoiding financial regulatory requirements such as transaction 
reporting requirements; "' 
Facilitating the retention or control by another of his/her criminal 
proceeds; "' 
(viii) Securing that the funds are placed at the disposal of the perpetrator of 
the predicate offence 
(ix) Avoiding prosecution for the predicate offence; "' and 
192 Id., art. I (e). 
193 The Vienna Convention (1988), stipra note 108, art. 3(b)(1); The European Laundering Convention 
(1990), id., art. I(a). 
194 The Vienna Convention (19 8 8), Id., art. 3 (b)(i); The European Laundering Convention (1990), id., 
art. I (a). 
'95 The Vienna Convention (1988), Id., art. 3(b)(ii); The European Laundering Convention (1990), id., 
art. 1(6); 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) & (2)(B)(i); Drug Trafficking Act (1994), s. 49; Section Criminal 
Justice Act (1988), s. 93C. 
196 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(1)(A)(i) & (2)(A). 
197 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(1)(A)(11). 
198 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) & (2)(B)(11). 
199 Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 50(l)(a); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 s. C, 
I1 (1); Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 93A(l)(a). 
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(X) Avoiding the making or enforcement of a confiscation order. "' 
These various extrapolations of the purpose or outcome of a money laundering 
operation can be grouped into four categories: 
o Legitimation: When the legislature speaks of "concealing the illicit origin" or 
"concealing or disguising the true nature or source", what it is really speaking of is 
the legitimation concept as understood in the conu-non sense of money laundering 
and the various policy discussions. In a way this could be described as money 
laundering in the strict sense. 
e Evading the law: This could take different forms. Some forms of law evasion as 
an outcome of money laundering are specifically proscribed by some legislatures. 
Of the list above one finds evading the legal consequences of committing the 
predicate offence (nos. ii, ix, and x) including prosecution for the offence or the 
making and enforcement of a confiscation order, evading tax laws, and avoiding 
transaction reporting requirements. This idea of evading the law is also expressed 
indirectly in the proscription of "facilitating the retention or control by another of 
his or her criminal proceeds" and placing the funds at the disposal of the 
perpetrator of the predicate offence. 
9 Concealing or disguising more broadly This includes concealing or disguising 
other facts about the property apart from those conceming its legitimacy. This 
could be the location of the asset, the control and ownership of the asset or its 
movement. 
9 Investment for a criminal purpose: The outcome of money laundering as defined 
by some legislators could take the forrn of investing or re-investing in a criminal 
enterprise or scheme (no. iv). A typical example of this type of money laundering 
is one which has been repeatedly prosecuted in the United States; the purchasing 
of a vehicle for the purpose of using it in drug trafficking. "' 
200 Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 50(l)(b)(1); Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 93A(l)(b)(i). C 20 ' Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 49(1)&(2); Crirrunal Justice Act 1988, s. 93C (1) & (2). 
202 Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 49(1)&(2); Crirninal Justice Act 1988, s. 93C (1) & (2). 
203 U. S. V. Cruz, 993 F. 2d 164 (1993). [the defendant was convicted under section 1956(a)(1)(A)(1) of 
conducting financial transaction involving the proceeds of a specified unla%vful activity with the intent 
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Contrasting this legislative approach to the purpose of money laundering with the 
legislative history of the main instruments, one finds that the main pre-occupation of 
the drafters was "law enforcement". For instance., the U. S. Bank Secrecy Act came 
into being as a result of agreement amongst various law enforcement agencies and 
their success in convincing the U. S. Congress of the seriousness of the use of financial 
institutions to frustrate their enforcement efforts. "' The Vienna Convention 1988 was 
essentially an enforcement instrument . 
2" The enactment of the U. S. MLCA was 
primarily geared towards putting more pressure on financial institutions to perform 
their duties under the BSA. 206 In that sense it was also an enforcement tool. 
Some of the U. S. case law confirms this concern for enforcement as implicit in 
the proscription of legitimating or disguising the illicit origin. In U. S. v. Bowman, the 
court concluded that the defendant intended to hide the nature of the money in that it 
was stolen by using multiple safe deposits. "' The test of concealment applied by the 
court was that the defendant's conduct has rendered tracking the money difficult. "' In 
U. S. v. Norman, the court upheld the defendant's conviction of money laundering for 
purchasing a vehicle using criminal funds and titling it in the name of a business he 
controlled . 
2" The court held that the crucial point was that the defendant "made it 
more difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what had happened to it. 112 10 
This trend in the U. S. case law is not predominant in that it does not restrict 
the application of money laundering law to cases where enforcement has been 
seriously undermined or rendered more difficult and costly. As the cases cited above 
show, the acts constituting money laundering offences are typically simple and 
non-nally do not amount to serious hindrance of law enforcement. "' Further, money 
laundering offences are normally prosecuted in conjunction with other offences of the 
nature of the predicate offence, which results in aggravating the sentence and 
enhancing the position of prosecution in plea-bargaining. 
of promoting the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. The conviction was based on D's purchase 
of a car, which he used within six weeks of its purchase while carrying twenty pounds of marijuana. ] 
204 See above Section 2.1. 
205 See above Section 3.4. 206 See above Section 3.2. 207 U. S. v. Bowman, 235 F. 3d 1113. 
208 Id., at 1116. 
209 U. S. v. Non-nan 143 F. 3d 375 (1998). 
210 Id., at 378. 
2 11 See supra footnotes 162 et seq. And accompanying text. 
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In addition to these forms of purposeful money laundering offences, money 
laundering law criminallses another category of conduct, which involves mere 
spending and receiving of criminal proceeds without any attempt at legitimation, 
concealment or disguise, promotion of further criminal activity or evasion of the law. 
Article 3(c)(1) of the Vienna Convention 1988 provides for this category of offences 
in a language that appears in other instruments. It stipulates that, subject to its 
constitutional principles and the basic concepts in its legal system, each State Party 
shall establish as an offence when committed intentionally: "The acquisition, 
possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt, that such property was 
derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) 
of this paragraph. " Similar language is reproduced in 6(c) of the European Laundering 
Convention. At the domestic level, the U. K. law introduces a similar offence with 
respect to the proceeds of drug trafficking and the proceeds of criminal conduct. 212 
Section 1957 of Title 18 of the United States Code creates a purposeless 
money laundering offence equivalent to those referred to here. The section is, 
however, more detailed. It provides that: "Whoever [ ... ] knowingly engages or 
attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a 
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be 
punished[. ]" 
The logic that informed this type of offence was expressed in the words of a 
Congressman defending the provision: "I am sick and tired of watching people sit 
back and say, 'I am not part of the problem, I am not committing the crime, and, 
therefore, my hands are clean even though I know the money is dirty I am handling. ['] 
The only way we will get at this problem is to let the whole community, the whole 
population, know they could very well be convicted of it if they knowingly take these 
funds. If we can make the drug dealer's money worthless, then we have really struck 
the chord, and we have hit him where he bruises, and that is right in the 
pocketbook[. ] 11213 So, in essence, this offence aims at blocking the criminals out of the 
legitimate economy completely and blocking all their transactions with this economy 
whatever its purpose. 
21 Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 51(l); Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 93B (1). 
213 H. R. Rep. No. 855,99t" Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), at 13. 
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6.3. Summation: Over-breadth and Discrepancies 
The analysis above reveals that the definition of the harm targeted by money 
laundering law occurs at different levels. This is implicit in the cases that triggered the 
legislative intervention and the debates that form its history. It is explicit in some 
policy documents that attempted to sum up the debate and inform the legislative 
efforts. Then, there is the actual translation of this harm into legal definitions, such as 
the definition of money laundering offences, and finally there is the implementation of 
money laundering law and how it affects this definition. 
The analysis above reveals that there is clear discrepancy between the policy 
definitions proposed in some of the main policy documents in the field and the 
legislative history and cases that inspired these definitions and underlined the 
legislative intervention. The policy definitions tended to be much broader than the 
cases that instigated the concern and raised the alarm. This breadth was incorporated 
into the legal definitions of the offences of money laundering, which tended to be 
open ended and unqualified. The only restriction of the actus reus in a money 
laundering offence tends to be the criminal source of the funds. Apart from that, the 
acts forming the offence are general enough to encompass any possible handling of 
these proceeds. Further, the purpose of the acts is also all encompassing. 
While one should not generalise and speak of "a general enforcement policy" 
with impunity, it remains safe to say that over-breadth of the definitions has resulted 
in an incoherent enforcement policy, to say the least. Further, in a country, like the 
United States, with aggressive enforcement policy, the implementation of money 
laundering law has exploited all the pen-nissiveness of the concepts and has resulted in 
applying it to cases that depart starkly from the situations originally targeted. 
These issues are serious in the context of criminal law enforcement in that they 
undermine fundamental legal principles. For example, the principle of legality 
mandates that there is no crime without a law. A broad legal definition that fails to put 
those concerned on sufficient notice would fail to satisfy the mandates of the principle 
of legality. Further, this extensive prosecutorial discretion would undermine the 
principle of equality before the law: equal cases will be treated unequally. 
One question that needs an answer at this stage is: should the law be refined to 
reflect more strictly the policies that triggered it? Answering this question is 
contingent on a clearer understanding of the purposes of money laundering law and 
the harrn that it seeks to prevent. 
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7. Conclusion 
Money laundering law has evolved rapidly over the past three decades. As discussed 
above, its evolution has gone through four clearly defined phases. The 1970s 
constituted a phase of incipience that concentrated on the preventive aspect of money 
laundering law and mainly localised in the United States. Limited international 
developments have also taken place. The 1980s was a decade of maturation where 
money laundering law acquired strongly repressive and international dimensions. 
Supranationalisation of money laundering law emerged with the first days of the 
1990s, institutionalised in the creation of the FATF. Finally and abruptly, a new phase 
commenced with the events of September 11, which generated anti-money laundering 
measures that are less inhibited by considerations of legal principles and that brought 
the exceptionality of money laundering law into stark relief 
In discussing the historical evolution of money laundering law, it becomes 
apparent that it has emerged as a response to law enforcement concerns in cases that 
involved sophisticated forms of criminality and large sums of money. Law 
enforcement officers became aware of the nexus between financial institutions and 
criminal money transfers, and the ways in which this association facilitates the 
transfer of money beyond their jurisdiction and defeats their law enforcement efforts. 
The result of this recognition was a plethora of legislative activity at national, 
international, regional and supranational levels. 
The legal regime that emerged is multifaceted. Its complexity leaves ample 
scope for confusion and incoherence. In order to structure the analysis of the scope of 
the law and to assess its coherence and its purpose, this Chapter proceeded from a 
definition of money laundering, as the harrn that this body of law seeks to avert. The 
analysis revealed that there is a clear discrepancy between the legislative policy as 
distilled from the legislative history of the main legal instruments and the legal 
definitions of the offences. It has been argued that the legislative definitions of money 
laundering offences have tended towards over-breadth exceeding the original 
situations that the law sought to tackle. This over-breadth has resulted in inconsistent 
enforcement policies and ones that further broadened the net of the law by lax 
interpretation. Over-breadth of penal provisions constitutes a breach of the principle 
of legality as a fundamental principle of criminal justice. It also grants very wide 
70 
prosecutorial discretion in a manner that undermines the principle of equality before 
the law. 
A basic question that needs to be addressed is whether the law needs to be 
refined to reflect the issues that triggered the legislative intervention. Answering this 
question requires deeper understanding of the purposes that money laundering law 
seek to serve and the harm that it purports to control. Such understanding cannot be 
achieved without a contextual analysis of the social circumstances in which money 
laundering law has evolved. This is the task assumed in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, and as money laundering law was unfolding, lawyers, 
sociologists, economists, political scientists, and many others had been noticing an 
unfamiliar intensification of a number of disparate phenomena in their surroundings: 
* production processes were being fragmented and stretched across borders; 
* the number of transnational non-governmental organisations have increased 
phenomenally; 
e companies with foreign operations have increased and the assets of the larger 
ones exceed the GNP of various countries; 
e intemational organisations such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank 
were acquiring greater powers and competence; 
9 the cross-border criminal organisations have developed economic power that 
rivals that of the multinational corporations; 
communication technology were progressing at an unprecedented rate; 
countries worldwide were changing their regulatory regimes towards more 4- 4 
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liberalisation; 
e separatist and fundamentalist movements have acquired new momentum all 
around the world; and 
* individual national governments were increasingly unable to control their 
territories and enforce national policies. 
In their attempts to understand these various phenomena, analysts from the 
different disciplines discovered an intricate web of causal relations that linked them all 
into a single set of intertwined processes. This unity has been expressed in the 
emergence of the terrn 'globalisation' To describe this set of seemingly disparate 
processes. This Chapter attempts to devise a possible working framework of analyses of 
globalisation that could be useful for the purposes of policyinakers, lawyers, and legal 
academics generally, and for understanding money laundering law more specifically. In 
so doing , this Chapter explores a number of those relevant themes. First, the next 
section addresses what globalisation means, using cross-disciplinary insight and 
developing a definitional framework that will form the basis for the understanding of the 
reasons for the emergence of money laundering law, the purposes that it seeks to serve 
and the methods that it employs to serve these purposes. Building on this framework, the 
following section will address how globalisation came about by discussing the two 
primary instruments of globalisation, i. e., technology and regulation. Subsequently, the 
temporal scope of the study will be defined by establishing the historical parameters of 
globalisation. This will be followed by an essential analysis of globalisation as a legal 
problematic. It is this analysis and the outline of possible solutions that will be used to 
analyse money laundering law as a legal response in the three subsequent Chapters of this 
volume. 
2. Deflnition: What is Globalisation? 
The use of the word 'globe' to refer to our planet dates back to the sixteenth century 
when Magellan circled the earth and proved beyond doubt that it has a spherical shape. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary it was not until 1892 that the word 'global' 
began to be used to mean, "involving the whole world". ' 'Globalise' and ' lobalism', on 9 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary 582 (2 nd ed. 1989). 
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the other hand, were not coined until 1944. ' Despite sporadic references to the concepts 
of globalism and globality in academic writing during the 1960s and the 1970s, the term 
globalisation did not acquire its academic significance until the mid 1980s. Since then it 
has pervaded every discipline and many other languages across the world have coined 
similar terms. ' 
The ten-n's popularity did not serve the cause for precision and clarity. 
Journalists, politicians, and business gurus used the word global'sation extensively to 
denote a variety of meanings, or even no meaning at all. Within academic discourse, the 
term was further muddled partly because of cross-disciplinary discourse and partly 
because it was often used loosely to give a pretence of novelty to old debates. The 
situation was not any better in legal debate, despite the more pressing need for precision. 
For this reason, this section attempts to clarify the evolving concept of globalisation in a 
way that provides a better foundation for the debate over legal implications of this 
process. 
The study of globalisation is exemplary of the fusion of disciplines at the end of 
4 the twentieth century. Contrasted with the Nineteenth century, where disciplinarity and 
specialisation find their origin, the second half of the Twentieth century has witnessed an 
accelerated fusion between disciplines induced by growing consciousness of the inter- 
links between the various social and natural phenomena. ' While cross-disciplinary 
enquiry is inevitable for understanding such a comprehensive social process as 
globalisation, the task is not easy. Each discipline has its own terminology and internal 
debates. To benefit from the various disciplinary insights, one must master the 
terminology and grasp the analysis without getting entangled in the internal debates. 
2 Reiser, 0., and Davies, B., "Planetary Democracy: an Introduction to Scientific Humanism and Applied 
Semantics" (1944), cited in Scholte, J., Globalization. - A Critical Introduction 43 (2000). 
3 For a survey of such terms see Scholte, id,, at 43 3. 
4 Robertson, R., Globalization. - Social Theoiy and Global Culture (1992), at 165. "It is in fact a field of 
disciplinary, interdisciplinary, metadisciplinary, and paradisciplinary contestation. " 
5 For a case for the fusion of social sciences see Wallerstein, I., Some Reflections on History, the Social 
Sciences, and Politics, in Wallerstem, L (ed. ), The Capitalist World-Economy vil (1979). For a case for the 
1111 Co unity of knowledge and the fusion of humanities, natural, and soc al sciences see Wilson, E., nsilience. - 
The Unity of Knowledge (1998), at 3. 
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The main disciplines that contributed to the analysis of globalisation are 
Sociology,, International Relations, ' Economics, ' Political Geography' and 
Communication Studies. " In their examination of the process they vacillate between two 
sets of questions: the process of globalisation and how that process affects their 
disciplines and the standard debates within those disciplines. The present author is only 
concerned with the first set of questions, which centres on a number of specific themes: 
definition (ff'hat is globalisation? ); 
evidence (Is it a reality orfantasy? ); 
history (Mien did it start? ); 
causes (Why and how did it happen? ); 
" measurement (Miat is the extent ofglobalisation? ), - 
" implications (How does it affect our social institutions? ); 
" evaluation (Is it good or bad? ); and 
" future (ff'hat is the outcome of the process and is it reversible? ). 
2.1. Cross Disciplinary Analysis 
The problem of defining globalisation cannot be exaggerated; it is the first problem that 
faces the student of globalisation. This initial lack of agreement on a definition 
undermines all the debates over the reality, the value, the implications, and the future of 
globalisation. 
Analysts fail to agree with each other simply because they are referring to 0 
different things. To some, globalisation is nothing but intensive market liberalisation. 
6 See Waters, M., Globalization (1995); Robertson, R., supra note 4; Giddens, A., The Consequences of 
Modernity (1991); Featherstone, M. (ed. ), Global Culture. - Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity A 
Theoty, Culture &Society (1990). 
' See Scholte, supra note 2; Baylis, J., and Smith, S. (eds. ) The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations (1997); Rosenau, J., Turbulance in World Politics: A Theoiy of 
Change and Continuity (1990). 
8 See Reich, R., The Work ofNations. - Preparing Ourselves For 2 Ist Century Capitalism (199 1); Hirst, P., 
and Thompson, G., Globalization in Question. - The International Economy and The Possibilities of 
Governance (1996). 
9 Harvey, D., The Condition of Postmodernity An Enquiiy Into the Origins of Cultural Change (1990); 
Harvey, D., Spaces of Hope (2000). 
10 McLuhan, M., Understanding Media: The Extensions ofMan (1964); Ferguson, M., "Electronic Media 
and the Redefining of Time and Space" in Ferguson, M. (ed. ), Public Communication: The New 
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This definition makes the term simply another vehicle for the debate over free trade 
versus protectionism and market economy versus command and control. To others, 
globalisation and intemationalisation are synonymous, pre-empting any debates about the 
implications of the process for governance and other social structures on the ground that 
there is nothing new to discuss. " 
Another strand of the globalisation analysis has confused the concept with 
unification or homogenisation. This confusion is partly linguistic. Unified or all- 
inclusive was one meaning that the word global has acquired during its hiStory. 12 A 
certain strand within cultural studies that emphasised the emergence of a common 
consumer culture specifically promoted this meaning. According to this view, common 
patterns of consumption create a collective identity based on those consumption 
patterns. " Products consumed worldwide, like Coca-Cola, McDonalds, and Levis, are 
more than simple consumption items catering to specific needs; instead they are modes of 
self-expression and source of identity. " The spread of such consumption items across the 
world and the value connotations attached to them have led some to speak of global 
cultural homogeneity, i. e., globalisation as homogenisation. 
The concepts of 'interdependence' and 'transnationalisation' are yet another two 
concepts that figure extensively in the writings on 'globalisation' and are often used 
synonymously. In fact, many issues currently discussed under the heading of 
globalisation were discussed in the 1970s and 1980s under the headings of 
interdependence and transnationalisation. " In other words, these two concepts actually 
preceded globalisation and were later integrated within it. 
Interdependence "refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among 
Imperatives. - Future Directionsfor Media Research (1990); Ferguson, M., "The Mythology of 
Globalization", 7 Eur. J. Corrun. 69 (1992). 
1 For a review of the various usage of the term that confuses it with other concepts see Scholte, supra note 
2, at 44-46 (listing four redundant concepts of globalisation: globalisation as internationalisation, 
liberalisation, universalisation, or westemisation). 
12 The Oxford English Dictiotiary 582 (2 nd ed. 1989). 
13 Ferguson, M., supra note 10 (1992), at 80. 
14 Waters., supra note 6, at 140. 
15 See, e. g., Keohane, R., and Nye, J., Power and h7terdependence: World Politics hi Transitioii (1977); 
Rosenau, J., The Study of Global h2terdepeiidence. - Essaýys oii the Traiisnationalization of World Affairs 
(1980); Artis, M., and Ostry, S., hiternatio7ial Emiomic Policy Coordbiation (1986). 
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countries or among actors in different countries. "" In other words, it means that what 
happens in one country affects or deten-nines what happens in another country. 
Transnationalisation, on the other hand, refers to a State of affairs where the States are no 
longer the only actors and where cross-border relations are taking place between non- 
state entities such as corporations, civil associations, or individuals. " The concepts of 
interdependence and transnationalisation are linked causally. Transnational relations 
work as transmission belts, making each country more sensitive to what happens in 
another country. Hence, transnational relations cause and intensify the condition of 
interdependence. " This section will not discuss at this stage the differences and the links 
between those two concepts and the concept of globalisation, but will later on in this 
paper. 
So far this Chapter has indicated that the term globalisation has been used to mean 
liberalisation, internationalisation, homogenisation, interdependence, or 
transnationalisation. Many globalisation theorists were discontent with this situation. 
They believed that if globalisation is to become a conceptual tool for the analysis of 
social change, then it must have a distinct meaning. For this reason they directed their 
attention to defining the concept in a way that distinguishes it from all other related 
concepts. 
David Harvey refers to "time-space compression"" as characteristic of our 
contemporary condition. Roland Robertson while accepting the "compression of the 
world" as the objective aspect of globalisation finds "the intensification of consciousness 
of the world as whole"" to be the subjective element of the process and the most 
distinctive feature of globalisation in its contemporary form. Anthony Giddens, on the 
other hand, emphasises what he calls "the disembedding of social systems, " meaning "the 
'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring 
across indefinite spans of time-space. "" He defined globalisation as "the development of 
16 Keohane, R., and Nye, J., supra note 15, at 8. 
17 See id. at 24-25. 
18 Id. at 26. 
19 Harvey, supra note 9, at 240. 
20 Robertson, supra note 4, at S. 
21 Giddens, supra note 6, at 2 1. 
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social and economic relationships stretching world-wide. "" Jan Aart Scholte defines 
globalisation as "the rise of 'supraterritorial' relations between peoples. 9121 These 
relations transcend territorial space 2' and are not constrained by "location, distance, and 
borders. ')125 Malcolm Waters similarly defines globalisation; it is "[a] social process in 
which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in 
which people become increasingly aware that they are receding. 9126 
In addition to these definitions, which could be said to emphasise the core or 
catalyst of social change, one encounters another set of definitions emphasising the 
direction of this change, i. e., where this process of globalisation is heading. According to 
the Encyclopaedia of Business and Management: "Globalization is the process of 
increasing integration in world civilization. "" Richard O'Brien speaks of the "end of 
geography" and asserts that we reach this condition only as the "nation becomes 
irrelevant" and a "global, integral whole" emerges. " Anthony Giddens asserts that "for 
some purposes we have to regard the world as forming a single social order. "" 
In sum, globalisation has been used by some as synonymous with already existing 
concepts such as internationalisation, liberalisation, homogenisation, interdependence, 
and transnationalisation. While these processes are linked to the process of globalisation 
in various ways, globalisation theorists rejected this confusion and worked on developing 
definitions of globalisation that bring out its distinctive characteristics. Their definitions 
of the concept are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they merely emphasise different 
aspects of the process and look at it from different angles. This Chapter develops a 
definitional framework of the concept that attempts to reconcile the previous definitions 
and to clarify the links between globalisation and other similar concepts. 
22 Giddens, A., Sociology 727 (1989). 
23 Scholte, supra note 2, at 46. 24 Id. at 48. 25 Id. at 49. 
26 Waters, supra note 6, at 3. 
27 Kogut, B., and Gittelman, M., "Globalization", in Warner, M. (ed. ), International Encyclopedia of 
Business and Management, Vol. 2 (1996). 
28 O'Brien, r., Global Financial Integration: The End of Geograpkv, (1992), at 2. 
29Giddens, supra note 22, at 727. 
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2.2. A Proposed Definition 
This part endeavours to extract out of the myriad of studies on globalisation a 
straightforward working definition for lawyers. In doing so, this Chapter will try to avoid 
what might seem to be jargon, but in describing this specific new phenomenon one must 
use some unfamiliar words for their descriptive power. Familiar words may not capture 
the idea's real content and may only continue to confuse it with older concepts. " 
Questions guiding the following analysis are: (1) What is common between the various 
new phenomena that we are witnessing around us? "; (2) What are the differences and the 
relationship between globalisation and the other concepts of liberalisation, 
internationalisation, homogenisation, interdependence, and transnationalisation?; and (3) 
How do the various definitions of globalisation fit together? 
There are two prominent features to the examples earlier discussed. 32 They all 
express a process of change or transformation, and space is a central element in this 
change. Taking the first example on the list, production is one of society's main 
economic activities. In the past, production activities used to be localised within the one 
State's territory; thus products used to have a distinct nationality. We are now witnessing 
an increasing fragmentation of the production process whereby products are the outcome 
of a series of activities stretching across various countries. As a result, it is increasingly 
difficult to determine the nationality of certain products. Robert Reich, an economist 
who built a thesis around this observation, offers the following example, "A jet air plane 
is designed in the State of Washington and in Japan, and assembled in Seattle, with tail 
cones from Canada, special tail sections from China and Italy, and engines from 
Britain. "" What is the plane's nationality as a product? Where did its production take 
place? 
The same two elements of change and space are captured in the definitions of 
globalisation surveyed above. " David Harvey talks about "time-space compression, " 
Roland Robertson discusses the "compression of the world, " Jan Aart Scholte refers to 
the "rise of supraterritorial relations, " Richard O'Brien foresees the "end of geography", 
30 See Scholte, supra note 2, at 49 . 31 See supra Part I (list of phenomena occurring over the last three decades). 
32 See id. 
33 Reich, supra note 9, at 112. 
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II Anthony Giddens emphasises "the 'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts , 
and Malcolm Waters finds the centre of change in the recession of "the constraints of 
geography on social and cultural arrangements. "" Thus, globalisation is always about 
change, which is often spatial change. 
Although the term globalisation is geographic in nature and the element of space 
is incorporated within it, it is not always about spatial change. Referring again to the list 
of phenomena at the beginning of this Chapter, the prominence of non-state actors (i. e., 
corporations, criminal organisations, civil associations, and international organisations) 
and the relative decline of State power are both important elements of the globalisation 
process. Globalisation is used for its omission of any reference to the State as much as it 
is used for its geographic connotation. When we speak of 'global' relations, we often 
mean cross-border or worldwide interactions between non-state actors. Global is used 
because it omits any reference to the State as the geographic scope of social relations and 
the dominant actor. 
This Chapter chooses to define globalisation as a process of social change of both 
geographic and political dimensions. In the geographic sense globalisation describes a 
change in the space within which we conduct our social relations and a growing 
consciousness of this spatial change. In the political sense, globalisation denotes a shift 
in the balance of power and the pre-eminence of actors away from the State to non-state 
actors. This definition is neither all-inclusive, nor is it entirely exclusive. It does not 
include within it all the characteristic features of globalisation. The definition also falls to 
indicate the distinctive direction of the spatial change and its accompanying 
consciousness, hence allowing a random number of spatial changes to fall within it. 
The only case for such a skeletal definition is that the process to which 
globalisation refers is too dialectic and complex to be compressed into a short, 
comprehensive and exclusive definition. The terms proposed above simply place 
globalisation generically within the processes of social change and identify both spatial 
change and its accompanying consciousness and political change as core features of the 
process. The proposed definitional framework also implies that there are other defining 
34 See supra, Section 1, Introduction. 
35 See Waters, supra note 6, at 3. 
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features. 
2.2.1. A Process of Social Change 
Defining globalisation as a process of social change is unhelpful without an 
understanding of what "social change" means. This is specifically important when we 
realise that change is a constant in every society. New technologies are frequently 
introduced, new laws are enacted, old laws repealed, governments change, and society's 
economic performance undergoes periodic fluctuations. Do these changes constitute 
social change? Or does social change have another more specific meaning? 
Social change is not just any change occurring within the society. Changes like 
those mentioned above might constitute triggers or symptoms of social change processes. 
They do not, however, represent processes of social change in their own right. Change 
must satisfy certain criteria in order to qualify as a form of social change. Definitions of 
social change vary. Some are more restrictive than others. One frequently quoted 
definition provides "social change is any nonrepetitive alteration in the established modes 
of behaviour in society. "" According to this definition, social change takes place only 
when the social structure is altered. " This includes changes in group relationships, group 
norms or group roles. " 
Others define social change more broadly. " They view social change more as a 
process rather than an outcome. This view encompasses a variety of changes in the 
society that could be fast or slow, incremental or comprehensive, involving individual 
modes of conduct or group norms or patterns of relationships. " The justification for this 
broad approach is that what might seem as incremental or merely quantitative form of 
change often results in more profound changes in the social structure. Social change is 
rarely revolutionary; rather, it is often incremental and cumulative. 
The debate about whether globalisation is a reality or a myth can be restated as a 
36 Friedman, L., and Landinsky, J., Law as an Instr1iment of Incremental Social Change, an unpublished 
paper first presented at the 1967 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, reprinted 
in Grossman, J., and Grossman, M. (eds. ) Law and Change in Modern Alnerica 3 (1971). 
37 Id. See also Giddens, stipra note 22, at 632-633. 
3' Friedman, L., and Landinsky, J., supra note 36. 
39 See Grossman, J., and Grossman, M. (eds. ), stipra note 36, at 3-6; see also Dodgshon, R., Society in Dine 
and Space: A Geographic Perspective on Change (2000), at 45-47 
40 Grossman, J., and Grossman, M. (eds. ), stipra note 36, at 3-6. 
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debate regarding whether globalisation constitutes a process of social change. Are there 
really significant changes to our social life that can be termed globalisation? The 
differences in answering this question can sometimes be traced back to differences in 
understanding social change. Those who view social change as essentially a 
revolutionary event of displacement where one system replaces another would tend to 
reject globalisation as a process of social change. This is simply because our social 
institutions, such as capitalism, as a mode of production and the State as an institution of 
governance seem to remain in place. Others who define social change more broadly and 
include within its scope changes that are short of displacement tend to view globalisation 
as a very complex and far reaching process of social change that might eventually settle 
into more radical systemic changes. 
This Chapter clearly subscribes to a broad definition of social change and places 
globalisation categorically within its boundaries. Capitalism remains the dominant mode 
of production while undergoing significant changes. With the expansion of 
commodification, " capitalism is expanding by creating new objects of accumulation. " 
The corporation as the main vehicle or organisational structure of capitalism is also 
subject to fundamental changes. " The market as the main institution for distribution is 
expanding geographically into new areas. The State as the dominant structure of 
governance for the past two centuries continues subject to fundamental changes in its role 
and relationship to other institutions and even to the individual. These changes in our 
social life qualify severely and collectively as forms of social change under the broader 
approach to the concept and possibly under the more restrictive approach. 
Continuity is always an element in change. This is even more important to 
acknowledge in studying globalisation. The process of globalisation creates new 
institutions and relationships while maintaining the older ones. The State, for example, 
continues as a governing structure but multinational organisations and private actors 
emerge as agents of governance. The role of the State is redefined, but only in some 
contexts. In certain respects it continues to play its governance role in the same old ways. 
41 Commodification means turning a product into a commodi I market to create 
surplus. Scholte, supi-a note 2, at 112. 
that is exchanged on the 
42 Id., at 112-124. 
43 Id., at 124-130. 
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This pattern of change repeatedly emerges in discussing any aspect of the change 
introduced by the globalisation process and must be considered in devising any tools to 
deal with its outcomes. " 
Some of the changes in our social life that are taking place are directly reducible 
to the spatial element of globalisation, namely, the alteration in the geography of social 
relations. Others, however, are not. Globalisation as a process of social change is C 
therefore larger than its geographic aspect and its consequences. As indicated earlier, 
globalisation refers not only to the geographic expansion beyond the State, but also to its 
partial loss of power in favour of other actors. 
2.2.2. Spatial and Political Dimensions 
Attempts at describing the process of globalisation have often referred to the 
compression of the world. This compression is essentially a technological achievement. 
If distance is measured by the time it takes to cross it, then technologies that reduce that 
time compresses the world. Technologies achieving significant reduction in the time to 
cross distances are not new. They date back to the invention of the self-propelled ships, 
the railway, the telegraph, and the aeroplane. Such technologies rendered the world 
significantly smaller but yet not small enough. The current period is significant because 
of the instantaneousness with which distance can be crossed. This distinguishes 
globalisation from trarisnationalisation. The latter still involves crossing distances over 
time. It still involves here and there albeit they are both considerably proximate. 
Satellite communication and the Internet, on the other hand, make individual instant 
contact between distant places possible, and thus obliterate distance for a lot of practical 
purposes. 
It follows then that if the difference between here and there is the distance 
between them, and the distance is measured by the time it takes to cross it, then a 
technological innovation reducing that time to a virtual zero has the effect of 
compressing here and there into a single place. If that technology spans the globe and 
connects various localities, then one can say that the whole world is being compressed 
44 This salient feature of change in the context of globalisation leads commentators to constantly qualify 
their thesis on globalisation with a series of 'buts'. See Scholte, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
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into a single place. Globalisation is about this instantaneous coverage of distance. It is 
'k 
anL, OUt compression of the world down to a single place. 
The compression of the world changes the space within which we conduct our 
social life. This change has far reaching implications for every aspect of life. The 
spatial boundaries of our social life determine to a very far degree our economic 
activities, our modes of governance, our cultural values and symbols, and our communal 
relations. " A number of differences, for example, between the hunting and gathering 
societies and the agrarian societies developed out of the change in the space within which 
they lived. This change influenced their family, governance and religious structures. For 
this reason, the impact of globalisationon on our social life and its political, cultural, and 
economic structures preoccupies students of globalisation and triggers a process of 
redefinition within all disciplines, including the legal one. 
David Harvey and Roland Robertson both focus on the compression of space. By 
contrast, all the other surveyed definitions focus on the way social relations are 
positioned in this new space. When Jan Aart Scholte speaks about the rise of 
supraterritoriality and Anthony Giddens refers to the ... lifting out' of social relations from 
the locality", what they are actually saying is that the compression of the world affects 
social relations by taking them out of the territory of the nation-state and stretching them 
across the world. The social relations are no longer localised; they no longer take place 
within a specific locality. They are happening on earth, but where on earth we cannot 
specify without resorting to arbitrariness or formality. Malcolm Waters and Richard 
O'Brien also had a similar approach; they were both concerned that the compression of 
the world renders the geographic constraints on social relations irrelevant. 
Speaking of compression of space may give the impression that all our social 
relations and processes are happening within this new space and that locality or 
territoriality no longer exists, it is very important to dispel such a perception immediately. 
As indicated earlier, Globalisation creates new space for our social relations, but it does 
not totally replace the old one. The 'global' and the 'local' coexist, and that is what 
makes understanding and organising our social life at the beginning of the twenty-first It) 
45 See id, at 46. For a discussion of the importance of space in understanding social change see Dodgshon, 
supra note 39. 
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century more difficult. " 
This contrast between the various definitions indicates that our concern with 
globalisation is not concern with the instantaneous physical connection between the 
various localities, but with the implications for our social structures: economic, political, 
and cultural. On this basis it is important to remember that while the compression of the 
world and the consciousness of this compression are core elements of globalisation, the 
term is encompasses a much broader process of change that is often political in nature. 
2.2.3. Consciousness as an Element 
In reality, the globe is still as big as it has always been. The world did not 
compress in a physical sense. It compressed in our perception just because we are 
capable through technological means to stretch ourselves across and reach its furthest 
ends in virtually no time. For this reason our consciousness of the compression is as 
much an element of the definition of globalisation as is the new global space that 
technological capabilities have made possible. For some, this consciousness is actually 
the most distinctive feature of our contemporary glob alisation. " It is expressed in the 
extensive use of the words 'global' and 'globalisation' in daily parlance and the 
emergence of equivalent terms in all the main languages around the world. It is also 
expressed in our persistent concern With orgaiiising the whole world, i. e., with the 
problem of global governance. " 
Satellite communication technologies obliterating distance are now available for 
the individual. They are home commodities in increasing parts of the world. For this 
reason, the consciousness of the world as a single place or at least as a small place is 
happening at the individual level. The process of globalisation is a micro level process 
not just a macro level process. This distinguishes it very clearly from the processes of 
46 This point is made repeatedly by writers on globalisation. See, e. g., Harvey, D., The Condition of 
Postinodernity, supra note 9, at 293-296 (indicating that collapse of spatial barriers in certain respects 
accentuates the importance of locality). 
47 Robertson, supra note 4, at 78 ("'Globality' refers to the circumstance of extensive awareness of the 
world as a whole[. ]"). 48 Id., at 54. 
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internationalisation and interdependence. " In both those processes the focus has been on 
the relationships between macro entities, mainly between the States. Both Roland 
Robertson" and Jan Aart Scholte trace this consciousness back to the 1960s and explain it 
by media developments in that decade. According to Scholte, "[g]lobal consiousness 
perhaps gained its single greatest boost by the transworld publication in 1966 of pictures 
taken from outer space showing the earth as one location. "5' 
Incorporating our consciousness of the world as an element of the 
definition of globalisation expresses a certain reality. Globalisation would not have 
happened without human interference. This is not just because technologies are human 
inventions, but also because to use technologies we must allow such usage by enacting 
enabling laws and regulations. Globalisation theorists express this fact by saying that 
globalisation is a reflexive process ; 52 It occurs as a result of endogenous as well as 
exogenous factors. " In conclusion, for working purposes, this Chapter suggests the 
following definition: Globalisation is a process of social change that is identified with 
and substantially triggered by a change in the space within which we conduct our social 
relations. Both the objective geographic change and the subjective consciousness of this 
change are defining elements of this process. Globalisation is distinct from 
interriationalisation, liberalisation, homogenisation, transnationalisation, and 
interdependence. However, each of these processes has influenced as well as been 
influenced by the globalisation process. 
3. Causes: How Did Globalisation Happen? 
The question of what produced the process of globalisation is one of the main questions 
preoccuping students of this process. The causal link between globalisation and 
capitalism is fairly well established. " Rationalism, as the core structure of our 
'9 Reinicke, W., Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? (1998), 11. He makes the same 
point albeit in a narrower context. He distinguishes between globalisation and interdependence by 
describing the former as microeconomic process while the latter is a macroeconomic one. 
50 Robertson, R., supra note 4, at 9. 
51 Scholte, J., supra note 3, at 85. 
52 Robertson, SUPra note 5, at 13 (distinguishing between globalisation theory and world system theory on 
the basis that the former's focus on the reflexivity of globalisation and the latter focuses on the systernic 
character of the world as a whole). 
53 Kogut, B., and Gittelman, M., supra note 27, at 1650. 
54 Waters, M., supra note 6, at 19-26; Scholte, supra note 2, at 95-99 . 
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knowledge, is also contended as another force behind the process. " The most cited cause 
of globalisation, however, is technology. Clearly technology is a main direct cause of 
globalisation. Technology is an instrument, an answer to how globalisation happened 
rather than why it happened. However, closely interconnected with the technological 
advance is regulation. 
3.1. The Obvious: Technology 
As previously indicated, globalisation has a subjective element consisting of the growing 
consciousness of the geographical change of our social relati and a material or onsi 
objective element. The material element finds its core in the actual geographical change 
of social relations In addition to this geographic core, globalisation in its material aspect 
is a much broader and dialectic process. One part of this process, which is discussed later 
and is paramount and specifically relevant to the present thesis, is the rearrangement of 
State power and the emergence of powerful non- state actors. Each of the elements of 
globalisation is to a significant degree a technological achievement. There is a consensus 
amongst writers on globýalisation that technology is the sine qua non cause of this 
process. 56 
Satellite pictures of the planet in 1966 showing earth as a single place were 
probably responsible for formulating our consciousness of earth as one place. " Satellite 
broadcast, the telephone, and the Internet continue to confirm this consciousness by 
bringing images of one distant locality to another, allowing us to follow events happening 
thousands of miles away as they take place and to communicate on real time basis across 
such distances. This instantaneous communication across the planet through computer 
mediated telecornmunication compresses space and obliterates distance, thus changing 
the geography of social relations. 
Technological innovations that freed individual exchanges from the geographic 
55 Scholte, supra note 2, at 93-95. 
56 For a pioneer and insightful account, albeit lacking in academic quality, of how technology brought about 
globalisation, see McLuhan, M., supra note 10, at I "After three thousand years of explosion, by means of 
fragmentary and mechanical technologies, the Western world is imploding. During the mechanical ages we 
extended our bodies in space. Today after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our 
central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is 
concerned. " 
57 Scholte, J., supi-a note 2, at 85. 
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confinement of State boundaries have dealt a blow to State power and have forced the 
State to reconsider its mechanisms of governance. Digital technologies that enhance 
exponentially the storage and processing of data further accentuate the need for change in 
State power or governance. Such technologies have ended the State monopoly over 
information and have made previously inconceivable amounts of information available to 
the individual and to private entities, thus reconfiguring the power relationship between 
the State and the citizenry. 
The foregoing paragraphs stated how technology helped bring about the three 
core aspects of globalisation. Certain areas of technological innovation were specifically 
instrumental in bringing about this change in our social life. Information technologies are 
the primary catalyst of this transformation. " Information technology is a broad term that 
includes both information processing and communication, i. e., computing and 
telecommunication technologies. 
Telecommunication means communication at a distance. Attempts at 
communicating at a distance date back to the beginnings of history where people used 
drums, fire and smoke signals. " The starting point, however, of what one commentator 
described as "distanceless" communication" is the advent of the telegraph in the 1840s. 
With this invention, messages could cross distance at unprecedented speed by using of 
electricity. The invention of telephony soon after has made instantaneous voice 
communication across borders possible. 
Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century and after 150 years of inventions 
and discoveries, the world is covered by a web of global information flows linking its 
remotest localities. By 1990, cross-border direct dial telephones were available in over 
200 countries. In the mid 1990s, the Cable News Network (CNN) claimed that "its 
transmission from seventeen satellites reached some 123 million reception points in 
5' There is large body of scholarship that studies the current process of social change as an information 
revolution in which globalisation is only an outcome and a single aspect of a much larger process. See 
Bell, D., The Coming of Post-Industrial Society A Venture in Social Forecasting (1973); Castells, M., The 
Rise of the Network Society (1996); Hepworth, M., Geography of the Infoi-mation Economy, in Studies in 
the Information Economy: Urban and Regional Develoment (1989). 
59 For a brief and inforrriative history of telecommunication see Kaiser, T., et al., The FHTE Web Histom, of 
Telecommunication (1996), available at www. fht-esslingen. de/telehistory/indexhaupt. htnil (last visited on 
Dec. 18,2000). 
60 Scholte, supra note 2, at 66. 
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around 140 countries. "" By mid-1998, the Internet, which started in 1969 by the U. S. 
Department of Defence as a communication network to be used in the case of a nuclear 
attack, has secured 140 million users worldwide. " The Internet is the global technology D 
par excellence. It can transfer massive amounts of information around the world 
instantaneously and cheaply. Through developments in computers, this information tool 
has become available to the individual, sometimes even at the comfort of his own office 
or home. 
Telecommunication technology has thus compressed space, obliterated distance 
and removed the geographic constraints on social interaction. Information processing 
technologies have in their turn made massive amounts of information available very 
cheaply. The history of modem computers dates back to the Second World War where 
computing machines were developed to carry out military functions, such as designing 
missiles or breaking secret codes. " Computers in their early years were bulky expensive 
machines available only to governments or large corporations with very limited 
operational capacity by today's standards. Not until 1958 and the invention of the 
Integrated Circuit did computers become increasingly smaller, cheaper and more 
efficient. In 1971, the microprocessor was invented. It allowed all the components of a 
computer to be placed on one minuscule chip. This has opened the door for the 
manufacturing and commercialisation of the microcomputer in 1975, followed by the 
Personal Computer (PC) in 1981. With these developments, computer power became 
available to the ordinary person and ceased to be the monopoly of large entities, such as 
the State or the large business corporation. 
According to 'Moore's Law', the pace of technological innovation is such that 
microchip capacity doubles every eighteen months. Although this rule was first proposed 
in 1965, it has only been confirmed in the past three decades. This simply means an 
exponential increase in our information processing speed and capacity. It also means 
smaller and cheaper computers. In 1960, the average cost of processing information was 
61 Id. at 75-76. 
62 UNDP, Hunian Development Report (1999), at 58, available at http: //www. undp. org/hdro/report. html. 
ýIast visited December 18,2000). 
3 For a brief history of computing, see Jones International, Computers. - History and 
Development in Jones 
Telecommunications & Multimedia Encyclopedia (1999), available at 
www. digitalcentury. com/encyclo/update/comp_hd. htn-d (last visited Dec. 18,2000). 
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$75 per million operations. By 1990, this cost fell to less than one-hundredth of a cent. ' 
This decline in cost meant decline in the price of computers making them affordable to 
the average individual of medium to high income. In 1977, an executive in the computer 
industry said: "there is no reason why anyone would want a computer in their home. " 
Two decades later, around 100 million households in the United States and Europe have 
at least one computer at home. " 
Transport technologies are another area of technological innovation relevant to 
the process of globalisation. Commercial aviation was introduced in the late 1950s. In 
1997, the number of passengers using domestic and international commercial flights was 
1.5 billion per annum. " Equally revolutionary developments in the transportation of 
goods in the 1950s have been directly connected to the increase in international trade in 
the second half of the twentieth century. 67 The introduction of standardised metal 
containers that could be separated from lorry's chassis loaded onto ships and later on 
unloaded onto lorries at the country of destination has cut the costs of transportation 
precipitously. Such developments in the transportation of goods have made the export of 
many goods economically viable when it would not have been with older methods of 
transportation. 
In summary, each aspect of the process of globalisation can be traced back to 
some technological]. development. Even our capacity to aff ct the global environment is 
technological in nature. This environmentally damaging impact can be traced back to the 
industrial revolution, the discovery of fossil energy and its use in large-scale 
mechanisation. 
3.2. The Role ofLaw and Regulation 
3.2.1. In General 
Technology is an indispensable instrument of globalisation. Its globalising 
potential, however, is influenced and shaped by laws and regulations. Globalisation, as 
we understand it today, is a conscious process. People perceive the world as a single or 
64 Castells, M., supra note 58, at 45. 
65 LJNDP, supra note 62, Box 2.1, available at hq: //www. undp. org/hdro/report. htn-ý. 
66 Scholte, J., supra note 2, at 76. 
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compressed space laws and regulations enable the technology to achieve its globalising 
potential and allow human activity to stretch across borders. Laws and regulations also 
help create powerful non-state actors, such as international organisations and 
corporations, by permitting such actors to come into being and to acquire their sources of 
power. 
Although one should not exaggerate the autonomy of regulation from 
technological pressures, history provides many examples of the restrictive impact of 
regulation on the globalising potential of technology. In the early years of the radio, 
Marconi Company prohibited its operators fTom communicating with other radio 
operators, thus putting a cap on the potential of radio as an instrument of instant 
communication across distance. This prohibition manifest in the Titanic disaster where 
the absence of standardised radio-operating procedures deprived the ship from rescue it 
could have otherwise secured. " Another example can be found in the area of air 
transport. In 1944, U. S. president Franklin Roosevelt convened the International Civil 
Aviation Conference in Chicago with the aim of engendering a freedom of the skies. The 
Soviet Union decided to withdraw from the conference at the last moment and denied 
other countries the right to fly over its territory. It then created a distinct regulatory 
system for the Eastern Bloc. This action significantly limited the global reach of aviation 
and created barriers between nations that belonged to separate regulatory arrangements. " 
Intellectual property laws provide a more relevant example. By legally creating 
property rights to inventions and other intellectual productions, such as computer 
software, the price of technology rises to a degree that might be, absent other safeguards, 
prohibitive to poorer countries. Globalisation is in essence a technological achievement. 
Therefore, preventing the larger part of the world from accessing the technologies that 
underlie global telecommunication through fierce application of intellectual property 
rights will inevitably result in limiting the reach of telecommunication technologies to a 
much smaller segment of the globe. " 
But what have laws and regulations actually contributed to bringing about our 
67 For an interesting brief account of developments in 'containerisation' and its link to trade, see Delivei-ing C) 
the Goods, (Economist, Schools Brief, Nov. 15 -21,1997), 
68 Braithwaite, J., and Drahos, P., Global Business Regulatioi7 (2000), at 328. 
69 Id. at 455. 
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contemporary condition of globalisation? In 1995, the U. S. Department of Commerce 
issued its policy paper 'Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation' in 
which it outlined the regulatory framework necessary to "create a global information 
network that transmits messages and images with the speed of light from the largest city 
to the smallest village. Through the interconnection of disparate but interoperable 
networks, these information highways will allow us to communicate as a global 
community. . . 
"' The regulatory framework envisioned for the creation of this 'global 
community' is based on global market access measures including: Standardisation or 
harmonisation, privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation. These four categories 
provide a reasonable statement of the regulatory policies that have enabled globalisation 
in the past three decades. 
3.2.2. Standardisation and Han-nonisation 
Legal hannonisation is the convergence between the rules set by different 
governments. While standardisation is often used interchangeably with harmonisation, 
the term actually has somewhat different meaning in certain contexts. Specifically 
relevant to this discussion is the meaning of 'standardisation) as a technical form of 
harmonisation pertaining to the product specifications. Such specifications may be 
relevant to the method oj'Lproduction, to the product's function or to its Interoperability 
with other products. 72 
Harmonisation , in a general sense, plays an important role in the context of 
intense global or even merely transnational relations. Govenu-nents often resort to 
harmonisation as a response to globalisation or transnationalisation and as a way of 
dealing with the problems that such cross border relations may impose. Harmonisation of 
money laundering laws and regulations is an example of the use of han-nonisation to 
counter the problems of globalisation. Harmonisation has, however, been instrumental in 
bringing about globalisation. Telecommunication as the primary instrument of 
70 LYNDP, supra note 62,69-70 (1999), available at http: //www. undp. org/hdro/report. html. 
71 U. S. Department of Commerce, Global Inforination Infi-astructure (GII). - Agendafor Cooperation, at 26, 
available at htti): //www. iitef nist. gov/documents/docs/. gii/giiagend. htn-il (last visited Nov. 8,200 1). 
72 Braithwaite, J., and Drahos, P., supra note 68, at 332; OECD, Regulatory Refor? n and International 
Standardisation, Working Party of the Trade Committee, TT 19-2 1, OECD Doc. TD/TC/WP(98)36/FINAL 
(1998). 
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globalisation would not be possible without standardisation. " Any form of 
communication, for example language, assumes agreement on the symbols and the codes 
of this communication. In the early years of the telegraph, each State unilaterally set its 
own standards. This resulted in significant impediments to cross-border communication. 
In some instances , it was necessary for the telegraph operator to physically cross the 
border in order to hand a message to his counterpart on the other side. " Exasperation 
with this type of problem and the international community's desire for a more efficient 
cross-border communication led to convening the International Telecommunication 
Conference in 1865. This conference carried out the first standardisation effort by 
designating Morse code as the preferred code for the telegram. 15 The Conference also 
established the International Telegraph Union (ITU) in 1865 as one of the first two 
international organisations" for the purpose of providing a forum within which countries 
can develop and co-ordinate the telegraph standards and procedures in order to achieve 
interoperability. 
During its 135 years of history, ITU has expanded its jurisdiction to new 
technologies. It brought long distance telephony under its auspices in 1925 and 
radiotelegraphy in 1927. In 1934, ITU evolved into the International Telecommunication 
Union, with the French providing telecommunication as an alternative and more generic 
term that encompasses the widening scope of technologies that the Union co-ordinates 
and regulates . 
77 In the 1970s, this scope further expanded to include satellite 
communication. 78 
The ITU performs its standardisation functions through a complex web of 
international telecommunication standardisation conferences, study and expert groups, 
committees, and scientific organisations. The increasing complexity of the 
73 The U. S. Government in its policy document on the implementation of the GII stated: 
"An essential technical element ... is interoperability, i. e., the ability to connect applications, services, 
and/or network components so that they can be used together to accomplish tasks. As the GII will be based 
on many different existing and emerging components at local, national and global levels, It Is Imperative 
that these components be interoperable. The key to interoperability is the development of global standards. " 
U. S. Department of Commerce, stipra note 71, at 12. 
74 Braithwaite, J., and Drahos, P., supra note 68, at 332. 
75 George A. Codding, "The International Telecommunications Union: 130 Years of Telecommunications 
Regulation", 23 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 501 (1995). 
76 The other one is The Universal Postal Union. 
77 For a brief history of ITU, see Codding, slipra note 78, at 502. 
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telecommunication regulations drafted by the technical committees forced States in 1973 
to delegate their sovereignty. The States granted the Telegraph and Telephone 
regulations direct enforceability by national administrations or private operating agencies 
without further requiring the official endorsement of governments in an international 
conference . 
7' The standardisation operations by ITU filled thousands of pages and 
covered an extensive array of topics bearing both on the product specifications of 
telecommunication technology and on its performance with interoperability as the 
paramount objective. " 
Standardisation helps globalisation in yet another way. By standardising product 
specifications, perfonnance and method of production, goods could be traded more 
liberally between different countries and production processes could be integrated across 
national borders; thus, facilitating the globalisation of two important economic activities, 
namely trade and production. Removing technical barriers to trade through 
standardisation was the rationale behind establishing the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) in 1947. ISO is a non-governmental organisation that has as its 
mission the promotion of "the development of standardization and related activities in the 
world with a view to facilitating the international exchange of goods and services... 118 1 
The ISO standardisation activities cover a very broad range of products from telephone 
and bank cards to paper sizes and wire ropes. 
The ISO's achievement in the standardisation of freight containers serves as a 
good example of the significance of standardisation in facilitating cross border trade. By 
standardising the sizes of containers and the lorry's chassis that carried them goods could 
be containerised, loaded on the compatible lorries, transported to harbours, then unloaded 
onto ships in an efficient manner and transported across long distances by sea. Upon 
arriving to their destination, lorries of the same standardised chassis' size would carry 
them to their ultimate warehouses and finally to their retailers. Standardisation of 
78 Braithwaite, J., and Drahos, P., supra note 68, at 329-332. 
79 Id., at 327. 
80 Art. 1.3 of the International Teleconununication Regulations provides: "These Regulations are 
established with a view to facilitating global interconnection and interoperability of telecommunication .. 
. 11 Ititernational 
Telecommunication Regtilatioii (1988), available at Nvww. wia. org/dns- 
law/pub/ITU jelecom ReFs. h (visited at 12/30/2000) 
81 International Organisation for Standardisation, Introduction to ISO, available at 
wý, vw. iso. ch/infoe/intro. htm (last visited Dec. 30,2000). 
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containers and its associated technologies has had enormous consequences for the 
efficiency and cost effectiveness of international trade, increasing significantly its 
volume, and thus enabling its globalisation. " 
Following the significant reduction of tariff barriers to trade through the operation 
of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade since 1947, the "technical barriers to trade 
became more evident. " In 1994, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 83 
was passed as one of the twenty-nine legal texts of the WTO Agreement. The TBT 
Agreement's purpose is to ensure that WTO Members who ratify it are cornrnitted to 
using international standards where such standards exist or are imminent. Parties also 
must commit to reducing the hindering effect that technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures might have on international trade. Growing consciousness of the 
effect that disparities in technical regulations might have on the flow of international 
trade underlie incorporating TBT as a standardisation mechanism within the WTO 
system. " 
So far, this discussion focused on standardisation in the narrow technical sense 
that introduced it. Legal harmonisation, in the broader sense, including the 
harmonisation of substantive legal principles, such as contract and property principles, is 
however part and parcel of the globalisation process. Every geographic expansion of 
social relations carries with it geographic spread of legal ideas and principles. The early 
military expansion of the Roman Empire between 27 B. C. and 284 A. D. carried with it 
the parallel expansion of Private Roman law. " The rise of trade in medieval Europe 
across its various cities and communities led to the emergence of Lex Mercatoria as a 
harmonised set of legal principles governing merchants in their trade. " Globalisation 
since the 1960s has resulted in extensive harmonisation efforts, on aspects of which this 
study will elaborate. Harmonisation of substantive legal principles underlying business 
transactions undoubtedly facilitates the cross border operation of such transactions. It is 
not, however, readily accepted that this type of harmonisation is a necessary 
82 Thinking About GlobaliZation: Populai- Myths and Economic Facts (1997), available at 
www. econornist. com/bookshop/schools/schools brief html (last visited Mar. 28,2000). 
83 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994), available at www. wto. org. (last visited Oct. 3,2000). 
84 International Organisation for Standardisation, Standards and Woi-ld Ti-ade, available at 
www. iso. ch/wtotbt. htm (last visited Dec. 30,2000). 
85 Braithwaite, J., and Drahos, P., sitpra note 68, at 40-41. 
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infrastructure or instrument of globalisation. " This debate remains beyond the scope of 
this Chapter. 
In conclusion, harmonisation in general, and standardisation in a more specific 
technical sense, are regulatory mechanisms necessary for globalisation5 as we understand 
it today to take place. Without technical interoperability, telecommunication systems 
would not be able to perform their function in bringing a distant locality to the 
instantaneous proximity that we presently experience. Technical standardisation also 
facilitates integrating markets and production and increases the volume of world trade. 
While substantive legal harmonisation is not necessarily a globalising instrument, 
enthusiastic efforts, aided by the rapid technological circulation of information, are 
expended around the world towards this cause. 
3.2.3. Privatisation 
As explained in the definition of globalisation adopted above, it is a process of 
change that is both geographic and political. While standardisation is primarily an 
instrument for the geographic aspect of globalisation, privatisation is an instrument for its 
two facets; i. e., geographic compression and political power shifts. 
Privatisation is a broad and diverse concept. " Discussions of privatisation often 
represent it as the transfer of ownership from the government to the private sector. An 
example of this approach is found in a World Bank publication that defines privatisation 
as "the transfer of ownership of SOEs [State Owned Enterprises] to the private sector by 
the sale -full or partial- of ongoing concerns or by the sale of assets following 
liquidation. "" Other commentators, however, perceive privatisation more in terms of its 
impact on the governance structure in the society. In this sense, privatisation is discussed 
as redistribution of governance roles in favour of the private sector. It is thus defined 
broadly as "the shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to 
86 Id. at 45-47. 
87 On the rejection of the proposition that substantive harmOnisation is a necessity for globalization see, 
e. g., Pistor, K., The Stan dardizatio n of Law and its Effects on Developing Econoinies, G-24 Discussion 
Paper Series, No. 4 (2000). 
88 For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in the definition and the various approaches see Feigenbaum, 
H., et al.., Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization (1999), 5-12. 
89Kikeri, S., et al.., Privatizations: Th e Lessons of Experience (1992), 14. 
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the private sector. .. "" Without undermining the significance of the transfer of 
ownership in privatisation, privatisation remains essentially a transfer of roles and 
functions from the State to the private sector. This often involves transfer of property 
rights from the public to the private sector or creation of new private rights. 
The current privatisation movement started in the United Kingdom, which 
pioneered it in the early 1980s, shortly after the ascent of the Conservative Party to power 
in 1979. " This trend has followed more than three decades of nationalisation policies, 
and continuous expansion of the public sector, which has witnessed a pervasive direct 
intervention of the State as a producer and a service provider in various economic sectors. 
In sectors such as public utilities, including gas, electricity, telecommunication, water, 
and sometimes transportation, this intervention was justified on the basis of the goal of 
universal service. Public utilities were perceived as essential and a belief developed that 
every citizen was entitled to these basic services. Government's direct intervention in 
providing health services and education was founded on similar perceptions of 
entitlement and that it was the government's responsibility to guarantee universal access. 
In other areas such as mining and shipbuilding, government intervention was justified on 
the basis of the strategic significance of such industries for national security. " 
In November 1984, the Conservative Government in the United Kingdom under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, privatised the British Telecom. 
Commentators marked this privatisation as the watershed in the privatisation policy, 
which established it as a programme and as a resilient trend. " The trend soon spread to 
other countries at various stages of development. In 1985, U. S. Secretary of Treasury 
James Baker brought privatisation to the international sphere in his address to the 
Bank/Fund Annual Meetings in Seoul. 9' Ever since, privatisation has become a policy 
item on the agendas of the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
90 Feigenbaum, H., supra note 88, at 1. 
91 On the U. K. experience see Letwin, 0., Privatising the World: A Sttidy of International Privatisation in 
the T17eoiy and Practice (1988); Ve1janovski, C., Selling the State: Privatisation in Britain (1987); 
Graham, C., "Privatisation - the United Kingdom Experience" in Mceldowey, F. 
(ed. ), National and 
International Perspectives on Law and Privatisation 17 (F. McEldowney ed., 1999). 
92 Ve1janovski, C., id., at 54-57. 
93 Letwin, supra note 91, at 12 - 94 Williamson, J., Wliat sholild the Bank Think Abotit the Washington Consensits? (1997), available at 
http: //www. lie. c om/TESTMONY/B ankwc. htm (last visited Jan. 21,200 1). 
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is under the influence, and sometimes the 
pressure, of such institutions that the phenomenon of privatisation is constantly spreading 
into growing numbers of developing countries. 
The trend towards privatisation acquired more significance when it began to 
infiltrate the thinking of governments with command economies in Eastern Europe, the 
Soviet Union, and China. Henceforth, those governments have directly commanded up 
to ninety percent of all productive economic activities mostly through 'state owned 
enterprises. "' With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the disintegration of the 
Socialist Bloc, a massive programme of wholesale privatisation started. To gain a sense 
of the size of this process, it is enough to note that in the early 1990s, the former German 
Democratic Republic privatised more enterprises over a period of eighteen months than 
the rest of the world did over a period of fifteen years. " It is also important to note that 
in the former socialist countries, privatisation did not only mean transfer of roles and 
ownership from the public to the private sector, it effectively meant creating the notion of 
private property from scratch. This fact makes privatisation in the ex-command 
economies not only quantitatively more significant, but rather qualitatively so. 
Although privatisation is initially a political decision, turning the policy into 
practice cannot take place without extensive lawmaking. The intervention of the 
legislature varies amongst countries depending on their basic laws and constitutional 
principles. In the extreme case of the former planned economies, implementing 
privatisation policies required overhauling the legal system, introducing new 
constitutions and civil codes that implement afresh the concepts of private property and 
regulate it. In other countries, such as Germany, less extensive constitutional changes 
were required in order to allow the privatisation of certain sectors. The majority of 
academic opinion perceived telecommunications and postal services to be exclusively a 
federal function under Article 87(l) of the Basic Law before its amendment. Therefore, 
preparing these services for privatisation has required amending the Basic Law to allow 
95 Kikeri, S., et al., supra note 89, at 73. 
96 Id. at 74. 
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private providers to provide these services. " 
Brazil is also a case in point. It needed radical constitutional change in order to 
terminate the dominance of the public sector in the economy. Under the twenty years of 
military rule (1964-1984) the public sector represented approximately seventy percent of 
the country's gross national product. The Latin-American liquidity crisis in the early 
1980s limited Brazil's access to capital and rendered such interventionist economic 
policies not viable. This economic condition triggered a policy shift towards 
privatisation. In order to put this and other policy shifts into effect, Brazil introduced a 
new constitution in 1988. Article 173 limited the State's direct participation in the 
economy to cases of national security, significant public interest and a number of other 
constitutionally prescribed exceptions. The list of exceptions was however too large, 
including telecommunications, electricity, gas, transportation, mining, the post, and the 
telegraph. As a result, further legal intervention continued to be necessary in order to 
implement more rigorous privatisation. " 
Because of the absence of a written constitution and the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty, which grants the Parliament under the English constitution the right "to 
make or urimake any law whatever, "" the privatisation programme in the United 
Kingdom faced much less legal constraints than in other countries. Nevertheless, in each 
case of privatisation, legal intervention remained necessary to repeal the earlier 
nationalisation acts and to pave the way for the privatisation of the service or the 
industry. However, France applied a different legal solution. In July 1986, a general 
enabling law was introduced delegating the power to the government to privatise a list of 
enterprises without further recourse to the Parliament for legislation. "' 
The role of law in the privatisation process is very extensive. It is not merely 
confined to establishing the principle of privatisation in the constitution or the basic law. 
Very complex legal issues anse in any privatisation process; for example: the transfer of 
rights and liabilities from the national body to the new entity, the rights of third parties, 
97 Reckewerth, S., "Constitutional Imitations on Privatisation in Germany", in McEldowney, F. (ed. ), supra 
note 91,13 1. 
98 De Noronha Goyos, D., and Filippozzi, E., "The Brazilian Constitutional Review and the Privatisation 
Programme - An Overview", 5 Int'l Company Com. L. Rev. 243 (1994). 99 A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (10th ed. ) 39-40, cited in National and International 
Perspectives on Law and Privatisation, supra note 94, at 17. 
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the transfer of employees, their rights and legal status, to whom is the ownership to be 
transferred, and the extent of foreign capital control of the privatised entity. "' Several 
policy issues arise in this context and the law is invariably used to reflect the 
government's policy stances whether liberal, interventionist, welfare-oriented, or market- 
oriented. The potency of privatisation as a globalisation instrument depends largely on 
such policy options and the laws implementing them. 
The U. S. Department of Commerce 1995 prescription on the requirements 
necessary for a 'global infori-nation network' lists privatisation as a measure necessary for 
global market access. "' This categorisation summarises the ways in which privatisation 
acts as an instrument for globalisation in the geographic sense. Direct government 
involvement in the production of goods or supply of services often results in State 
monopoly and protectionist measures that exclude foreign investment in the concerned 
sector. Privatisation, on the other hand, is often a first and necessary step towards the 
market liberalisation and opening it for foreign investment. Considering the scope of the 
present privatisation movement, sectors that were originally considered too strategic and 
too sensitive in tenns of public interest value, such as telecommunications and other 
utilities, are now frequently taken over by foreign investors. The sensitivity of the sectors 
that are now open to foreign investment and sometimes control, render global 
interdependence and inter- entanglement more acute. 
Ownership is power. Privatisation, as has once been indicated, represents "the 
largest transfer of property since the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII. ""' 
It, therefore, represents a massive transfer of power. Power shifts that are inherent in 
privatisation are central to the definition of globalisation presented above and to the 
argument of this work. Privatisation reorganises governance structures and institutions in 
the society. It removes the utility or the strategic sector from the direct control of 
government and places it under private control. From this point onward, the government 
would not be able to implement any public policy relating to the sector privatised without 
100 Letwin, supra note 94, at 15. 
"' Jane Richardson, Translating Policy into Law- The Role of the LegalAdviser in National and 
International Perspectives on Law and Privatisation 42-44 (F. McEldowney ed., 1999). 
102 See U. S. Department of Commerce, supra note 7 1. 
103 Pirie, M., Privatization in Theog and Practice (1985), at 21 Cited in Ve1janovski, C., supra note 91, at 
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entering into negotiations with the newly created private power. "' 
Privatisation also creates new classes of interests. "' When British Telecom was 
privatised in 1984,2.3 million individuals bought shares. "' Privatisation through public 
offering typically broadens the base of ownership and popularises the equity market. 
This results in creating a new class of interests that is capable of developing and 
exercising its own bargaining power. After an extensive programme of privatisation, 
such classes fon-n another interest group with whom the government must negotiate in the 
development and implementation of public policy. The separation between the 
government and the supply of goods and services through privatisation has also rendered 
transparent economic sectors that were previously shrouded in secrecy. This access to 
information was a by-product of privatisation that empowered the new classes of interest 
and enhanced their leverage in negotiations over public policy issues. It also empowered 
old interest groups such as the consumers, which were almost helpless under the opaque 
system of supply of goods and services in the era of nationalisation. "' 
The potency of privatisation as a globalisation instrument is contingent on the 
employed mechanisms of privatisation and on post-privatisation regulation. Govenunent 
can use the law to restrict foreign investment, for example by requiring a controlling 
share of local capital in the privatised utility in order to prevent foreign control. This 
clearly undercuts the possibilities of geographic globalisation inherent in the process. 
Furtherniore, the capacity of privatisation to shift the power arrangements in the society 
is contingent on the mechanisms of privatisation and how far it removes governnient 
control over the economy. "' 
If government adopts a highly interventionist regulatory policy vis-6-vis the 
privatised industry or utility, regulation can act as a substitute for direct ownership in 
securing government control over the sector. This capacity, however, should not be 
exaggerated. Government intervention through regulation remains checked by the private 
104 On the political significance of privatisation see, eg., Feigenbaum, H., et al., supra note 88. 
105 Id. at 56. 
106 Letwin, 0., stipra note 9 1, at 12. 
107 McEldowney, J., "Law and Regulation: Current Issues and Future Directions", in Bishop, M. et al. (eds. ), 
Vie Regtilatoiy Challenge 408 (1995), at 413. 
108 This point is made repeatedly and poignantly in Feigenbaurn, H., supra note 88. The authors clearly 
distinguish between privatisation and 'shrinking the State', which they define as "reducing the overall level 
of State intervention in the society rather than simply reducing the size of the public sector.? l 
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sector control over the sources of financing. This power becomes even more 
commanding in the currant context of globalised capital markets, where capital can move 
freely and choose the forum that is most suitable to its interests. No matter how reserved 
the privatisation is, changes in the governance structure and the place of government 
within it invariably takes place. Post-privatisation governance is always more diffused 
and decentralised. 
3.2.4. Deregulation and Liberalisation 
As the previous section explains, the capacity of privatisation as an instrument of 
globalisation is contingent on the degree and type of regulation imposed on the privatised 
sector. Regulation is a substitute for government direct supply of goods and services. It 
means control exercised by the State, through legislation and other government 
instruments, over the activities of legitimate private economic entities. '09 Albeit 
simplistic, one can distinguish between two types of regulation: economic regulation and 
social regulation. Economic regulation includes governinent regulatory control over 
economic decisions such as pricing and profit structure, output, market entry and exit. 
Social regulation, on the other hand, refers to government intervention, which aims at 
advancing special interests such as consumer protection, environirnental protection and 
health and safety considerations. "' 
A regulatory reform movement started in the middle of the 1970s, guided by the 
same goal that triggered and directed the privatisation movement of the same period, 
namely the desire to roll back the State and reduce public sector intervention in the 
economy. This movement, unlike privatisation, started in the United States. The reason 
for this is very simple. The United States has always had a dominant private sector and a 
minimal State involvement in the direct supply of goods and services. When virtually the 
rest of the world engaged in massive nationalisation programmes after the Second World 
War, the United States remained the exception. Instead, the United States relied on strict 
and interventionist regulatory policies implemented through independent technocratic 
'09 On the definition of regulation see Majone, G., "Introduction", in Majone, G., (ed. ), Deregulation and 
Re-regulation? Regulatoiy Reform in Ettrope and the United States 1 (1990), at 1-2; Cranston, R., 
"Regulation and Deregulation: General Issues", 5 Univ. South Wales L. J. 1 (1982), at 2. 
110 Prosser, T., Law andRegidators (1997), at 10-15. Cranston, R., id., at 2. 
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regulatory agencies in order to implement the State's social and economic plans. When 
the tide of public sector expansion ebbed, other countries lead by the United Kingdom 
launched extensive privatisation programmes as previously described. The United States, 
on the other hand, had little to privatise and a lot of regulatory structures to dismantle. 
This regulatory reform movement has thus been termed 'deregulation'. 
Deregulation, inasmuch as it implies the end of all regulations, is misleading. 
During the past three decades one can easily detect a proliferation of State regulatory 
intervention in areas such as health and safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection. In other words, during the same period of deregulatory reform, one can easily 
see proliferation of social regulation. Deregulatory pressures are, however, to be 
witnessed in the area of economic regulation. These pressures and the broader movement 
towards reducing the size and role of the State are the product of a growing belief in the 
market as a superior mechanism of resource allocation and disillusionment with the State 
as a disinterested technocrat capable of allocating resources objectively and rationally. "' 
Accordingly, this has led economists and policy makers to leave more decisions to the 
market and to reduce the number of justifications for State intervention to correct market 
failures. In the area of social regulation where the State is increasingly active, the voices 
for the supremacy or even the capacity of the market to serve the social interest remain 
less convincing. 
A survey of deregulation in various sectors of the U. S. economy serves to 
illustrate the trend's direction. In 1978, deregulation of air transport was finally 
effectuated through legislation. This involved totally dismantling the economic C) 
regulatory structure; i. e., price-and-entry regulation, while leaving safety regulations in 
place. During the same period, deregulation of the truck industry took place, relaxing the Z) 4 
rules on new entry and allowing individual truckers to set their own prices. Similar 
reforms were implemented in the railway sector, where in 1980 railway companies were 
allowed to abandon unprofitable lines more easily and to set their prices more freely. "' 
Deregulation as "substituting market mechanisms for administrative 
For a brief discussion of the theoretical foundations of deregulation and their impact on regulatory 
policy in the United States see Linowes, D., "Privatization and Deregulation in the United States" in 
Dennis, G., and Goodrich, J. (eds. ), Privatization and Deregulation in Global Perspective 80 (1990). 
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coordination""' is clearly a globalisation instrument as it is understood in this Chapter. 
The more decisions left to the market, the more decentralised the structure of governance 
i. e., the more acute globalisation is as a process of political reorganisation. The record of 
deregulation, however, remains ambivalent. With deregulatory pressures dismantling 
State economic intervention in certain areas, contradictory regulatory pressures are 
inviting State control over the economic decisions of private entities in others. Taking 
the concern for energy supply, which was triggered by the Californian energy crisis in 
2000 as an example, one can clearly see a relapse towards more government intervention 
in the power generation market. Shortly after the re-election of the Labour Party to 
government in the United Kingdom in June 2001, a report of the Better Regulation Task 
Force was published. The Report concluded that the U. K. market was in many respects 
over regulated and recommended a series of deregulatory measures. At the same time, 
concern over energy supplies has resulted in declaring a policy of more regulation of the 
electricity generation market. On these bases, one can only conclude that while the trend 
towards price-and-entry deregulation is definitely a globalising trend in the political 
sense, its depth and linearity are not conclusive. Reversals in its progress contribute to 
the ambivalence and dialectic nature of political arrangements during the currant process 
of globalisation. 
Liberalisation is a type of deregulation that has particular bearing on the process 
of globalisation. In reversing the protectionist trends of the 1930s, liberalisation formed 
the starting point for all international economic policy discussion since the Second World 
War. "' Liberalisation means allowing the unrestricted flow of goods and services across 
borders. "' In implementation, this meant removing or reducing nationalistic economic 
"' Breyer, S., "Regulation and Deregulation in the United States: Airlines, Telecommunications and 
Antitrust", in Majone, G. (ed. ), stipra note 109,8, at 5-16 
113 Koebel, P., "Deregulation of the Telecommunication Sector: A movement in line with Recent 
Technological Advances", in Majone, G., ( ed. ), supra note 88,110, at 115. 
114 Jackson, J., The World Trading System. - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (1997), 
11-14. 
1" For a discussion of different definitions of liberalisation see Driesen, D., 
"What is Free Trade?: The Real 
Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment Debate", 41 Va. J. Int'l L. 279 (2001). In this article the 
author argues that there is ambiguity in the definition of "free trade. " He organises 
his discussion around 
the question of "what precisely rnust trade be fi-ee of in order to be 
free ... T' Id. at 280. 
He then proposes 
that free trade in policy discussions and in the law of the WTO and the jurisprudence of the 
Dispute 
Settlement Body is used in three different meanings: free trade as (1) trade free of 
discrirrunation between 
foreign and domestically produced goods; (2) trade free of attempts to coerce non-complying countries to 
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regulations aimed at restricting the access of foreign goods and services to national 
markets. Import tariffs and quotas are the obvious example of such restrictive measures. 
Early liberalisation efforts have thus focused on reducing the amount of tariffs imposed 
on imports. This was done through a complex process of bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations of tariff concessions resulting in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)"' in 1948 as a multilateral agreement for the mutual reduction of tariffs. 
This initial round of multilateral negotiations was followed by seven other rounds. The 
most successfulwas the Uruguay Round, which concluded in 1994 and resulted in the 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the reduction of tariffs on 
non-primary products to 3.9 percent in industrialised countries"' and to 12.3 percent in 
developing countries. '" 
Barriers to trade are not always so straightforward. Following the impressive 
success of trade negotiation rounds in reducing tariffs on non-primary products to near 
negligible levels, attention has shifted to non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB). The first five 
rounds of trade negotiations were almost entirely dedicated to negotiating tariff 
concessions. Negotiating NTBs first appeared on the agenda as a primary goal of 
negotiations in the sixth round: the Kennedy Round (1962-1967). This focus on NTBs 
persisted in the last two rounds of trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) and 
the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). "' Non-tariff protectionist measures are only restricted 
by the imagination of governments. All attempts at cataloguing these various measures 
have resulted in voluminous but incomprehensive records. 12' Examples of NTBs include 
imposing a requirement to place imported cattle in quarantine without providing 
quarantine facilities, 121 or an importing nation requiring a product inspection to be 
conducted by its own authorities and does not send an inspector to implement the 
implement certain non-trade law standards such as environmental law; or (3) as trade ftee of national 
regulation under broad laissez-faire conception. 
116 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A-1 1, T. I. A. S. 1700,55 U. N. T. S. 194, 
available at www. wto. org [hereinafter GATT]. 117 Jackson, J., supra note 114, at 74. 
118 Kloiber, K., "Removing Technical Barriers to Trade: The Next Step Toward Freer Trade", 9 Tul. J. Int'l 
Comp. L. 511 (2001), at 512. 
119 Jackson, J., slipra note 114, at 73-74. 
120 In 1973, the GATT produced a catalogue of NTBs of all participating countries that included over 800 
such barriers. In 1986, UNCTAD in a similar project had on her country-by-country lists many more than 
the GATTs 800 non-tariff barriers. See id. at 154. 
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requirement. 
122 
Determining what constitutes non-tariff barrier to trade could be very 
problematic. While the protectionist character of these amusing examples is very 
evident, other cases could be much more complex. In a highly integrated world, any 
national regulation could constitute a burden on cross-border trade. Regulations that alm 
at advancing other social interests, such as the protection of the environment or the health 
and safety of consumers, could be perceived as creating a barrier to trade, especially 
where the obligations imposed are more onerous on foreIgn producers. Determ1ning 
whether the measure constitutes a trade barrier or not hinges on questions, such as 
whether the measure is necessary for advancing the perceived interest. 123 In this context, 
liberalisation policies could create deregulatory pressures in a wider sense. 
The Uruguay Round expanded the liberalisation agenda to a wider range of areas 
such as services, textiles and agriculture. While the progress achieved by the Uruguay 
Round in liberalising services was impressive, liberalisation in agriculture and textiles 
remains limited. This again confirms the dialectic nature of globalisation. Liberalisation, 
like deregulation, is not linear or conclusive. Protectionist and restrictive measures 
persist despite the economic assumption in favour of liberalisation. 
As it becomes apparent, while information and communication technologies are 
determining factors in the process of globalisation, globalisation remains to a certain 
degree a legal or regulatory product. Globalisation involved major technological leaps, 
as well as drastic regulatory activities including harmonisation and standardisation of 
laws, privatisation of government property and functions and deregulation especially in 
its liberalising aspect. 
4. Globalisation: some particularly relevant aspects 
In this Chapter it has been argued that globalisation is a process of social change, that this 
change is both geographic and political and that the term is used both for its spatial 4= 
connotations as well as for its omission of any reference to the nation State. There, it has 
12' Kloiber, K., supra note 118, at 5 13. 
122 Jackson, J., stipm note 114, at 155. 
123 For a critical discussion of the role of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body in making such 
determination see Driesen, D., slipm note 115. 
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also been argued that globalisation is a product of both technology and regulation. 
Information and telecommunication technologies compressed the world physically and 
altered its structure of power, while regulation enabled the use of such technologies and 
confirmed the new structures of power through standardisation, harmonisation, 
deregulation and privatisation. 
Since money laundering is both about money and about crime, a brief description 
of globalisation in relation to both these aspects becomes a necessary pre-requisite to any 
discussion of money laundering. This section will address each of these two aspects in 
turn. 
4.1. Money and Finance 
Money is information. The physical appearance of money, as one can now readily testify, 
is not intrinsic to its function. Very early in its history, transfer of data in a record has 
been used as a substitute for the physical transfer of money from hand to hand. Further, 
the determination of the medium of exchange, its production and its value are based on 
rules accepted in the society where such medium is exchanged. These rules can be based 
on custom or stipulated in a statute book. It is thus apparent that any changes in the 
technologies of information processing and transmission in a society is bound to have 
great influence on the function and use of money in that society. It is also apparent that 
changes in the financial and monetary regulatory structures in the society are likely to 
have equally potent effects. 
As explained above, globalisation is the product of both types of changes: 
technological and regulatory. In that sense, globalisation is most discernible in the area of 
money and finance. The globalising forces of technology and regulation have produced 
their most substantial alterations in this area of human activity and the changes that 
resulted have been a driving force for globalisation in every other aspect of the society. 
The following few paragraphs will attempt to sketch the progress of globalisation in 
money and finance. This account is a factual one that does not engage in the numerous 
debates that surround this aspect of globalisation. This account will also briefly show 
governance problematic as it manifests in this sphere. 
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When one talks about globalisation in the area of money and finance what one is 
referring to is both the removal or recession of geographic restraints on the movement of 
capital as well as the retreat of the government role in this area in favour of the market. In 
view of the information nature of money, infon-nation and communication technologies 
have played a crucial role in this regard. Now, money can move around the globe in huge 
sums at the click of a button and stock traders no longer need to meet at the trading floors 
of the exchanges. Stock market dealings instead are now conducted on computer screens 
and through teleconimunication networks. "' At the regulatory front, there is a number of 
watershed events that are accepted amongst commentators as forming the globalisation 
path of money and finance. These events include: the emergence of the Eurodollar market 
in the late 1960s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the dismantling of 
the exchange controls in the 1970s-1980s and the broader deregulation and liberalisation 
movement of the same period. Each of these events will now be dealt with in brief 
The Euromarket refers to an offshore regulation-free market where financial 
assets are denominated in foreign currency. "' Euromarket is commonly traced back to the 
early post Second World War years when Russia and other countries of the eastern bloc 
held their dollar deposits in European banks to avoid potential US seizure that might be 
performed for political reasons. "' Such deposits were then used for lending to other 
European banks and institutions. It was not, however, until late 1950s and early 1960s 
that the Euromarket has acquired real momentum. In this regard it is worth noting that the 
first Eurobond issue took place in London raising $15 million for the Italian motorway 
authority Autostrade. "' This development of the market was triggered by an increase in 
foreign holdings of the American dollars resulting from the Marshall plan as well as the 
activities of American multinationals abroad. Also, restrictive US domestic regulatory 
measures, such as interest rate control called "regulation Q' that sets upper level on 
interest rates offered to depositors, encouraged American banks to lend their dollars in 
the offshore Euromarket. In this regard, the Euromarket offered the market players an 
124 On the impact of technology on money and finance see O'Brien, R., Global Fbiancial Mtegration. - The 
Did of Geography (1992) at 7-16. 
125Helleiner, E., States aiid the Reei7iergeiice of Global Finaiice. - Froin Brettoii Woods to the 1990s (1994) 
at 8. 126 Valdez, S., A Mtroductioi7 to Global Finaixial Markets (1997), at 120. 
127 Id., at 120. 
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adventurous arena free from restrictive national regulations. "' This feature has proved 
very attractive that market dealings have grown from $1 billion in 1959 to $6 in 1992. '2' 
It is partly due to the Euromarket operations that the second decisive event in the history 
of financial globalisation; namely the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, took place. 
Determined to avoid the devastation of another world war and convinced that the 
beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the inter-war period were primarily to blame for the 
Second World War, finance ministers and renowned economists from 44 countries 
gathered in the Bretton Woods (New Hampshire, U. S. ) in 1944 to design post-war 
monetary and financial arrangements. The international monetary system that emerged 
from this conference has been tenned the Bretton Woods system. This system was based 
on fixed exchange rates with limited and restrictive mechanisms to be implemented in 
cases of fundamental disequilibrium. The dollar was to remain convertible to gold on 
demand at $35 per ounce. Other countries were required to adopt par value for their 
currencies in terms of dollar or gold. Exchange rates during the operation of the Bretton 
Woods system were stable. Their stability required employing a myriad of capital control 
measures and financial regulatory restrictions. It also required periodic intervention by 
central banks in the foreign exchange markets in order to keep the exchange rates within 
a certain very limited band. 130 
Due to a variety of reasons, including the Euromarket operations and the cost of 
the Vietnam War, the U. S. was forced to abandon the dollar-gold convertibility in August 
1972. With such measure, the Bretton Woods system collapsed and a system of floating 
exchange rates; i. e., exchange rates determined by supply and demand on the foreign 
exchange currency, replaced the Bretton Woods system of par value or fixed exchange 
rate arrangements. 131 
The implications of this transition for globalisation in money and finance are 
manifold. With the collapse of the system, the various capital controls that were put in 
place mainly to secure its stability lost their rationale. The United States led the 
128 For a detailed explanation of the emergence of the Euromarket see Helleiner, E., supra note 125,81-91; 
O'Brien, R., supra note 124, at 33-37. 
129 Id., at 12 1. 
130 For more detailed analysis and description of the Bretton Wood system see Helleiner, E., supra note125, 
25-77; Eichengreen, B., and Sussman, N., The International Monetai-y Systein in the (Veiy) Long Run 
(IMF, Working Paper, VvT/00/43, March 2000), 29-32. 
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movement towards dismantling capital controls by removing its various controls in 1974. 
Britain followed suit in 1979. The 1980s have seen the spread of the liberalisation 
movement across the developed world. By the end of the decade, the OECD countries 
had achieved almost total financial liberalisation. This liberalisation movements have 
created several markets that possess genuine global characteristics in terms of their 
delocalisation and their openness to entry by market operators from all over the world. 
The foreign exchange market is one a very significant example. 
The implications of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system were not only 
geographic. The shift towards floating exchange rates has also and very significantly 
meant that the role of government in governing the system has receded in favour of the 
market. One commentator describes this stating that: "As a result of these changes we 
now have an international financial system which is often seen as being run by the global 
investor, where global portfolio preferences determine the fate of currencies [ ... ]. The 
World's money managers are seen to exercise great global power, with the capital account 
determining the current account, rather than the other way round. " '" 
The same point was expressed numerically by another commentator. Referring to 
the increased volume of international financial transactions, he says: "All of this activity 
has resulted in a ballooning of the foreign exchange markets, which by 1995 were 
estimated to be handling nearly $1.2 trillion each day. By comparison, the total foreign 
exchange reserves of all governments (which represent their ability to intervene in the 
foreign exchange markets) stood at a little over $670 billion. " 133 
The challenge of these developments to national governments was not confined to 
the issue of monetary sovereignty. All financial and legal regulatory structures that has 
thus far been based on territorial allocation of jurisdiction had to be reconsidered to adjust 
for de-territorialisation. Governments also had to devise new means to redress the shifts 
in the balance of power in favour of private players some of them are even criminal. The 
remainder of this Chapter and actually this work as a whole is dedicated to understanding 
some of these challenges and the gove=ental response in the form of money laundering 
laws. 
13 ' Edwards, R., Interiiational lvloiietaiy Collaboration (1985), at 491 et seq. 
132 O'Brien, R., supra note 124, at 34. 
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4.2. Crime Beyond Borders 
It is a truth accepted amongst analysts of the phenomenon of crime in the context of 
globalisation that the instruments of globalisation, i. e.; technology and regulation have 
acted indiscriminately globalising crime along with the other legitimate aspects of 
economic and social activities. "' Information and telecommunication technology has 
been accessible to criminals as much as others and they utilised them to advance their 
activities in scope and sophistication. Deregulation, especially that of financial markets, 
have given criminals the opportunities they needed to place their assets beyond the reach 
of their pursuers. The relaxation of border controls in cases such as the European 
integration has also contributed to the possibilities of globalisation of crime. "' 
Considering that, crime is a challenge to governance to begin with, equipping criminals 
with instruments that allows them to further evade governance takes this challenge to a 
different level. 
Globalisation in the context of crime has the same two components: geographic 
and political. The geographic element is often referred to in the studies of this subject by 
the term "transnational crime. " And it includes very generally crime involving the 
territory of more than one State. Studies of the phenomenon are also conscious of the 
political element of globalisation reflected in the growing economic power of criminal 
organisations and criminals more generally. In one of the earliest official studies of the 
phenomenon, both aspects were stipulated. In April 16 1985, the UN Secretariat 
published a Working Paper called "New Dimensions of Criminality and Crime 
Prevention in the Context of Development: Challenges for the Future. " Listing the "new 
dimensions" of criminality the Working Paper included: "(a) [ ... ] the very substantial 
increase in the financial volume of certain conventional economic crimes, such as tax 
evasion, illegal capital transfers or fraud in the massive transfer of vital commodities, 
where the overall impact may be great enough to threaten the economic stability of entire 
133 Reinicke, W., supra note 49, at 30. 
134 Shelley, L., "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State? ", 48 Jouriial of 
bzteriwtionalAffah-s, Winter 1995, at 465. 
135 Id., at 466. 
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countries; ""' (Political element) and "the high degree of international coordination and 
extension characterizing certain criminal operations[. ]""' (Geographic element) 
Transnational crime is a crime that involves the territory of more than one 
country. This could mean that the actus reus of the crime took place in more than one 
country such as the classic example of the killer who fires the shot across the border from 
France, hitting his victim in Italy who later succumbs to his wounds in Switzerland. The 
crime could be also transnational even if the actus reus has been totally completed within 
the territory of one country provided that certain preparatory works have taken place in 
another territory, such as the purchase of the gun or the hiring of a gunman. It could also 
be deemed transnational if the crime that was committed domestically has substantial 
effects on the territory of another country or involved a criminal group that typically 
operates across different countries. "' 
With the advances in technology, the capacity to commit transnational crime has 
become available to many criminals not necessarily the most sophisticated ones. Some 
transnational crimes, such as computer hacking, are even committed by youngsters who 
possess very advanced computer skills and have access to the latest of infori-nation 
technology. Evidently, with the liberalisation of markets, many criminal regulatory 
breaches and criminal market manipulations are committed transnationally. Examples of 
such transnationalisation are very obvious in the area of insider dealing and, as will be 
discussed later on in this work, in the area of money laundering. "' It is natural that the 
globalisation of multinational corporations should extend to their legal as well as illegal 
activities. Considering the volume of cross-border activities conducted by multinational 
136 New Dimensions of Criminality and Crime Prevention in the context of Development. - Challengesfor the 
Ftiture, Working Paper Prepared by the U. N. Secretariat, U. N. Doc. A/Conf, 121/20 (16 Apr. 1985), ý 9. 
Reproduced in Bassiouni, S., and Eduardo Vetere (eds. ), Organized Crime. - A Compilation of U. N. 
Documents 1975-1998 at 808. 
137 id. 
138This analysis of the transnational character of organised crime is based on the definition of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), art. 3(2). "For the purpose of paragraph 
I of this article, an offence is transnational in nature if. - (a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is 
committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in 
another State; (c) It is col=tted in one State but involves and organized criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects M 
another State. 
139For a relatively early discussion of the transnationalisation of insider dealing see Thomas, J., "Icarus and 
his Waxen Wings: Congress Attempts to Address the Challenges of Insider Trading in a Globalized 
Securities Market", 2-3 3 T, `anderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1990), 99-133. 
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corporations and considering that the liberalisation movement is particularly geared 
towards facilitating such activities, it is normal that corporate criminality constitutes one 
major concern for governments across the world. 
It is however, the transnational activity of organised criminal groups that has 
ranked high on the official national and international agendas. According to the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)"', an "Organized 
Criminal Group" means "a structured oup of three or more persons, existing for a 9 C) 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences [ ... ], in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit. ""' There are five major organised criminal organisations: The Russian 
Mafiya, the Italian Mafia, the Colombian Cartels, the Chinese Triads, and the Japanese 
Yakusa. These major groups are divided into clans and subgroups and the estimates put 
their total membership well above three millions. In addition to these key players there 
are many other smaller groups including Nigerian fraudsters and traffickers, Pakistani 
drug traders and Afghani poppy farmers. 142 Concern for the transnational operations of 
organised criminal groups dates back to the mid-1970s. "' This concern did not receive its 
due serious attention until after the Cold War. This is simply because of the pre- 
occupation with the security problems of the Cold war era in a manner that relegated such 
concerns for crime to a lesser degree. "' 
The transnationalisation by organised criminal groups can be explained on many 
accounts. As indicated above, technological innovation and regulatory change were 
primary instrumental factors in this process of de-localisation. Further, economic 
considerations cannot be neglected. Oraganised criminal groups operating for profit are 
essentially economic or business organisations. They are motivated by the same business 
140 The United Nations Convention against Ttransnational Organized Crime was adopted by the General 
Assembly at its Millenium meeting in November 2000. It was opened for signature at a high-level 
conference in Palermo, Italy, in December 2000 (during the week of 12-15 December 2000). 141 Id., art. 2 (a). 
142 For a brief description of these groups see Guymon, C., "International Legal Mechanisms for Combating 
Transnational Organized Crime: The Need for a Multilateral Convention", 18 Berkley Journal of 
International Law (2000), at 56-6 1. 
143 The issue of organised criminal groups and their transnational operations was placed on the UN agenda 
for the first time in 1975 when it was addressed by the Fifth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention 
held in that year. Bassiouni, S., and Vetere, E., (eds. ), Organized Crime. - A Compilation of U. N. Documents 
1975-1998 at xvil. See also Report of the Congress, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 56/3 (1975). 
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considerations as legitimate business and their development reflects similar trends. 
Organised criminal groups like legitimate business transnationalised to take advantage of 
market opportunities in other countries and to benefit of cheap labour and production 
opportunities. "' In certain respects, especially with respect to their money laundering 
activities, transnationalisation was primarily motivated by reducing the risk of 
apprehension through exploiting legislative discrepancies and the territorial limitations on 
the enforcement powers of policing and investigative agencies. 
The evidence of the transnational character of organised criminal groups, as 
evidence generally in this area, is often anecdotal. The best evidence is to be found in 
cases of cross-border activities that has been uncovered and prosecuted. One such case 
was uncovered in Romania where a network of criminals spanning Africa, Eastern 
Europe, Israel, Latin America and Pakistan was uncovered. The operation involved drugs 
originating in Pakistan, shipped to Kenya, from there to Haifa via South Africa and 
ultimately to Romania where it was seized. The network was led by a Gennan national of 
Ugandan origin and the company that was supposed to handle the cargo in Romania was 
an Israeli-Romanian company. The shipment was ultimately intended for the Italian 
market and was to make a further stop in Slovakia on its way had it not been detected. "' 
Transnationalisation is not restricted to the drug trade. Many traditional organized 
crime activities such as fraud or contract killing are acquiring transnational dimensions. 
For example, organized groups may now resort to hiring gunmen from one country to 
commit a killing in another country in order to avoid apprehension. Also, traditional 
criminal acts are now becoming increasingly transnational or even global. One very 
common example now is the Nigerian fraud schemes that, according to law enforcement 
data total hundreds of millions. According to the same sources, American retail investors ZI) 
are the primary victims of such schemes representing a significant portion of that 
144 Shelley, L., supra note 134, at 464. 
145 Id., at 466. The fact that organised criminal groups are business essentially business entitles Is captured 
in Shelley's reference to such groups as "illicit multinationals", id. at 470. 
146 Id., 472-473. 
114 
figure. "' Another increasingly global market is the market for stolen cars. Stolen cars are 
not only disposed of locally. They are also often exported for resale abroad. "' 
Another more staggering aspect the transnationalisation of organised crime is the 
development of on-going strategic alliances and co-ordination amongst criminal groups. 
According to intelligence sources, organised criminal groups hold summits of their own 
to strategize, establish their alliances, agree their market shares and fix prices. In 1990, a 
summit was held in East Berlin between the leaders of Italian Mafia and the Russian 
Mafiya leading to co-operative agreements. It is also believed that, a secret agreement 
exists between the Russian Mafiya and the Sicilian since 1992 aiming at securing illicit 
trade through Central Europe and creating a global market in drugs and nuclear material. 
According to French intelligence reports, a meeting was held in 1994 in Burgundy 
gathering representatives of the five major criminal organisations in an effort to discuss 
sharing western European market in drugs and prostitution among other things. A co- 
operative agreement between the Sicilian Mafia and the Colombian cartels whereby the 
Sicilians traded a share of the heroin market in New York for a share of the Cocaine 
market in Europe. "' 
The transnational character of crime and criminal groups does not tell the whole 
story. The extent of the challenge cannot be appreciated without some sense of the 
criminal power. One way of assessing this power is by assessing the size of their 
revenues and capital. Estimates in this regard vary and they are not necessarily reliable. 
They do however have some indicative value. One estimate puts the annual retail sales of 
illegal drugs at $500 billion, which makes it larger than the global trade in oil. "' A 
stronger evidence of the staggering size of this trade can be found in the size of a single 
cocaine seizure made in 1989. In Los Angeles 21.4 metric tons of cocaine of six billion 
dollars of street value were seized. Commenting on this finding one author indicated that 
this amount is "more than the gross national product of 100 sovereign States. " 151 
147 Shelley, L., "Transnational Organized Crime in the United States: Defining the Problem", 32 Kobe Zn 
University Law Review (1998), at 83. 
148 On this theme of traditionally local crimes turning transnational see id., at 82-84. 
149 On these arrangements and others see Guymon, C., supra note 142, at 66-69. 
150 Rotman, E., "The Globalization of Criminal Violence", 10 Cornell Journal of Law and public Policy 
(2000), at 6. 
151 Id., at 5. 
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This comparison between the income of criminal groups and the country 
resources is particularly relevant to the political aspect of globalisation. A clear gap 
between criminal income and national income in favour of the criminals is a clear 
indication of the shift in the balance of power away from the State. According to a one 
estimate, the volume of drug-related earnings in the Colombian money supply in 1979 
was US$600-700 millions or 16.4-19.7% of money supply. "' The impact of such 
economic power has been felt in countries like Italy and Colombia where criminal 
organisations have deeply infiltrated the government effectively removing any State 
capacity to combat it. 153 Similar degrees of penetration could be detected in Russia. 
Russian Interior Ministry officials have estimated that in 1993 most of Russia's 2000 
banks were under criminal control. Criminal groups also infiltrated most of its 40000 
State and private enterprises effectively undermining its privatisation programme. "' 
The blatant exercise of power by criminal groups has led one commentator to 
state accurately that "International organized crime is an assault on the three pillars of 
State sovereignty: the control of borders, the monopoly on the use of violence for 
enforcement, and the power to tax economic activities within State borders. ""' The brutal 
exercise of power by criminal organisations have been likened to the practices of 
dictatorships and authoritarian governments. One commentator went as far as to describe 
this as the "new authoritarianism" 156 and another described the power of the Cosa Nostra 
as "a state within a state. " 157 
Economic analysis further shows that financial activities by criminals using their 
enormous accumulation of capital undermine state economic and monetary policies. 
According to such analysis, this is true with respect to leading world economies such as 
the US. A great proportion of the wealth created by the drug cartels is held in US dollars 
abroad. This has the potential of distorting the basis on which to assess the demand and 
152 Keh, D., "Drug Money in a Changing World: Economic Reform and Criminal Finance", UNDCP 
Technical Series, No. 4 (1996), Table 1. 
153 Shelley, L., supi-a note 134, at 469-470, One important aspect of the penetration of the State is the strong 
link between organised crime and corruption. On this relationship see Bassiouni, S., and Vetere, E. (eds. ), 
supra note 136, at xxxiv-xl. 154 Rotman, E., supra note 150 at 11-12. 
155 Guymon, C., sup7-a note 149, at 61. 
156 Shelley, L., "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism", in Friman, H., and Andreas, 
P. (eds. ) T17e Illicit Global Econonty and State Power 25 (1999). Cited in Rotman, E., supra note 150 at 9. 
157 Id., at 10. 
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supp YI for local currency as an important factor in making interest rate policy decisions. 
Also, aggregate increase in the foreign holdings of US dollars is a source of monetary 
expansion that can undermine any national attempt at controlling the money supply. 
Similar distortions can occur when criminal money is used to provide informal credit. "' 
This brief expose provides the reader an overview of one of the more obvious 
negative aspects of globalisation. With criminal power now rivalling and exceeding the 
power of many States and the scope of criminal operations exceeding the strict 
territoriality of State jurisdiction, the challenges are real. Further, liberal financial 
markets, as discussed in some detail above, and the natural fungibility of money leaves 
this power more securely in the hands of this illicitly self enriching 'elite. The challenges 
are, therefore, real and money-laundering control as one legal solution is highly 
imaginative. In the remaining parts of this work, this legal solution will be elaborately 
and critically discussed. 
5. The Tirnefrarne: When Did Globalisation Begin? 
This is one of the main questions in the globalisation debate. The varying views on this 
question offer three possibilities: "' (1) that globalisation is as old as history, dating back 
at least to the beginnings of Christianity as a world religion; (2) globalisation is a 
contemporary phenomenon that started with the beginnings of modernity and 
capitalism; "' or (3) that globalisation is much more recent and is a product or a symptom 
of the post-modem and post-industrial information society. "' 
Despite the seemingly stark difference between these views, they all agree that 
recently there has been a sudden acceleration in the process. In other words, the question 
is not whether we are undergoing change at this particular stage of history. It is rather 
how deep and how novel is this change. The debate can thus be reduced to a question of 
degree. 
Exploring the parameters of this debate and engaging in it is beyond the scope of 
this Chapter. The Chapter simply relies on this element of agreement on globalisation 
158 For this analysis see Keh, supra note 152, Table 1, at 3-5. 
159 Waters, supra note 6, at 4; Scholte, supra note 2, at 62. 
160 One of the main proponents of this view is Giddens supra note 6, at 2 1. 
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acceleration witnessed in the past three decades; globalisation is a recent phenomenon 
that started in the beginnings of the 1970s. The bases of this position is found by 
analysing how globalisation came about. 
Globalisation is a product of technological and regulatory change. Its history is 
thus indistinguishable from their history. While telecommunication dates back to late 
nineteenth century, the intensity, 'instantaneousness 9 162 , and spread of present modes of 
communication, as well as their cheap costs is incomparable to the developments of that 
gremote' past. The present telecommunication revolution could not have been possible 
without the invention of the Integrated Circuit in 1958 and the Microprocessor in 1971. 
These technological developments made our present reality of intense, instantaneous, 
global communication possible. 
The history of globalising legal change is equally recent. While standardisation is 
as old as cross-border technologies, such as the telephone and the train, its momentum 
has picked up with the shifting emphasis on non-tariff barriers to trade since the Tokyo 
Round (1973-79). Further, the privatisation of British Telecom in 1984 marks the 
beginning of the privatisation movement in the pioneering United Kingdom as well as 
worldwide. The parallel movement towards deregulation dates back to the mid-1970s in 
the United States. 
This rough calendar of globalising legal and technological development shows 
that globalisation as a process of social change could be situated temporally in the last 
three decades of the twentieth century to the present. While the process does have some 
roots and genesis since the late nineteenth century, its legal and technological forces did 
not gather their collective momentum until the beginning of the 1970s. This process has 
also reached a new height with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent 
disintegration of the Soviet Bloc. This conclusion, therefore, delineates the historical 
scope of this work and forms part of the basis for its core theme. 
16 1 For attempts at organising the history of globalisation into periods see Scholte, sitpra note 2, at 62-88; 
Robertson, supm note 4, at 57-60. 
162 The present author attaches great importance to this instantaneous character of current modes of 
communication. In her view, this is the sine qtta i7oii condition for the emergence of 
de-temtonal social 
life. 
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6. Globalisation as a legal problematic 
The debate about globalisation and the law falls within a broader debate in globalisation 
studies concerning the problem of governance. In fact, this concern forms one of the core 
aspects of problematising globalisation. " Posed as a question, globalisation theorists 
have repeatedly asked what are the implications of globalisation of economic activities 
and organisations for the Westphalian structure of governance? How can we control, 
regulate or organise these emergent "deterritorial" aspects of social life? Such questions 
echoed in the writings of political economists, social scientists and inevitably lawyers. 
This part of the discussion focuses on the latter's approach and sets the structure and 
analytical framework for the remainder of this work. 
The complexity of the concept of globalisation did not escape lawyers. One 
author indicated that globalisation is a "multifaceted concept encompassing a wide range 
of seemingly disparate processes, activities and conditions- some nebulous, others 
concrete- that often re-enforce as well as clash with each other. ""' Lawyers, however, 
while acknowledging this complexity did not engage intensely in the debate about 
definition. They did not strain themselves to distinguish globalisation from other similar 
phenomenon such as transnationalisation, or internationalisation. They often used this 
term interchangeably with some of the others. "' In analysing legal writing on 
globalisation one can encounter three approaches to the question of defining the concept: 
some authors omit totally any attempt at definition and use the concept instead as self- 
explanatory, 166 others list a set of examples of what is perceived as symptoms of 
globalisation and label it as such, 161 others actually tackle the question of definition and 
adopt one definition or another. In all these cases, the student can clearly see the lawyer's 
disinterest in this definitional problem and the eagerness to move on to the more practical 
issues involved. 
163 Scholte, J., stipi-a note 2, at 132-158. 
164 Seita, A., "Globalization and the convergence of values", Coi-nell Inte7-national Law Join-nal (1997), at 
429. 
165 Seefoi- example Herald Baurn, "Globalizing Capital Markets and Possible Regulatory Responses", in 
Basedow, J., and Kono, T. (eds. ), Legal Aspects of Globalization: Conflicts of Law, Internet, Capital 
Mai-kets and Insolvency in a Global Economy (1999), at 77-132. 
166 See e. g., Engel, D., "Transformation of Law and Place: Introduction to the Articles by Buchanan, 
Dariah-Snuth, Maurer, and Aman", 2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 363 (1995). 
167 John Jackson, Global EconorMcs and international EcononUc Law, I Journal of International Econornic 
Law 1 (1998). 
119 
Nevertheless, in studying the lawyers' definitions of globalisation, one can discern 
the similarities with other social scientific analysis as well as certain disciplinary 
characteristics. Lawyers like others perceive globalisation as change in the social 
surrounding that merits their attention. The geographic nature of this change is repeatedly 
expressed in their writing. According to one author, the disparate processes of 
globalisation are connected by a single theme and that is "What is geographically 
meaningful now transcends national boundaries and is expanding to cover the entire 
planet. " 168 
There are also various characteristic features about the lawyers' understanding of 
globalisation. These characteristics can all be traced to the particular understanding of 
territory in the discipline of law. For lawyers, geographic spheres and territories are 
descriptions of legal spheres of competence or dominion. "' In that sense, when lawyers 
talk about globalisation as change of geography, they are also implicitly referring to 
globalisation as a political shift in power and authority. In a legal sense, territory is a 
"sphere of legal competence""' and deterritorialisation is a loss of such competence. This 
IC the explains why lawyers are more explicitly conscious of globalisation as an omission oi 
State. The word "denationalisation" is used frequently by lawyers to define what 
globalisation is about. This is often combined with the incorporation of the problem of 
governance in their definition. For example, one author discussing the status of non- 
governmental organisations under international law defines globalisation as: 
"denationalization of clusters of political, economic, and social activities that undermine 
the ability of the sovereign State to control activities on its territory[. ]""' 
Legal writing about globalisation is organised around this problem of loss of State 
power and the mismatch between the legal competence of the State and the geographic 
scope of certain activities and/or problems. Lawyers tend to either advocate solutions to 
this problem or critique emerging solutions. The latter spurs a whole set of new problems 
that are essentially side effects of the attempts at solving the problem of legal 
governance. The discussion in the remainder of this section will follow this structure. It 
168 Seita, A., supra note 164, at 429. 
169 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public Inter7iational Law (1998), at 114. 
170 id. 
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will start by elaborating on the core problem of territorial governance versus social and 
economic deterritoriality, this will be followed by a discussion of the various emerging 
solutions of this core problem. The section will be concluded with a discussion of the 
problematic implications of such solutions for democracy, legitimacy and State 
sovereignty. 
6.1. Territoriality v. De-territoriality 
s ind cated in the previous paragraph, the problem of the mi between the 
scope of State governance and the scope of social activities is the core legal problem 
posed by globalisation. This problem is captured in the titles of writings that address the 
issues such as: "International Business and National Jurisdiction" 172 , "On governing a 
Pen-neable Society" 17' and "Global Economics and International Economic Law. " 174 
Authors repeatedly pose questions such as: "Just where is the market when it exists in the 
computer system? Who regulates a market when its geographical coordinates can no 
longer be pinned down easily? " "Which jurisdiction or jurisdictions are supposed to 
regulate a given conduct in connection with a cross-border securities transaction? And 
gravely formulate the problem in statements as: "There is a serious disconnect between 
the scope of economic processes and the reach of rules to govern those processes, " 175 
"Individuals had become global actors, yet the frameworks establishing rules, rights, and 
duties remained tied to a territory" 176 
This section will describe this primary problematic of globalisation in more detail. 
The first part will explain the prevalent territoriality of the Westphalian legal order. This 
will be followed by a description of the current deterritorialisation of economic and social 
activities. The last part will be dedicated to a schematic analysis of the problems that this 
contrast poses for legal governance. 
17 1 Nowrot, K., "Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations 
Under International Law", 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (1999), at 597. 
172 Neale, A., and Stephens, M., International Business and National Jurisdiction (1988). 
173 Wiener, J., Globalization and the Harnzonization of Law (1999), at 3. The title referred to in the text is 
the heading of chapter one of the book. 
174 Jackson, J., supra note 167. 
175 Posner, T., and Reif, T., "Homage to a Bull Moose: Applying Lessons of History to Meet the challenges 
of Globalization", 24 Fordham International Law Journal, (2000), at 490. 
176 Wiener, J., Globalization and the Harinonization of Law (1999), at vii. 
121 
6.1.1. Territoriality and the Law 
The organisation of the world into geographic entities called "States" dates back to the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. These Peace Treaties have divided Europe into independent 
territorial units thus creating the notion of "State" as we understand it today. "' According 
to the criteria of statehood as formulated in article I of the 1933 Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and duties of States, a State can be defined as a political community that 
possesses a defined territory and a permanent population and is subject to an organised 
form of government. "' 
This definition makes it apparent that territoriality is a constitutive element of the 
State. The significance of this element has been repeatedly pronounced by scholars of 
international law. According to Oppenheim, "a State without a territory is not possible. ""' 
Similarly, Shaw states that "statehood is inconceivable in the absence of a reasonably 
defined geographical base. ""' On these bases, the world order created by the 
Westphalian Peace Treaties is a geographically segmented one. The State, which 
constitutes its geographic unit, was conceived by the treaLies to be a highly monopolistic 
and exclusive political arrangement. Each State possesses the faculty of sovereignty, 
which grants it the exclusive right to organise its internal affairs in any manner it 
perceives to be fit (internal sovereignty). It further grants it full independence vis-a-vis 
other States in the international order (external sovereignty). "' 
In relation to the law, State internal sovereignty was translated into an understanding 
of legal systems as an absolute monopoly of the State. Law, thus, has become 
synonymous with State-law to the exclusion of any other possible sources of rules of 
conduct. "' Consequently, the territoriality of the State and its sovereignty was reflected in 
"' Shaw, M., "Territory in International Law", 13 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1982), at 
62. 
178Brownlie, I., supra note 169, at 70-72; Shaw, M., International Law (1997), at 139-144. 
179 Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, (8th ed. 1955), at 45 1. 
180 Shaw, M., supra note 177 at 61. 
'8' On the concept of sovereignty see Verzijl, J., International Law in Historical Perspective, Vol. 1, 
(1968), at 256-266. 
182 This State-centred understanding of legal systems has not passed unchallenged, seefor exaniple 
. 
fLaw: An Introduction (19S4) pp. 29-3 1. For more recent challenges of this Cotterrell, The SocioloD- o 
monopoly based on analysis of globalisation see Teubner, G. (ed. ), Global Law TFithotit a State, (1997); De 
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the legal order, which became predominantly territorial in its turn. The concept of State 
jurisdiction emerged to delineate the scope within which each State exercises its "judicial, 
legislative and administrative competence. ""' This is the concept the territoriality of 
which is most pertinent to our present analysis. 
As part of public international law traditional mission of delimiting the scope of 
exercise of State powers"', it has developed, doctrinally and sometimes judicially, "' 
certain principles relating to the legal jurisdiction of the State. According to Brownlie, 
"[flhe starting-point in this part of the law is the proposition that, at least as a 
presumption, jurisdiction is territorial. ""' [Emphasis added] One should, however, 
distinguish between three types of State legal jurisdiction: (1) prescriptive or legislative 
jurisdiction, which refers to the power of the State to prescribe rules of law; (2) 
adjudicative jurisdiction, which refers to its power to rule judicially over legal questions; 
and (3) enforcement jurisdiction, meaning State power to take action to enforce its laws 
or its judicial decisions. "' While prescriptive and judicial jurisdiction may be exercised 
on non-territorial basis, enforcement jurisdiction is strictly territorial except in rare and 
very exceptional cases. "' Considering that the effectiveness of legal rules and judicial C) 
decisions is highly dependent on their enforcement, this strict territoriality of the 
enforcement jurisdiction strengthens legal territoriality more generally. 
Another distinction is made between jurisdiction over civil matters (civil jurisdiction) 
and jurisdiction over criminal matters (criminal jurisdiction). It is to be noted that 
stretching the territorial jurisdiction of the State has been more tolerated in civil rather 
than criminal matters. "' This could be explained on basis of the particular nature of 
criminal law , its more severely coercive character and the close link between crimes and 
the moral structure and values of the society. All these features of criminal law make 
foreign criminal jurisdiction more of a threat to the notions of State sovereignty and its 
Sousa Santos, B., Toward a Neýv Conunon Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition 
(1995); especially chapter 4. 
183 Brownlie, I., supi-a note 169, at 70-72; and Shaw, M., supý-a note 178, at 301. 
184 Shaw, M., supi-a note 177, at 73. 
185 Lotus Case (1927), PCIJ, Ser. A, no. 10. 
186 Brownlie, I., supra note 169, at 301. 
187 Bassiouni, C., International Criininal Lavv Vol II on Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms (2 nd ed., 
1999), at 36. 
188 Shaxv, M., supra note 178, at 452. 
189 Id. at 457. 
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exclusive authority within its territory. 
While State sovereipty gives the State the right to exercise certain exclusive legal 
competencies within a specific territory, such exclusivity should be enforced against 
other persons of international law. This is captured by the external aspect of sovereignty 
and the corollary duty of other States to refrain from intervention in any matter 
concerning another State. One application of the principle of non-intervention in the legal 
sphere is the concept of the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. `0 According to this 
concept certain matters are reserved for the domestic jurisdiction of the State and free 
from any binding international law. The classic example of such matters is issues of 
nationality and immigration. The importance of the concept of reserved domain should 
not be exaggerated. It is generally accepted that the scope of the reserved domain is 
historically contingent. This means that "no subject is irrevocably fixed within the 
reserved dornain[. ]"" Recent developments in international law and the current 
expansion of its subject-matter supports this general view and proves the limitations of 
the reserved domain as a principle. 
The analysis presented in +the previous paragraplis leads one to conclude that the 
world order that prevailed since the 17"' century is a geographically fragmented one. The 
State monopoly of legal ordering has resulted in a legal system that is based on a 
presumption of territoriality. While this is not to suggest that territoriality remained pure 
and exclusive of other criteria, territoriality continues to dominate the principles of legal 
jurisdiction. 
6.1.2. Social and Economic De-territoriality 
Against this backdrop of legal territoriality, lawyers and lawmakers have been 
increasingly confronted by fori-ris of social and economic activities that break, to varying 
degrees, with such territorial boundaries. Before one goes on to elaborate on this 
observation, it is important to indicate that the reference to economic and social de- 
territoriality remains a reference to a partial phenomenon. De-territonalisation does not 
touch our social life in any unifon-n degree. Simply, in analysing the question of 
"0 See genet-ally BrownheJ., supra note 169, at 293-297; Shaw, M., supra note 178, at 454-455; and 
Verzij 1, J., supra note 18 1, at 272-2 83. 
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globalisation one should always remember that substantial aspects of our social life 
remain in essence territorial. 
De-territorialisation of social life takes vanous fonns. In one sense, de- 
territorialisation can pertain to the fact that actions that are taking place strictly within the 
boundaries of one country are having acute impact across various territories. The typical 
case of this form of de-territorialisation is environmental pollution. A local industry that 
is emitting excessive levels of carbon dioxide, is realistically affecting the life of all the 
inhabitants of the planet by contributing to the threatening problem of global warrning. 
Another example is the now typical global repercussions of initially national financial 
crisis such as the Latin American debt crisis in the mid-1980s and the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997. "' 
Largely due to technological changes in the area of telecommunication, social actions 
or activities are increasingly de-territorial in themselves rather than merely in terms of 
their effect. One primary example is the geographic fragmentation of the processes of 
production, which sets the present era apart from earlier forms internationalisation that 
were based on cross-border commerce rather thLan -prQ-d-uction. --. 
Reich's_-example of an-- 
aeroplane that is "designed in the State of Washington and in Japan, assembled in Seattle, 
with tail cones fi-om Canada, special tail sections from China and Italy, and engines from 
Britain"' is worth repeating here for its illustrative value. 
This geographic dispersal of production is caused and paralleled by another equally 
significant process of de-territorialisation; that is of the corporation. This phenomenon 
takes place at various levels. Because of the liberalisation of capital markets, the 
ownership of companies is now increasingly dispersed amongst shareholders of various 
countries. The freedom of incorporation, has also resulted in companies repeatedly 
shifting their place of incorporation. The place of a company's operation is also 
frequently different ftorn the location of its decision-making machinery and its country of 
incorporation. The case of the Bank for Credit and Commerce International can serve to 
illustrate this point. 
191 Brownlie, I., id., at 293. 
192 The Latin American crisis was triggered by the default of Mexico on its sovereign debt in 1984. The 
Asian Crisis, on the other hand, was triggered by the devaluation of the Thai Pah. On this issue see . 193 Reich, R., supra note 8 at 112 (1991) 
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What mention of the BCCI brings to mind is the fact that de-territorialisation is 
not confined to the legal aspects of our social life. Undergoing a very similar process of 
geographic expansion is the groups of organised criminals that up until recently 
constituted a local problem for certain countries such as the United States and Italy. 
According to studies of organised criminal activities, criminal organisations are forging 
major trarisnational alliances with similar organisations in other countries and entering 
into informal agreements organised around common interests. "' Such alliances are said to 
exist between groups as geographically disparate as the Chinese Triads and the 
Colombian drug cartels. "' This, it is argued, has spawned a globalisation of illegal 
markets in drugs, arms or illegal immigrants. "' 
The Internet takes this de-territorialisation of economic life to a different level. 
The act of advertising goods and services on the Internet, is an act the geographic scope 
of which is expanding with every access to the site from a different country. This reality 
makes it happening anywhere at any point of time. This makes tying such act down to a 
single territory mere arbitrariness. The spatial transformation brought by the internet has 
been stropgjy__qaptqrqd by one author st4jtlqg that: "_sýp iz hy- jVs in _qce 
is no longer ýn qp geqgT- 
electronics ... there is a movement from geo- to chrono -politics: the distribution of 
territory becomes the distribution of time. " 197 
The Problem 
The problematic implications of this mismatch for governance are now common 
place. They are contemplated incessantly by lawyers. Simply stated, while national 
interests and values are expressed in national laws territorially applicable, infringement of 
such interests and values has a non-territorial character. 
For example, the national interest in a sound and safe financial system is traditionally 
expressed in national regulation of banking operations and capital adequacy standards. 
The threat to a country's citizens and its national financial system can, however, result 
from bank failures and financial crisis occurring in another probably even remote 
country. This has been illustrated by the BCCI case and the Barings, case as well as by 
194 Strange, S., The retreat of the State: TheDiffusioii of Power h7 the World Econonýv (1996), at 111. 
195 id. 
196 id. 
197 Wiener, J., supra note 173, at p. 88. 
126 
the lessons of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
In situations of de-territorial impingement on national interests and values, the State 
concerned might lack any fonn of jurisdiction over the offensive acts absent an 
aggressive application of a "nationality principle" or "effect doctrine" to assert 
jurisdiction. In other cases, the country concerned might have a prescriptive jurisdiction, 
in that its laws apply to the offensive act, but lacks enforcement jurisdiction because of 
the presence of the offender, the assets or even the documentary evidence outside its 
territory. 
The mismatch dilemma is sometimes more subtle. This occurs particularly in relation 
to the mobility of large capital and the geographic fluidity of multinational corporations. 
In such cases,, this mobility might create pressures on the domestic jurisdiction to 
abandon the pursuit of certain national interests where this pursuit proves unfavourable or 
costly to business. This phenomenon is commonly known as "regulatory competition" or 
"regulatory arbitrage". Over the past few decades, labour rights and environmental 
protection have repeatedly suffered such deregulatory pressures. 
Globalisation, therefore, creates a situation where national interests either cannot be 
pursued or cannot be protected because of the pressures of de-territoriality. This 
challenge to governance has created demands for imaginative readjustment of our 
contemporary st, j-, Luctures and mechanisms of govenihig. A State-centred structure of 
governance is no longer sufficient. 
6.2. Solving the Governance Problematic. -A Frameworkfor Understanding Money 
Laundering Law 
Money laundering law is a response to globalisation. The link between globalisation and 
money laundering law is well established in the legislative history of the core national ZI) 
and international instruments discussed in Chapter Two of this study as well as in the 
writing on the subject. Restating some of this history here is useful to confirni this 
obvious fact. 
The U. S. Bank Secrecy Act 1970, "' as the first legal instrument dealing with the 
problem of money laundering, emerged in response to the increasing use of offshore Zý It) 
198 Pub. L. 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114. 
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financial centres for the purpose of evading U. S. law enforcement. The House Report on 
the Bill has provided in justification of the "foreign transaction reporting requirements" 
that: "Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have 
permitted proliferation of 'white collar' crime; have served as the financial undepinning of 
organized criminal operations in the United States; have been utilized by Americans to 
evade income taxes, conceal assets illegally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans 
and others to avoid the law and regulations governing securities and exchangesj ... ] etc. 
11199 It then went on to explain the problem that foreign secret accounts create, which 
justifies legislative intervention: "When law enforcement personnel are confronted with 
the secret foreign bank account or the secret financial institution they are placed in an 
impossible position. 
11200 
In upholding the constitutionality of the BSA (1970), the U. S. Supreme Court 
expressed awareness of the changes in the context, which in its opinion merited the 
measures adopted in the Act. The threatening developments that merited the BSA's 
unusual regulatory requirements involved both the use of foreign secret accounts to 
circumvent national laws and the rise of criminql orgAniisations possessing substantial -- 
wealth. The words of the Court are worth restating here: "While an Act conferring such 
broad authority over transactions such as these might well surprise or even shock those 
who lived in an earlier era, the latter did not live to see the time when bank accounts 
would join chocolate, cheese, and watches as a symbol of the Swiss economy. Nor did 
they live to see the heavy utilization of our domestic banking system by minions of 
organized crime as by millions of legitimate businessmen. 11201 
The U. S. MLCA (1986) developed also out of similar considerations. The 
President's Commission on Organised Crime, whose work inspired the legislation, found 
that "in recent years ... criminals 
have mastered the details of modem technology, 
international finance, and foreign secrecy laws to create select fraternity of money 
199 H. R. Rep. No. 91-975,9 1" Congress, 2d Session (1970) as reprinted in U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, Vol. 2,4394 (1970), at 4397. 
200 id. 
20 ' The California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 39 L Ed. 2d 812 (1974), at 823. 
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laundering professionals. As a result, organized crime today uses banks and other 
202 financial institutions as routinely, if not as frequently, as legitimate businesses. " 
This has led the U. S. Congress to accept the argument of law enforcement officials that 
"only a substantive prohibition of the act of laundering will deter and significantly 
decrease money laundering" and pass the MLCA rendering it an offence to launder the 
proceeds of a criminal activity. 
Similarly, the Swiss Banks' Agreement on the Observance of Care (1977) was a 
response to billions of Swiss Francs deposited in the Swiss financial sector in violation of 
the Italian capital controls. "' The U. K. law incriminated money laundering as a response 
to the failure of existing laws to deprive drug traffickers of their enormous but ill-gotten 
wealth, which they could place in assets abroad. "' Considerations of the same sort 
operated at the international level to induce agreement on the main anti-money 
laundering instruments. For example, the Council of Europe Recommendation on money 
laundering, as the first international instrument on money laundering, proceeded from the 
assumption that: "modem forms of criminality in the majority of the European countries 
--sqppQrtc shown an 
impTessive increase in orgAnised violent criminality -ed-by 
large 
financial resources and aimed at raising more and more gain. " It was also geared towards 
addressing the concern that "the transfer of funds of criminal origin ftom one country to 
another and the process by which they are laundered through insertion in the economic 
system give rise to serious problems[. ] 
The gist of this brief summary of the concerns and assumptions that underlie the 
main legal instruments on money laundering in the past two decades is that money 4- 
laundering law emerged as a response to transnational criminal activity, i. e., the 
geographic aspect of globalisation, and to powerful criminal enterprises, i. e., the political 0 
aspect of globalisation. Understanding money laundering law should be based on an 
understanding on how it purports to address these current problematic aspects of global 
legal govemance. 
202 President's Commission on Organized Crime, The Cash Coimection: Organized Crime, Fiiiancial 
Institutions mid n7oiiey Lalaidering (1985), at 8. 
203 S. Report No. 99 ý33,99hCongress, 2 
nd Session (1986), at 3. 
204 See above Chapter Two, Section 2.2. 
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The legal response to the challenges that globalisation poses to legal order can be 
organised into six modalities or mechanisms. These modalities can be observed in the 
different fields of public law. It will be argued in the subsequent part of this volume that 
money laundering law utilises each of these modalities in an attempt to control and 
prevent transnational organised criminal activity. The first reaction to extraterritorial 
threats is likely to be an attempt to reverse the process through regulatory measures that 
close the national borders to capital flows, information flows, or other cross-border 
activities. These protective measures could be labelled de-globalisation by reference to 
their affect on the process that triggered them. "' Another response could be to attempt to 
stretch national jurisdiction across border in order to govern extraterritorial activities that 
the State perceives as detrimental to its interests. 207 Such measure is problematic in that, 
in its unilateral forms, it tends to offend against the sovereignty of other countries and as 
a result to undermine the potential for international co-operation. This 
extra territorialisation of national jurisdiction is also available only to powerful States 
that possess the resources and the clout to extend national jurisdiction and to enforce this 
--ext-ension 
a ainst other countries. qý_p__ 
Other mechanisms could be less nationally onented and more co-operative. For 
example, over the past three decades one could discern a strong trend towards 
haimonisation of national laws as well as an equally strong trend towards co-operation 
amongst enforcement authorities across borders. "' Such mechanisms are, by far, the least 
upsetting of the State-based system of international governance. 
The legal responses mentioned so far centre to a great extent around the State as 
the primary agency of governance. Other forms of less traditional governance tend to rely 
on private or supranational to functions that were originally perfon-ned by the State. 
Privatisation and supranationalisation of the functions of the State in law and order 
represent the clearest departure from the structures of legal governance as we know it 
205R. v. Cuthbertson, [ 1980] 2 All ER 40 1. This case constitutes the trigger of the legislative intervention to 
amend laws of forfeiture and the corollary introduction of an offence of money laundering. See above 
Chapter Two, Section 3.3. 
206 See below Chapter Four, Section 2. 
207 See below Chapter Four, Section 3. 
208 See below Chapter Four, Sections 4&5. 
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since the birth of the nation State. "' In that sense they represent the lawyer with some of 
the most vexing challenges to the prevailing notions of legitimacy. 
Analysing money laundering law in terms of these six legal responses to 
globalisation provides a vehicle for systernatising this hybrid legal system and placing it 
in the wider context of current legal order. It is the task of the following three chapters of 
this volume to conduct this analysis. 
7. Conclusion 
Understanding money laundering law as a legal phenomenon is not possible without an 
understanding of the context in which it emerged. Over roughly the same period of time 
that money laundering law has been developing, social scientists have observed a process 
of social transformation that they have labelled globalisation. In this Chapter, the author 
has tried to trace the origin, the contours and the causes of this process. In this regard, 
globalisation has been defined as a process of social change that possesses two core 
dimensions. The first dimension, and from which the terni globalisation is derived, is a 
4 hic gne and it si ly MMp sa compression of the Cace within which social p_ -l. ---- --4TR 
L jr 
_ 
relations are conducted. The second dimension is political and can only be defined by 
reference to the State. This refers to the emergence of non-state actors that are not only 
transnational but also possess substantial powers. 
Globalisation is not a process that is simply happening to the society. In many 
ways it is a process that is brought about by the society itself The discussion so far has 
illustrated that conscious regulatory arrangements have played an equally significant role 
in bringing about the process of globalisation. This analysis is particularly pertinent to the 
lawyer. As explained above, globalisation creates a geographic mismatch between the 
government and the governed. This mismatch is compounded by the increasing powers of 
the governed in disproportion to the State. Both aspects of globalisation pose vexing 
problems for the legal order. The fact that law was instrumental in bringing globalisation 
about suggests that it is unlikely to be impotent in helping to manage it. 
Understanding globalisation, its causes and its challenge to the legal order in 
those tenns is essential for the understanding of the legal policy that underlies money 
209 See below Chapters, Five and Six. 
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laundering law. Building on the analysis in this Chapter and on the particularly relevant 
examination of globalisation in the area of crime and financial markets, the following 
chapters of this work are dedicated to analysing systematically money laundering law as 
a response to globalisation. This systematisation aims at placing money laundering law in 
context and understanding the consequences of certain policy choices in this area in the 
overall structure of contemporary legal order. This framework further permits 
comparisons across different areas of the law. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LEGAL PEOBLEMATIC: STATE-BASED SOLUTIONS 
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3. STRETCHING NATIONAL JURISDICTION 
3.1. An Overview 
3.2. Money Laundering Law: An Extraterritorial Instrument 
4. HARMONISATION 
4.1. Harmonising as a Solution: An Overview 
4.2. Convergence in Money Laundering Law 
5. ENFORCEMENT CO-OPERATION: A TRADITIONAL SOLUTION WITH NEW FEATURES 
5.1. International Enforcement Co-operation: The Broad Context 
5.2. Money Laundering Law Enforcement Co-operation 
6. CONCLUSION 
1. Introduction 
As elaborated upon in the previous Chapter, globalisation from a governance 
perspective creates a problem of "mismatch. " In one respect, government is 
essentially territorial while the governed activities are increasingly extraterritorial. In 
another respect, non-state actors are gaining substantial economic and informational 
power in disproportion to the State, i. e., the government. Both aspects of the problem 
clearly manifest themselves in the area of criminal law enforcement. The troubles 
faced by the State in enforcing its authority in general, including such fundamental 
sovereign authority as that expressed in criminal law, has led some to argue the 
decline of the State and the retreat of the State. Such conclusions, - 
however, are 
premature. In its attempt to reassert its authority and establish order, the State has 
adopted a number of techniques. Each of these techniques has become part of the 
"toolkit" of money laundering law. 
A possible reactive solution to the dis-empowering effect of globalisation is to 
reverse its tide. The idea is that if law has been instrumental in bringing globalisation 
about then it should be capable of terminating its process. Some attempts have been 
made in this regard, and this is the modality that this Chapter terms as de- 
globalisation. Money laundering law relies substantially on the operation of such C) 
modality to an extent that this creates conflict with other economic policies. Trends in 
this direction are discernible in the regulation of the Internet in a number of countries 
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and especially in more totalitarian ones, such as China. It is also discernible in 
mechanisms of capital controls that are sometimes used to contain a financial crisis. 
The question with respect to such attempts is one of effectiveness. Proponents of 
globalisation and others who are inclined towards deterrninacy believe that 
globalisation is irreversible. Considering the key role of technology in causing 
globalisation, there is an element of truth to this argument. The role of law, however, 
should not be underestimated, and hence law's capacity to regulate. Further, 
technological developments are now being put to the task of creating de-globalising 
technologies. 
A possible second solution is one that attempts "to bridge" the geographic 
mismatch. It is the traditional mechanism of extraterritoriality. The history of 
criminal jurisdiction is one of developing principles that attempt at expanding the 
territorial jurisdiction of the State beyond its territory. While some forms of 
extraterritoriality are the product of amicable agreements between States, others were 
simply the exercise of an aggressive defensive by some powerful jurisdictions. The 
most obvious example of the latter exercise of extraterritoriality is the United States. 
Aggressive extraterritoriality creates antagonism amongst States to the extent of 
defeating its purposes in the long run. Amicable extraterritoriality, unless practised 
with sufficient safeguards, can result in j eopardising the rights of the individual. 
In order to secure their authority, States are increasingly resorting to what 
might be described as pooling of sovereignties. This best describes the final two 
modalities of State-based governance in the era of globalisation. Harmonisation, as 
one such solution, is based on achieving substantive conversion between the laws in 
different countries in a manner that deprives offenders from the benefits of safe 
havens. This was a primary objective of the stage of supranationalisation of money 
laundering law. This trend in money laundering law was discussed in Chapter Two 
and will be further discussed in the Chapter Six below. The last modality is 
international co-operation. This fon-n of handling the governance problematic will 
remain relevant for as long as the organisation of international society into sovereign 
States persists. Under such structure, enforcement jurisdiction remains squarely 
national. The increasingly transnational character of social and economic activities 
renders local enforcement ineffective. The only sustainable solution to such problem 
is necessarily co-operative. 
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Before delving into the detailed discussion of each of these modalities, it is 
important to note that (1) the distinction between the tools of governance described in 
this Chapter and the tools described in the following two chapter is somewhat 
arbitrary. The use of supranationalisation to achieve harmonisation is one example of 
this arbitrariness. (2) While some of the modalities described in this Chapter are 
seemingly traditional, they have acquired new features in this era of globalisation that 
merit treating them as distinct from their earlier forms. 
2. De-globalisation through Regulation 
1. An Overview 
As argued in Chapter Three, laws and regulations have played an instrumental role in 
bringing globalisation about, ' it, thus, is arguable that the law can interfere once more 
to reverse the tide of globalisation or to limit its flow. This can be achieved through 
laws and regulations that impose restrictions on the free movement of goods, capital 
and people, or the free access to and use of telecommunication and information 
technologies. This de-globalisation through law is one obvious and ready solution to 
the problems that globalisation might raise. 
The hitemet is one of the pimary teclmological instraments of glob alisatiOll. 
Legal restrictions on Internet use and access represent a good example of de- 
globalisation through law. While such attempts exist to one degree or another in all 
jurisdictions, China's case is a discrete and illustrative one. ' China has perceived the 
clear financial and economic benefits of globalisation. It has also become aware of the 
threats that this process can bring about. The primary national interests that China 
perceived to be threatened by wide Internet access were the national interests in 
political control, State security, social cohesion, social stability, public order, ideals of 
socialism and the basic principles of the Constitution. ' In order to protect these values 
and interests while gleaning the benefits that the Internet could bring, China is 
See supra Chapter Three, Section 3.2. 
2 See McGeary, A., "China's Great Balancing Act: Maxin-iizMg the Internet's Benefits While Limiting 
its Detriments", 35 Int'l Law. 219 (2001); Feir, S., "Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted 
Repair of Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of Idea", 6 Pac. Rim L& Pol'y 
J. 361 (1997); Taylor, J. "The Internet in China: Embarking on the 'Information Superhighway' with 
One Hand on the Wheel and the Other Hand on the Plug", 15 Dickenson Journal of International Law 
621(1997). 
In specifying their purpose, Chapter 1, s. I of the Computer Information Network and Internet 
Security Protection and Management Regulations (December 30,1997) stipulate that they seek to 
"preserve the social order and social stability. " Cited in McGeary, A., supra note 2, at 226. 
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continuously attempting to regulate and control the use of the Internet. 
China's regulatory system is based on limiting access to inforrnation on the 
Internet. To achieve this objective, the Chinese government casts a wide regulatory 
net that catches Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet information providers and 
all users of this medium. The regulations prohibit access to certain Internet sites and 
retrieval and distribution of categories of information that the Government perceives 
to be prejudicial to the national interests and values referred to above. To enforce such 
regulations, the Government uses filtering and blocking technologies. It also imposes 
a cumbersome set of licensing and registration requirements upon Internet users, 
service providers and information providers. The regulations governing the Internet 
further impose wide policing requirements on ISPs and infon-nation providers. ' 
The efficacy of China's regulation of the Internet has been questioned. ' It is 
however generally accepted that such tight control does deter the ordinary user of the 
Internet in China even if it fails to deter the tenacious and highly skilled one. ' 
The threat of globalisation to the State's capacity to govern has not been more 
obvious as it has been in the economic sphere. Financial liberalisation' and the 
consequent flood of capital flows across borders have significantly undermined 
governments' monetary and economic autonomy. The government's instruments of 
monetary policy are becoming increasingly ineffective under the conditions of open 
economy and financial liberalisation. For example, the use of open market operations 
to reduce liquidity in the economy is a traditional and effective instrument to achieve 
stabilisation and control inflation under the conditions of a closed economy. In an 
open economy with liberalised capital account, these mechanisms could prove counter 
productive if it results in increasing interest rates and attracting more foreign 
investment! 
Such governance problems, especially as manifested in the Mexican debt crisis in 
' For an overview of these regulatory arrangements see D. McGeary, A., id., at 224-229. For a review 
of the Chinese goverm-nent agencies involved in Internet regulations see Feir, S., supra note 2, at 368- 
371. 
5 McGeary, A., stipra note 2, at 229-230; Feir, S., stipra note 2, at 377-382; Taylor, J., stipra note 2, at 
637-639. 
6A senior Chinese goveinment official noted that "the regulations were intended to deter those who 
might casually visit blocked or banned sites and added a person intent on accessing prohibited 
information will find a way to access that information. " Cited in McGeary, A., szipra note 2, at 227. 
7 International financial liberalisation comprises of "removal of restrictions on international capital 
movements and the opening of the domestic financial sector to foreign competition. " Tamirisa, N., 
Trade in Financial Se7-vices, IMF Working Paper No. 89 (1999), at 4. 
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1994 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, have resulted in re-examination of the 
value of financial liberalisation and repeated resort to capital controls across the 
developing world. Capital controls are another example of de-globalisation through 
regulation. They encompass a wide range of regulatory measures imposed by a 
country for the purpose of controlling capital flows crossing its borders. Examples of 
such measures include imposing a tax on capital inflows, ' imposing a non- 
remunerated reserve requirement on banks and private companies for foreign currency 
obligations" and imposing restrictions on foreign ownership. 
Traditionally, capital controls were used to protect nationalist values by 
preventing the control of foreign capital of domestic industries or of certain categories 
of industries that are perceived to be strategic. Current capital controls are often 
employed to restore a degree of monetary autonomy that allows the government to use 
monetary policy instruments effectively and to achieve economic stabilisation. '' 
Capital controls are therefore often used to insulate the economy temporarily until 
government monetary policy interventions succeed. They are also used to influence 
the composition of capital inflows mostly to discourage short-term capital flows and 
favour long-term foreign investment. " It is now commonly acknowledged that short- 
term capital flows, through the volatility they cause, were key factors in the repeated 
financial crises in the 1990s. 
De- glob ali sation through law is therefore a common remedy to the problems of 
governance that globalisation creates. De-globalisation measures are incorporated in 
the key international treaties that were concluded explicitly to promote the values of 
liberalisation. Art. VI §3 of the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement 
provides that "Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate 
international capital movements [J" Further, safeguard or escape clause measures 
have always been incorporated in international trade agreements allowing parties to 
8 McKnight, N., "Stepping Stones to Reform: The Use of Capital Controls in Economic Liberalization", 
82 Va. L. Rev. 859 (1996), at 877. 
9 In 1994, Brazil imposed a 1% tax on foreign investment in the stock market. Id., at 885. 
10 For a detailed analysis of the Chilean experience with non-remunerated reserve requirement see 
Laurens, B., "Chile's Experience with Controls on Capital Inflows in the 1990s", in Ariyoshi, A. et al. 
(eds. ), Capital Controls. - Count7y Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, IMF Occasional 
Paper No. 190, Appendix I (May 2000). 
11 Id., at 70; Otker-Robe, 1, "Malaysia's Experience with the Use of Capital Controls", in Anyoshi, A. et 
al. (eds. ), Capital Controls. - Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, IMF Occasional 
Paper No. 190, Appendix III (May 2000), at 96. Both studies confirm that gairang monetary policy 
autonomy was one of the primary objectives of imposing capital controls. 
12 For a discussion of the rationales of capital controls see McKnight, N., supra note 8, at 879-883. 
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impose trade restrictions as an exception to their trade liberalisation obligations under 
certain circumstances. " Art. XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
gives the Contracting Parties a broad escape clause that permits them, in 
circumstances that poses a threat to their domestic industries, "to suspend the 
obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. "" The 
effectiveness of such remedies is , in turn, problematic and their impact on economic 
growth is often argued to be negative; but they nevertheless remain some of the most 
readily used responses to the governance challenge of globalisation. 
2.2. De-globalistaion Trends in Money Laundering Law 
There is an inherent tension between money laundering prevention and control on the 
one hand and libralisation on the other. In many ways and consistently with the 
argument presented in this volume, money laundering is an externality of the 
liberalisation movement, especially capital account and financial services' 
liberalisation. This tension is reflected in the legal instruments on money laundering. 
For example, the recent USA PATIOT Act addresses the problem of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. It empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to 
impose special measures to deal With situations of "primary money 'laundering 
concern. it 15 In exercising his power, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to take 
into consideration "the extent to which the action or the timing of the action would 
have a significant adverse systemic impact on the international payment, clearance, 
and settlement system, or on legitimate business activities involving the particular 
jurisdiction, institution or class of transaction"" that raise the concern. This provision 
reveals the awareness of the Congress of the potential conflict between the desire to 
control terrorist financing and the goal of keeping the channels of commerce open. It 
" For a general discussion of safeguard policies in international trade arrangements see Jackson, J., 
The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (1997), at 175-213. 
14 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1994)), Art. XIX Para. 1 (a), reprinted in 
World Trade Organization, The Legal Text. - The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 17 (1999). 
15 This is a designation that the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered, on basis of reasonable 
grounds, to attach to certain financial institutions, financial transactions or jurisdictions outside the 
United States. Once the Secretary reaches the conclusion that a certain financial institution, a certain 
jurisdiction or a certain type of financial transaction is a "primary money laundering concern, " he will 
have the power to impose special measures upon domestic financial institutions in their dealing 1xith 
the designated financial institution or jurisdiction or in their carrying out of the designated transaction. 
See USA PATPUOT ACT, PL 107-5 6 (October 26,200 1), s. 311. 
16 Id. 
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grants the Secretary of the Treasury the discretion and delegates to it the task of 
striking the balance. 
The conflict between money laundering control and prevention measures on 
the one hand and liberalisation measures on the other is likely to arise under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). " GATS constitute the first 
multilateral step towards the progressive liberalisation of trade in services. As such, it 
imposes "Most-Favoured-Nation" (MFN) treatment, national treatment and 
transparency obligations on its State Members. By way of exception to the 
liberalisation measures of GATS, article 2 of GATS Annex on Financial Services 
provides that: "a Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential 
reasons, including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons 
to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the 
integrity and stability of the financial system. " Money laundering prevention 
measures fall within the scope of this exception. It is likely that such prudential 
measures will come under the scrutiny of the new WTO Dispute Settlement Body as 
they are challenged by countries whose industries are affected by their 
implementation. " 
The restrictive effect of money laundering laws on the freedom of movement 
of capital has been scrutinised by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in several 
joined cases. These cases concerned a Spanish law that imposed a prior authorisation 
as a requirement for any export of coins, banknotes or bearer cheques. " The ECJ was 
asked to confinn the compatibility of this law with the European Community law, 
which prohibits restrictions on movement of capital . 
2' The Spanish Government 
argued that this measure was imposed in order to prevent illegal money laundering 
activities, which are non-nally associated with this type of conduct. The Court ruled 
that the measure was incompatible with the Community law on the movement of 
capital. In reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned that the effective enforcement 
of national laws including criminal law on money laundering could be achieved 4-: ý 
17 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS, 1994), in World Trade Organization, supra note 
14,284. 
18Ruttley, P., "The WTO Financial Services Agreement" 13 Jotirnal of InternatIonal Financial 
Markets 109 (1999), at 115. 
'9 Joined cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 Bordessa, Mellado and Maestre [1995] ECR 10361 Joined 
Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Sainz: de Lera, Jimenez and Kapanoglu [1995] ECR 14821 
20 Council Directive 88/361/EEC, OJ 1988 L178/5 (June 8,1988), for the implementation of Article 67 
of the Treaty, Arts I and 4; Arts 73b, 73c and 73d (1) of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 0. J. C340 173 (1997). 
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through less restrictive measures. The Court held as valid a measure that requires 
prior declaration of the sums transported as opposed to prior authorisation and argued 
that such a measure could be a suitable substitute for prior authorisation. 
In order to prevent money laundering, the FATF and its members adopt and 
encourage policies of geographic targeting. According to these policies, financial 
transactions emerging from certain countries or jurisdictions maybe subject to stricter 
scrutiny. The FATF's Recommendation 21 provides that: "Financial institutions 
should give special attention to business relations and transactions with persons, 
including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or 
insufficiently apply these recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no 
apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as 
far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to 
help supervisory authorities and law enforcement agencies. '121 While the language of 
the Recommendation seems mild, its impact on a certain jurisdiction's access to the 
global financial system could be substantial. This is particularly the case in view of 
the severe criminal sanctions attached to money laundering offences in the FATF 
countries and the natural aversion of financial institutions to liability. These issues 
w1 4- with in more detaill inthe Chapter Six below. ill be dealt 
The USA PATRIOT Act 2001 takes these measures a step further . 
22 It 
gives 
the Secretary of the Treasury the power and discretion to prohibit any domestic 
financial institution from keeping a correspondent account or a payable-through 
account on behalf of a foreign banking institution operating in a jurisdiction that the 
Secretary finds of "primary money laundering concern. vv23 Imposing such a prohibition 
could be of serious de-globalisation effect if one takes into consideration the 
importance of the United States as a financial jurisdiction and the importance of 
correspondence account services for capital mobility and the conduct of international 
business transactions. It remains to be seen whether such measures will be subject to 
challenge under the provisions of the GATS. 
It, therefore, becomes clear that money laundering law utilises restrictive 
regulatory measures to control and prevent the problems of transnational crime. The 
resort to such measures has been extended following the tragic events of September 
21 FATF, The Forýv Recommendatioiis (1996), Reconunendation 2 1. 
22 Supra note 15, 
,3 Id., s. 311. 
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11. The problem with such approach is that excessive use might undermine the 
benefits of a liberal economic system. To the knowledge of the author, there has not 
been, so far, any systematic analysis of the impact of these ad hoc restrictive measures 
on liberalisation. The unilateral nature of these measures also makes them 
questionable in terms of the equity of the global economic order. 
3. Stretching National Jurisdiction" 
1. An Overview 
As explained in the discussion of the legal problematic of globalisation, the 
jurisdictional territoriality of the law unmatched by de-territorlallty in the social and 
economic spheres has produced the governance vacuum that troubles lawyers. 25 
Throughout its history, the principle of territoriality has been increasingly challenged 
by changes in the geography of social and economic relations brought about by 
developments in transportation and communication technologies. In response, lawyers 
have been innovative in developing other jurisdictional principles that stretch the 
reach of the State beyond its defined territory or in other words localise acts that could 
otherwise fall outside the ambit of its jurisdiction . 
2' According to the Harvard 
Research on Jurisdiction of Crime (1935), "Indeed with the increasing facility of 
communication and transportation the opportunities for committing crimes whose 
constituent elements take place in more than one State have grown apace. To meet 
these conditions, the jurisdiction of crime founded upon the territorial principle has 
been expanded in several ways. 1127 
The pressure of a mobile social and economic reality is evident in the now classic 
definition of the territorial principle in criminal law. According to Art. 3 of the 
Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, "A State has 
jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in part within its 
territory. , 21 [Emphasis Added] A crime is committed in whole within a State's 
24 Note that the discussion in this section focuses on the criminal and regulatory jurisdiction of the state 
rather than the civil jurisdiction. It is in the area of public law that the governance vacuum 
has been 
more felt. 
25 See supra Chapter Three, Section 6. 
26 For an early discussion of the problem of extraterritorial harms and comparative 
State responses see 
Beckett, W., "The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners", 6 B. Y. I. L. 44 (1925). 
27 "Harvard Research on Jurisdiction of Crime: Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to 
Crime" 29 Am. J. Int. L. Supp. 435 (1935), at 484. [Hereinafter, Harvard Research or the Harvard Draft 
Convention] 
28 The Harvard Draft Convention, id., at 439; and convizentaii, at 480-483. 
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territory when all its constituent parts (the conduct and the criminal result) have taken 
place within that territory. Some crimes, however, start within the territory of a State 
but are consummated outside that territory. Alternatively, a crime could start outside 
the territory of a State but produce its criminal result within the territory of the State. 
The latter two cases fall within the jurisdiction of the State on basis of the territorial 
principle as crime committed in part within its territory. 
This development in the territorial principle constitutes one of the first attempts to 
expand the doctrine in response to economic and social mobility. " The principle has 
thus differentiated into subjective territoriality, " where part of the criminal conduct 
takes place in the territory of the State while its result or its effect takes place abroad, 
and objective territoriality, " where the result of a criminal conduct carried out abroad 
takes effect within the territory of the State. 
While traditionally accepted as a basis for criminal jurisdiction, the nationality 
principle 32 expands the scope of State jurisdiction beyond its territory and therefore 
forms a helpful tool in dealing with the governance vacuum created by social and 
economic mobility. According to this principle, a State's laws and regulations apply to 
its citizens wherever they are. The universal acceptance of this principle stems from 
its grounding in the basic concept of State sovereignty. This principle brings within 
State jurisdiction violations of its laws committed by any of its citizens regardless of 
the place where such violations have been committed. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction has also been achieved through another jurisdictional 
principle referred to as the protective principle. " According to this principle, 
jurisdiction over a crime is assumed even if it doesn't occur in whole or in part within 
the territory of the State, nor produce any physical harm within that territory provided 
it threatens the security, integrity or sovereignty of that State. Typical examples of 
such crimes are terrorism, ' when 
it is directed against the interests of the State outside 
its territory, and counterfeiting of a State currency. The rationale for extending the 
jurisdiction in such cases lies in the fact that the State, where the act took place, might 
29 For a brief historical overview see Sarkar, L., "The Proper Law of Crime in International Law" in 
Mueller G., and Wise, E. (eds. ), International Criminal Law (1965) at 51-6 1. 
30 See generally Blakesly, C., "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" in Bassiouni, C., (ed. ), International 
Criminal Law 33 (2 nd ed., 1999), at 47-50. 
31 Id., at 50-54. 
32 id. 
, at 
61-66; Brownlie, I., P7-inCiples ofPublic International Law (1998), at 306; Neale, A., and 
Stephens, M., International Business and National Jurisdiction (1988), at 15-17. 
33 Blakesly, C., supra note 30, at 307. 
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not be interested in prosecuting an offence directed against the interests of another 
State. The protective principle is now generally recognised as a principle of 
jurisdiction and historically has been used to deal with extraterritorial threats of 
political nature. 
Where coherent international public policy has emerged, a principle of 
universality has been adopted to secure prosecution of acts that violate such globally 
recognised interests. With regard to violations of this sort, international law goes 
beyond merely granting any country, within whose jurisdiction the accused might be 
present, the right to prosecute. It further imposes upon such country the duty to carry 
out this prosecution or alternatively extradite the accused to another country that is 
willing to perform this duty. " The crimes for which a principle of universality applies 
include war crimes, genocide, apartheid, hijacking and sabotage of civil aircraft. " 
More recently, there have been further attempts by mainly the United States to 
further expand the reach of its national jurisdiction for purposes of economic 
regulations. " Such expansion was attempted as a solution to the overreaching effects 
that economic behaviour carried out and completed outside the territory of one 
country might have within its territory. In response, what is tenned the "effects 
doctrine" has emerged. According to this doctrine a State has jurisdiction over 
conduct carried out outside its territory if that conduct has or intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory. " It could be argued that this doctrine is 
consistent with and based on the principle of territoriality in its objective fon-nulation. 
The reality is that the effects doctrine relaxes the nexus between the conduct and its 
consequences in a marmer that permits the application of the State's law to a conduct 
that has been performed and completed outside its territory but that might have 
repercussions within its territory. Such repercussions need not be part of the criminal 
conduct or a constituent element of the offence. 
The facts of the Alcoa" case that established the "effects doctrine" will serve to 
illustrate the distinction between the "effects" in the context of ob ective territorialit); 
34 For a detailed analysis of this principle and its status in international law see Bassiouni, C., and Wise, 
E., Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Ditty to Ext7-adite or Prosecute in International Law (1995). 
35B]akesly, C., supra note 30, at 70-8 1; Brownlie, I., supra note 32, at 307-309. 
36 Interestingly, in a Report submitted to the League of Nations in 1926, Mr. James Brierly established 
that with respect to offences committed outside the territory of a State by non-nationals, the United 
States does not assume any jurisdiction. Bnerly, J., Report on the Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial 
Critne, League of Nations Document (1926), repl-inted in 20 Am. J. Int. L. Supp. 253 (1935), at 253. 
37 Neale, A., Stephens, M., supra note 32 , at 167. 38 U. S v. Aluminium Co of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (1945). [Hereinafter, Alcoa Case]. 
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and the "effects" as encompassed in the "effects doctrine. " In the Alcoa case, US law 
was applied to a foreign company "Aluminium Limited" penalising under US law its 
act of organising a cartel operating through a Swiss corporation with a number of 
other foreign companies. The jurisdiction of the US law was based on the fact that the 
operations of the cartel have resulted in restricting imports of aluminium into the US 
and consequently pushing up the prices. On settling the jurisdictional question, the 
court stipulated that "it is settled law [ ... ] that any state may impose liabilities, even 
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has 
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends. "" The facts of this case 
and the effects accepted as basis for jurisdiction are clearly distinct from the effects 
envisioned in the objective territoriality principle. " The classic illustrative case of the 
objective territoriality principle is that of a murderer who fires a shot across the 
border from Italy wounding the victim in France who then subsequently succumbs to 
his death in Switzerland. While the death is a constituent element of the offence in 
this hypothetical case, the subsequent impact of the cartel on the US aluminium 
market is not an element of the penalised restraint of trade. It is merely a subsequent 
and remote repercussion. 
The US expansionary jurisdictional inclinations that have been increasingly 
manifested over the past few decades are not confined to prescriptive jurisdiction. As 
indicated in earlier discussion in this Chapter, despite developments in jurisdiction 
theory over the decades, enforcement jurisdiction continues to be strictly territorial. 
This however did not hold against US recent expansionary trends. " Extraterritorial 
enforcement actions are increasingly resorted to by US courts. This takes various 
forms including: (1) demanding the disclosure of evidence that is held abroad 
sometimes in breach of foreign statutory requirements; (2) imposing remedies on 
foreign companies in civil anti-trust cases such as requiring foreign firms to make 
know-how available to competitors on reasonable basis; and (3) imposing American 
39 Id., at 443. 
40 11 The type of 'effect' which the Alcoa ruling has in mind has nothing in common with the effect which 
by virtue of established principles of international jurisdiction confers the right of regulation. The 
'effect' within the meaning of Alcoa ruling does not amount to an essential element or constituent part 
of the restraint of trade, but is an indirect or remote repercussion of a restraint carried out, completed 
and in the legally relevant sense, exhausted in the foreign country. " Mann, F., "The Doctrine of 
Jurisdiction in International Law", Recued des Cours 9 (1964), at 104. 
41 Zagaris, B., and Rosenthal, J., "United States Jurisdictional Considerations in International Criminal 
Law", 15 Cal. W. Int'L L. J. 303 (1985), at 316-320; Nadelmann, E., Cops Across Borders: The 
hiternationalisation of U. S. Law Enforceinew (1993). 
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export regulations on foreign companies who have any link with the US such as being 
foreign subsidiaries to an American parent company or merely using American 
technology. 42 
In conclusion, stretching the national jurisdiction through various legal and 
doctrinal vehicles is increasingly resorted to in order to bridge the governance gap. 
Such development is not without problems. Over assertiveness of jurisdiction by one 
country often results in antagonising other countries and invoking conflict and 
retaliatory actions. " This, in turn, undermines other productive forms of co-operation 
that are most needed as a solution to the "governance vacuum. " 
3.2. Money Laundering Law: An Extraterritorial Instrument 
3.2.1 Extending the Territorial Reach of Criminal Law 
The crime of money laundering extends the reach of criminal law beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the State. Criminal law proscribes money laundering in an 
increasing number of countries. Money laundering presupposes the occurrence of a 
"predicate offence" whose proceeds are being laundered. The common practice of 
States is to confine the crime of money laundering to laundering the proceeds of a 
crime that is committed within the territory of the State. There is however a more 
recent trend towards criminalising money laundering of the proceeds of crimes 
committed abroad subject to conditions such as dual criminality. Prosecuting money 
laundering in the latter case could arguably be considered an extension of the State's 
jurisdiction to the predicate offence. A conviction for money laundering in some 
jurisdictions, such as the United States, could result in the confiscation of the 
laundered funds and. thus, in effect imposing penalty on a person for an act that 
originally lied outside the jurisdiction of the State. 
Vienna Convention of 1988 imposes a duty on the Parties to criminalise the 
laundering of the proceeds of drug-related offences. It is, however, silent on the 
question of the location of the predicate offence. According to the commentaries "it 
would accord with recent practice if implementing legislation were to reflect the 
possibility that the predicate offence was located in a State other than the enacting 
42 For a detailed analysis and evaluation of such cases and bibliographic reference see Neale, A., 
Stephens, M., stipra note 32, Chapters 9& 11 - 43 See Zagaris., B.., and Rosenthal, J., stipra note 4 1, at 328-33 1. Providing an account of a number of 
mcidents of U. S. extraterritorial enforcement that caused friction with other countries. 
See also Lowe, 
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one. 1144 On the question of confiscation, the Convention provides that States must 
enable the confiscation of the proceeds of all the offences established by the 
Convention including those of money laundering. However, the Convention is silent 
on whether this would include the laundered funds as well as the profit derived from 
the laundering service where the prosecution is for the offence of laundering only. 
The Council of Europe Convention of 1990, on the other hand, establishes the 
extraterritorial reach of money laundering control explicitly. After imposing the 
obligation on each Party to establish money laundering as a criminal offence, the 
Convention goes on to stipulate that: "it shall not matter whether the predicate offence 
was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Party. "" It is not, however, clear 
whether the funds laundered shall be confiscated in this case as "proceeds" or 
"instrumentalities" of money laundering offence. 
According to the LJK law on money laundering, criminal conduct as a 
precondition for money laundering is defined very broadly to include any act that 
constitutes one of the predicate offences for money laundering under the law, or 
would constitute such an offence if committed in the UK. " The law does not require 
that the act should constitute a criminal offence in the country where it was 
committed. 
Money laundering law extends the territorial jurisdiction of criminal law in 
another way. As explained in Chapter Two of this volume, money laundering offences 
are defined typically broad. This broad definition of the actus reus results in 
extending the national jurisdiction on basis of the territorial principle. Merely drawing 
a cheque on a U. S. bank as part of scheme of money laundering is likely to bring the 
case within the U. S. jurisdiction as an offence committed in whole or in part within 
the U. S. territory. 
3.2.2. Extraterritoriality of Anti-money Laundering Regulations 
Regulatory extraterritoriality can be achieved through two methods. One is by direct 
imposition of the regulatory requirements on institutions that are not subject to the 
A., "Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980", 75 
Am. J. Int'l L. 257 (1981). 
44 Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, T 3.44, LTN Doc. E/CN. 7/590, U. N. Sales No. E. 98. XI. 5 (1988). 
45 The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime, European Treaty Series No. 141 (November 1990), Art. 6(2)(a). 
46 Criminal Justice Act 1988 as amended by Crirrunal Justice Act 1993, s. 93A. 
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regulatory jurisdiction of the State concerned. The other is by exerting pressure on 
another State to implement anti-money laundering regulatory requirements even 
though it does not perceive them to be in its best economic interest. Both methods 
were envisaged by the FATF in the Forty Recommendations (1996). " 
Recommendation 22 required the financial institutions to ensure that anti-money 
laundering mechanisms are "applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries 
located abroad, especially in countries which do not or insufficiently apply [FATF] 
recommendations. " [emphasis added] 
By imposing this requirement on the financial institutions in countries that 
apply the FATF Recommendations, the FATF actually extends the scope of the 
Recommendations territorially. It also provided in Recommendation 21 that special 
attention should be given by financial institutions in any transactions with persons or 
entities from countries, which do not apply the Recommendations. In view of the 
interdependence of financial markets, strict application of this Recommendation 
results in placing pressures on States to implement the Recommendations in order to 
maintain their access to the global financial market. " 
The United States serves as an illustrative example of the extraterritorial reach 
of anti-money laundering regulations. The US Bank Secrecy Act applies equally to 
US banks and to foreign banks operating within the jurisdiction. US regulators, unless 
denied access by the host country, will examine branches of US banks that are 
operating abroad. " US banks may be denied the authority to open a branch in a 
country that is uncooperative and does not have a satisfactory anti-money laundering 
mechanism. " 
The criminal law of money laundering extends the regulatory framework 
further to cover financial institutions that are neither branches of US banks nor 
operating within the US. The US criminal jurisdiction extends to offences that are 
committed in whole or in part within its borders. Because of the very fluid nature of 
the actus reus in money laundering, this territorial link to the US jurisdiction can be 
stretched very far. For example, if illicit money was wired through a US bank as part 
of a cross-border process of laundering, this transit will be sufficient to give the US 
47 This mechamsm was also envisioned in the 1990 version of the Forty Recommendations. FATF, 
Report 1990 (February 17,1990). 
48 See iiifra Chapter Six, Section 4.4.2. 
49 Morgan, M., "Money Laundermg: The United States Law and Its Global Influence", in Norton, J., 
Studies iii hiteniational Fbiaticial aiid Econoinic Law (1996), at 4 1. 
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criminal jurisdiction over the whole process of laundering. Any foreign bank involved 
in this process will thus be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the US. 
The case of Banque Leu is an illustrative example of the extraterritorial reach 
of the US criminal law and how it leads to the extension of its regulatory system 
extraterritori ally. " Banque Leu was a Luxembourg bank that had no offices in the US. 
In 1993 it entered a guilty plea to money laundering in the US and agreed to forfeit 
$2.3 million to the US and $1 million to Luxembourg. 12 The bank was charged with 
money laundering under US law because it accepted deposits of $2.3 million in the 
form of cashier checks drawn on banks operating in there, which fonned part of 
money laundering operation initiated in the US. 53 The bank sent the checks to the US 
to clear them and on basis of this action fell under the country's criminal jurisdiction. 
This clearly demonstrates how the loose definition of the actus reus in money 
laundering can result in extending the territorial jurisdiction of the State. As one 
author commenting on the case puts it: "Acceptance of U. S. dollar negotiable 
instruments by a bank anywhere in the world outside of the United States renders the 
bank susceptible to U. S. criminal jurisdiction in the money laundering area because 
all such instruments must necessarily clear through the United States. 1' 51 
What is of more interest in the current context is the fact that, in addition to 
entering into a forfeiture agreement with the U. S. Government, the Luxembourg bank 
agreed to submit to a three-year US audit specifically for money laundering. " It also 
agreed to produce an anti-money laundering monograph that should be updated 
annually for two years. " Such regulatory requirements were imposed as a form of 
sanction for criminal conduct on a bank that was not regulated by the United States, 
hence, extending the US regulatory jurisdiction extraterritori ally. 
The extension of the regulatory jurisdiction in the case discussed above was 
temporary and specific. However, the extraterritoriality of the criminal law of money 
laundering has a more durable effect on the scope of anti-money laundering 
regulations. Foreign institutions and countries wishing to avoid prosecution for 4 4: ) 
50 id. 
51 For a discussion of the case see Munroe, K., "Surviving the Solution: The Extraterritorial Reach of 
the United States Anti-Money Laundering Laws", 14 Dick. J. Int'l L. 505-524 (1996), at 520. 
52 id. 
53 id. 
54 Id. 
55 
Id. 
56 Id. 
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criminal money laundering and its devastating effects" must show good institutional 
record of fighting against money laundering. The history of a country's handling of 
the money laundering problem, and the internal controls of a foreign financial 
institution are relevant factors in determining the occurrence and the outcome of a 
prosecution under US money laundering law. " 
In the case of the Banco de Occidente the reputation of the bank's owners and 
management resulted in a lenient outcome on an indictment for money laundering 
offences under US law. " Initially, the prosecution sought a total of $824 million in 
forfeiture and civil penalties. " This amounted to seven times the total assets of the 
bank, which would have led to its bankruptcy had it been imposed. Instead, the 
indictment was settled by a guilty plea and an agreement to forfeit $5 million over a 
period of four years. " This much more lenient settlement that allowed the bank to 
survive was largely due to the reputation of its management and owners. 
3.2.3. Extraterritoriality as a Problem 
Criminal and regulatory extraterritoriality imposes serious problems for financial 
institutions. The regulatory extraterritoriality creates conflict between the laws and 
regulations of the countries under which the bank is regulated and the laws and 
regulations of the country that is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, 
the extraterritorial application of the law of one country might impose on a bank a 
duty to report certain transactions while the home country's laws and regulations 
prohibit such reporting on basis of strict bank secrecy. In this case, the bank will be in 
the unfavourable position of having to breach the laws of one country or the other and 
bear the consequences. 
In anticipation of such a possibility the FATF recommended that in this 
situation the financial institution should not breach the home country's regulation. 
Instead , it should 
inform the extraterritorial jurisdiction that compliance is not 
57 Within 10 days of the indictment of Baiwo de Occidente (Panama), the US managed to freeze S80 
n-dllion of the bank's assets world-wide. This amounted to over half of the bank's total assets and 
resulted in its being placed under the control of the Panamanian Banking Commission. Id. 
58 Id. (arguing that the best way for a small Caribbean country to protect its banks against devastating 
US prosecution is by implementing a vigorous compliance program within the financial institutions 
that would convince the US that the bank concerned is a "a good corporate citizen". ) 59 Id. 
60 id. 
61 Id. 
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possible under the local laws and regulations. " The solution contemplated by the 
FATF has not always been applied. Some US courts enforced grand jury subpoenas 
requiring foreign financial institutions to produce account records despite the 
prohibition of such production under the financial institutions' local secrecy laws. " 
Failure to comply with such court order places the institution in contempt of court, 
while compliance invoke its liability under local laws. " 
The extraterritoriality of the criminal law of money laundering in terms of its 
application with respect to foreign predicate offences also creates its problems for 
financial institutions. The banks are expected to know their customers regardless of 
where they come from. If the customer is a foreign official the bank is expected to 
discover this fact as part of its 'know your customer' obligation. " It is also expected to 
be able to establish whether the official's deposits are commensurate with his/her 
income. A United Kingdom non-governmental Working Group" tackling the problem 
proposed that every bank should keep an internal register of customers who are Public 
Sector Officials, members of their families or individuals/entities acting on their 
behalf" It also proposed that financial institutions must investigate and verify the 
Public Sector Official's stated sources of funds. " To facilitate this task the group 
proposed that all countries should implement a constitutional provision requiring 
senior public officials to disclose to the State their full assets. " This information must 
be incorporated in a certificate indicating the net worth of the person. The certificate 
must then be circulated by the State to the financial institutions worldwide to allow 
them to compare the official's deposits with its declared assets as means to 
establishing the propriety of the source. " 
Conscious of the difficulty inherent in the implementation of such a disclosure 
procedure, the Group suggested an alternative mechanism that it labelled an 
62 FATF, The Forty Recoinmendations (1996), Recommendation 22. 
63 Morgan, M., supra note 49, at 43. 
64 Ellinger, E., Lornnicka, E. and Hooley, J., )VIodern Banking Law (3 rd ed., 2002). 
65 Basel Committee, Custoiner Due Diligencefor Banks (October, 200 1). 
66 The Anti-Corruption Working Group is an expert working group that was established in July 1997 by 
the Executive Committee of The Society of Advanced Legal Studies to look into the issues that arise 
when financial intermediaries handle the proceeds of corrupt acts overseas. The Society is a company 
limited by guarantee that was incorporated in February 1997 with the object of promoting advanced 
legal research. 
67 The Society of Advanced Legal Studies, Banking on Corruption: The Legal Responsibilities of TIzose 
Who Handle the Proceeds of Corruption (2000), ý 103.1. 68 Id., 104.5. 
69 Id., 10 5.1. 
70 
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"internationally recognised warranty certificate. "" According to this procedure, any 
bank transferring funds that belong to a public sector official must certify that "they 
have known the client for n years [and] that there have been no suspicious transaction 
reports or enquiries by regulatory/judicial authorities in respect of the 
1112 account/individual during those years. 
In the view of this author both proposals ignore the fact that in grand 
corruption either certificate shall be produced by, or under the influence of, the 
corrupt officials themselves. Both solutions actually give corrupt officials the chance 
to circumvent the suspicious reporting requirement as well as giving the banks a 
leeway by legitimising their dealings with the corrupt officials through reliance on the 
proposed certificates. A better solution would be to rely on the generally available 
information on the economic performance of the country and what might accordingly 
seem to be a legitimate income for an official of a certain rank. Information on the 
salaries of public servants in different countries may be compiled by non- 
govenunental organisation such as 'Transparency International"' to assist the banks in 
carrying out their obligations. 
In addition to the problems that extrateMtoriality poses for financial 
institutions attempting to comply with conflicting requirements, extraterritoriality in 
the context of money laundering law is fraught with the same problems that beset 
extraterritoriality more generally. Aggressive extraterritorial application of anti- 
money laundering regulations is bound to unden-nine the potential for international co- 
operation and to trigger retaliatory measures. This is particularly true in view of the 
conflict of values and national that is inherent in ant-money laundering measures. 
Privacy rights are accorded different levels of protection in different countries and the 
interests of countries in maintaining financial confidentiality vary according to the 
structure of their financial markets and their competitive position. 
4. Harmonisation 
4.1. Harmonising as a Solution: An Overview 
Harmonisation is a process of approximating national laws that regulate a particular 
subject matter. Harmonisation efforts might aspire to the unification of the law but, 
71 Id., ý 105.1. 
72 id. 
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. at)sent supranational lawmaking with direct applicability, they hardly achieve this 
ultimate aspiration. " This is due to cultural, historical and doctrinal differences that 
shape the different legal systems. Further, the unifon-nity of legal texts does not 
guarantee unifon-nity of application. Different courts apply similar laws differently, 
especially when these courts belong to different legal jurisdictions. " 
In Chapter Three, harmonisation was discussed as an instrument of 
glob alisation. 11 It has been argued that technical standardisation of communication 
technologies have facilitated global communication and hence brought about 
globalisation. It has also been argued that harmonisation of laws has been carried out 
to facilitate and encourage international trade. " In the present context, it is argued that 
han-nonisation is sometimes offered as a solution to globalisation as a legal 
problematic. To counter a transnational threat to national public interest, countries 
stand shoulder to shoulder creating a continuous wall of similar laws. Prudential 
regulations offer a good example. It is the national interest of county A to create a 
sound financial system. In order to achieve this result, country A imposes on its 
financial intermediaries capital adequacy standards. In globalised financial markets, 
Banks from country A are very likely to lend to banks from country B. If country B's 
prudential regulations are less rigorous, a banking crisis in country B might destabilise 
the banking system in country A. " Harmonisation of prudential regulations between 
Country A and Country B could be one solution to the governance problematic. 
Similar problems and similar solutions occur in other areas of the law. 
Harmonisation amongst national legal systems occurs through a variety of 
methods. " Although placing this section within a chapter on State-based solutions 
73 Transparency International is a civil society organisation dedicated to the curbing of both 
international and national corruption. See www. transparency. de. (last visited on 2. May 2002). 
74 On different degrees of harmonisation see Baum, H., "GlobaliZing Capital Markets and Possible 
Regulatory Responses" in Basedow, J., and Kono, T. (eds. ), Legal Aspects of Globalization. - Conflict of 
Laws, Internet, Capital Markets and Insolvency in a Global Economy 77 (2000), at 99-100. In terms of 
legislative harmonisation the author distinguishes between two types of harmonisation in terms of 
depth. The first he describes as ininimum harmonisation, which is limited to basic principles and core 
elements. The second is comprehensive harmonisation, which results in uniform law. 
75 Andersen, C., "Uniformity in the CISG in the First Decade of its Application", in Fletcher, I., 
Mistelis, L., and Cremona, M. (eds. ), Foundations and Perspectives of Intei-national Trade Law 2 89 
(2001), at 292-293. 76 See above Chapter Three, Section 3.2.2. 77 id. 
78 Wiener, J., Globalization and the Hal-711onization of Law (1999), at 33. 
79Froomkin, M., "Of Governments and Governance" 14 Berkelýy Technology Law Join-nal 617 (1999), 
at 622-624.; Mistells, L., "Is Harmonisation a Necessary Evil? The Future of Harmonisation and Ne", 
Sources of International Trade Law" in Fletcher, I., et al., supra note 75,3, at 12-18. The author 
reviews the various classifications of the methods of harmonisation and suggests a synthesis. 
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suggests that hannonisation is a State policy implemented autonomously by each 
State, this conclusion is inaccurate. As it will be described in the discussion of supra- 
nationalism in Chapter Six below, harmonisation is sometimes imposed by supra- 
national agencies. This method of harmonisation is typically employed in cases of 
either treaty-based integration, such as the European Union or the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, or in cases of de facto integration, such as the case with 
respect to the regulation of technologically integrated capital markets. 
Treating harmonisation as a State-based solution remains, however, logical for 
two reasons. First, harmonisation, as a policy, seeks to approximate national laws that 
remain territorially enforceable by each State and in that sense the solution by its 
definition is embedded within national legal systems. Second, supra-nationally 
imposed legal harmonisation remains the exception not the rule. " The majority of 
legal hannonisation that is taking place is done autonomously at State level or through 
traditional international law mechanisms. Sometimes it takes place through the 
spontaneous spread of legal norms across borders and their adoption within various 
jurisdictions. " In other instances, harmonisation takes place as a result of a deliberate 
decision by a national lawmaker to copy the rules of another jurisdiction either as a 
form of importing foreign expertise, where national expertise is lacking, or as part of 
regulatory competition. When a certain problem is perceived as a transantional 
problem, countries often get together and enact an international treaty regulating or 
controlling the problem. Such treaties are often geared towards harmonising the laws 
of the State Parties in their approach to the perceived problem. " 
There is yet another method of han-nonisation and one that is increasingly in 
use in numerous areas of the law. This method involves generating soft law norms that 
are then incorporated by the national legislature into national law. "Soft law" 
go The state-based nature of this solution is captured in the argument of some commentators on 
harmonisation that "harmonization is intended to, and has the effect of, reasserting state sovereignty" 
and that harmonisation has the core advantage of not impinging on national sovereignty. Wiener, J., 
supra note 78, at 37. 
81 Legal norms sometimes spread through transnational commercial transactions and their 
accompanying trade usages and commercial customs. These norms constitute what is called lex 
inercatoria. Since the present discussion concerns harmonisation of national laws, lex meractoria and 
its instruments are not dealt with by the author as means of legal harmonisation. Instead, they are 
tackled in the next Chapter as forms of private lawmaking. It is important however to note that 
harmonisation of national laws sometimes occurs as a result of the adoption of such cross-border 
commercial practices by national legislatures. 
82 On the drawbacks of harmonisation by treaty making see Mistells, L., supra note 79, at 21-22; 
Krone, H., "The Future of Harmonisation and Formulating Agencies: The Role of Unidiolt" in 
Fletcher, I., et al., supra note 75, at 61-65. 
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instruments include model laws, statements of principles, recommendations, 
guidelines, codes of conduct and other forms of non-binding instruments. Such soft 
rules are generated by a wide number of agencies referred to generically as "standard 
setters" or "formulating agencies. "" The nature of the standard-setters varies. This 
function could be exercised by inter-governmental organisations. Some inter- 
governmental organisations, such as the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL)" and the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT)", are established specifically for the purpose of 
harmonising a specialised area of the law. Other inter-governrnental organisations, 
such the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, exercise this 
function as part of a much broader mandate. A number of non-gove=ental 
transnational organisations and professional associations have started playing an 
important role in standard-setting. These include the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICQ and the International Bar Association (EBA). " 
The multiplicity of formulating agencies is proving to be an obstacle to the 
efforts towards harmonisation. It is to circumvent this obstacle in the area of trade law 
that the UNCITRAL was created. " Its primary purpose was to co-ordinate the 
conflicting activities of various standard- setters in this field. The efforts of the 
UNCITRAL in this regard include keeping abreast with and documenting the efforts 
of other agencies, participating in their meetings and encouraging mutual 
consultation. These efforts are however often defeated by competitive spirit, turf 
protection and self-justification. " Despite its drawbacks, harmonisation through soft 
law remains the more favoured method. This is due to the flexible and expeditious 
nature of the process of creating soft law instruments and also due to the fact that the 
adoption of these instruments does not circumvent the national democratic 
processes. " The latter argument does not hold though in cases where such standards 
are imposed on the States through techniques such as conditional lending, as will be 
discussed in the context of supranationalism in Chapter Six below. 
83 This term was coined by Clive Schniitthoff in his book Comniercial Law in Changbig Econoinic 
Chinate (1981) at 24. Cited iii Mistells, L., id., at 3-36 and footnote 70. 
84 For a review of the role of the UNCITPAL, see Hermann, G., "The Role of the UNCITRAL", in 
Fletcher, I., et al., supra note 75,28-36. 
85 On the role of UNIDROIT see Krone, H., supra note 82,59-72. 
86 Mistelis, L., supra note 79, at 18-19. 
87 Hermann, G., supra note 84. 
88 Id. 
89 Froon-ikin, M., supra note 79, at 624. 
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The global integration of financial markets has made regulatory harmonisation 
more pressing in this sphere. Harmonisation efforts in this area are clearly coincident 
with the beginnings of globalisation in the early 1970s. The leading institution in this 
field is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. " The Committee issued its 
"Basel Concordat" in 1975, which could arguably be described as the first 
harmonisation document in this field. The document provided recommendations on 
the supervision of banks that operate internationally. Over the past three decades, 
other institutions joined in the efforts to harmonise and set standards for financial 
regulation and supervision. These include the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). " Sips of the problem of conflict 
mentioned above started to emerge and the Financial Stability Forum came into being 
for the purpose of introducing a degree of co -ordination. " 
The route of financial regulatory hannonisation is an interesting one. " 
Standards are set by the various standard-setters in the form of non-binding statements 
of principles, recommendations and committee reports. These soft-law rules are then 
transmitted to national jurisdictions through various processes. For example, through 
the common membership between the Basel Committee and the European Union, the 
Basel recommendations were closely followed in the Council Directives on capital 
standards. " This process has resulted in hardening the soft recommendations of the 
Committee into European Community law. The recommendations spread further to 
Central and Eastern Europe, especially to the countries seeking accession to the 
European Union. Conditional lending by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank served as another method of transmitting the financial regulatory 
principles to less developed countries. These mechanisms, in addition to the voluntary 
90 Basle Committee was established in 1974 by the Group of Ten under the administrative auspices of 
the Bank for International Settlement in Basle, Switzerland. The Committee comprises of 
representatives of the central banks and other financial supervisory authorities of the eleven member 
countries of the GIO and Luxembourg. For a detailed account on the work of this Committee and its 
history see Norton, J., Divising International Bank Syper-visory Standards (1995), Chapter Four; 
Walker, G., International Bankhig Regidation. - Law Policy aiidPractice (2001), Part 1. 
91 Giovanoli, M., "A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects of International 
Financial Standard Setting", in Glovanoll, M. (ed. ), hiternational Monetai-y Law. - Issuesfor the New 
Millewtittin 3 (2000). 
92 Walker, G., International Banking Regidation. - Law, Policy aiid Practice (200 1), at 307-316. 
93 For a brief discussion see Follak, K., "International Harmonization of Regulatory and 
Supervisory 
Frameworks" in Giovanoli, M. (ed. ), stipra note 91,291, at 306-313. For more detailed discussion, see 
also references, stipra note 90. 
94 Follak, K., id., at 306. 
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adoption of the regulatory principles, have produced significant regulatory 
harmonisation worldwide. " 
An urge for harmonisation is also manifest in criminal law. As the strictest 
form of legal coercion and as a statement of moral condemnation, criminal law is the 
ultimate expression of State sovereignty and is closely tied to national systems of 
values. Differences in the systems of values have resulted in differences in legal 
arrangements at all levels of criminal law. National laws differ in their criminal 
investigative procedures, in the rules of evidence they apply, in the penalties they 
impose, in their decision to criminalise, in the definition of offences and the 
determination of their gravity. The rift between countries that still impose capital 
punishment and countries that abolished it is only one example. Other examples 
include offences that are known in some jurisdictions and not known in others, such 
as insider dealing. 
In a porous world these differences have a great impact on the effectiveness of 
national penal systems. One example may illustrate the point. If pornography is a 
criminal offence in country A and not so in country B, pornographic images posted on 
the Internet at a server in Country B are as likely to violate the anti-pornography 
criminal statutes in Country B as any local distribution of pornographic images is 
likely to do. This is due to the borderless nature of the medium. The effectiveness of 
Country A's criminal laws that regulate pornography is most served by a cross-border 
han-nonisation of criminal law prohibiting pornography. It is also evident from this 
example that consensus on such issues is not attainable considering the cultural and 
philosophical underpinnings of different legal systems. 
The sovereign character of penal law has meant that technically it stayed 
outside the scope of competence of "Community Law" in the European context. In 
1974ý the European Commission noted in its "Eighth Report of Activities" that penal 
law "is a subject which does not as such enter the Community's sphere of competence, 
but remains within the province of each Member State. "" Despite this formal 
exclusion of criminal law from the scope of Community competence, Community 
influence has infiltrated criminal law through various mechanisms triggering an C I- 
95This is not to suggest that harmonisation in this context amounts to actual unification. 
Differences 
ersist due to structural differences between the various markets. 
6' Cited iii Delmas-Marty, M., "The European and Penal Law" 4 Europeaiz Law Journal 87-115 (1998), 
at 87. 
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imperfect process of hannonisation. " The dynamics of this process can be helpful in 
illustrating the issues pertaining to harmonisation of criminal law in general. The 
reason for this infiltration is twofold: at one level it is the natural outcome of the 
existence of important Community interests, i. e.; supranational interests that require 
protection. At another level, it is the result of the threat of transnational crime to the 
national interests of Member States and the facilitative effect of the "Internal Market" 
on this form of criminality. 
The most obvious European Community interest requiring the protection of 
criminal sanction is the financial interests EU. Assaults on this interest have been 
found to possess certain characteristics. The assaults normally reflect a high degree of 
organisation, rely on sophisticated techniques of concealment involving the use 
fictitious entities and commercial concerns, and finally they are normally of 
transnational character spreading over a number of countries. " A direct link has been 
observed between this transnational character and the growth of the internal market. " 
In order to provide penal protection to this supranational interest, Member States 
opted for granting the financial interests of the Community treatment equal to that of 
their national interests. This meant extending national criminal laws to acts of assault 
on the financial interest of the Community. This assimilation between national interest 
and Community interest was initially granted voluntarily by Member States. 
Subsequently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) interpreted the EC Treaty 
obligation to "take all appropriate measures, [ ... 
], to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty[. ]""' as imposing an obligation to assimilate. 'O' 
Article 280 of the Treaty establishing the European Union as amended by the 
Amsterdam Treaty affirmed this ECJ rule. 112 
This method of harmonisation was not, however, sufficient. Mere extension of 
national penal law to Community interests, while introducing new criminal offences 
in the different Member States, left in tact the variations between the national laws of 
different countries. This undermined the effectiveness of the system of protection and 
97 On the various mechanisms and the legal basis for this Community-based penal law see id. 
98 Id., at 102 
99 Id. 
100 Article 10 (ex Article 5) of the EC Treaty, slipra note 20. 
10' Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Republic, Case 68/88, E. C. R 02965 (1989). 
102 Article 280 (2) (ex Article 209) "The Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter affecting their own financial 
interest. 
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permitted the offenders a chance to exploit these variations to defeat the protection. In 
response, two other mechanisms of harmonisation were attempted. The first 
mechanism involved enacting a Convention for the Protection of the Financial 
Interests of the Communities (PFI Convention). The main purpose of the Convention 
was to unify the definitions of the acts constituting an offence against the financial 
interests of the Communities. The Convention also attempts to achieve a degree of 
harmonisation with respect to the penalties involved and the allocation of 
responsibility. The Convention was criticised as providing insufficient unification and 
harmonisation. It was also feared that failure to address questions of harmonisation of 
rules of procedure and evidence is likely to "paralyse penal co-operation. " 103 
The second method of harmonisation was envisioned by a group of experts, 
commissioned by the European Commission, who proposed the creation of a Corpus 
Juris for protecting the financial interests of the EU as a supranational penal code. "' 
As a supranational code it would have the advantage of direct applicability. The 
Corpus addresses both substantive and procedural rules. In terms of the substantive 
rules, it introduces not only unification of definition of offences but also unification of 
penalties, thus going beyond the PFI Convention. In terms of the procedural aspect it 
proposes a supranational system including European public prosecutor office and 
hybrid system of so called "confrontational proceedings" aiming at solving the 
perennial conflict between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems of criminal 
procedure. "' The latter rules would represent deep harmonisation between the 
European procedural laws confined to a specific area of criminal justice, namely fraud 
against the financial interests of the Community. 
This hannonisation project is advocated as necessary for the protection of the 
supranational interest of the Community. In the words of the lead expert of the project 
"the only way to combine the three virtues -justice, simplicity and efficacy -is via the 
unification path. ""' 
In addition to the attempts to protect the Community interest through 
harmonisation, this technique was also attempted in order to protect the separate but 
103 Delmas-Marty, M., supi-a note 96, at 109. 
104 These recommendations were first published in Delmas-Marty, M. (ed. ), Corptis Aris hitroducing 
Peiial Pmvisio77sfor the Purpose of the Finaixial Intei-ests of the Eitropean UWon (1997). It was later 
on revised and published as Delmas-Mar-ty, A and Vervaele, J. (eds. ), The Inipleiiiewatioyi of the 
Coypits Ails in the Meniber States (2000). 
105 Delmas-Marty, M., stipra note 96. 
106 Id., at 110. 
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common interests of the Member States against transnational criminal threats. The 
Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of Financial System for the Purpose of 
Money Laundering offers one example of this type of harmonisation. "' Because of the 
lack of competence to enact penal law, the directive imposes on the Member States an 
obligation to prohibit money laundering. "' It does not indicate the nature of this 
prohibition. The Preamble to the Directive, however, states that "money laundering 
must be combated mainly by penal means. " Article (1) of the Directive adopts the 
Vienna Convention definition of money laundering while extending it beyond drug 
money laundering to "any other criminal activity designated as such for the purpose of 
the Directive by each Member State. " The degree of harmonisation achieved by this 
Directive is limited. By deferring to Member States to designate the predicate 
offences, it left ample scope for differences between Member States. The Directive 
also does not address any other aspects of han-nonisation. In justifying its intervention 
in this area, the Preamble emphasised particularly the transnational character of 
money laundering and the facilitative effect of the liberalisation of capital movement 
and financial services. 
The interests that triggered harrnonisation of criminal law in the European 
context are equally applicable at the international level. The global nature of certain 
threats creates global interests that require the protection of penal law. Creating 
parallel crimes across jurisdictions provides one solution. Further, the transnational 
character of crime, as illustrated in the example of Internet pornography, creates 
another situation where harmonised criminal law can offer a solution. It is in order to 
address such concerns that international criminal law has emerged. "' It is a treaty- 
based branch of international law that typically imposes a duty on State Parties to 
criminalise certain types of conduct. The development of international criminal law 
has been incremental. The decision to elevate a certain conduct to the status of 
international crime has stemmed from different concerns. 
In certain instances, the decision to criminalise on international basis stemmed 
from a desire to protect a collective interest. The safety of the high sees represents an 
example of such interest. In order to protect it, a customary international rule has 
107 Council Directive 91/308/EEC, Doc. 391LO308 (10 June 1991). 
108 Id., art. 2 
109 For a general discussion of the development and ambit of international criminal law see 
Schwarzenberger, G., "The Problem of an International Criminal Law" 3 Clo-rew Legal Probleins 263 
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emerge imposing upon all States a duty to criminalise and to assume jurisdiction 
over pirates' conduct. Piracy is normally conducted in high sees. It offends against the 
common interest of all States in safe trade routes and yet it does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of any State to prosecute. This provides an incident of harmonisation as a 
solution to the governance vacuum that emerges once a conduct takes place beyond 
the jurisdiction of any particular State. 
In other instances, the decision to harmonise the criminalisation of certain 
conducts stemmed from the desire to enhance the effectiveness of national 
jurisdictions in their pursuit of a conduct that offends against their national laws. A 
prime example of this rationale is the international efforts to control illicit traffic in 
drugs. Controlling drug trafficking is a national interest common to many if not all 
States. The transnational character of drug trafficking activities has resulted in 
repeated attempts at harmonising national approaches to this problem through 
international treaties. These efforts have culminated in the Vienna Convention 1988. "' 
The sovereign character of criminal law and its close link to local values and 
concepts of justice have resulted in the incorporation of the principle of dtial 
criminality in the operation of international co-operation in penal matters. "' The 
principle of dual criminality is both a condition for extraterritorial jurisdiction and a 
requirement for international co-operation. In the former case it means that the 
conduct should be punishable both in the country assuming extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and in the country where the conduct has actually taken place. In the latter case, it 
means that the conduct should be punishable in the country requesting the co- 
operation and the country recipient of the request. 
The requirement of dual criminality renders harmonisation of criminal law a 
requisite for effective co-operation in penal matters. 112 This requirement has provided 
an incentive for various harmonisation efforts at the international level, as the case is 
with respect to international efforts to criminalise money laundering. The persistence 
of national differences in the definition of offences and the rules of criminal liability 
(1950); Bassiouni, C., "An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing Trends of International Criminal 
Law" 45 Revite Intei-nationale de Droit Pkal 405 (1974). 
110 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988), 28 ILM 493 (1989). See supra Chapter Two, Section 3.4. 
'1 Wyngaert, C., "Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdiction", in Jareborg, N. (ed. ), Double 
0-iiniiiality: Studies i7l IntematioiialOlIW77al Law 43 (1989). 
112 For a discussion of dual cnnunality as a requirement for international co-operation see 
Stessens, G., 
Money Laundei-ing: A New International Lait, Eiijbi-cenient Model (2000), at 287et seq.; Nadetman, E., 
S11P7-a note 41, at 411-414. 
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has induced both scholars and policy makers to argue for and endeavour to dilute the 
principle of dual criminality. This is most evident in the context of mutual legal 
assistance where there is a growing shift towards abandoning the requirement of dual 
criminality for the sake of more effective co-operation. "' 
Harmonisation provides a favoured solution for the problem of governance in 
a global context. This is due to the fact that it is in essence a co-operative method that 
respects the national sovereignty of each State. As such, it does not offend against the 
existing principles of the Westphalian system. It has however been criticised on 
account of its lack of effectiveness at occasions, where a deeper degree of 
harmonisation is needed and the deeply ingrained differences between national 
systems does not permit it. Methods of harmonisation through treaty-making or 
technocratic standard- setting that seek to regulate private conduct has also been a 
source of concern with regard to its democratic deficit. The problems become more 
acute when hannonisation takes a more aggressive form through supranational 
structures, as will be discussed in Chapter Six of this volume, or through unilateral 
actions of a more powerful jurisdiction. 
Harmonisation has been advocated as a method of improving national legal 
systems through the importation or exportation of better quality norms. This argument 
is particularly asserted with respect to harmonisation that is based on the adoption of 
international standards. This method however encounters the well-known 
shortcomings inherent in any process of legal transplant. As one author argues, laws t-) 
are embedded in the context in which they apply. Merely transplanting international 
standards within a certain context would not guarantee their effective application. 
Their failure could stem from inherent contradictions between the newly adopted 
standards and the general legal system or from lack of understanding of the 
transplanted rules because of their alien character. Such process could thus result in 
undermining the development of an effective legal system that is responsive to local 
needs and local culture. "' Other commentators have also argued in favour of 
regulatory competition as opposed to regulatory harmonisation. 115 
113 Stessens, G., id., at 287 et seq. The author argues for the removal of the dual criminality 
requirement in the context of mutual legal assistance. 
114 Pistor, K., The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Econoinies, G-24 Discussion 
Paper Series (2000). 
115 On this argument see Sykes, A., "The (Limited ) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International 
Goods and Services Markets" 2 Join-nal of International Econoinic Law 49 (1999); Baum, 
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The trend towards growing han-nonisation confirms the need and the viability 
of such mechanism. The success however is contingent on selecting the contexts in 
which harmonisation is necessary and also selecting the methods of achieving 
harmonisation. "Top-down" harmonisation that is sometimes exercised by more 
dominant jurisdictions ignores the validity of the argument advanced in the previous 
paragraph and that when all is said and done the enforcement of the law remains a 
national institution. The success of this institution is contingent on the consistency of 
the legal norm with the national system and the acceptance of the norm within this 
system. 
4.2. Convergence in Money Laundering Law 
Chapter Two of this volume provided a chronology of money laundering law. It has 
been demonstrated how money laundering law moved from the domestic context of 
the United States into the international context through instruments such as the 
Vienna Convention (1988) and the Basel Principles of the same year. "' In the 1990s 
the spread of money laundering law took a more aggressive supranational direction. 
The mechanisms of that regime as it formed in the 1990s will be subject to more 
extensive analysis in Chapter Six. The internationalisation and supranationalisation of 
money laundering have been driven by the belief that only through harmonisation and 
approximation of laws can the legal and regulatory loopholes be closed against the 
exploitation of the increasingly transnational criminals. This belief is consistent with 
the rationales of harmonisation as a response to globalisation as discussed above. 
This Section is dedicated to outlining the paradigmatic elements of the present 
system of money laundering control and prevention. It is however important to note 
that variations in money laundering laws still exist and differences in implementation 
often accentuate them or even create new ones. Nevertheless, one can still speak of a 
money laundering control model or paradigm. Such differences are indicated in the 
discussion below. 
Money laundering control strategy has four prongs: (1) criminalising money 
laundering; (2) strengthening the methods of tracing, freezing and confiscating the 
proceeds of illegal activity; (3) implementing regulatory tools to prevent the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering; and (4) improving international I 
1" See supra Chapter Two, Sections 3.4. and 3.5. 
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co-operation. The following few paragraphs elaborate on these four aspects of money 
laundering control strategies with reference to national differences. 
4.2.1. Criminalising Money Laundering: 
As it has been indicated above money laundering was not considered a criminal 
offence until 1986 when it was criminalised in both the US and the UK. "' In 1990 
another five countries of the FATF members had already established money 
laundering as a specific criminal offence: namely, Australia, Canada, France, Italy and 
Luxembourg. Since those early days, the criminalisation of money laundering has 
spread much further. 
The prevailing definition of the elements of the offence remains that of the 
Vienna Convention 1988. "' The offence of money laundering established by the 
Convention is very narrow in that it applies only to property derived from drug-related 
offences. "' However, it is very broad in that it covers any manipulation of such 
property whether to conceal its origin, location, disposition, movement, ownership or 
any other rights with respect to the property. "' "Property" is also defined very broadly 
to include any possible kind of asset. 121 Such asset is to be considered proceeds of the 
specified offences whether it was derived directly or indirectly from the offence. 
Since the Vienna Convention, criminalisation of money laundering has 
developed beyond the scope of dr-ug-related proceeds. It became obvious that such 
limitation is neither justified nor practical. Drug trafficking is not the only serious 
offence that generates large criminal fortunes. Confining money laundering offences 
to the proceeds of drug-related crime creates a host of practical problems and renders 
the law ineffective. For example a banker who is under a duty to report suspicion of 
money laundering will be unable to report because of uncertainty about the source of 
suspicious funds. If the banker reports and it turns out that the funds are not derived 
from a drug-related offence he might be liable for a breach of confidentiality. 
Defining the predicate offences of money laundering is a policy issue to which 
countries give different solutions. It is now common to extend the offence of money 
laundering beyond the scope of drug-related offences. In doing so, countries adopt 
117 See supi-a Chapter Two, Section 3. 
118 The Vienna Convention 1988, supra note 110, art. 3(l)(b). 
9 Id., art. 1 (p). 
120 Id., art. 3 (1)(b). 
121 Id., art. 1 (q) 
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different approaches. Some extend it beyond this scope to all serious offences while 
others extend it to a specific list of offences, which they deem most likely to result in 
laundering activity. In making their decisions, countries bear certain considerations in 
mind. The seriousness of the offence, the size of wealth that it generates, the 
involvement of organised criminal enterprise and whether the offence threatens the 
integrity of the financial sector. 122 
Another issue that breeds differences and demands legislative decision-making 
is the question of the mental element of the offence of laundering. According to the 
general principles of criminal justice, the prosecution must prove that the launderer 
knew that the money was derived from an unlawful activity. The prosecution must 
also prove that by manipulating the funds he intended to hide its origin, nature, 
location, ownership or any other aspect thereof as described in the definition of the 
offence. This burden of proof can be onerous, especially in view of the complexity of 
money laundering operations and the extensive use of shell companies and bearer 
securities. To render this burden manageable, there is a growing consensus to allow 
for the reliance on inferential evidence. This is the case in the Vienna Convention of 
1988, which provides that "knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an 
offence set forth in paragraph I of this article may be inferred from objective factual 
circumstances. " 123 
Money laundering often involves the use of financial intermediaries. Since 
financial intermediation is often carried out by the fon-nal financial sector in a 
country, concern about money laundering has always been entwined with concern for 
the integrity of the financial sector. Because of these facts the need to criminalise 
money laundering raises the issue of corporate criminal liability. If financial 
institutions are to be discouraged from getting involved in money laundering their 
criminal liability needs to be addressed. Countries differ greatly on the question of 
criminal liability of corporations. While some accept it and design sanctions that are 
consistent with the non-corporeal nature of legal persons, others reject this liability on 
basis of the general principles of their legal system. The FATF, conscious of the 
national variations in this regard, proposed the establishment of criminal liability of 
corporations for money laundering only where such liability is acknowledged by the 4: ) 
122 American Bar Association Central and Eastern European Law Initiative, "Money Laundering: A 
Concept Paper Prepared for the Government of Bulgaria", 28 Int'l Law, 835 (1994), at 841-842. 
123 Vienna Convention 1988, stipra note 110, art. 3(3). 
164 
legal system of the country concerned. "' This makes corporate criminal liability a 
third issue that the legislature of a country should address in a criminal law of money 
laundering. 
4.2.2. Tracing, Freezing and Confiscation 
According to the Vienna Convention of 1988, the FATF Recommendations, and the 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, rules and mechanisms for confiscation 
of illegally obtained assets constitute a central pillar of any anti-money laundering 
policy. Inadequate provisional and confiscation measures against the proceeds and 
instrumentalities of crime render money laundering control ineffective. This is true 
with respect to the rules of tracing, the inadequacy of which results in failure to 
identify the funds as proceeds or instrumentalities of crime, and to enforce anti-money 
laundering rules and regulations. The same is true with respect to the inadequacy of 
provisional measure such as freezing and seizure against the property suspected of 
being laundered. Failure to impose provisional rules to prevent any further 
manipulation of the funds can undermine money laundering control specially in an era 
of instantaneous global money transfers. 
However, where confiscation rules are drawn too narrowly so as to exclude 
certain profit-generating criminal conduct from qualifying as predicate for 
confiscation, money laundering control not only becomes less effective but also loses 
part of its raison d', jtre. Money laundering control, in effect, is an enforcement 
instrument of economic criminal law, One central rationale for this prohibition is to 
prevent circumvention of forfeiture laws. Narrowly cast net of confiscation rules 
defeats this purpose and complicates the enforcement of money laundering where the 
assets are actually criminal assets but nevertheless not claimed by the State. 
According to Vienna Convention 1988, "confiscation" means "the permanent C; 
deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority. "125 The 
Convention imposes on the Parties an obligation to take any necessary measures to 
enable the confiscation of proceeds of any of the offences covered by the Convention 
or any instrumentalities thereof '2' The Convention also imposes on the parties the 
124 FATF, The Forty Recommendations (1996), Reconunendation 7. 
125 Vienna Convention 19 8 8, supra note I 10, art. I 
126 Id., Art. 5 (1)(a) & (b) 
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duty to take necessary measures to enable the identification, tracing, freezing or 
seizure of such proceeds or instrumentalities. "' 
Countries have divergent approaches to the issue of confiscation. Systems of 
tracing, freezing and seizure are also different. While they are mature in some 
countries they are less so in others. "' 
4.2.3. Regulatory Convergence 
Money laundering often involves the use of financial intermediation. Concern about 
the use of the formal financial sector for money laundering purposes was amongst the 
most important reasons for the emergence of money laundering control policy. 
Evidence to this effect is to be found in the fact that money laundering was first 
tackled in the US Banking Secrecy Act of 1970, which imposed a number of 
regulatory reporting requirements and its legislative history. "' 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision confirmed this concern in its 
Statement of Principles discussed above. "' The third prong of money laundering law 
includes regulatory policies that are often classified by analysts of money laundering 
control regimes as preventive, as opposed to control policies of criminalisation and 
confiscation, which were discusses above. As indicated by the Basel Principles 1988, 
financial regulatory measures are crucial for the enforcement of criminal and 
confiscatory measures. The regulatory model comprises of the following aspects: 
(a) Authorisation Requirements 
The FATF provided in Recommendation 29 that "the competent authorities 
regulating or supervising financial institutions should take the necessary legal or 
regulatory measures to guard against control or acquisition of a significant 
participation in financial institutions by criminals or their confederates. " This 
obligation falls squarely within the competence of banking supervisory authorities, 
which must scrutinise the applicants for authorisation to conduct financial activity. 
The rationale behind this stipulation is that allowing criminals to own or control banks 
is the best way to facilitate their money laundering activities as illustrated in the BCCI 
case. Money laundering control depends to a very far degree on the internal corporate 
127 Id., art. 5 (2) 
128 See generally Stessen, G., supra note 112, at 29-82. 
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control, if the owners of the organisation are corrupt, such control will be absent. And 
if the infiltration of the financial institutions by criminal elements becomes endemic, 
money laundering control can be rendered totally ineffective. 
(b) "Know your customer": 
Financial institutions are required to satisfy themselves as to the identity of 
their customers. This applies whether they are dealing with occasional or usual 
customers. Identification must be established by official or any other satisfactory 
documents. This requirement aims at enabling financial institutions to screen their 
customers to avoid dealings with criminal elements. It also aims at creating a paper 
trail that facilitates investigations by law enforcement authorities. 
According to this requirement, banks are no longer allowed to hold 
anonymous accounts. Where the institution suspects that the customer is just a 
nominee account holder who is holding the account on behalf of another, or where the 
account holder is a company the financial institution must satisfy itself as to the 
identity of the principals on whose behalf the transactions are being conducted. "' 
(c) Transaction Reporting: 
Financial institutions are required to report certain transactions to designated 
persons or authorities. The reporting requirement proposed by the FATF is based on 
criteria of suspicion. Suspicion can stem from the nature of the transactions if they are 
complex, unusual and "have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. ""' The 
Recommendations also provide that reporting based on the unusual character of the 
transaction is also sufficient, provided that it captures or instances of suspicious 
transactions. 
Some countries impose an objective reporting requirement based on the size of 
the transaction and without any suspicion requirement. This approach has been 
implemented in the US and Australia, and was rejected by the UK as likely to result in 
excessive reporting that overburdens the law enforcement agencies. 
130 See Supra Chapter Two, Section 3.5. 
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(d) Record-Keeping 
The primary purpose of anti-money laundering regulatory regime is to 
maintain the money and paper trail visible in a way that facilitates the investigation of 
crime. To achieve this purpose, financial institutions are required to keep record of the 
identity of their customers and the reports of suspicious transactions. The records 
must be "sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the 
amounts and types of currency involved if any). ""' The institutions are required to 
make the records available to competent authorities upon request. 
4.2.4. International co-operation: 
International co-operation is crucial for money laundering. Transnationalising the 
laundering process offers the launderer substantial benefits. It allows the offender to 
place the assets beyond the jurisdiction of the country where the predicate offence was 
committed, to benefit from jurisdictions with lax criminal and regulatory systems, and 
to benefit from problems of co-operation and communication between different 
criminal and regulatory jurisdictions. "' 
The FATF, aware of the transnational character of money laundering, 
dedicated Recommendations 30 to 40 to the question of strengthening international 
co-operation. The elements of international co-operation in the prevention and control 
of money laundering are discussed in more detail in the next section. In the present 
context it is important to note that a degree of harmonisation was required in order to 
facilitate international co-operation. In this regard, the FATF recommended that 
States should establish money laundering offences as basis for mutual legal 
assistance. Members were also encouraged to establish a network of multilateral and 
bilateral agreements in this regard. "' It was also proposed in Recommendation 40 that 
countries should establish money laundering as an extraditable offence under their 
laws and any extradition agreements to which the country is a party. 
Harmonisation attempts were not confined to the substantive aspects of 
criminal law. At the investigative level, FATF recommended that countries should 
establish "controlled delivery" relating to criminal assets as an investigative 
133 Id., Recommendation 14. 
"' On the global character of laundering and its benefits to perpetrators see Savona, E., and. De Feo, 
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technique. "' FATF perceived this technique as valuable for investigating certain 
offences as well as further understanding money laundering techniques more 
generally. "' 
In conclusion, controlling and preventing money laundering has provided an 
impetus for harmonisation in various areas of the law: criminal law, financial 
regulation and international co-operation arrangements. Harmonisation in all these 
areas was perceived as instrumental for enhancing the effectiveness of money 
laundering laws and hence the enforcement of economic criminal laws in general. 
Unless a supranational legislative and regulatory body exists, e. g., in the context of 
the European Union, han-nonisation is never complete. It is for this reason that money 
laundering laws remain to a certain degree divergent and a number of policy options 
remain available for the domestic regulatory and legislative bodies. The extent of 
harmonisation achieved remains substantial, especially in view of the short life of this 
body of the law. This was not achieved without some cost to principles of 
international law and democracy. Forceful methods to impose harmonisation upon 
weaker jurisdictions are discussed in Chapter Six of this volume. 
5. Enforcement Co-operation: A Traditional Solution with New Features 
International co-operation is a very broad concept. It can encompass all efforts at 
policy co-ordination, harmonisation, international institutional arrangements, and 
treaty-based extension of national jurisdiction, such as the creation of universal 
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. This is only a non-inclusive list of 
possibilities for international co-operation as a mechanism for solving the governance 
problematic in a global context. It is therefore necessary to delimit the scope of this 
mechanism for solving global governance vis-a-vis the other mechanisms suggested 
in this volume. 
This solution is strictly concerned with the mutual co-operation between States 
in the enforcement of their respective laws and regulations. It is not concerned with 
making these national laws similar, consensually extending their reach or jointly 
creating supranational institutions to manage the tasks of governance. As it has been 
repeatedly indicated, enforcement jurisdiction remains strictly territorial and upon it 
depends the effectiveness of both prescriptive and judicial powers of any State. 
136 Id., Reconunendation 36. 
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Absent a form of a World State, a supranational enforcement system is not a likely 
option. States, thus, are left with the only option of co-operating and the efficacy of 
their legal orders is increasingly contingent on the success of such arrangements. 
5.1. International Enforcement Co-operation: The Broad Context 
The ultimate goal of criminal justice is to control crime. Under current criminal 
justice systems, there are two approaches to achieving this ultimate goal. The first is 
based on removing the capacity of criminals to commit crime by imprisoning them 
and forfeiting the instrumentalities of the crime. The second approach is specific to 
economically motivated crimes and is based on removing the incentives to commit 
crime by stripping the offender of the benefits of criminal activity through the 
confiscation of the criminal proceeds. In order to achieve the goal of criminal justice 
through either of those approaches, laws now are in place criminalising activities, 
attaching prison sentences and other sentences and empowering the courts to order the 
confiscation of assets. 
Enforcing such criminal laws requires detecting a violation, identifying the 
offenders, establishing their whereabouts, arresting them, gathering evidence 
sufficient to indict them, prosecuting them and finally imprisoning them. Where there 
are forfeitable assets other enforcement actions are required including identifying the 
assets, locating them, tracing them to the offence, seizing and finally forfeiting the 
assets. In many cases these steps are all conducted within the boundaries of a single 
State. In the present context, a growing number of offences are taking transnational or 
even global dimensions with the implication that evidence, offenders and assets are 
often located beyond the territory of the State. The need for effective methods for 
gathering evidence abroad, arresting offenders located outside the jurisdiction and 
seizing assets in foreign countries has become increasingly compelling. 
Powerful jurisdictions such as the United States have sometimes resorted to 
extraterritorial application of their local enforcement processes, such as issuing 
subpoenas to the local branches and employees of multinational corporations 
requiring them to produce documents held by their foreign branches. Unilateral 
measures however are of limited effectiveness because of the resistance they induce in 
foreign jurisdictions. Hence, co-operative mechanisms become a necessity. Several 
137 FATF, The F07-ty Recommendations, Interpretative Note to Reconunendation 36. 
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mechanisms were devised to meet each of the law enforcement needs. They have been 
identified by a leading expert in the field of international criminal law as including: 
extradition, mutual legal assistance in penal matters, transfer of prisoners, seizure and 
forfeiture of illicit proceeds, recognition of foreign penal judgements, and transfer of 
penal proceedings. "' Collectively they may be referred to as modalities of 
international co-operation in penal matters. 
International co-operation in penal matters has gathered significant momentum 
in the past three decades. These developments naturally coincided with globalisation 
trends especially in capital markets. The first evidence of this coincidence is to be 
found in the fact that, apart from extradition, all the other forms of co-operation have 
emerged in the post-war period and particularly since the 1970s. The history of 
regional multilateral co-operation in penal matters in Europe dates back to 1957. "' 
One author reviewing these developments in Europe characterised the period from 
1961 to 1971 as one of innovation and the period from 1972 to 1990 as one of 
expansion of co-operation and improvement. "' The United States has been 
particularly aggressive in pursuing its law enforcement goals internationally. 141 
Developments in the United States provide an evidence of the degree and history of 
the increased momentum in this area. For example, it was in the mid-1980s that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission established its special office for handling 
enforcement matters. 142 Also, between 1979 and 1990, the United States national 
central bureau of Interpol increased its personnel from 60 to 110 and its budget from 
$125,000 to 6,000,000.14' Between 1976 and 1986, the bureau's caseload increased 
from 4,000 to 43,863. '44 
International co-operation in penal matters finds its legal basis in bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and in national laws. 14' Because of the intrusive nature of criminal 
enforcement, both on individual rights and on State sovereignty, co-operation 
138 Bassiouni, C., "Policy Considerations on Inter-State Cooperation in Criminal Matters", in Bassiouni, 
C., (ed. ), International Criminal Law: Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms 3 (2 Id ed., 1998), at 
3. 
139 This history starts with the European Convention on Extradition, Europ. T. S. No. 24 (1957). 
140 Mtiller-Rappard, E., "Inters-State Cooperation in Penal Matters Within the Council of Europe 
Framework", in Bassiouni, C., (ed. ), supra note 30, at 33 1. 
141 See generally on the U. S. law enforcement efforts abroad, Nadelmann, E., supra note 41. 
142 Id., at 3. 
143 Id. 
144 Id., at 4. 
145 For a critique of this fragmented nature of international criminal enforcement law and an argument Cý 
for integration see Bassiouni, C., Stipra note 13 8. 
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arrangements have always been circumscribed by various limitations and exceptions 
as well as strict procedural requirements. The principle of double criminality is one 
traditional condition to international co-operation. The gist of this principle is that co- 
operation could be denied if the act for which the co-operation is sought does not 
constitute an offence under the law of the requested State. 146 Other conditions of co- 
operation pertaining to the offence include the exclusion from the scope of co- 
operation: political, military and fiscal offences. Most co-operation agreements grant 
the States the right to decline to co-operate if it would prejudice the security or other 
essential interests of the requested States. Further, the speciality principle restricts the 
requesting State in its use of the help provided by the requested State. According to 
this principle, the requesting State may only use the information provided for the 
specific purpose defined in its formal request and not any other. The same applies to 
the case of extradition, which means that the extradited person may only be 
prosecuted for the offence specified in the extradition request. 
These rules and principles as well as the procedures for the execution of 
requests for co-operation constitute restrictions on the flow of co-operation between 
States in penal matters. "' The pressing needs of international co-operation in the 
present context and the speed with which assets, information and individuals can 
move between jurisdictions have brought these obstacles under closer scrutiny by 
scholars, policy makers and law enforcement officials. Despite the scrutiny and 
criticism, the restrictive principles and procedures still persist mainly because of the 
importance of the interests and values they actually or seemingly protect. Two trends 
can, however, be discerned. First, there is a growing tendency towards relaxing some 
of the restrictions in certain contexts of international co-operation. Second, there is a 
trend towards informal direct co-operation between law enforcement agencies. 
The first trend is manifest in the evolution of the "political offence" principle. 
Once a universally accepted exemption from co-operation, it has been gradually 
diluted since the 1970s as a result of growing concern over transnational terrorism. 
The trend took the form of excluding from the scope of political offence a growing 
146 On this principle see Jareborg, N., (ed. ), Double Crinzinality: Studies in International Crinzinal Law 
(1989). 
117 Gully-Hart, P., "Loss of Time Through Formal and Procedural Requirements in International Co- ln 
operation", in Eser, A., and Lagodny, 0. (eds. ), Principles and Proceduresfor a New Transizatioiial 
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number of offences. In the European context, for example, "' the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism"' excludes from the scope of political 
offence for the purpose of extradition a number of acts including: unlawful seizure of 
aircraft, unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation and the broad category of 
any endangerment of persons involving the use bombs and fireanns. "' For the 
purposes of mutual legal assistance, the Convention goes one step further by 
excluding the political offence exemption for all the acts included in its articles 1 and 
2. "' This excludes all categories of violent offences that involve the endangerment of 
persons. A similar approach has been adopted in the United States since the U. S. -U. K. 
Supplementary Extradition Treaty was signed in June 1985.152 Since then the U. S. has 
sought to extend the limitations to other extradition treaties of which it is a party. 151 
In the same vein, many countries now exclude international crimes, such as 
war crimes, genocide, piracy and crimes against humanity, from the scope of the 
"political offence" exemption. "' Also, the United Nations Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1998)"' provides that State Parties should ensure 
that criminal acts within the scope of the convention are not justifiable by political, 
ideological, religious or other considerations. "' The trend towards restricting the 
scope of the political offence exemption does not mean that the exemption has been 
totally abandoned. "Purely political offences" such as offences of opinion and public 
expression remain squarely covered by the exemption. Further, the restriction of the 
exemption remains more or less confined to countries with developed democratic 
systems. This is evidenced in the fact that the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism is only open for signature by member countries of the 
148 See Poncet, D., and Gully-Hart, P., "Extradition: The European Approach", in Bassiouni, C., (ed. ), 
supra note 30,277, at 293-294. 
149Europ. T. S. No. 90. 
150 Id., art. 1. Article 2 of the Treaty grants the State Parties the discretion to remove 
from the scope of 
the exemption any offence violence apart from those specifically covered 
by Art. 1. 
151 Id., Art. 8. 
152 United Kingdom-United States: Extradition Treaty, Supplement Limiting Scope of Political Offense 4-P 
to Exclude Acts of Terrorism, 24 I. L. M. 1104 (1985). 
153 For a critical assessment of the Treaty see Blakesley, C., "The Evisceration of the 
Political Offense 
Exception to Extradition", 15 Den. J. Int'l. L. & Pol'y 109 (1986). For an argument in support of the 
Treaty see Sofaer, A., "The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism", 
15 Den. J. Int'l. L. & Pol'y 125 
(1986). 
15' Bassiouni, C., "Extradition: Law and Practice of the United States", in Bassiouni, C. (ed. ), supra 
note 138,19 1, at 243. 155 37 I. L. M. 249 (1998). 
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Council of Europe. '5' This is unlike other Council of Europe conventions, which are 
open for signature by non-member countries. "' Also, the United States Senate has 
specifically advised the President not to negotiate a restriction of the scope of the 
political offence distinction with totalitarian and non-democratic regimes. "' 
The trend in favour of relaxation of traditional exceptions to international co- 
operation is not confined to the "political offence" doctrine. Similar trends could be 
observed with regard to other key exceptions and restrictions on co-operation such as 
the principle of dual criminality and the principle of speciality. The pressure to 
abandon or to restrict traditional limitations and exemptions continues to stir strong 
debate within the field of International Criminal Law. "' The resistance to total 
abandonment of the traditional doctrines in the developed democracies is 
predominantly grounded in concern for human rights. "' The fear is that abolishing 
these principles might result in undermining the fundamental rights of the subject to 
the proceedings. Unlike other solutions to the governance problematic, this concern is 
less threatening. This is primarily due to a parallel trend in the law on international 
co-operation in criminal matters, which links human rights norms to international co- 
operation in penal matters and gives these norms direct applicability to the processes 
of co-operation. "' In the European context, this means that the individual subject to 
the process can rely directly on human rights norms even when they are not explicitly 
incorporated in the law and treaties governing the co-operation. "' 
The second trend in international co-operation in penal enforcement is a 
tendency towards informal channels of co-operation. The informality in this context 
157 Europ. T. S. No. 90, art. (11). 
15' For example, The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime, stipra note 45. 
'59 S. Exec. Rep. No. 99-17. Cited in Cherif Bassiouni, "Extradition: Law and Practice of the United 
States", in Cherif Bassiouni (ed. ), supra note 30,191, at 243. 
160 See conti-ibutions in Eser, A., and Lagodny, 0., (eds. ), supra note 147. 
16 1 Blakesley, C., sup7w note 153. In arguing against the dilution of the political offence exemption, the 
author relied on the need for judicial determination of matters pertaining to fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 
162 On the relationship between human rights norms and traditional restrictions of international co- 
operation, see Wyngaert, C., "Rethinking the Law of International Criminal Cooperation: The 
Restrictive Function of International Human Rights Through Individual-Oriented Bars" M Eser, A., and 
Lagodny, 0. (eds. ), supra 147,489; Bert Swart, "Human Rights and the Abolition of Traditional 
Principles", in Eser, A., and Lagodny, 0. (eds. ), id, 505; Williams, S., "Human Rights Safeguards and 
International Co-operation in Extradition- Striking the Balance" in Eser, A., and Lagodny, 0. (eds. ), 
id., 535. These contributions focus on the question of whether the application of human rights norrns to 
international co-operation proceedings obviates the need for traditional limitations. 
163 This principle has been established in the Soering case, European Court of Human Rights, 7 July 
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describes either the fact that co-operation is not based on any specific statutory or 
treaty-based authority, or the fact that even where such authority exists the procedural 
requirements are minimal. Informal co-operation can take many fonns including 
posting law enforcement officers abroad with the mandate of liasing with local 
counterparts. "' It also includes establishing joint task forces to investigate 
transnational cases. "' Scholars and law enforcement experts have often lamented the 
absence of a modality for international co-operation in the gathering of intelligence 
necessary for the detection of crime. "' Existing modalities for co-operation focus on 
the advanced stages of evidence gathering that are associated with the prosecution for 
an offence and ignore the necessary stage of intelligence gathering. Recent 
instruments however aim at addressing this vacuum and encourage flexible forms of 
information sharing. Article (9) of the Vienna Convention 1988 provides for such co- 
operation by encouraging Parties to "Establish and maintain channels of 
communication between their competent agencies and services to facilitate the secure 
and rapid exchange of information[. ]" In view of their novelty, the exact scope and 
impact of such arrangements is yet to be assessed. 
Regulatory enforcement shows similar trends towards cross-border co- 
operation. Both the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions have published general principles for co- 
operation between regulatory and supervisory agencies in different countries. "' This 
need for supervisory co-operation stems from the increase in financial institutions that 
conduct their business across-national borders and within the jurisdiction of different 
supervisory authorities. In terms of formality, different countries prefer different 
approaches. While some countries opt for more legalistic bilateral and multilateral 
frameworks for co-operation others opt for more flexible instruments such as the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). "' The latter seems to be the more preferred 
approach in the area of securities regulatory enforcement. It is however important to 
note that regulatory authorities may remain bound by restnctions on information 
164 Nadelmann, E., supra note 112 , at 107-111. 
Discussing models of transnational policing. 
165 Article 9(l)(c) of the Vienna Convention 1988 provides specifically for this form Of co-operation. 
166 Bassiouni, C., supra note 30, at 8. 
167 Basel CoMrrUttee on Banking Supervision, Essential Eleinents of Stateinent of Cooperation between 
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Principlesfor Meinoranda of Understanding (September, 199 1). 
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sharing that are proscribed in their national laws. "' In the context of their co-operation 
they are required by international standards to advise the counterpart of any such 
limitations. "' 
In sum, mutual co-operation in the enforcement of national laws is an 
obvious and commendable method for bridging the governance gap created by 
globalisation. This wisdom did not escape policy makers and enforcement agents who 
have engaged in an incessant effort to establish nets of inter-state co-operation. The 
speed with which economic activity crosses borders has created pressure to speed up 
the processes of co-operation. The result was trends towards dismantling traditional 
doctrines and procedures that limit or slow down the process. The exceptions and 
procedures while somewhat weakened remain resilient. This is mainly because of the 
pressures of human rights concerns rather than sovereign interests. Similar trends 
towards co-operation are also evident in the area of financial regulatory enforcement. 
5.2. Money Laundering Law Enforcement Co-operation 
Money laundering law as an enforcement tool is particularly concerned with crime as 
a transnational phenomenon. It is argued in this volume that this law aims at 
addressing the enforcement failures that stem partially from the territoriality of State 
enforcement jurisdiction vis-a-vis extraterritorial criminality. One obvious tool in this 
regard is international co-operation in penal matters. "' 
In the historical review of money laundering law, it was highlighted that the 
emergence of mutual legal assistance as a modality of interstate co-operation in penal 
matters and the development of bilateral MLATs was directly linked to money 
laundering concerns and instrumental in dealing with the problem. "' It was also 
illustrated that the Vienna Convention 1988 was the primary international instrument 
that placed this modality on multilateral basis. "' Other money laundering legal 
instruments such as the FATF Forty Recommendations and the Council of Europe 
169 Basel Comrnittee, id., at 1. 
170 id. 
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Laundering Conventions also dedicated substantial attention to the question of mutual 
legal assistance and international co-operation more generally. "' 
This section addresses international co-operation as one of the instruments 
utilised by money laundering law to solve the governance problem confronted by the 
State in its attempt to control and to prevent criminal activity. This section describes 
the objectives international co-operation in the context of money laundering law and 
the modalities of this co-operation. It then goes on to discuss critically the informal 
information sharing and transnational co-operative arrangements as non-traditional 
forms of co-operation intensively employed in the context of money laundering law. 
5.2.1. Purposes and Modalities 
Generally, international co-operation in the enforcement of money laundering laws as 
criminal statutes has the same objectives and modalities as such co-operation in any 
other context. Money laundering law however possesses certain characteristics that 
reflect on the objectives and the modalities of international co-operation in certain 
ways. First, money-laundering laws are proceeds-oriented as opposed to offender- 
oriented. "' In other words, they aim primarily at constructing the money trail and 
ultimately securing the enforcement of forfeiture and confiscation orders. Second, 
money laundering laws and regulations are essentially enforcement and investigative 
tools. As a result of these two features of money laundering laws, international co- 
operation in this regard often focuses on securing evidence abroad and enforcing 
confiscation and forfeiture order against assets held abroad. "' 
This explains the proliferation of MLATs that coincided with money 
laundering control as an enforcement policy. "' MLATs create mechanisms that permit 
the State, where the investigation is taking place, to use the process of another State, 
where relevant evidence exists, in order to obtain this evidence. A particular feature of 
mutual legal assistance that emerged out of the concern for money laundering is the 
emphasis on removing banking secrecy as an obstacle to co-operation. Since 
investigating money laundering is often dependent on gaining access to bank records, 
strict bank secrecy could be detrimental to any such investigation. This emphasis first 
174 FATF, The Foi-ty Recommendations (1996), Recommendations 30-40; Chapter III, The Council of 
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appeared in the form of prohibition to invoke bank secrecy as grounds for refusing 
assistance in the Vienna Convention 1988. Article 7(5) provides that: "A Party shall 
not decline to render mutual legal assistance under this article on the ground of bank 
secrecy. " A similar formula appears in article 18(7) of the Council of Europe 
Laundering Convention. The FATF places this principle in the general framework of 
its recommendations by recommending that "Financial institution secrecy laws should 
be conceived so as not to inhibit implementation of these recommendations. " 
The second modality of co-operation involves tracing, immobilising and 
confiscating assets. This is the newest form of inter-state co-operation in penal matters 
and has emerged directly out of the profit-oriented approach to criminal justice and 
the globalisation of international finance. This form of co-operation is particularly 
designed to address the problem that arises when the criminal proceeds are placed 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the State that is attempting forfeiture or 
confiscation. In this case the State, where the suspected proceeds are located, is 
required to take measures to prevent any transfer or disposal of the assets pending the 
judicial process relating to them in the requesting State. Considering the speed with 
which assets could be transferred or removed from the jurisdiction, the efficiency of 
co-operation in preventing dealings with the assets becomes crucial for the effective 
enforcement of money laundering law. 
Addressing enforcement problems through the use of co-operative 
arrangements has replaced unilateral procedures such as extraterritorial disclosure 
orders, which were used by some countries, especially the United States. Unilateral 
measures were particularly detrimental to the privacy rights of bank's customers and 
placed illegitimate burdens on corporations which were faced with the choice of either 
breaching the laws of their home country or the laws of the country issuing the 
order. "' 
5.2.2. Non-traditional Forms of Co-operation: Informal and Transnational 
Money laundering law is an enforcement tool. Its regulatory aspect is geared towards 
the gathering of infon-nation for the purpose of securing the enforcement and 
preventing the evasion of State laws and regulations. Its penal aspect is concerned 
177 For a discussion of these developments see Bassiouni, C., and Gualtieri, D., "International and 
National Resonses to the Globalisation of Money Laundering", in Savona, E., supra note 134,107. 
178 On the detriments of the unilateral approach see Stessens, G., supra note 112, at 3) 18-329. 
178 
with controlling this evasion and inducing compliance with money laundering 
regulations. As a result, information gathering and processing becomes a very 
important dimension of money laundering law. Also, the cross-border character of 
money laundering activities creates a need for cross-border information gathering and 
sharing. 
The intricacies of this information gathering or intelligence dimension of 
money laundering law are manifold. First, suspicious transaction reporting and other 
forrns of reporting requirements that are imposed by money laundering regulations 
generate a voluminous amount of financial data. This data require processing and 
management. Second, money laundering law, as an enforcement tool, relates to the 
activities of a variety of enforcement agencies, which requires co-ordination and 
routing of information to and from these agencies. Third, the data generated and 
analysed is normally of confidential character and impinges on the privacy rights of 
individuals. As such, this data requires careful handling in order to safeguard the 
rights and liberties of individuals and the economic interests of corporations and 
sometimes even the State. Fourth, the role expected of financial institutions in curbing 
money laundering is inconsistent with their original function as service providers. It is 
a role that is not necessarily aligned with their business interests or with their 
commercial culture. "' Again, this conflicting nature of the role of financial 
institutions requires delicate balancing. 
In order to address all these problematic practicalities, it has become a feature 
of money laundering laws to designate a central agency and vest it with the 
responsibility for receiving and analysing the financial data and routing it as 
necessary. "' Sometimes this function is given to an already existing government 
agency such as the ministry of finance, the public prosecutor's office or the police 
department. In other cases, a special agency is created to handle specifically this 
179 On this conflict and the changing culture and role of financial institutions see Wadsley, J., "Banks in 
a Bind: The Implication of the Money Laundering Legislation" 16 Journal of International Banking 
Law 125 (2001); Chan, M., "Banks Caught in the Middle" 22 Co. Law. 245 (2001); Bompas, A., "Civil 
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Intelligence 25 (2001); McCormack, G., "Money Laundering and Banking Secrecy" 16 Co. Law. 6 
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International Banking Law 485 (199 1); Johnson, H., "Confidentiality Diminishing" 13 International 
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function. These agencies are commonly referred to as Financial Intelligence Units 
(FlUs). The structure, nature and functions of these agencies vary considerably 
amongst jurisdictions. "' 
In 1995, an ad hoc group known as the Egmont Group came into being 
comprising oa number of domestic FrUs. Because of the diversity of domestic 
arrangements for handling financial information relating to money laundering control, 
the Group directed early attention to the definition of a FTU for the purpose of 
defining its membership. In 1996, the Group adopted a definition of a FIU as "A 
Central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), 
analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial 
information: (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) required by national 
legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering. ""' The definition was 
specifically drafted to distinguish FlUs and to be broad enough so as to include FlUs 
in all their variations. It is for this reason that the definition focuses on the function of 
the FIU without reference to its judicial, administrative or police nature or structure. "' 
The Egmont Group was created with a specific purpose in mind and that is to 
enhance co-operation amongst FlUs and to expand and systematise the exchange of 
financial information. It is with this particular aspect that this discussion is concerned. 
The Group's "Statement of Purpose" starts with recognition of the international nature 
of money laundering. Throughout its Preamble, the Statement repeatedly emphasises Z) 
the importance and the need for co-operation and information sharing amongst FlUs 
across borders. The Preamble also recognises the obstacles that beset information 
exchange and co-operation amongst FfUs. "' 
The Egmont Group provides a forum for exchange of information amongst its 
member FlUs. This multilateral form of co-operation only supplements and does not 
substitute for bilateral exchange of information amongst Members. This co-operation 
caters for the need for expeditious sharing of intelligence at an early stage of money 
laundering suspicion. In a cross-border operation a lag between the suspicion of 
laundering and the communication of this suspicion to competent authorities abroad 
might result in conclusively losInIg the "money trail. " 
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The exceptional nature of this fon-n of co-operation stems from two facts. The 
first is that it is not treaty-based unlike traditional forms of judicial co-operation and 
mutual legal assistance. It is important however to note that article (9) of the Vienna 
Convention 1988 specifically refers to the desirability of creating channels of 
communication between competent authorities in State Parties and indicates that such 
channels should be based on bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements. 
Exchange of information amongst FlUs has been commonly based on Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU). MOUs are typically not disclosed publicly, which limits the 
capacity to assess the practice of information sharing and to understand its contours. `5 
The second exceptional feature of the exchange of information amongst FlUs is that it 
is specifically free of the procedural requirements that are normally attached to mutual 
legal assistance. This feature, while understandable in terms of need for speed, raises 
due process and individual rights concerns. "' 
There are however certain sources of limitations on the exercise of FIUs of 
their functions. Like any other domestic agency, FlUs are subject to the restrictions 
incorporated in the domestic laws that established them. Two restrictions that are 
common in domestic laws are the principle of speciality and the requirement of 
confidentiality. The principle of speciality imposes limitations on the use of financial 
information by FlUs. These limitations are coterminous with the purpose and function 
of the FIU as envisioned by the law. For example, the Financial Intelligence Unit may 
be required to restrict its use of the information for the purpose of detecting money 
laundering and in that sense may be barred from using the information to aid the 
enforcement of tax laws. Confidentiality, on the other hand, requires FlUs to keep any 
information confidential and to disclose it only in accordance with the conditions and 
for the purposes specified in the law. 
These restrictions of speciality and confidentiality also apply to the cross- 
border exchange of information. According to the Egmont Group's "Principles for 
Information Exchange, " any information exchanged may only be used for the specific 
purpose for which the exchange was made. Further, any information exchanged must 
be subject to safeguards that ensure that it is used in a manner consistent with privacy 
and data protection laws. The Prbiciples apply a national treatment principle requiring 
184 Egmont Group, supra note 182. 
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that the information received should be accorded the same standard of protection that 
is afforded to similar information from domestic sources obtained by the receiving 
FIU. The State providing the information may impose in its bilateral MOU higher 
privacy standards than those available under the laws of the requesting State. 
The standards governing the exchange of information under these informal 
arrangements are lower than those imposed under MLAT. For example, there is no 
dual criminality principle and the exchange does not necessarily pertain to a specific 
criminal proceeding. These variations stem essentially from the different functions 
that these arrangements serve. While MLATs are used for gathering evidence in the 
context of particular criminal proceedings, FlUs' information sharing is of an 
intelligence nature that precedes any charge or criminal proceeding. "' It, however, 
remains a possibility that this informal information sharing could be used as an easier 
altemative to mutual legal assistance mechanisms as a method of collecting evidence. 
In order to safeguard against this possibility, it has been recommended that informal 
assistance should be denied where the requesting State has already initiated criminal 
proceedings or investigation. Such condition should be placed on statutory basis or 
included in the MOU governing the co-operation. "' 
In surm-nary, international co-operation arrangements have been an integral 
part of money laundering law since its inception. This is an immediate result as well 
as an evidence of the cross-border nature of money laundering operations that loomed 
large in the minds of money laundering lawmakers. Facing a situation of 
extraterritoriality that challenges the enforcement jurisdiction of the State, co- 
operation with similarly threatened States becomes an obvious solution. 
The specific nature of money laundering law as an enforcement tool of laws 
that are economic in nature has resulted in the rising importance of two modalities of 
international co-operations. The first is mutual legal assistance and the second is 
seizing and freezing assets and eventually the enforcement of confiscation or 
forfeiture orders. In addition to these formal and treaty-based co-operation 
arrangements, other forms of informal co-operation have emerged. A new specie of 
government agencies vested with the powers to collect and analyse the financial data 
under money laundering laws have created their own transnational community and 
developed their own arrangements of cross-border exchange of infori-nation. Like 
187 Id., at 263-264 & 271-272. 
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other informal arrangements that forego procedural safeguards, individual rights 
become vulnerable. However, in this case other restrictions and mechanisms were 
incorporated that introduced a number of safeguards without compromising the 
considerations of efficiency and effectiveness. In view of the novelty of these 
arrangements, the effectiveness of the specified safeguards remains to be assessed. 
6. Conclusion 
In order to reassert its authority and to establish order in an era of accelerated 
globalisation, the State has resorted to some seemingly traditional instruments of 
governance. Its instrumentalities in this regard included: (1) defensive instruments 
such as de-globalisation through restrictive regulation; (2) aggressive measures such 
as unilaterally adopted or multilaterally agreed extraterritoriality; and (3) collective 
measures such as harmonisation and co-operation. Money laundering law has utilised 
each one of these modalities to re-enforce the authority of the State in the area of 
crime control. These techniques of governance are however more widely used in 
various areas of law and regulation. 
While, the modalities discussed in this Chapter are seemingly traditional, their 
method of implementation in this era of accelerated globalisation gives them new 
importance and new traits. In a previous era of less rigorous transnationalism, such 
mechanisms were merely incidental to an essentially localised form of governance. In 
the present context, these modalities are part of the structure of governance necessary 
for achieving a degree of order and predictability. In their implementation in this 
novel context they manifest new traits and raise a variety of problems. 
The main problem of using regulation to reverse the process of globalisation, 
is that such measures in the context of this intense compression are not always 
effective. This limited effectiveness limits the reliability of this instrument. Further, 
this procedure stands in clear conflict with liberalisation as the organising economic 
principle of the present world order. The decentralisation of the global order renders 
policy co-ordination between various parts of the system problematic. 
Similar symptoms of lack of co-ordination albeit more detrimental in terms of 
individual freedoms could be discerned in the use of extraterritonality as an 
instrument of governance. Money laundering law, as well as other areas such as I 
188 Id., at 274. 
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competition law, relies on extraterritoriality as a mechanism for imposing order 
against transnational actors. Extraterritoriality is not a novel mechanism for dealing 
with extraterritorial threats. In the current context of intense globalisation, 
transnational. actors are more repeatedly encountered with the threat of sanction for 
violating extraterritorial laws. The problem becomes more acute when the actor is 
faced by conflicting obligations under the national law and the law of the State that is 
seeking to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Harmonisation and co-operation are more co-ordinated methods of solving the 
governance problem of globalisation. There are various types of harmonisation 
according to the degree and depth of approximation and according to the instruments 
of such approximation. Harmonisation remains a benign method of governing a world 
of transnational relations unless it is imposed top-down by more powerful 
jurisdictions vis-a-vis less powerful ones. The problems of this form of hannonisation 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six of this volume. 
International enforcement co-operation is an area that has been growing 
rapidly in recent decades. Co-operation endeavours in the enforcement of criminal 
laws as well as social and economic regulations are proliferating. While international 
co-operation as a means of dealing with common problems is not new, in recent years 
it has demonstrated new traits. These included departure from traditional principles 
that used to inhibit international co-operation and resort to informal co-operation 
arrangements. The relaxation of principles in the area of international criminal law has 
been a very deliberate and careful process. Often the departure from one principle has 
been accompanied by establishing an alternative principle or safeguard. This was 
manifest in the case of the political offence exception. 
Informality, however, remains to be assessed. This trend is clear in money 
laundering law, where FlUs enter into informal information sharing arrangements. 
While certain safeguards have been mounted, their efficacy needs further empirical 
assessment. 
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1. Introduction 
So far it has been argued that Globalisation in its political and geographic aspects has 
undermined the power of the State and led some to the conclusion that the State is 
declining. The rationale suggest that the State has become too small to govern social 
and economic activities that expand beyond its borders and somewhat uninformed and 
under-resourced to regulate and control increasingly powerful private actors. 
Economic criminals and their organisations are only one example of this trend. 
The previous Chapter has argued that the State has resorted to a number of 
modalities that re-enforce its powers vis-a-vis these new actors in order to keep her as 
the primary agency of governance that is global in its dimensions. These modalities 
included the defensive instruments of de-globalisation through regulation and the 
over-reaching instrument of extra -territoria lisation. The community of States has also 
resorted to co-operative instruments that aim at pooling their sovereignties in efforts 
of har7nonisation of their national laws and mutual co-operation in the enforcement of 
these laws. It has been argued that money laundering law has made use of each one of 
these modalities with a degree of success. Problems of effectiveness and some 
concerns offairness and dtie process however remain to be addressed. 
Without prejudice to the successes of these more conservative modalities, 
more remains to be done. At this stage, the State itself resorts to more innovative 
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methods that involve delegating part of its powers of governance to other agencies. 
By doing so the State foregoes part of its sovereignty in favour of achieving order and 
predictability. The two modalities employed to this end are privatisation and 
supranationalisation. This Chapter discusses privatisation as a form of non-state 
governance, while supranationalism will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
Privatisation in some of its aspects, as argued in Chapter Three of this volume, 
is an instrument of globalisation. The process of mass transferral of State assets to 
private parties has resulted in a massive shift of power in the society. Further, the 
large-scale transfer of the State's production activities and service provision to private 
actors has resulted in proportional increase in the role of private power in governance. 
Privatisation of the State's functions in maintaining law and order has, on the other 
hand, been utilised as a method of tackling the governance problematic created by 
globalisation. Analysis of this trend reveals that privatisation pervades all aspects of 
State power in the area of law and order. Private actors now perform parts of the 
judicial, prescriptive and enforcement functions of the State. While the private role 
has always played part in these spheres, the past three decades have seen more 
delegation to private actors than ever before since the monopolisation of these 
functions by the State. Again, money laundering law has made utmost utilisation of 
this modality of governance. In fact, money laundering law is in certain respects a =1 I 
privatisation instrument. 
Public law scholarship has always been suspicious of the private role in public 
governance. ' The suspicion is manifest in the perennial concern with administrative 
capture by private interests. This concern is based on the assumptions that public 
governance should be conducted and implemented in pursuit of the public interest and 
that private actors, inevitably, pursue private interests that are inherently in conflict 
with the public interest as a goal. Assumptions that are unfavourable to private power 
render burgeoning forms of private order particularly alarming to legal scholars. This 
alarm is compounded by the fact that accountability of judicial, lawmaking and 
enforcement agencies, as a pre-requisite for their legitimacy, has thus far been based 
on the State structures; parliamentary accountability and judicial and constitutional 
review being paramount forms of public accountability. Private adjudication, 
rulemaking and enforcement do not readily lend themselves to these forms of public 
' See below Section 3.3. 
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accountability. This leaves public law scholarship in search of alternative 
mechanisms. 
Money laundering law is based in essence on the idea of employing private 
agents, e. g., bankers, accountants, lawyers, brokers and dealers, to police the financial 
transactions of the public in search for signs of criminality and to document these 
transactions for police purposes. In this sense, it constitutes to varying degrees a 
deviation from criminal procedure rules of search and seizure that guard the 
individual against unwarranted intervention in one's own private affairs. Two factors 
render this particular intervention problematic: (1) the tradition of financial 
confidentiality that has prevailed in many countries for several decades; and (2) the 
intrusive nature of criminal law as a threat to basic individual freedoms. While a 
degree of deviation could be necessary as a response to the change in the social 
context from that, which has prevailed during the forination years of the principles, 
this deviation should be measured and should not exceed what is justified by this 
change. 
This Chapter deals with privatisation as a modality of global govemance. It 
places the trend as it manifests in money laundering law within the broader context by 
examining forms of privatisation in different areas of the law. The discussion of the 
trend across different sectors serves to show the common concerns as well the 
direction of reform. 
2. Private Dispute Resolution 
What is described here as "private" dispute resolution is commonly referred to as 
"Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR). The choice of designation here is merely to 
highlight the specific feature of this trend most pertinent to the context of the 
discussion. 2 Private dispute resolution is an alternative to public or State dispute 
resolution mechanisms that has evolved since the beginning of the last century. ADR 
is a broad term describing any method of dispute resolution that employs a private 
neutral in place of a State judge. The most important and most commonly used 
method of ADR internationally is arbitration. This method is also significant, in terms 
of the extent of privatisation of justice, in that it results in legally binding decisions 
2 Note that the private character of ADR is not uncontroversial. See Reuben, R., "Public Justice: 
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution", 85 California Law Review 577 
(1997). (arguing that arbitration constitutes a State action. ] I 
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that are enforceable through the standard coercive processes of the State. It is in this 
context that the private actor holds the biggest segment of State power in the 
administration of justice. 
The evolution of ADR has been highly innovative and a variety of methods 
have been designed over the years. The classic form of non-binding ADR methods is 
mediation. In this form, the parties designate a neutral third party to help them in 
resolving their differences through negotiation. The results of mediation are typically 
non-binding. ' Their implementation depends on the good will and the co-operation of 
the disputants. Other techniques of non-binding ADR include mini-trial, ' fact-finding 
by a neutral' and ombudsman. ' 
Private dispute resolution is not a novel form of dispute resolution. In many 
ways it is the original form of settling disputes. In the transnational commercial 
context, private dispute resolution has always been favoured to State dispute 
resolution by the merchants. While historically State courts were reluctant to enforce 
arbitration agreements, a shift occurred in the 1980s according to which the courts 4-) 
began to look upon ADR more favourably. This judicial favour was expressed in 
expanding the enforceability of ADR agreements and restricting the application of 
contractual defences especially those based on consent. ' It is to this shift that ADR as 
a form of privatisation of the judicial function could be pinned. 
From the perspective of the State, ADR developed as a solution to two types 
of problems: jurisdictional problem and capacity problem. The increase in the courts' 
caseload has far exceeded the courts' capacity to resolve disputes expeditiously. In the 
United States for example, filing cases before formal judicial institutions have 
increased by 14.3% between June 1981 and June 1982 alone. ' Filing appeals has rose 
3 Parties could agree to be bound by the results of mediation and other forms of non-binding ADR. 
Distinction however remains between these forms and arbitration in that the results are not handed 
down by an arbitrator but instead negotiated between the parties. Should they fall to agree on a 
solution, no resolution would result. 
41a panel comprising of a neutral and a manager from each party proposes a solution or gives an 
opinion; or a neutral evaluation of a point of law or fact. " ICC, Introductioi? to ADR Dispute Resolution 
Sei-vices, available at www. iccwbo. org. (Last visited February 16,2002. ) 
5This is a "settlement enhancement technique, in which the parties [ ... ] agree to appoint a mutually 
acceptable fact-finder and to stipulate to the factual findings of such a neutral. " Reuben, R., supra note 
2, at footnote 3. 
6 "a third part who intervenes to address concerns that individuals or dependent groups 
have with larger 
and more powerftil organizations or bureaucracies. " Id. 
7 Id., at 602-605. 
8 Delgado, R., et al., "Fairness and Formality. Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution", Wiscoiisb7 Lait, - Review 1359 (1985), at 1362. 
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from 2,800 in 1950 to 26,000 in 198 L' This has led to the shift in Judicial policy, vis- 
a-vis ADR agreements, that has been described above. 
Historically, ADR was the favoured solution of the transnational merchant 
specifically because of its independence from State laws and procedures. From the 
business perspective, this desire to remain free from State constraints continued to 
determine the transnational business preference for this independent forum for dispute 
resolution. According to the International Chamber of Commerce, demand for its 
International Court of Arbitration services continues to rise annually in direct 
correlation to the expansion of world trade and the globalisation of the economy. " 
From a State perspective, encouraging ADR constitutes a solution to the vexing 
conflict of law questions that beset certain aspects of economic activity such as the 
Internet and e-commerce. " 
The effectiveness of ADR as a solution to these jurisdictional and capacity 
problems stems from the main features of the process as infornial, private andflexible. 
Infon-nality means that ADR is less constrained by the procedural requirements that 
govern State judiciary. Flexibility means that the parties are free to choose the 
procedures that govern their dispute and, to a certain extent the substantive law, that 
binds them. ADR also grants the parties the chance to keep their disputes private and 
that has always been one of its most appealing features. " These very virtues that 
commended ADR as a solution have been the source of substantial criticism on 
account of legitimacy. These concerns are particularly crucial in a context where ADR 
has spread to apply to disputes between parties of different power positions and 
substantial informational asymmetry (e. g., consumer/corporation disputes and 
employer/employee disputes. )" 
' Id. 
10 ICC, Introducing the Court, available at www. iccwbo. org. (Last visited February 16,2002). 
President William Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Frainewworkfor Global Electronic 
Cominerce (July 11,1997), Chapter II, Section 3. This policy document promotes generally a system of 
private rulemaking through contract to govern e-commerce and specifically "the development of 
adequate, efficient, and effective alternate dispute resolution mechanisms for global commercial 
transactions. " In a similar policy initiative, the European Commission advocated that "Member States 
and the Corrimission should encourage online dispute settlement and alternative consumer redress 
procedures. " E-Europe. - An Information Societyfor All, Communication on a Commission Initiative 
for the Special European Council of Lisbon (23-24 March 2000). 
12 See ICC, Advantages ofA7-bitration, in ICC, Introduction to Arbitration, available at 
www. icewbo. or . 
(Last visited February 16,2002. ) 
13 On the changes to the context of arbitration and its implication for the legitimacy of its private 
character see Gibbons, L., ''Private Law, Public 'Justice': Another Look at Privacy, Arbitration and 
Global e-commerce", 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispitte Resolution 769 (2000), at 778-788. 
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Critics of the legitimacy of the informal procedures of ADR have asserted that 
this informality could be prejudicial to the weaker party. " The argument in this regard 
could be based on social and psychological research as well as on political analysis of 
power relations. " From a lawyer's standpoint, the fact that procedural law is often 
designed to redress imbalances of power to substitute for inequalities through form. 
Removing such procedures simply deprives the beneficial party of the protection they 
were designed to grant. " To some this neglect of procedural protection amounts to a 
breach of the due process requirements in the resolution of disputes and hence 
constitutes a breach of the values of democracy. " It has also been argued that ADR is 
antithetical to the principles of democracy in that it limits public participation by 
removing the determination of the meaning and application of the law in the context 
of dispute resolution from the public sphere to the secret arbitration forums. " 
When the same trait is both a virtue and a deficit, the balance becomes 
intricate. Irresolution is reflected in the writings of the critics discussed above. The 
solutions seem to advocate imposition of certain procedural constraints on ADR akin 
to those imposed on the judiciary. The requirements proposed range from publishing 
arbitral awards" to imposing constitutional constraints on the private ADR forum. 
None of these proposals is conclusive. Striking the balance, as one of the critics 
suggests, requires "step-by-step consideration of ADR goals and practices and 
constitutional standards, constitutional right by constitutional right 2' ADR procedure 
by ADR procedure, and factual application by factual application. Surely broader 
principles will emerge. 1121 
3. Private Law-Making 
1. An Overview 
By arguing that privatisation of lawmaking is one solution to the governance 
problematic of globalisation the author is not suggesting that this private role in 00 
lawmaking is a novel phenomenon. Apart from laws that reflect general morality, 
" See generally Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Wiscoiishi Law Review 1359 (1985). 
15 Id., 1375-1400. 
16 Id., 1368 -1375 & 1400-1402. 17 See Reuben, R., supra note 2, at 632-641. 
18 Id. 
'9 Gibbons, L., supra note 13. 
20 Reuben, R., supra note 2, at 577. 
21 Id., at 591. 
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such as the law of murder, every law or regulation reflects a private interest and is a 
response to the pressure of the group representing this interest. This is particularly 
true in the area of economic law and regulation. In addition to the direct lobbying 
exercised by private interest to influence the content of the law, legislative lawmaking 
is often but codification of existing practices and standards. Private lawmaking also 
has a long-standing role in custom as a source of law in many jurisdictions. 
Property rights and the freedom of contract and the sanctity afforded to them 
under the law are another source of private power over the activities of others. For 
example, under the law of trespass, private owners have great powers to exclude 
others from access to their property or to regulate this access. 22 L-1 the past, such 
powers were used in the American South to exclude the Blacks from access to public 
places. This has been characterised as a "full-fledged regime of law with the private 
owners of property laying down the terms and the courts providing the sanctions, the 
principal one of which is the action of trespass. 1123 
The relevance of this interpretation of property and contract as sources of 
private regulation to the present context is that it indicates that every privatisation of 
ownership and functions in the society involves granting a larger role to private power 
in regulating activities. The more privatised the supply of goods and services and the 
more deregulated this supply, the greater is the private power in determining the 
content of social and economic arrangements. One analyst has argued that "under the 
influence of laissez-faire doctrine the State has relinquished to the individual the 
'sovereign' function of laying down the rules which govern society. "" 
In addition to these implicit forms of private role in law and regulation, private 
groups are now increasingly exercising an explicit role in lawmaking and regulation. 
Countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States incorporate consultation 
with affected parties within their lawmaking and regulatory processes. For example, 
Section 553 of the U. S. Federal Administrative Procedure Act imposes a notice-and- 
comment procedure on administrative agencies in their rulemaking process. " Such a 
procedure guarantees substantial private participation in the agency's rulemaking, The 
agency is also required to demonstrate that it has considered all the alternatives and 
22 Jaffe, L., "Law Making by Private Groups" 51 Han, ard Laýv Revieiv 201-253 (1937), at 214-219. 
23 Id., at 218. CiMig Robert Hale, "Force and the State: A Comparison of 'Political' and 'Economic' 
Compulsion" 35 Col. L. Rev. 149 (1935), at 182 etseq., 198 et. seq. 
24 Id., at 214 Oting Morris Cohen "Property and Sovereignty" 13 Corn. L. Q. 8 (1927). 
25 Admin-Istrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551-559,701-706 (1994). 
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addressed the main arguments. 26 In the United Kingdom, The Financial Services and 
Markets Act (2000) imposes a general duty upon the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) to "maintain effective arrangements for consulting practitioners and 
consumers[. ]"" As part of these arrangements, the FSA is required to establish a 
Practitioner Panel representing the interests of practitionerSH and a Consumer Panel 
representing the interests of Consumers . 
2' The FSA is obliged by the Act to consider 
any representations made by these panels and to provide a written and reasoned 
statement in cases of disagreement with any such representation. " 
Voluntary se4f-regulation is another form of explicit private rulemaking. The 
primary examples of this type of private rulemaking can be found in the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO); an international organisation that brings 
together the leading national standardisation agencies in 140 jurisdictions. Such 
standards are typically of a technical nature pertaining to product configuration such 
as the size and shape of credit card and telephone cards. Some commentators deny the 
regulatory value of this form of rulemaking on account of their voluntariness. " This 
view, however, is limited. Regulatory agencies often adopt these standards and 
enforce them in a variety of ways, either by direct referral to the standards or by 
enforcement policy favourable to the firms that apply them. For example, the 
IS09000 quality management and quality assurance standards and the IS014000 
framework for environmental management are increasingly becoming a condition for 
access to certain markets. " These market mechanisms enforce the standards 
sufficiently so as to render the voluntary character merely juridical. 
Sometimes the exercise of private rulemaking is the result of direct delegation 
by the legislative authority. In this case, the legislature designates a specific non- 
governmental entity to set and implements standards subject to State agency I 
oversight. This type of private regulation is termed audited self-regulation. " The most 
obvious example of this form of self-regulation is the authority given to the 
26 Freeman, J., "The Private Role in Public Governance" 75 New York Law Review 543-675 (2000), at 
638-639. 
27 Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), s. 8. (Hereinafter, FSMA 2000). 
28 FSMA 2000, s. 9. 
29 FSMA 2000, s. 10. 
30 FSMA 2000, s. 11. 
31 Michael, D.., "Federal AgencyUse of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique", 47 
. 4dininistrative 
Law Review 171-250 (1995), at 178. 
12 Freeman, J., supra note 26, at 644-646. 
33 See generally Michael, D., supra note 3 1. 
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professions to regulate themselves through their professional associations such as the 
English Bar, the Law Society or the Exchanges. " 
According to this analysis, one can identify various forms of private 
rulemaking: explicit v. implicit, voluntary v. commissioned, technical v. policy 
oriented. Each of these categories might involve varying degrees of privatisation of 
rulemaking. It is generally to be observed, that private rulemaking has not superseded 
public rulemaking. Instead, it works in parallel, sometimes complementing and at 
other times supplanting. The State regulatory machinery remains, however, very close 
to the regulatory process. 
The rationales for private rulemaking are nianifold: ` First, the development of 
the rules by the parties addressed by them enhances the chances of compliance. 
Second, in an increasingly sophisticated economic environment) governments 
normally lack the expertise to write adequate rules regulating these activities. Such 
expertise is normally available at a prohibitive cost for governments with growing 
fiscal constraints. Delegating to the private sector is one option to gain access to the 
expertise needed without bearing the cost. Third, private rulemaking has sometimes 
developed as a solution to the limitations of the territoriality of State jurisdiction. 
Each of these rationales is becoming more compelling in the context of globalisation. 
To illustrate this point, the next Section will deal in more detail with the use of private 
power to bridge the territorial gap in the prescriptive jurisdiction. 
3.2. Bridging the Territorial Gap with Private Rules 
Lex mercatoria, the transnational law of commercial transactions that is made up of 
the general principles of commercial law and established commercial practices, is the 
most prominent example of private lawmaking as a response to the limits of territorial 
sovereignty. Lex mercatoria long precedes the process of globalisation. It emerged in 
medieval Europe to regulate transnational commercial relations. " Its role, however, 
34 The United Kingdom offers a good example of a self-regulatory regime of corporate governance see 
Dignam, A., "A Principled Approach to Self-Regulation? The Report of the Hampel Conunittee on 
Corporate Governance" 19 Co. L. 140-154 (1998); Morse, G., "Controlling Takeovers - the Self 
Regulation Option in the United Kingdom" Jotiriial of Business Law 58-74 (January 1998) Pettet, B., 
"The Combined Code: A Firm Place for Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance" 13 Joul*llal of 
hiteniatioiial Baiikiiig Law 394-400 (1998). 
35 Jaffe, L., supra note 22, at 211-212; Michael, D., siepra note 3 1, at 181-189. 
36 For a brief history of lex iiieractoria see Berger, K., "The New Law Merchant and the 
Global 
C 
Market: A21" Century View of Transnational Commercial Law" 3 hiteriiatioiialA rbitraftoii Law 
Review 91-102 (2000). 
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has witnessed a new revival at a time coincident with the beginnings of globalisation 
processes. In 1962, the London Colloquiurn on the New Sources of the Law of 
International Trade Law was held at King's College. This colloquium represented the 
first major event to deal with lex mercatoria in its modem form. " 
Writers on lex meracotoria in its modem form marvel at the astounding 
features of an emerging self-validating legal regime of private rules. " According to 
one author, the so-called "closed circuit arbitration" contract is "a self-regulatory 
contract which goes far beyond one particular commercial transaction and establishes 
a whole private legal order with a claim to global validity. "3' This type of contract 
creates a hierarchy of rules including the standard rules of contract regulating the 
future activity of the parties. In addition, the contract creates higher order rules that 
govern the interpretation of the rules and the procedures for future conflict resolution. 
This latter set of rules is the most important in terms of the process of creating the 
contract as an autonomous self-validating legal order. The contract refers the 
determination of its validity to an external institution, typically arbitration. This 
institution while created by the contract is independent from it and has the power to 
preside over its validity as well as its own. " 
While in its original form, lex mercatoria was an informal law of trade 
practices and general principles, in its modem fon-n, it has developed quasi-fon-nal 
legal sources. " These quasi-formal sources include standard contract, model clauses 
and rules adopted by international professional organisations. " One of the leading 
international business organisations in this area of quasi-formal, private and 
transnational rulemaking is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). " 
Amongst its more famous activities is the codification of standardised trade terms 
under the name of Incoterms. The first edition was published in 1936 and subsequent 
editions have continued to expand the coverage of the code. " The ICC's rulemaking 
37 Id., at 9 1. 
" Teubner, G., "'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in Gunther Teubner (ed. ), 
Global Law withotit a State 3-28 (1997), at 15-19. 
39 Id., at 16. 40 Id., 16-17. 
41 Garro, A., "Rule-Setting by Private Organizations, Standardisation of Contracts and the 
Harmonisation of International Sales Law" in Fletcher, I., Mistelis, L., and M. Cremona 
(eds. ), 
Fotindations and Perspectives of International Trade Law 310-319 (2000), at 
ý, 22-002. 
Id., at ý22-001. 
43 Cattaul, L., "Harmonising Commercial Law: Keeping Pace with Business" in Fletcher, I., et al. 
(eds. ), id., 37. 
44Garro, A., stipra note 4 1, at ý22-016 to T, 22-017. 
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activities have expanded to other areas including a variety of forms such as: codes of 
conducts, guides and customs and practices, all of which are grouped under the term 
"voluntary codes. "" Professor Teubner refers to these quasi-formal rulemaking 
processes by transnational private business associations as another element of 
extemalisation in the process of validating the transnational contractual legal order 
autonomously from sovereign laws. " 
The rationale of lex mercatoria and its revival in the present global context is 
that one of the outcomes of the territoriality of the prescriptive jurisdiction is the 
emergence of acute differences in rules and policies amongst various jurisdictions. 
Such differences render transnational transactions burdensome and uncertain. Resort 
to private legal orders that are equally transnational is one response to this 
problematic legal disparity. " 
Regulating cyberspace is another area where governments have resorted to 
private regulation explicitly to resolve the jurisdictional mismatch problem. The 
jurisdictional dilemmas produced by globalisation could not be more acute than they 
are on the Internet, the global medium par excellence. Internet activities take place 
across numerous national jurisdictions simultaneously. Absent clear rules on the 
applicable law to Internet activity, legal certainty would be undermined and with it the 
economic potential of the Internet as a marketplace. Private regulation figured and 
was utilised as one solution to this dilemma. While all the other rationales of private 
regulations apply equally to cyber regulation, this jurisdictional rationale was 
particularly important in this context. 48 
Such concerns have led the American Bar Association to initiate its "Global 
Cybespace Jurisdiction Project. " The purpose of the Project was to examine the 
jurisdictional uncertainties resulting from electronic commerce. The Project lasted 
two years, and its Report was published in 2000 advocating a hybrid solution 
including: (i) creating private sector contract-based regimes to which local 
governments may defer to reduce jurisdictional uncertainty; and (ii) creating self- 
regulatory regimes that can produce useable standards and rules acceptable to a 
broad 
0 
'5 Id., at 22-018. 
46 Teubner, G., sitpi-a note 38, at 17. 
47 See Bhala, R., "Self-Regulating in Global Electronic Markets Through Reinvigorated Trade 
Usaaes" 
31 Idaho Law Review 863-936 (1995). Arguing that trade usage could be reinvigorated to 
fill the legal 
vacuum in the governance of certain trade practices in the electronic 
foreign exchange market. 
11 48 Perritt, H., "Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet" Uflivel-sity of 
Chicago Legal 
Fo7-iwi 215 (2001). 
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majority of the e-commerce participants. 
49 
In certain situations, private rulemaking was the only alternative acceptable to 
governments in their attempts to reconcile their diverging national interests. The 
regulatory system for domain names is a case in point. Domain names are a scarce 
and valuable resource on the Internet. Assigning Internet addresses and controlling the 
data required to direct the Internet traffic to its right destinations is one of the few 
functions on the Internet that requires centralisation. Because of a historical accident, 
the control of this data and the exercise of this function fell to the United States 
Department of Commerce. With the expansion of the Internet and the development of 
its commercial uses, other countries especially in Europe expressed concern about the 
control of such an important resource by the United States. The solution that was 
devised to resolve this dilemma was the creation of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a non-profit corporation. ICANN function 
was to manage this scarce resource of Internet addresses and names. In perforining 
this function, ICANN performs a number of regulatory functions using contracts ZD 5 
codes and standards. " 
In all the contexts in which private rulemaking was used, certain concerns 
were raised and suspicions entertained. It is to this point that this Section now turns. 
3.3 Issues and Possible Solutions 
Private r-ule-making, like every other exercise of private power in what is perceived as 
a public realm, raises numerous and strong concerns. This is in a way a reflection of a 
deeply rooted weariness of private power in public law scholarship and its perennial 
concern with capture and interest group pressure as evils that befit the processes of 
public decision making. " Such manifestations of private power are known to 
undermine the capacity of public decision making processes at delivering 
disinterested decisions geared strictly towards the public interest. 
The shortcomings of private rulemaking are manifold. Rulemaking should be 
done in the public interest and delivered by those who do not possess any conflicting 
interest that might distort the content of the rule. Private power, on the other hand, is 
49 American Bar Association, "Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on 
Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet" 55 Blisiness LawYer 1801 (2000), at 1823-1824. 
50 For a very lengthy and critical discussion see Froonilun, M., "'Wronc, turn in Cyberspace: 
Using 
Z-- -- 
ICANN to Route around the APA and the Constitution" 50 Dlike Law Journal l/ (2000). 
51 Freeman, J., supra note 26 at 557 et seq. 
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inherently self-serving, which makes these guarantees of neutrality absent. 52 This is 
further accentuated by the informal character that rulemaking normally takes in a 
private setting. Informality excludes the procedural safeguards that might have 
worked to mitigate the bias of the private rule-maker. Private rulemaking often raises 
concerns for lack of transparency and predominance of certain interests and lack of 
representation of others. Also, the prevailing culture in private institutions differs 
normally from the public service culture that should ideally prevail in public 
institutions. Delegation to private rule-makers is often done without specification of 
any standards to cover the exercise of this new power, hence, the culture of private 
interest continues to prevail unchecked by rulemaking standards. 5' 
So far, the concerns raised relate to the norms of due process. " Another related 
aspect of great concern is the lack of accountability that characterises private 
rulemaking. From a democratic perspective, such institutions are not subject to the 
popular accountability that exists in the case of public rulemaking. In the latter case, 
incompetent or corrupt officials could be removed from office by the electorate 
through the exercise of their franchise. In the case of private rule-makers, such 
mechanism of accountability is unavailable. Although they are subject to private 
remedies in tort, contract and competition law, in the absence of procedural 
requirements and clear mandates, they are largely insulated against judicial oversight 
for the legitimacy of their rulemaking. " 
Despite the problematic aspects of private rulemaking, the increasingly 
dominant view is that private power has a role to play in governance. As early as 
1937, one writer analysed the role of private power in rulemaking arguing that private 
participation in lawmaking and government should not be dismissed lightly. He 
argued that the role of private power in lawmaking is pervasive and that it is not, by 
52 Lawrence, D., "Private Exercise of Goveimmental Power" 61 Indiana Law Journal 647 (1986), at 
660-662. 
53 On standards as a concern and solution see Jaffe, L., supra note 22, at 248 et seq. The author 
discusses the limitations of standards as a determinant of the validity of private delegation on account 
of the difficulty inherent in defining the standard and its lack of utility in the absence of public agency 
oversialit. 0 54The due process nature of the concerns over private delegation started with the earliest forms of such 
delegation. In Carter v. Carter Coal co. the U. S. Supreme Court stated thatý "one person may not be 
entrusted with the power to regulate the business of another, [ ... ]. The 
delegation is so clearly arbitrary, 
and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment[. ]" 56 
36), at 311. S. Ct. 855 (19) 
55 Freeman, J., Supra note 26, at 574. 
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definition, contrary to the American constitutional tradition. 56 More recent writers 
argued that "private actors are also regulatory resources capable of hamessing pnvate 
capacity to serve public goals. "" 
In order to remedy the defects of private rulemaking several mechanisms have 
been proposed. On one end, there is a growing body of literature that argues for 
treating private agencies that are exercising a public function as state actors and 
subjecting them to the same procedural requirements and constitutional constraints. " 
This solution, if taken to the extreme, might undermine the whole rationale of 
privatising the regulatory function. It, however, remains of value in that extending 
some of the procedural and constitutional constraints to private actors might be a 
viable requirement to a certain degree. The oversight of a public agency is another 
obvious mechanism of accountability that can and is widely employed. Other 
commentators have sought alternative remedies to these due process and 
accountability deficits. Such mechanisms include the representative character of the 
private rulemaking body as an obvious remedy to the concerns for bias. " If all 
affected interests are represented in the rulemaking body, the rules will be the product 
of a compromise amongst them. Also, transparency of the rulemaking process is 
another potentially potent remedy. Hence, if private rulemaking is here to stay due 
process and accountability safeguards should be designed to counter the shortcoming's 
of this form of privatisation. 
4. Privatisation of Enforcement 
The third prong of the Government's legal function is that of implementing and 
enforcing its laws and regulations. The enforcement of public policy as expressed in a 
country's laws and regulations and as handed down by its judiciary is a very important 
phase in the realisation of the goals of any public policy. The effectiveness of such 
policy, to a very far extent, hinges on the effectiveness of the implementation and 
enforcement policies. The implementation and enforcement function is not merely an 
automatic implementation of a general rule. The content of the rule is largely shaped 
and ultimately determined by the implementation policies and the exercise of 
56 Jaffe, L., supra note 22. 
57 Freeman, J., supra 26, at 594. 
58 Id., at 574 et seq. 
'9 Lawrence, D., supra note 52, at 688-689. One of the author's core arguments is that private 
delec, ation does not always involve a conflict of interest, Id., at 687-688. 0 
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enforcement discretion. Despite the importance of this stage in the life of a law, 
designing enforcement mechanisms often attracts much lesser public attention and 
debate. " 
This Section provides an overview of the privatisation of the enforcement 
function in the context of globalisation. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, it 
discusses the privatisation of the regulatory enforcement. Examples in this Section are 
derived primarily from the areas of securities regulations and environmental 
regulations. The second is dedicated to the privatisation of enforcement in the realm 
of criminal justice by focusing on the privatisation of policing. The second part 
provides a prelude to the discussion of privatisation in the context of money 
laundering law. 
4.1. Privatisation of Regulatory Enforcement 
Command-and-control as an approach to regulation is generally a State-based 
approach founded on a deterrence theory of compliance. According to this approach, 
the State sets or adopts elaborate standards of conduct for the regulated industry and 
polices compliance with these standards. Failure to comply results in civil or criminal 
sanctions of such a magnitude so as to offset any incentive to violate the rules. 
Successful detection of violations is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the 
regulatory system. This means that the regulator must continuously gather information 
on the performance of the regulated entities and determine whether there is any 
violation. 
The process of policing compliance is often a costly one. It also typically 
requires expert knowledge of the industry that is not normally available to the State. 
With the growing complexity of the economic activity and the economic expansion 
especially in developed countries, the State has become less and less capable of 
meeting the costs of this form of economic regulations. In the area of environmental 
regulations, countries have become increasingly aware of the inadequacy of their 
environmental law enforcement. " In a study published by the United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO) in 1991 examining the capacity of the Environmental 
60 Bhagwat, A., "Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of Administrative Discretion" 50 
Hastings Law Join-nal 1275 (1996). Arguing that granting the administrative agency ex ante 
enforcement powers as opposed to ex post powers can affect substantially the substance of the 
law and 
affect the distribution of power betxeen the regulator, the regulated and the 
Congress. 
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Protection Agency (EPA) to fulfil its mandate, the GAO found that while the EPA's 
scientific and regulatory responsibilities have increased the EPA budget has not 
increased beyond its initial level on $1.7 billion in 1979. " It further concluded that 
with a federal budget deficit of $300 billion at the time of the study, the Government's 
ability to meet the public expectations of protecting the environment at any cost 
would be sharply constrained. " 
In view of the growing demands for regulations and the increasingly limited I 
resources available for this function, it was natural that concerns for efficiency should 
become paramount. Regulatory agencies have come under attack for their failure to 
meet this test. Economic analysts of regulations argue that government regulators do 
not possess the incentive to adopt regulations that are economically efficient. In 
analysing the incentives of government regulators, some have argued that bureaucrats 
either seek to maximise their budget or their political influence. Since such incentives 
are not non-nally aligned with economic efficiency, the conflict is often resolved in 
favour of a less optimum solution. According to this analysis a government regulator 
would opt for an enforcement mechanism that guarantees its agency a larger budget 
even if there was another more efficient option. Seeking political support can also 
explain sub-optimal regulatory choices. " 
Applying similar economic rationales to the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, one commentator argues that the bureaucratic structure of the 
Commission is unsuitable for effective civil enforcement of securities regulation. " 
Any enforcement action in order to take place has to go through a very long 
bureaucratic cycle of preparation, review and authorisation. This lengthy path delays 
and hence undermines the deterrent effect of any such action. " The role of the Office 
of the General Council (OGC) in the argument of this comrnentator was particularly 
negative. According to his analysis, the raison ditre of the OGC was to act as a check 
on the work of others. In the view of the commentator, the OGC was "structurally 
61 Harper, B., "Trust but Verify: Innovation in Compliance Monitoring as a Response to the 
Privatization of Utilities in Developed Nations" 48 Administrative Law Review 593 (1996), at 597-599. 
62 United States General Accounting, Environniental Protection. - Meeting Public Expectations with 
Limited Resources, GAO/RCED-91-97 (June 199 1), at 16. 
63 Id., at 8. 
64 Cohen, M., and Rubin, P., "Private Enforcement of Public Policy" 3 Yale Journal of Regulation 167- 
(1985), at 169-172. 
65 Davis, T., "New Model of Securities Law Enforcement" 32 Cianberland Law Review 69 (2001- 
2002) 
66 Id., at 100-103. 
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biased" toward finding litigation risks and substantive issues that had the effect of 
slowing the pace of the enforcement. The OGC's decisions had their incentive in "turf 
protection" rather than in the efficient use of the Commission's resources for 
enforcement. " 
All this concern over the limited resources available for enforcement and the 
inefficient use of these resources by government regulators has led generally to calls 
for innovation in regulatory and enforcement systems and more specifically for a 
degree of privatisation of these systems. " Privatisation of enforcement can take 
different forms including relying on general market sanctions; creating market-based 
incentives for compliance; self-regulation; contracting out to a private enforcement 
agency; and relying on private actions. 
Market forces sometimes operate as a spontaneous incentive for compliance 
with regulations. This is most evident with respect to envirom-nental regulations. The 
growing consumer interest in protecting the environment, especially in developed 
countries, has meant that for corporations to market their products and appeal to the 
consumer they need to show environmental awareness and to create a corporate image 
that is environmentally friendly. This has meant that failure to comply with 
environmental regulations is now being sanctioned indirectly by consumers. The 
effective cost of violation is loss of market share. " Regulatory policy has sought to 
capitalise on this market sanction by imposing on publicly-traded companies an 
obligation to regularly disclose information relating to their compliance with 
environmental requirements. " While this market incentive works for firrns that market 
their products directly to the consumer, it has limited influence on the behaviour of 
fin-ns that are only sold to other commercial purchasers. Further, the consumer 
sometimes lacks the time or the expertise to assess the environmental soundness of 
most of the products that are consumed. " 
The second method of privatisation of enforcement is deliberately creating a 
market dynamic that would induce the regulated to CoMply. 72 This method is normally 
67 Id., at 10 1- 102. 
68 See Hai-per, B., supra note 61; Cohen, M., and Rubin, P., supra note 64; Bhagwat, A., supra note 60.; 
United States General Accounting, supra note 73. 
69Rechtschaffen, C., "Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental 
Enforcement" 71 Southern California Law Review 1181(1998), at 1195. 
70 Id., at 1244-1252. 71 Id., 1196-1198. 
72 United States General Accounting, supra note 62, at 30-33; Cohen, 'IM., and Rubin, P., stipra note 64, 
at 169-172. Providing economic analysis of market-based approaches to regulation. I 
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accompanied by replacing the detailed specification of the standards of conducts 
expected of the regulated for a definition of the result or outcome to be achieved. An 
example of such mechanism is imposing a tax calculated as a charge per unit of 
pollution. The tax should be calculated in such a way that it offsets the benefit of 
polluting beyond a certain level. The advantage of this system is that it becomes in the 
interest of business to monitor its own polluting activity in order to secure accurate 
determination of its tax liability. The regulator still bears the cost of verifying the 
accuracy of the regulated self-audits. This cost could be burdensome in a complex 
economy. " 
The previous two methods of privatisation of enforcement are not but methods 
of inducing self-regulation. One, however, can discuss outright delegation to the 
regulated entities to police their own compliance as another distinct category of 
private enforcement. In this case, the sanction for non-compliance is not market-based 
but regulatory in nature. In the area of securities regulation, comprehensive self- 
regulation through the exchanges preceded government command-and-control 
methods and informed them. The International Organization of Securities 
Commission's (IOSCO) Principles of Securities Regulations recommend that the 
regulatory regime should make use of the self-regulatory organisations (SROs). " 
According to a report by one of IOSCO's committees, "In its most complete form, 
self-regulation encompasses the authority to create, amend, implement and enforce 
rules of conduct with respect to the entities subject to the SRO's jurisdiction. "" Both 
in securities regulations and environmental regulations, self-regulation also takes the 
form of reporting and record-keeping requirements that permit the regulatory agency 
to perform its function in detecting violations. 
Instead of delegating to the regulated entity itself, the regulator can delegate 4- 
Z-) 
the enforcement to an independent private organisation. The advantages of such an 
approach is to benefit from the efficiencies of private organisations. This approach is 
often accompanied by the use of market-incentives for compliance and remuneration, 
such as t ing the remuneration of a private environmental audit agency to a reduction Yi Cý 
73 United States General Accounting, Environmental Protection: Meeting Public Expectations with 
Limited Resources, GAO/RCED-91-97 (June 199 1) at 3 1. 
74 International Organization of Securities Cornmission, Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation (February 2002), Principle 7. 
75 The SRO Consultative Conirnittee, Nfodelf07- Effective Regidation (IOSCO, May 2000), at 3. 
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in the level of pollution below a certain standard. " This approach raises concerns for 
confluence between the regulated entities and the contracted enforcement agency. 
Such risk of corruption, however, is equally present under a publicly run system of 
enforcement. 
The final method of privatisation of enforcement and a very important one is 
the private right of action. An individual who is aggrieved by actions in violation of 
regulatory standards, can sue the violator for damages. By so doing, the plaintiff 
secures damages for the harm sustained and, maybe incidentally, enforces the 
regulatory norm. In addition to the rights of actions available under the general 
provisions of the law of tort or the law of contract, some regulatory schemes create 
specific private rights of actions as a method of private enforcement. Private securities 
fraud action created by the United States Securities Exchange Act 1934 are but one 
example. 
Both in the context of securities regulation and financial regulation these 
"private attorney generals" are instrumental for the enforcement of the regulatory 
schemes. " The advantages of private civil actions are many. The han-n sustained by a 
particular individual is the best detector of a violation and the gravity of that violation. 
The individual harmed is probably in a better position to know the facts. Normally 
private action is speedier than the lengthy administrative procedures needed for taking 
a public enforcement action. This speed is necessary if enforcement is to influence the 
conduct of the regulated industry. " The risk of legal liability also operates on the 
regulated firms as a cost-based market incentive for compliance. In countries like the 
United States, where class action is part of the legal tradition, the private bar and the 
advocacy groups have developed very sophisticated mechanisms for policing 
regulatory violations. " 
One commentator, arguing in favour of the privatisation of civil enforcement 
under the United States securities law, observed that the private bar is often faster to 
act upon detection or suspicion of regulatory violations than the Commission with its 
lengthy procedures. In response to the severe market decline of the U. S. NASDAQ 
(i. e., U. S. over the counter market) in 2000, the private bar initiated a larger number 
76 See genei-allv Cohen, M., and Rubin, P., supra note 64. 
77 Freeman, J., supi-a note 26, at 661. 
78 Davis, T., "New Model of Securities Law Enforcement" 32 Cw7zberland Law Review 69 (200 1- 
2002), at 94 et seq. 79 id. 
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of proceedings than the Commission. Also, the private bar's response to the issue of 
the financial analysts' potential conflict of interest came only two days following the 
first signals raised by the acting Chain-nan Laura Unger in her testimony to the 
Congress. The commentator also noted the substantial technical resources available to 
private firrns and dedicated to detecting violations and publicising actions. " 
Aware of the potential potency of private actions as an enforcement 
mechanism in competition law and also aware of the limitations of centralised 
administrative enforcement., the European Commission is currently seeking to amend 
the regulations implementing the rules on competition laid down in article 81(l) and 
81(3) of the founding Treaty (1957). " Article 81 establishes the rules concerning 
restrictive agreements. Art. 81(l) prohibits all restrictive agreements, while art. 81(3) 
exempts certain agreements from the scope of the prohibition. Council Regulation No. 
17 sets the rules of procedure for the implementation of the Treaty rules on 
competition. It provides for the direct applicability of art 81(l), which means that 
Member States shall apply the prohibition rule directly and enforce it through their 
administrative and judicial authorities. On the other hand, Regulation No. 17 gave the 
European Commission a monopoly over the application of the exemptions 
encompassed in article 81(3). The application of this provision was subject to prior 
notification and authorisation by the Commission of any exempted agreement. The 
result of this procedure was a highly centralised regulatory competition scheme. 
The current proposals for amendment focus on removing the restriction on the 
application of art. 81(3) by the Member States through their competition authorities 
and courts. 82 The result of such amendments is decentralisation of the regulatory 
scheme and opening the door for private action against anti -competitive behaviour 
before national courts. In defending its proposal the Commission argues that the 
proposed system will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the protection of 
competition by adding more enforcers. 83 
Despite all the advantages of the private action, this approach has its own 
80 Id,. at 95-96. 
81 The Treaty Establishing the European Community, 0. J. C340 173 (1997). Corrunission of the 
I European Communities, Proposalfor a Cowicil Regulation on the linpleinentation of the Rides on 
Conipetition Laid Down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, COM(2000) 582 Final, (Brussels, 
27/Sept. /2000). 
82 Commission of the European Communities, id. 
83 Id., at p. 6. On the advantages of private enforcement see Mno Monti, Effective Private Enforcenzew 
ofEC Conipetition Policy, Speech to the Sixth EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop (1 -2 June 
2001), Speech/01/258, (I June 2001). 
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shortcomings. Two are particularly important. First, over zealous individuals, lawyers 
and advocacy groups can cause over- enforcement of regulations. On the basis of the 
finite nature of resources, including enforcement resources, there is an optimal level 
of enforcement beyond which resources will be expended inefficiently. This means 
that enforcing the regulations against trivial violations will result in diverting the 
courts' time and resources away from more worthwhile cases in terms of societal 
value. " One solution to this problem could be achieved through reform of the 
standing rules and the rules of evidence. Restrictive rules of standing and stricter rules 
of evidence will inevitably result in reducing private civil enforcement and vice 
versa. 85 
The second criticism of private action is that it results in transferring the 
control over the regulatory process away from the regulator to the private parties. It is 
the private individuals who decide what actions to bring. Their choices in terms of 
what violations to pursue could be different from those of the regulator. Such conflict 
could even result in sabotaging an enforcement policy based on inducing compliance 
co-operation by the regulated entities. " Further, Private individuals' primary concern 
is often obtaining damages for harrn sustained. Enforcing the regulations and 
achieving the public interest embodied in them is typically incidental. Settlements 
reached out of court could result in distorting or aborting the regulatory objectives 
sought by the regulations. 
Some safeguards have been proposed and employed in order to mitigate 
certain of these conflicts in enforcement objectives. For example, Article 15(3) of the 
European Commissions proposal introduces a right for the Commission and national 
competition authorities to make submissions to national courts orally or in writing. 
Such submissions are not binding on the national courts. " Other examples include 
granting the regulatory agency the right to review any proposed settlement between 
the parties before its submission to the court. these safeguards, however, are limited in 
their use and effect. 88 
84 Barnett, A., and Terrell, T., "Economic Observations on CitiZen-Suit Provisions of Environrnental 
Legislation" 12 Duke Eiiviroiviwwal Law aiid Policy, Foruln 1 (2001), at 9-11. 
85 Such concerns and policies informed the reforms of the United States securities la-ws during the 
1990s. See Davis, T., stipra note 65, at 78-82. 
86 Rechtschaffen, C., "Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of EnvLronmental 
Enforcement" 71 Southerii Califorizia Law Review 1181 (1998), at 1232. 
87 Commission of the European Communities, supi-a note 8 1, Article 15(3). 
's Rechtschaffen, C., supi-a note 86, at 1232. 
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In conclusion, the growing complexity of economic activities has resulted in a 
growing need for special expertise in implementing and enforcing their regulation. 
Coupled with the financial constraints that beset most governments, the demand for 
expertise and financial resources has resulted in devising innovative methods of 
regulatory enforcement that typically involve reliance on the private sector. This 
privatisation took several fonns including reliance on market sanctions, creation of 
market-based incentives for compliance, self-regulation, delegation to independent 
private enforcement agencies and encouraging private action as a method of 
enforcement. Each of these methods had substantial merit but also triggered serious 
concerns. Considering that the enforcement stage is ultimately what defines the 
content of regulatory policy, all the due process concerns and the accountability 
concerns raised by private law-making apply. Some solutions and safeguards were 
devised, but their potential is yet to be assessed with more rigour. 
4.2. Private Enforcement in Criminal Law 
At this point of the discussion, it becomes apparent that wherever government seemed 
to struggle, the private role figured as an option. This applies to situations ranging 
from supply of goods and services to rule-making, adjudication and enforcement. 
Privatisation has thus become a familiar alternative. No amount of familiarity, 
however, would prepare an uninitiated observer for the idea of private criminal 
justice. As stated repeatedly throughout this volume, criminal justice is different. 
Security and order are the basic functions of the State in its most minimalist form. 
Legitimate use of force is supposed to be the exclusive domain of the State. The 
forces of globalisation however do not stop at such proclamations. Under the current 
circumstances, the State is not rich enough, is not expert enough and is not 
territorially big enough. As a result, private power has had the opportunity to claim a 
role in this exclusive space of criminal justice. 
Closer inspection of the criminal justice system reveals that the private role is 
pervasive. The role of informants in the detection of crime, the practice of plea 
bargaining and granting the surety the power to arrest the bailee are all manifestations 
of private role in criminal justice. The trend, however, that this Section is concerned 
with is deeper and more structural than these random and secondary forrns of private 
participation. The expanding role of private policing in the United Kingdom, the 
United States and many other countries is one aspect of this trend. Also, the growing 4= 
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responsibilities of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in policing the Internet are part of 
the same trend in the virtual space. Financial intermediaries and accountants play a 
similar role in the context of corporate and financial crime as will be discussed in the 
next Section. Another important aspect is the private role in the implementation of 
criminal sanctions such as private incarceration. " 
The trend towards private policing has started in the 1950s and boomed in the 
1960s. While privatisation often occurs as deliberate public policy, the early 
appearance of private policing was an entirely private initiative. It was tolerated by 
governments but not initiated by them. During the 1960s and 1970s, this trend has 
expanded rapidly. By mid-1980s, estimates indicated that private police in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and the United States has exceeded public police in number. " 
Estimates in the 1990 indicate that in the United States the ratio of private security 
guards to police officers is three to two. In an affluent State such as California this 
ratio stands at over two to one. " 
Several reasons have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. As other 
incidents of privatisation, considerations of cost and limited resources of the 
government were paramount. One commentator argued that the changing economic 
climate, increased mobility and the emergence of organised forms of crime has placed 
a strain on the resources of public policing. " Also, the emergence of new forms of 
criminality and the expansion of private places that are open for public use, such as 
shopping centres and entertainment parks, has further challenged the expanding but 
nevertheless limited resources for policing. " In response to the growing demand for 
policing and the limited resources, public policy in the 1960s has shifted towards 
prioritisation. Police resources were increased and their functions and responsibilities 
limited. Such policy decisions did not address the question of who is going to fill the 
For a very good primer, though somewhat dated, on private prisons in the United States see Robbins, 
I., "The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration", 38 Ainerican Uhiversity Law Review 531 (1989). 
'0 Matthews, R., "Privatization in Perspective", in Roger Matthews (ed. ), Pi-ivatiziiig 0-iminal Justice 1 
(1989), at 2. Any estimates of this sort are however imprecise. This is due to the secretive character of 
he industry and to the problem of defining what constitutes private policing. Sklansky, D., "The Private 
Police", 46 UCLA Law Review 1165 (1999), at 1174-1175. 
9' Sklansky, D., id, at 1174. The author also provides a brief history of policing see id. at 1193 et seq. 1 92 South, N., "Reconstructing Policing: Differentiation and Contraction in Post-War Private and Public 4- 1 Policing", in Roger Matthews (ed. ), id., 76, at 77. 
93 Sklansky, D., supra note 90, at 122 1. 
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vacuum created by such withdrawal of public policing. " It is in this sense that private 
policing is partly a "spin off' of public policy, albeit not directly created by it. 
Governments in the 1980s have therefore perceived private policing as a good 
opportunity to reduce the government's law and order budget while providing the 
security needed by the public. " Other rationales were also advanced in support of this 
trend. Commercial and industrial interests perceived private police as more flexible 
than State police and more responsive to their needs. In that sense it was perceived as 
more accountable to the consumers of security as a service. 
Like other incidents of privatisation, private policing has raised serious 
concerns. The primary concern is one of accountability. This concern is particularly 
acute in this context in view of the coercive nature of the function assumed by private 
power. Although some private interests have perceived private policing as more 
accountable, this was based on a limited point of view. Like any exercise of private 
power, the interests served, unlike those served by State police, are particular ones. In 
this case they are the interests of those who pay the bill for the private guard. Wider 
societal interests and the interests of those who are subject to private enforcement are 
not taken into account. 
The accountability deficit is obvious when one realises the limitations of the 
law governing private security personnel. " As private citizens, they are exempt from 
the procedural and constitutional safeguards to which State police is subject. This is 
perceived as a virtue by some in that it grants such private forces the flexibility to 
pursue the interests of their employer. Again, this is a limited point of view. An 
exercise of coercive power unchecked by constitutional and procedural constraints 
could undermine the basic freedoms enshrined in the constitutions of all democratic 
societies. " An illustrative example is the increasing use of private security guards to 
exclude the poor or members of certain ethnic groups from access to public venues. 
Accountability is further undermined by the secrecy that shrouds the private security 
industry and other private agencies of criminal justice for that matter. 98 
94 South, N., supra note 92, at 79. 
95 On the cost rationale and its validity see Matthews, R., supra note 90, at 4-6. 
96 Sklansky, D., supra note 92, at 1183-1188. 
97 On the constitutional constraints on private police and its linuts see Sklansky, D., id., at 1229 et seq.; 
and Cafuzzi, M., "Private police and Personal Privacy: Who's Guarding the Guards", 40 New York Law 
School Law Review 225 (1995). 
98 Matthews, R., supra note 90, at 18. 
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Assessment of the success of privatisation often focuses on the cost savings 
achieved by privatisation and its contribution to flexibility and innovation. The 
specific nature of criminal justice makes other criteria paramount. Any evaluation of 
privatisation in this field must take into account the degree of accountability and the 
improvement in the delivery of justice. " While these criteria are qualitative in nature 
and therefore not as easily measured as cost, this should not mean givin more weiaht 9 Cý 
to cost considerations. In the context of criminal justice, justice should not be 
overlooked as part of the service delivered and any measure of privatisation should be 
assessed in terms of its impact on the quality of justice. 
As previously indicated, enforcement is an important function. The dividing 
line between enforcement and policy making is fine. That is due to the fact that it is 
only at the enforcement stage that the policy takes its ultimate shape. This 
understanding of the enforcement process has highlighted other concerns with respect 
to the privatisation of criminal justice. Policing involves wide exercise of discretion. 
Upon detection of an offence, it is the prerogative of the police to determine the action 
to be taken. This exercise of discretion is significant in ten-ns of its impact on criminal 
justice policy. In the context of State police, this discretion is exercised in accordance 
with the public policy. In the context of private policing, it has been noted that a form 
of informal negotiated justice is common. According to this process the victim, who is 
also the employer of private security, negotiates with the accused seeking restitution 
in exchange for refraining from reporting the offence and seeking public prosecution. 
This is also often used in the context of corporate fraud, where major corporations 
favour the secrecy of the informal process. This exercise of discretion and the resort to 
infon-nal justice risk undermining the objectives of public criminal justice policy. The 
pervasiveness of this exercise of discretion would result in rendering minor offences 
more severely punished than more serious offences with the detriment to justice that 
this entails. "' 
With respect to criminal justice, the same wisdom derived from the discussion 
of other forms of privatisation applies. Privatisation is here to stay, at least for the 
foreseeable future. It is a product of an expansion and sophistication of private 
activity, both legitimate and illegitimate, that supersedes the capacity of government. I 
99 Id. at 14 et seq. 
100 South, N., sitpra note 92, at 96-97. 
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One question that needs further investigation is how can the benefits of this process be 
reaped without sacrificing the integrity of the legal order. 
While the discussion in this Section has focused on uniformed patrol-and-beat 
private police, the phenomenon of private policing is much more widely dispersed 
than that. It is included in the growing number of statutory provisions that impose a 
duty to report crime on private citizens and especially on professionals. "' Similar 
concerns, however, apply. It is to one form of this policing in the context of money 
laundering law that the next Section turns. 
5. Money Laundering Law as a Privatisation Instrument 
This Section is primarily concerned with the regulatory/preventive dimension of 
money laundering law as opposed to its control side. There is a strong element of 
privatisation in the regulatory structure of money laundering prevention. Financial 
institutions, as the subjects of money laundering regulations, play an important role in 
the making of those regulations. They participate in the FATF process and the 
processes of other international standard- setters. At the domestic level they work 
closely with their governments in designing domestic regulations. "' At the 
enforcement stage, as a regulatory obligation and with the criminal liability as an 
incentive, the subjects of money laundering regulations are typically eager to install 
adequate internal controls, compliance audits and training programmes for their staff 
This is not however the element of privatisation that this Section is concerned with. 
Money laundering law is a tool of enforcement of other economic laws and 
regulations. Its function is to defeat sophisticated attempts at evading these laws and 
regulations. Through its regulatory instruments, money laundering law enlists a wide 
group of professionals to act as policemen for the purpose of detecting and preventing 
attempts at evading the laws and regulations it is created to guard. Designed to 
counter disturbing private power, money laundering law enlists other powerful but 
101 Glazebrook, P., "On Being Required to be a Policeman, Untrained and Unpaid", 60: 3 Cainbridge 
Law Journal 537-552 (2001). This paper offers a good survey of such reporting requirements under 
English law. The author further attempts to develop a test of reasonableness. 
102 Pursuant to U. S. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1994, the Treasur-y created Bank 
Secrecy Act Advisory Group. The Group consists of thirty individuals drawn from the financial 
community. The purpose of the Group is to strengthen the relationship between the 
Government and 
the industry in the area of money laundering prevention. This Group plays an important role in securing 
industry input into the anti-money launderma regulations. -1 ID 
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law-abiding private actors for the job. It is this particular aspect of privatisation that 
this Section is concerned with. "' 
This policing nature of the obligations created under money laundering 
regulations, which impose record-keeping and reporting requirements on financial 
institutions, was evident from the inception of this regulatory dimension. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Council of Europe's Recommendation No. R(80)10 
indicated that the current forms of criminality require banks' collaboration with the 
competent authorities. It then went on to say that: "To that effect it seems that 
particular obligations should be imposed on banks without, however, allowing them to Z) 
replace the police or be assigned functions involving the exercise of power or 
authority. ""' The policing nature is reflected in the concern expressed regarding the 
exercise of power or authority by the banks. 
5.1. no Are the Private Policemen? 
The list of professionals who possess such policing powers is detennined by the list of 
businesses and institutions that are subject to money laundering preventive 
regulations. "' This list is typically an evolving one. While such reporting and record- 
keeping requirements are normally associated with banks and financial institutions, 
the reality is that a growing list of businesses and service providers is addressed and 
103 For a discussion of the effectiveness of this private policing see Rusch, J., "Hue and Cry in the 
Counting-House: Some Observations on the Bank Secrecy Act" 87 Catholic University Law Review 
465 (1988); Byine, J., "The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting Requirments Really Assist the 
Governrrient? " 44 A labama Law Review 801(1993); Hughes, S., "Policing Money Laundering through 
Funds Transfers: A Critique of Regulation under the Bank Secrecy Act" 44 Alabaina Law Review 283 
(1992). 
104 Explanatory Memorandum to Comn-iittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Recommendation 
No. R(80)10 on Measures against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds f Criniinal Origin (adopted 27 
June 1980). 
105 The FATF Recommendation No. 8 provides that Recommendations 10-29, which pertain to money 
laundering preventive measures, "should apply not only to banks, but also to non-bank financial 
institutions. Even for those non-bank financial institutions which are not subject to a 
formal prudential 
supervisory regime in all countries[. ]" FATF, The Forty Recoiwiiei7datioiis ( 1996). 
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bound by these regulations. This includes and is not confined to: lawyers, "' 
accountants, 'O' travel agents, bureau de change, car dealers and real estate agents. 
Adding a new profession or business to the list is normally the result of expert 
evidence that this business is used by launderers for their money laundering activities. 
The FATF publishes on periodic basis a report on the developments in money 
laundering practices. These reports normally identify businesses and professions that 
need to be targeted by regulations and enlisted in the policing of money laundering, 
This decentralised collection of information is bound to prove problematic from a due 
process and privacy perspective. 
Extending the scope of the regulatory requirements to other categories of 
business takes little account of any other considerations apart from the use of the 
business for money laundering purposes. For example, Credit Unions in the United 
States have been included in the list of financial institutions to act as policemen of 
financial transactions regardless of their size and their level of expertise. A small 
credit union in Massachusetts was convicted for failure to file currency transactions 
reports (CTRs). This failure was largely due to the fact that its officers are unpaid 
volunteers who work part-time. This applies to most credit union officers, which 
renders their capacity to detect money laundering offences questionable. " 
The same approach to the question of extending the requirements could be 
observed with respect to the case of the Hawala system. There has been an ongoing 
concern about the use of the informal banking system for the purposes of money 
laundering such as the hawala system. This concern has become more acute after the 
September 11 events. The result of that was an FATF recommendation to extend the 
scope of regulations to informal banking systems. This means these informal 
organisations that are engaged in providing financial services will be expected to act 
106 Extending these obligations to the lawyers has been particularly problematic in view of the right to 
counsel that exists and client-lawyer confidentiality that is directly linked to this right. On the 
problematic implications of this extension see Abendano, K., "The Role of Lawyers in the Fight against 
Mone Laundering: Is a Reporting Requirement Appropriate", 27 Jow-nal o Legislation 463 (200 1). y 1Z ýf 
[arguing that such obligations are likely to undermine the confidentiality valued in the legal community 
and that any such measures would only be effective if they do not interfere with the lawyers' 
obligations towards their clients. ] 
107 Melnik, S., "The Inadequate Utilization of the Accounting Profession in the United States 
Government's Fight against Money Laundering", 4 New Yoi-k Universitý,, Jow-nal of Legislation and 
Public Policy 143 (2000-2001). [arguing for the importance of enlisting the accountants in the fight 
against money laundering. ] t) 1 
C1 ing 108 Huber, S., "Confidentiality of Bank Records, Money Laundering, and Transaction 
Reporti 
Requirements under the US Law", in Norton, J. and Auerback, R. (eds. ), International Finance in the 
1990s 380 (1993), at 382. 
212 
as policemen on behalf of the State and to perform certain reporting and record- 
keeping duties. It is the opinion of this author that the effectiveness of such extension 
is minimal. The legal paradigm for money laundering control and prevention has been 
based on taking advantage of the point of contact between criminals and the regulated 
legitimate system. In the case of the informal banking arrangements, this logic is 
absent. Enforcing the regulations on such organisations would be as strenuous as 
direct policing of criminals. 
In conclusion, it is arguable that other considerations apart from the use of a 
certain business for money laundering purposes should be taken into consideration in 
making the decision to extend the regulatory requirements to this business. The size 
and capacity of the business is one relevant factor. It is also a factor that is consistent 
with the policy of conducting cost-benefit-analysis as a pre-requisite for imposing 0 
regulatory requirements. It is also a factor that is consistent with the analysis of these 
regulatory requirements as a form of privatisation of the policing function. 
5.2. The Scope ofInformation Gathering"' 
Collecting information about the identity of the customer is the primary element of 
information gathering for the purpose of preventing money laundering. "' Financial 
institutions"' are required to identify their usual and occasional customers. To fulfil 
this requirement they should rely either on official documents or other reliable forms 
of identification. 112 
The identification gets more intricate in two cases. The first is when the 
customer is acting on behalf of another. In this case, financial institutions are required 
to take reasonable measures to establish the identity of the persons on whose behalf 
the transaction is taking place. "' The second is the case of legal entities. Financial 
'0' For a general discussion of the regulatory requirements in the United States and in the United 
Kingdon see Csoka, L., "Combatting Money Laundering: A Primer for Financial Services 
Professional", 20 Annital Review of Banking Law 311 (2001); Clark, N., "The Impact of Recent Money 
Laundering Legislation on Financial Intermediaries" 14 Dickinson folu-nal of International Law 467- 
(1996), at 467-492; Waldsley, J., "Money Laundering: Professionals as Policemen Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer" 275 (Jul/Aug 1994). 
'10 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Cttst=er Dite Diligencefor Banks (2001), at ý1; Joint 
Money Laundering Steering Group, Prevention of Money Laundering: Guidance Notes for the U. K. 
Financial Sector (December 200 1), T 4.1. 
In this context a "financial institution" has a broad meaning. It refers to any business that is subject 
to money laundering regulations. This is an open-ended category that is defined by the relevant laws 
and regulations. See sitpra 105and accompanying text. 
112 FATF, The Foqy Recoininendations (1996), Recommendation 10. 
113 FATF, The Fort. y Reconnnendations (1996), Recommendation 11. 
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institutions are required to confirm the legal existence of the entity and understand its 
structure. They must particularly make sure that the corporate vehicle is not used to 
shield a natural person who desires to act with anonymity. 114 
Verifying the identity of the customer is not a momentary process. The 
financial institution is required to monitor the account and update the identification 
periodically. It is also required to keep records of the identification for a period of five 
years after the end of the relationship. 
New concerns for corruption have resulted in new identification requirements. 
The Basel Committee has recommended that banks should be required to verify 
whether their customer holds an important public position. The identification role of 
the banks in this regard demands substantial pro-activity. In order to verify the 
political status of the customer, banks are expected to consult public sources of 
information in addition to the information provided by the customer. In the case 
where the customer holds a political position, banks are required to verify the source 
of the funds. "' 
In addition to retaining records of identification, financial institutions are also 
required to retain records on domestic and international transactions. The policing 
nature of this record-keeping requirement is obvious from the definition of the 
information to be recorded and the purpose of this record-keeping requirement. The 
FATF's Recommendation 11 provides that "such records must be sufficient to permit 
reconstruction of individual transactions so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for 
prosecution of criminal behaviour. " In other words, the financial institution is required 
to approach the transaction and the customer relationship with an investigative eye 
and to collect evidence that might be helpful in a future criminal proceeding. 
If a certain transaction seems unusual in that it is too large, too complex or 
does not have any obvious lawful commercial purpose, financial institutions should 
exercise more diligence. If the transaction was such that it raised suspicion that it 
stems from a criminal activity, financial institutions in many jurisdictions are now 
required to report this suspicion to the competent authorities and to act upon the 
authority's instructions subsequently. Suspicious transaction reporting now means 
more than just reacting to suspicion ansinc, from a particular transaction to actually C) 41D 
114 FATF, The Forýy Recomiwzdatioiis (1996), Reconunendations 10 & 11, and Inteipretative 'N otes: 
Basel Con-inuttee on Banking Supervision, Customer Due Diligeiicefor Baizks (2001), '111,33. 
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monitoring the customer's account in order to identify any irregularity in the account's 
movement that might raise suspicion and require reporting. 116 
The importance and sensitivity of the information gathered was poignantly 
expressed by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in California Bankers Assn. v. 
Shultz. His words are worth repeating here: "the banking transactions of an individual 
give a fairly accurate account of his religion, ideology, opinions, and interests [. ]"'" 
5.3. Due Process Considerations 
This massive and decentralised information gathering by financial institutions is 
bound to raise vexing due process concerns. Financial institutions are acting 
effectively as agents of the government in its policing function, yet they are exercising 
the powers of this agency free of the procedural requirements that bind State police 
and safeguard the rights of the subjects of this exercise. In California Bankers Assn. v. 
Shultz, "' these due process concerns were basis for a challenge of the constitutionality 
of the BSA. The Plaintiffs' main contention was that the Act and its implementing 
regulations violated their Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search 
and seizure. The court dismissed the challenge on the basis that "both the legislative 
history and the regulations make specific reference to the fact that access to the 
records is to be controlled by existing legal process. "' " 
In an insightful dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall highlighted the 
vulnerability of this procedural safeguard when he stated that: "This attempt to 
bifurcate the acquisition of information into two independent and unrelated steps is 
wholly unrealistic. As the Government itself conceded, 'banks have in the past 
voluntarily allowed law enforcement officials to inspect bank records without 
requiring issuance of a summons. ' The plain fact of the matter is that the Act's 
recordkeeping requirement feeds into a system of widespread informal access to bank 
records by Government agencies and law enforcement personnel. once recorded, 
[customer's] checks will be readily accessible without judicial process and without 
any showing of probable cause[J" 120 
"5 This category of customers is referred to as "politically exposed persons ('PEPs')", see Basel 
Comiriittee on Banking Supervision, Custoiner Due Diligencefor Banks (October 200 1), ýý41-44. 
116 Id., ýý53-54. 
117 39 L Ed 2d 812, at 854. 
'18 39 L Ed 2d 812. 
119 Id., at 835. 
120 Id., at 860-861. 
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This vulnerability was demonstrated in U. S. v. Deak-Perera. "' In this case, an 
Internal Revenue Agent gained access to Deak-Perera's, a non-bank financial 
institution, records under the pretext of inspecting the company's compliance with the 
BSA record-keeping and reporting requirements. The Agent exceeded the purpose of 
its inspection and conducted a fishing expedition collecting information of Deak- 
Perera's customers. On basis of this information, a tax investigation was initiated and 
a summons was sought requesting Deak-Perera to produce all the records pertaining 
to one of its customers. The Company challenged the summons arguing that the 
information on which it was based was improperly obtained. The Court considered the 
actions of the agent an abuse of process, 122 accepted Deak-Perera's argument and 
denied compliance with the summons. While the Court's ruling is commendable from 
a due process perspective, the case remains illustrative of the abuses that this private 
information gathering is susceptible to. Deak-Perera has acted in a responsible manner 
in protecting the legitimate interests of its customer. This is not however to be 
expected in all such instances. 121 
In the aftermath of September 11, the legal response was characterised by a 
more fluid flow of information amongst: financial institutions, regulators, the police 
and investigators, and intelligence agencies. Due process and privacy inhibitions to 
such unrestricted flow were marginalised. Part 3 of The United Kingdom Anti- 
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 concerning "Disclosure of Infori-nation, " for 
example, extends existing disclosure powers drastically. Art. 17(2) extends disclosure 
power, under a long list of existing laws included in Schedule 4 to the Act, to include 
disclosure requested for the purpose of criminal investigation, criminal proceedings 
and the broader purpose of facilitating a determination of whether any such 
investigation or proceeding is needed. These new disclosure powers are more 
extensive than they seem once one takes into consideration the blanket authorisation 
granted to the Treasury to extend the application of this Section to any disclosure 
provisions included in any subordinate legislation. 
12 ' 566 F. Supp. 1398 (1983). 
122 Id., 1402. 
123 For a discussion of the constitutionality issues arising out of the BSA see Eldridge, J., "The Bank 
Secrecy Act: Privacy, Comity and the Politics of Contraband" 11 North Carolbia Jourlial of 
Intei-iiational Law wid Cotiwiercial Regulatioii 667 (1986), at 675-696. For other cases addressing the 
due process concerns see U. S. v. Gimbel 632 F. Supp. 713 (1984); ]U. S. v. Varbel 780 F, 2d 758 
(1986). 
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Similarly the USA PATRIOT ACT"' relaxes the rules regarding access to 
information gathered by financial institutions and enforcement agencies. The Act 
permits financial institutions to share infon-nation pertinent to money laundering risks 
amongst themselves and with enforcement agencies. The Act further relaxes the rules 
regarding the Secretary of the Treasury's power to disclose information reported by 
financial institutions to other Government agencies. One of the most important 
developments in this regard under the Act is the inclusion of intelligence agencies 
amongst the Government agencies to whom disclosure of reported information maybe 
made. This development was of high priority in the minds of the drafters that it was 
included in an explicit amendment of the purpose of the BSA. The Purpose now 
reads: "It is the purpose if this subchapter to require certain reports or records where 
they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations or 
proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence activities, including analysis, to protect 
against international terrorism. " [Emphasis added] 
This exercise of policing functions under money laundering regulations 
involves a substantial exercise of profiling that is not governed by the clear-cut rules 
and procedures that govern State police in the exercise of their functions. The cost of 
this exercise to individuals and corporations could be onerous. Under the current 
economic conditions, access to financial services is a necessity for individuals and 
corporations to conduct their affairs. Financial institutions attempting to shield 
themselves against liability are likely to deny their services to certain individuals 
whose profiles fit the typical image of a drug dealer or a terrorist. Such exclusion 
could be based on minimal suspicion and would not necessarily be justified in reality. 
The costs of these outcomes to the freedom of association, the values of non- 
discrimination and equal opportunity deserve serious consideration. 
In sumý Money laundering regulations create a broad and expanding I 
contingency of professionals deputised by the government as private policemen. This 
stands in clear contrast with the "Surely not" response given by Bankes LJ in Toumier 
v. National Provincial 125 to the question of whether the banker is permitted to disclose 
infori-nation to an enquiring police officer about a customer who is charged with 
fraud. While the shift away from this view towards a closer public private partnership 
124 PL 107-56 (October 26,2001). 
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between financial institutions and the police is justified, in view of the massive shift in 
informational and economic power that took place in the latter part of the 20th century, 
some safeguards remain necessary. This decentralised exercise of policing functions 
poses serious threats to the values of due process, privacy and freedom of association. 
Such values are cornerstones of the legitimacy of the evolving legal order that merit 
procedural safeguards to secure their preservation. 
6. Conclusion 
In the second Chapter, it has been argued that privatisation of the economic activity 
was instrumental to the globalisation process. In terms of the two aspects of 
globalisation: the geographic and the political, privatisation as an instrument 
contributed mostly to the second. The phenomenal transfer of ownership and/or 
control that characterised major privatisation programmes has resulted in a shift in the 
balance of power in favour of private actors. When this shift was accompanied by a 
suitable infrastructure protecting competition, decentralisation of power also occurred. 
In a way privatisation bred further privatisation. When confronted by the 
governance crisis that resulted from globalisation in general, the State especially in 
developed countries often resorted to divesting of its law and order functions in favour 
of private actors. This was sometimes done as a solution to the fiscal weakness of the 
State in relation to the cost of economic regulation, enforcement and dispute 
resolution. This cost is becoming particularly high as a result of the decentralisation of 
the economic activity, such as in the utility market, or as a result of the sophistication 
of the economic activity, such as in the context of environmental regulation of 
industrial activities. In other occasions, such as in the context of the Internet 
regulation, resort to private order was done to resolve the mismatch between the 
geographic scope of the activity and the jurisdictional territoriality of the State. 
These capacity and jurisdictional difficulties have resulted in privatisation 
trends since the 1970s in all of the three lecral functions of the State: adjudication, It) 
lawmaking and enforcement. Privatisation of each of these functions has taken many 
forms and raised substantial concerns. The concern often centred on the degree to 
which these forms of private legal order respect basic democratic values, respect the 
rights of the individual and secure justice. The common view, 
however, is that private 
125 pq, ý4] I K. B. 461, at 474. 
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order is here to stay and that safeguards should be introduced and sometimes specially 
designed to incorporate within it the desired values. 
Privatisation of law and order and the concerns that it raises are manifest in 
Money laundering law, which can be viewed as a privatisation instrument. Since its 
inception, the primary goal of money laundering law has been to tap the infon-nation 
sources of financial institutions for the purposes of policing. Over the years, this has 
translated into an ever-growing list of reporting and record-keeping requirements. 
Again, this decentrallsed collection of information should be guarded by procedural 
safeguards. 
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1. Introduction 
Suprantionalisation is the second modality of non-state governance. Creating a global 
agency to govern global issues seems to be an obvious response to the governance 
problematic. If the State is not big enough to govern a social activity that is assuming 
a global dimension, then one option is to create an agency that is big enough. Such a 
solution, regardless of its practicality or lack thereof, encounters a hard doctrinal 
obstacle, namely the doctrine of State sovereignty. Despite this deeply ingrained 
principle of the international legal order, some supranational trends could still be 
discerned in the governance of global issues. 
This Chapter deals with this mechanism of governance in a number of 
sections. An understanding of the mechanism is not possible without a brief expose of 
the doctrine of State sovereignty and its legal implications for the sources of the law 
and for the law of international organisations. Following this expose, a number of 
supranational trends will be examined including the collective security system as a 
model of supranational enforcement and supranational adjudication as exemplified by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the International Criminal Court. The final 
Section deals with supranational trends in controlling and preventing money 
laundering. 
I 
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supranational trends will be examined including the collective security system as a 
model of supranational enforcement and supranational adjudication as exemplified by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the International Criminal Court. The final 
Section deals with supranational trends in controlling and preventing money 
laundering. 
2. Sovereignty and its Legal Implications 
Sovereignty is about power and authority and their spheres and holders. It emerged 
out of the Middle Ages, initially to define the hierarchy of authority in the feudal 
society' and subsequently to define the authority of the strong national kings vis-a-vis 
the Emperor and the Pope on one hand and vis-a-vis each other on another. 2 Over its 
long history, the notion of sovereignty disintegrated into many different ideas without 
losing its currency. This state of affairs have led a leading international jurist to report 
that "writers on the law of nations often sigh: if only this word had never been 
invented and if only it could be torn out root and branch from the traditional juristic 
terminology. 0 
Theorists attempting to clarify the concept spoke of different meanings and 
different usage of the term sovereignty. Their distinctions in this regard again varied. 
Commentators commonly distinguish between internal and external sovereignty 
depending on the sphere within which sovereignty is asserted. One jurist, however, 
creates a three-pronged distinction between inward, outward and upward aspects. 
While the inward and outward sovereignty correspond to the internal and external 
spheres, the upward aspect refers to the question of whether a sovereign could be 
bound by any rules. 4A leading international relations expert on the subject offers 
another taxonomy distinguishing between domestic sovereignty, interdependence 
sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty. 
5 Other 
distinctions between absolute and relative sovereignty 6 and positive and negative 
1 At this stage the concept was a relative one denoted by the Latin adjective superioritas meaning 
superior rather than supreme. This superlative version was only to enter the usage at a later stage. 
VerzIjl, J., h7teriiatioiml Laýv hi Historical Perspective Vol. 1 (1968), at 257. 
2 Id., at 257-258. 3 Id., 256. 
4 Id., at 259 et seq. 
Krasner, S., Sovereignty- OrgaWzed Hypocrisy (1999), at 9 et seq. 
6 This is a classic distinction both in constitutional theory and in international 
law theory. On the latter 
see Seidl-Hohenveldem, I., hiteriiatioi7al Ecoiwi7fic Laiv (3 
rd ed., 1999), at 19-20. 
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sovereignty have also been circulated. 7 While some of these distinctions are different 
names of similar notions, others are actually distinct shades of the notion of 
sovereignty. 
It is not the purpose of this discussion to go through all these various 
classifications. It is merely to show the heterogeneity of the concept and the care 
required in tackling it. In the present discussion, the author adopts the common 
distinction between internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to 
the authority and control exercised within the State and external sovereignty refers to 
the tributes of independence vis-a-vis other actors in the international sphere. In the 
following few pages the meaning of both these aspects is expounded. The legal 
implications of the doctrine of external sovereignty with regard to the sources of 
international law and its institutions is also discussed. 
2.1 Internal Sovereignty 
This notion pertains to supreme power and authority within the State. It is a question 
of constitutional theory that has been the subject of continuous debate. The earliest 
systematic analysis of this question has been presented by Jean Bodin in his Six Livre 
de la Republique (1577). Writing at a time of severe political unrest that threatened 
the very existence of the State, he defined sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual 
power of the Commonwealth" In elaborating his theory, he advocated the sovereignty 
of the ruler and indivisibility of sovereignty. A conception that was later on to provide 
the philosophic foundation for absolutism. In as much as Bodin's theory is concerned 
with the allocation of power within the State, it is not relevant to our present 
discussion. One query is however relevant and that is the question of what are the true 
marks, i. e. rights or prerogatives of the sovereign which distinguish him from any 
other loci of authority? This query was the starting point of Bodin's analysis, which 
sought to distinguish the sovereign from the senior administrative officials of the 
State. Its relevance to the present discussion is that it provides a classic account of the 
tributes most intrinsic to the concept of sovereignty as guidance for the subsequent 
discussion of supranationalisation. 
7 Jackson, R., Quasi-States: Sovereigim), Interiiational Relatioiis m7d the Third World (1990), at 26 et 
I 
seq. 
8 Franklin, H., (ed. & trans. ), Bodiii oii Sovereipity: Four Chaptersfi-07; j the Six Books of the 
Commoinvealth, (1992), at 1. 
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On this question, Bodin wrote "I find that supremacy in a commonwealth 
consists of five parts. The first and most important is appointing the magistrates and 
assigning each one's duties; another is ordaining and repealing laws; a third is 
declaring and terminating war; a fourth is the right of hearing appeals from all 
magistrates in last resort; and the last is the power of life and death where the law 
itself has made no provision for flexibility or clemency. "9 In Bodin's analysis the 
power of making laws is the primary mark of sovereignty. In his view "making and D 
repealing law includes all the other rights and prerogatives, so that strictly speaking 
we can say that there is only one prerogative of sovereignty, inasmuch as all the other 
rights are comprehended in it". ' 0 
Almost a century later, writing in the very similar context of the English Civil 
War, Hobbes published his Leviathan substantially subscribing to Bodin's conclusions 
on sovereignty. The main difference worth noting is that while Bodin vested the 
sovereignty in the ruler, Hobbes invented the concept of the State as a person vested 
with the sovereign power that is exercised by the monarch or by an assembly of men 
depending on the form of govenunent. 11 With respect to the marks of sovereignty, 12 a 
term used by Hobbes and reveals Bodin's influence, Hobbes reproduces a very similar 
list to that of Bodin's as cited above. ' 3 Further, Hobbes subscribes explicitly to the 
indivisibility of sovereignty. 14 
One obvious fact regarding the evolution of the concept of internal sovereignty 
and one that is worth stating is that it is a notion that has been context- contingent. 
Thinkers who formulated the concept in the context of political disturbances such as 
Bodin and Hobbes tended towards a sovereignty that is absolute, indivisible and 
vested in a specific locus. Changes in the political context in a way that consolidated 
the power of the State have led later thinkers to argue for the divisibility of 
sovereignty as a way of creating a check on State power. Such thinkers include Locke, 
Mill and Marx. This evolutionary and context-specific nature of the concept is 
captured in the words of Laski, an English political thinker of socialist persuasion 
who developed his thought in the context of the totalitarian States of 
Germany and 
9 Bodin, J., Methodfor the Easýv Comprehension of History, trans. by Beatrice Reynolds (1945), cited 
in Franklin, H., (ed. & trans. ), id., at xvi. 
'0 Id., at 5 8. 
'' Tuck, R., (ed. ), Hobbes: Leviathan, (1996), at 120-121. 
12 Id., at 127. 
13 Id., at 125-128. 
14 Id., at 127. 
223 
Italy. He concluded his argument for a pluralist concept of the State and of 
sovereignty by stating "I imagine the absolute Hobbes, who has seen internal 
dissention tear a great kingdom in pieces, hold up hands of horror at such division of 
power. Maybe I who write in a time when the State enjoys its beatification can 
sympathise but too little with that prince of monistic thinkers. , 15 It is this teleological 
nature of sovereignty that one needs to bear in mind in arguing for it or against it. 
2.2. External Sovereignty 
Sovereignty in the external dimension is the organising principle of the international 
legal order. It dates back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. According to this Treaty 
the European World was to be organised into territorial entities that enjoy autonomy 
from the Emperor and the Pope. These territorial units were to exercise authority 
within their territories and possess the capacity to conduct foreign relations. Although 4: ) 
the Treaty of Westphalia has introduced this territorial organisation of the community 
of kingdoms, it was not until a decade later that the principle of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of other States was explicitly formulated. 
While internal sovereignty means that within each State lies the authority to 
organise its internal affairs, external sovereignty adds another limb to this definition 
providing that such authority will be exercised to the exclusion of any external power. 
It is arguable that his rule of non-intervention is the core element of the doctrine of 
non-intervention. The principle of non-intervention was first advocated by two 
leading international jurists, Wolff and Vattel, during the second half of the 18 th 
century. The principle did not however become positive international law until 1933 
when it was stipulated in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 
Article 8 of the Convention reads: "No State has the right to intervene in the internal 
or external affairs of another. " 16 
The principle of non-intervention also applies to international organisations, 
which are typically required by their charters to refrain from any intervention in the 
internal affairs of their members. Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, stipulates 
it as a governing principle of the organisation that "Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
15 Laski, H., Studies in the Pi-oblein of Sovereigivy (1917), at 25. 
[6 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Signed at -'Vlontevideo on 26. December 
1933. 
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essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state". 
The doctrine of external sovereignty has posed a particular problem for 
international law scholarship. The question that arose was one of reconciling the 
concept of binding international legal norms with the external sovereignty of States. 
The question is in some way equivalent to the constitutional problem of absolutism in 
the international context. In this context scholars are again asking whether sovereignty 
is absolute or relative. Legal opinion was divided between three schools of thought: 
(1) those who argued that the State can voluntarily bind itself by contracting with 
other States, once such a will has been executed the merging wills of States create a 
lasting bond that States cannot dissolve; (2) others argued that the State can 
voluntarily bind itself for as long as it wishes to remain bound; (3) a third school and 
an extreme one argued that the State cannot possibly be bound and that such concept 
is antithetical to its sovereign character. " 
International lawyers dismissed the extreme theory, which has the effect of 
essentially denying the existence of an international legal order. Verzijl argued that 
"'sovereignty' can only be maintained as an acceptable legal concept if it is used in the 
connotation of freedom for the nations to lead their national existence as they think fit, 
in complete mutual independence, but within the limitations of international law, 
irrespective of whether such limitations flow directly from its own commands or from 
competent international organs freely created in common. "" While this definition 
qualifies sovereignty by explicitly subjugating the State to the norms of international 
law, it remains explicit on the voluntary character of these norms. This leads to the 
next point regarding what external sovereignty really means in terms of the sources of 
international law and its institutions. 
4.3. The Legal Implications of Sovereignty 
The principle of external sovereignty as the basic organising principle of international 
law begets an extensive number of legal principles across the various areas of the 
international legal order. This Section is not a comprehensive analysis of all such 
derivative principles. Instead, this Section focuses on the implications of external 
sovereignty for the sources of international law and for the 
law of international 
organisations. 
17 Verzijl, J,, SIIP7-a note 1, at 258. 
18 Id., at 259. 
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The basic principle here is voluntariness. International law does not recognise 
any supreme authority over the Community of States. Accordingly, States are only 
bound by the rules that they make and consent to abide by. Treaties are agreements 
that are only binding on their parties. Whatever rules they make would legally only 
bind those States that accept them. Some have recently argued that similar rules that 
appear in numerous treaties or rules that are included in a widely adopted multilateral 
treaty are declaratory of customary international law and hence binding on non- C) 
parties. 19 Accepting such an argument would introduce a degree of "majoritarianism" 
in international law that would cut against the consensual character of its sources. 20 
This argument, however, has not been widely accepted and the opinion remains 
divided to the exclusion of this concept from the scope of positive international law .21 
The persistence of the consensual nature of the sources of interriational law is also 
reflected in the debate over the legal value of the UN General Assembly Resolutions. 
Despite all the attempts of the developing countries to secure a binding force for these 
resolutions and in spite of all the doctrinal creativity of legal scholars, the rule remains 
that UN General Assembly Resolutions may only create "non-binding norms. " 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties places great emphasis on 
consent as a core principle of treaty-making. 22 In its "Preamble, " the Convention 
confinns the commitment to the principles of international law concerning sovereign 
equality and independence of all States and non-interference in domestic affairs of 
States. Article 34 provides that "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third State without its consent. " Consent is further guarded by the Convention by 
Articles 49 through 52, which invalidate any consent obtained by fraud, corruption 
and coercion whether of the State or of its representative. 
The voluntariness of the sources of international law is also reflected in the 
fact that it is almost a standard provision of international treaties to grant the parties 
the right to withdraw from the treaty subject to certain procedures. This practice is 
more consistent with the position of the second school of thought on the relationship 
between international law and sovereignty, which provides that the State can bind 
19 D'Amato, A., The Concept of Custoin in International Law (1971), at 139. 
20 Scott, G., Carr, C., "Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary International Law", 25 
Denvei- Join-nal of International Law and Polic ,v 
71 (1996). 
21 Seidl-Hohenveldem, I., SUP7-a note 6, at 30 et seq. The author finds evidence of the inconclusive 
C, 11 investment 
protection treaties. nature of this argument in the context of bilateral 
22 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna on 23. Nlaý, 1969 
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applicable to international organisations. 24 Membership, therefore, cannot be obtained 
by coercion. Further, the constituent treaties of international organisations typically 
pen-nit unilateral withdrawal subject to certain procedures and, in some cases, to the 
fulfilment of obligations already incurred. " 
This brief expose of the doctrine of sovereignty and its legal implications 
reveals that the structure of the international order remains a "horizontal" one. It is 
comprised of States that interact on basis of juridical equality and do not accept a 
supreme authority. The growing interdependence following the Second World War 
has led scholars and policy makers to urge for more derogation from and limitations 
on the principle of sovereignty in favour of more effective international legal order. 
Such derogation has also been observed as taking place and led some scholars to 
speak of the end of the nation State and the twilight of sovereignty. Others have 
however argued that external sovereignty is a form of "organized hypocrisy" in that it 
remains as a norm but it is often violated whenever such violation is more conducive 
to the promotion of national interests. 26 It is the argument in this thesis that change did 
occur. While sovereignty has always been sporadically violated and ceded in the 
pursuit of national interests, the second half of the 20th century has seen more 
institutionalised forms of such cession and sometimes violation. So it is the 
institutionalisation of the derogation from the sovereignty that is novel. This 
institutionalisation has led to the emergence of supranational trends in global 
governance. It is to this modality of global governance that the discussion now turns. 
3. Supranationalisation as a Solution 
1. Introduction 
Supranationalism is a term loosely used. It has not developed into a specific legal 
doctrine. Its history goes back to the 1950s and specifically to the fon-nation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community. The treaty instituting this Community is 
probably the first international legal instrument to use "supranational" as a legal 
ten-n . 
2' Despite the diversity of usage, a minimum common denominator could be 
established. Whenever the term is used it denotes an institutionalised exercise of 
24 Id., art. 5 
25 On withdrawal from international organisations, see Amerasinghe, C., P7411ciples of fnstitutio7ial Law 0- 
of International Oi-ganiz-ations. (1996), at 117 et seq. 
26 Krasner, S., supi-a note 5. 
27 '185 arrt. (9) Paras. 5&6. Verzijl, J., supra note 1, at - 
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European Coal and Steel Community. The treaty instituting this Community is 
probably the first international legal instrument to use "supranational" as a legal 
term. 27 Despite the diversity of usage, a minimum common denominator could be 
established. Whenever the term is used it denotes an institutionallsed exercise of 
power or authority over the State not by another State but by an international 
organisation or organ. The powers typically exercised are either judicial or 
prescriptive. That is to say that the supranational character has been attached to 
international organisations or organs that are either adjudicating disputes between 
States or prescribing rules of conduct to be followed by States. 
One international scholar analysing the term "supranational" has identified a 
number of traits that would give a certain organ a supranational character. This 
taxonomy included, amongst others, the following practices : 28 
(1) an international organ or the organisation is empowered to make decisions binding 
on its Member States by majority voting; 
(2) a non-representative international organ of an organisation is empowered to make 
decisions binding on all the members of the organisation including those that are 
not represented in the organ; and 
(3) an international organ or organisation composed of individuals acting 
independently from their governments is empowered to make binding decisions 
on its member governments. 
The common feature of these various practices as indicative of a supranational 
character is that they all depart from the principle of voluntariness and consent that 
govern the sources of international law and underlie the operations of international 
organisations. 29 In that sense supmataionalism is a departure from the doctrine of 
external sovereignty towards establishing structures of superior authorities in the 
international system. Sometimes this session of sovereignty is voluntary but at other 
occasions it is coercive or at least not based on genuine consent. 
The clearest examples of supranational structures of governance are the 
organisations of regional integration. In tenns of the depth of integration and hence 
the degree of supranationalism, the European Union is readily the most advanced of 
27 arrt. (9) Paras. 5&6, Verzijl, J., supra note 1, at 285. 
28 Id., at 287 et seq. 
29 See id., at 286. 
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these integration arrangements. Successful regional integration requires strong 
institutions to enforce it. Exaggerated commitment to national sovereignty is bound to 
be detrimental to regional integration and in the extreme case might lead to its failure. 
The success of the European integration is a factor of the willingness of its members 
to accept the authority of its institutions. This acceptance is reflected in the evolution 
of the doctrines of "direct effect" and supremacy of Community Law as well as the 
exclusivity of the Community's jurisdiction. Another feature of the European 
integration is the highly evolved system of judicial review that guarantees the 
compliance of the members with the Community law as well as the uniformity of its 
application. The supranational character of the Union is also found in the possibility 
for majority voting in the Council and the increasing powers of the Commission. 
Regional integration, while proliferating in this era of globalisation, is not 
primarily implemented as a response to the governance problematic posed by 
globalisation. It is implemented more in order to achieve certain economic and 
political benefits. It is for this reason that discussion of regional integration 
arrangements is beyond the scope of this study. The discussion in this Section is 
confined to supranational trends in the global order that specifically aim at governing 
activities stretching across national borders. 
The discussion is organised along the same lines as the three core powers of 
the State, i. e., the prescriptive power, the enforcement power and the judicial power. 
While discussion of supranational enforcement and adjudication is addressed in this 
general overview, dealing with supranational lawmaking is deferred to the specific 
case of money laundering law. This case provides sufficient illustration of 
supranational trends in lawmaking. In the following two subsections, the discussion 
will focus on the emergence of supranational agencies performing judicial and 
enforcement functions. The first Section focuses on the collective security system and 
the UN Security Council as its main institution. This system serves as an example of a 
supranational enforcement function. The following Section focuses on supranational 
judicial organs focusing primarily on the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the 
International Criminal Court. 
3.2. The Collective Security System. - A Case of Supranational Enforcement 
After two world wars with devastating worldwide effect, the lesson was obvious. War ID 
is a global problem and secuntY is a global concern. In this particular case, the 
29 
response was squarely supranational. The United Nations was established and at the 
core of its mission was "to maintain international peace and security" 30. In order to 
achieve this end, the Charter created a collective security system with the UN Security 
Council at its heart. Description of this system is due. 
According to article 24 of the Charter, primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security was conferred on the Security Council. The 
purpose of this arrangement, as stated in the article, was to secure the promptness and 
effectiveness of any action taken by the UN. This was further guaranteed by giving 
31 the decisions of the Security Council a force binding on all the members of the UN . 
The collective security system is essentially a dispute settlement system. It is however 
a comprehensive one involving determination of the issues and enforcement of the 
decisions. Like any other dispute settlement mechanism, the determination of the 
issues often involves creation of rules of conduct. This is particularly so in the context 
of the UN system in view of the typical vagueness of the rules of international law, 
which is bound to give the adjudicative process a strong norm-setting component. 
This is not to suggest that the Security Council is a judicial body. It is an executive 
body that exercises a dispute settlement function, which is bound to have an 
adjudicative component as will be illustrated shortly. 
The rules governing the collective security system are included in Chapter VII 
of the Charter. The competence of the Security Council is confined to "any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". Accordingly, the first step in the 
operation of the system is to determine whether one of these conditions or situations 
actual exists. The Security Council retains full discretion in determining whether a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or aggression has occurred. It exercises this 
discretion according to the circumstances of each case and their gravity. The category 
of "threat to the peace" has proved to be the broadest. It is also the category that has 
been most utilised since the end of the Cold War to expand the enforcement 
jurisdiction of the Security Counc1l. 32 
Once it has been detennined that one of the three conditions obtains, the 
Security Council has a choice between employing measures that do not involve the 
use of force according to article 41 of the Charter or taking measures involving the t) 111) 1 Z, -) 
30 Charter of the United Nations, art. 1( 1). 
31 Charter of the United Nations, art. 25. 
32 Malcolm Shaw', biteriiatioiial Law (1997), at 855-858. 
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use of force to the extent necessary to restore the peace and security according to 
article 42. Article 41 measures may include suspending economic relations either 
totally or partially, interrupting means of transportation and communication, and 
severing diplomatic ties. The most extensive use of article 41 measures was carried 
out against Iraq in response to its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.33 
Should the measures available under article 41 prove inadequate or are 
deemed by the Security Council to be inadequate, the Security Council may resort to 
article 42 of the Charter. Under this article, the Security Council has the power to 
employ force including any action by air, sea or land. Any action taken should be 
confined to what is necessary to "maintain or restore international peace and security". 
This determination is however again within the discretion of the Security Council. As 
originally envisioned by the Charter in articles 43 and 45, such use of force was 
supposed to be carried out by using armed forces committed by Member States to the 
enforcement actions of the Security Council according to agreements signed between 
the Security Council and all the Members. These agreements, however, never 
materialised. In the absence of articles 43 and 45 arrangements, the Security Council 
carried out its enforcement actions by delegation. 34 The enforcement function was 
therefore carried out by one of the State Members or by a multinational force under 
the leadership of one of the Members or even by a regional organisation such as 
NATO acting under the authorisation and the flag of the UN. 
The supranational character of the collective security system as operated by 
the UN Security Council is evident in two respects: (1) its composition; and (2) its 
voting procedure. The Security Council consists of fifteen out of the 160 members of 
the United Nations. Five of these are permanent members including the Republic of 
China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The other members are elected by the General Assembly subject to certain criteria. 
35 
The decisions of the Security Council pertaining to the application of Chapter VII, as 
well as any other non-procedural matter, are made by a majority of nine members 
including the permanent members. Accordingly, the Security Council manifests two 
33 Id., at 860-861. 
34 On this point generally see Chesterman, S., "Passing the 
Baton: The Delegation Of Security Council 
Enforcement Powers from Kuwait to Kosovo", in Yee, S., and Tieya, W., Interliational 
Law in the 
Post-Cold Wai- World. - Essays in Nfe7noii- of Li Haopei 148 (2001). 
35 Charter of the United Nations, art. 23 (1) 
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of the conclusive features of a supranational agency described in the introduction to 
this Section. 
During the course of its operations and especially since the end of the Cold 
War, the Security Council has expanded its operations thus increasingly impinging on 
the internal affairs of States. In performing its international security function, the 
Security Council extended its intervention to what would have qualified as a strictly 
internal affair. 36 It diversified its measures to include creating ad hoc tribunals to 
prosecute alleged war criminals, 37 determining border disputes and enforcing its 
determination, 38 and establishing compensation commissions . 
39 By expanding the 
concept of "threat to the peace" to include "widespread violations of humanitarian 
law, " 40 the Security Council expanded its enforcement powers considerably to include 
internal disputes and blurred the distinction between guaranteeing peace and security 
and humanitarian intervention. 
This extensive exercise of power by the Security Council has been critiqued in 
terms of its legitimacy. One commentator observing the extent to which the Security 
Council has extended its jurisdiction asked whether "the practice of the Security 
Council permit the conclusion that it has exercised its exceptional enforcement 
powers legitimately and fairly? jj4 1 He then concluded that at the level of perception, 
the diplomatic language of the Security Council resolutions is often vague and it fails 
to express the legal foundations for the Council's resolutions. This gives the 
perception of illegitimacy and creates the impression of unprincipled exercise of 
power. 42 This problem of perception has been further exacerbated by the Council's 
tendency towards informality and the conduct of its affairs in "informal sessions off 
the official record. If43 
The extensive exercise of power by the Security Council after the end of the 
Cold War is particularly alarming in the absence of a form of "check-and-balance" 
mechanism that holds the Council to account. Judge Shahabuddeen, 
in his Separate 
36 See Security Council Resolution No. 794 (1992). 
37 Security Council Resolution No. 808 (1993) establishing The International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. 
38 Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). 
39 Id., para. 16. 
40 Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) Nvith regard to former Yugoslavia. 
4' Franck, T., Fairness i7i Inter7iatio77al Laiv aizd histitittioiis (1995), at 22 1. 
42 Id., at 230. 
43 id. 
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Opinion in the Lockerbie Case before the ICJ, raised the question: "Are there any 
limits to the Council's powers of appreciation? In the equilibrium of forces 
underpinning the structure of the United Nations within the evolving international 
order, is there any conceivable point beyond which a legal issue may properly anse as 
to the competence of the Security Council to produce such overriding results? If there 
are any limits, what are those limits and what body, if other than the Security Council, 
is competent to say what those limits are? j, 44 
In conclusion, the fact that the Security Council in its majontanan manner 
implements these highly exceptional enforcement measures that clearly undermine the 
principle of non-intervention testifies to its character as the supranational organ par 
excellence. The extensiveness of the Security Council's power and its methods of 
implementing them have been criticised. The critique centres primarily on the 
accountability of the Council, the legitimacy of its exercise of powers, the consistency 
of this exercise and the Council's respect of the contours of its jurisdiction as defined 
by the Charter. The trend in the Security Council towards informality, accompanying 
the increase in its exercise of enforcement power under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
make legitimacy concerns more acute. 
3.3. Supranational Adjudication: The WTO and the ICC 
Establishing a rule-based mechanism for the resolution of disputes by independent 
and impartial arbiters, whose decisions are binding on the parties, marks the 
beginning of an advanced stage of organisation. in any community. Allocating the 
settlement of international disputes to such machinery has been repeatedly attempted 
over the past two decades. The modem history of such attempts is said to begin with 
the Jay Treaty 1794 45 between the United States and Great Britain. 46 The Treaty 
delegated the settlement of various legal disputes to mixed commissions acting as 
arbitrators . 
47 Not unlike the history of adjudication in the domestic context, 
international adjudication has thus emerged out of the practice of arbitration. During 
the I 91h century and the beginnings of the 2 Oth century, arbitration has evolved away 
" Question of Inteipretation and Application of the 19'171 Montreal Conveiition a7lSingftoin theAerial 
Incidew at Lockerbie (Libya Arab Janiahiriva v. UWted Kingdoin), P'-Ovisioiial 
Measures, Order of 
April. 14,1992, ICJReports 1992,32. 
45 1794 Treaty of An-iity Commerce and Navigation 
46 
Brownlie, I., Principles of Public lizter7iational Law (5 
th 
ed., 1998) at 704. 
47 id. 
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ftorn its informal origin of settling disputes according to principles of justice and 
equity, into a juridical process where disputes are settled in accordance with the law. 48 
The question of adjudication in the international sphere is not distinct from the 
question o collective security discussed in the previous Section. In fact, both 
concepts are geared towards eliminating the prospect of war and achieving world 
security. The first attempt at creating a permanent international judicial organ took 
place after the First World War. The Permanent Court of International Justice started 
its operation in 1922. After the Second World War, the International Court of Justice 
was established as a substitute for the Permanent Court. Considering that the Charter 
of the United Nations outlaws the use of force as a method of resolving disputes by 
individual States, the creation of a judicial organ becomes a neceSSity. 49 The 
persistence of the considerations of sovereignty, however, has limited the role of the 
International Court of Justice. 
The attempt at granting an international court a compulsory jurisdiction has 
failed both in the creation of the Pen-nanent Court of International Justice and the 
creation of International Court of Justice. The claims of sovereignty have prevailed 
over the need for collective organisation. As a result, the competence of the court 
remained entirely dependent on the consent of the parties . 
50 While membership of the 
Court is automatic upon membership of the United Nations, 51 this does not mean that 
the Court possesses automatic jurisdiction over disputes between its Members. Each 
country retains the power to refer a dispute to the Court or to forestall such referral. 
As a compromise, Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court provides that the States 
Parties may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in certain legal disputes. This has been 
referred to as the "Optional Clause". The idea behind it was that as the States' optional 
declarations proliferate, a situation akin to that of de facto compulsory jurisdiction 
will prevail. The reality however did not confirm this anticipation and the ipso facto 
jurisdiction of the Court remained limited. The result in terms of the context of this 
discussion is that the International Court of Justice remains a traditional international 
48 Id., at 704-707. 
49 The Char-ter of the United Nations, arts. 2(3) & 2(4). 
50 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36. 
5' Charter of the United Nations, art. 93(l). 
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court rather than a supranational one. Its jurisdiction is strictly contingent on the 
consent of States. 
Some commentators describe adjudication as supranational only if the court 
possesses competence to try cases involving private parties litigating against the 
State. 52 Examples include the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). This definition is however too restrictive for the 
purposes of this discussion. In the present context, supranational adjudication denotes 
any judicial body that has ipso facto competence to decide disputes involving States. 
The supranational trend thus manifests in the departure from the principle of consent 
as the basis for judicial dispute settlement. The depth of the trend is thus detennined 
by the degree of departure from the consensual character of the arrangement. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement System represents such a supranational 
arrangement. Under this system, any dispute arising under any of the Multilateral or 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements is to be resolved in accordance with the Dispute 
Settlement Procedures provided for under the relevant agreement specifically, and 
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding more generally. 53 The WTO Dispute 
Settlement System departs from the principle of consent in a number of respects: (1) 
Adherence to the Dispute Settlement Procedure is part and parcel of the membership 
of the WTO. State Parties do not possess the traditional prerogative to exclude the 
application of the dispute settlement mechanism, or any other provision for that 
matter, by making reservations. 54 (2) The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) possesses 
compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction not contingent on ad hoc approval by the 
parties. (3) Any complaining government has the right to the formation of a panel 
upon its request. 55 This is a corollary of the compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction of the 
DSB. (4) Any Panel Report or Appellate Body Report is automatically adopted by the 
DSB unless it is blocked by consensus. 56 This means that it is virtually impossible to 
block a report as long as the winning party participates in the vote. 
52 Helfer, L., and Slaughter, A. , 
"Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication", 107 Yale 
Law Journal 273 (1997), at 277. 
53 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (1994), in WTO, The 
Legal Texts: The Restilts of the Urtigtaq Rotaid of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1999), at 354. 
54 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994), art. 11 (2), in WTO, id., at 3. ltý 55 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govern-ing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 6(l), in WTO, 
supra note 53. 
56 Id., art. 16(4). 
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Another example of supranational adjudication is the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.57 This development has been celebrated 
by world federalists as a step towards their ultimate goal of a world federal 
government. The ICC is a supranational court in the strict sense referred to above. Its 
jurisdiction concerns the prosecution of individuals for the commission of certain acts 
that are criminal under international law. 58 The Court as a supranational judicial body 
seeks to protect what are perceived as universal values. It is also another instrument in 
the protection of world peace and security. The Preamble recognises "that such grave 
crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world". In fact, the Statute of 
the Court establishes the ICC as part of the machinery of the Collective Security 
System. Article 13(b) of the Statute permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction upon 
referral of a case by the Security Council operating under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. 
The Statute of the ICC makes concession to the demands of State sovereignty 
by repeatedly confirming that the ICC "shall be complimentary to national criminal 
jurisdictions. 09 The corollary of this principle is that a case shall be inadmissible 
before the Court if it is being investigated or prosecuted by a State that has a 
jurisdiction over it, or if a State that has such a jurisdiction has decided following 
investigation not to prosecute. 60 These affirmations are, however, conditional. 61 The 
Court shall nevertheless try a case despite such determinations by national courts, if 
the Court determines that the State concerned was unable or unwilling to genuinely 
prosecute. This determination will be based on an assessment of the process and the 
system of the State concerned and the extent to which its process was serious, genuine 
and impartial . 
62 The Court is ultimately the soul arbiter of its jurisdiction and of the 
admissibility of the cases before it. 63 The supranational character of the Court is also 
57 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9h (1998). 
5' The crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court are genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and crime of aggression. Id., art. 5. 
59 Id., art. 1. For a brief discussion of the long history of the ICC see Sadat, L., "The Establishment of 
the International Crinunal Court: From the Hague to the Rome and Back Again", 8 J. Int'I L. & Prac. 97 
(1999). 
60 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), supra note 50, art. 17(l). 
61 For a sovereignty-based critique of the ICC see Roberts, G., "Assault on 
Sovereignty: The Clear and 
Present Danger of the New International Criminal Court", 17 American University Law Review 35 
(2001). 
62 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), art 17(2) and 20(3). 
63 Id., art. 19(l). 
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evident in the fact that its Statute does not permit any reservations to its provisions. 64 
Further, any withdrawal is only effective after one year from the date of notification. 65 
The rise of supranational adjudication has also raised its concerns in terms of 
legitimacy and democratic values. With respect to the ICC, concern was expressed 
regarding the effect of this tribunal on the procedural safeguards guaranteed to the 
accused in the criminal process. Such concerns were particularly raised by some 
commentators in the United States, who were opposed to the potential subjugation of 
U. S. citizens to the jurisdiction of the court. 66 
The role of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body was equally problematic in the 
views of some. The strength of the resentment stems specifically from that fact that 
the DSB acts as a review panel of national legislative and regulatory measures in 
terms of their compatibility with WTO law. It has been argued that WTO suffers 
"democratic deficit" in three forms: (1) as an international organisation it is 
constituted of States and does not receive any "democratic input; " (2) the DSB 
exercises judicial lawmaking in the context of dispute resolution that is even less 
democratic than its national counterpart in view of the absence of parliamentary 
check; and (3) WTO as a forum for trade negotiations is vulnerable to capture by 
special interests, which are organised enough to influence their national 
representatives in this forum. 67 
In conclusion, there are clear trends towards supranational adjudication as a 
modality of global governance. The more successful examples are emerging in the 
context of international economic relations. The WTO Dispute Settlement System is 
the main and most universal institution so far. There are, however, many other 
examples in regional contexts. While this is an institution that is indispensable if 
supranationalism is to be accepted as a legitimate approach to global governance, it 
has nevertheless been critiqued on accounts of legitimacy. Global governance at this 
stage of evolution still has not developed satisfactory systems of "checks-and- 
balance" that are necessary to legitimise its various institutions. 
64 Id., art. 120. 65 Id., art. 127. 
66 Rober-ts, G., "Assault on Sovereignty: The Clear and Present Danger of the New International 
Criminal Court", 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 3 5-77 (200 1), at 53 et seq. 
67 Atik, J, "Democratizing the WTO", 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 451-472 (2001), at 455 et. seq. Cf. 
Petersmarul, E., "Constitutionalism and International Organizations", 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 398-469 
(1996-97). 
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4. Supranational Features of Money Laundering Law 
Since the beginning of the 1990s money laundering law has entered the supranational 
stage. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was created as an international body 
commissioned with the specific task of resolving the problems of controlling and 
preventing money laundering in the context of a global economy. As the operation of 
this body has evolved, it transpired into a supranational agency of distinct features. 
Money laundering law was being formulated within a deliberately unrepresentative 
agency and imposed worldwide through aggressive enforcement mechanisms and 
quasi-judicial review processes. This Section analyses in an evaluative manner the 
structure and operation of the Financial Action Task Force. 
4.1. The Financial Action Task Force: Origin, Mandate and Nature 
The FATF was created in 1989 by the G7 Sun-unit in Paris. Its mandate consists of 
one paragraph in the Summit's declaration on "Drug Issues. " Following a preamble on 
the seriousness of the drug problem, the Summit resolved as one of a variety of 
measures to "convene a financial action task force from Summit participants and other 
countries interested in these problems. Its mandate is to assess the results of 
cooperation already undertaken in order to prevent the utilization of the banking 
system and financial institutions for the purpose of money laundering, and to consider 
additional preventive efforts in this field, including the adaptation of the legal and 
regulatory systems so as to enhance multilateral judicial assistance. The first meeting 
of this task force will be called by France and its report will be completed by April 
1990. , 68 
Following its creation by the Summit, the FATF assumed a life of its own, 
without any limitations of mandate or timeframe. It is left to the FATF to decide its 
own destiny and to define its own mission. According to the Summit's practice and 
according to the standard operation of such entities, this body becomes independent of 
the Summit and no longer associated with it. Although what exactly this independence 
means is not entirely clear. 
The FATF was called into meeting by France and it produced its first report 
ahead of the deadline in February 1990.69 Its existence was subject to periodic review 
68 G7 SurrU'rUt, Paris, July 14-16,1989 Declaration on Drug Issues para. 53, (available at 
w-vý,,, v. library. utoronto. caLq7.1. Last Visited March 1,2000). 
69FATF, Repon (February 7h, 1990). 
238 
and was repeatedly extended for periods of five years. The last review took place in 
70 1997-1998 and the operation of the FATF was deten-nined to continue until 2004 . In 
the second year of its operation 1990-1991, the FATF agreed upon its mandate. The 
mandate was set in ten-ns of four tasks for the FATF to accomplish: 71 
(1) self- reporting and mutual assessment (monitoring and surveillance) on the 
adoption and implementation of FATF recommendation by all members; 
(2) coordination and oversight of efforts to encourage non-members to adopt 
and implement the recommendations; 
(3) making further recommendations and evaluations of countermeasures 
while serving as a forum for considering developments in money 
laundering techniques domestically and worldwide; and for the exchange 
of information on enforcement techniques to combat money laundering; 
and 
(4) standing ready to facilitate cooperation between organizations concerned 
with combating money laundering and between individual countries or 
temtories. 
This mandate was later one translated into three priorities for the Task Force's 
work : 
72 
(1) to define and carry out a systematic verification of the degree of 
implementation of its forty recommendations; 
(2) to undertake in-depth assessment of laundering techniques and their 
implications for the recommendations; and 
(4) to develop a well-focused and comprehensive external profile. 
These three priorities, set in accordance with the FATFs 1991mandate, continued 
unchanged in subsequent reviews. What has changed, however, is the order of these 
priorities. 
In reviewing its oPerations and extending its existence in 1997-1998, the 
FATF revised its order of priorities and set as its main priority to "establish a world- 
wide anti-money laundering network and to spread the FATF's message to all C 
70 FATF, Ammal Report 1997-1998 (June 1998), available at www. oecd. org fatf. (last visited April 29 
2002). 
71 FATF, Report 1990-1991 (May 13.199 1), at 3. 
(last 7-, FATF, 4nmial Report 1991-1992 (June 25,1992), at para. 1, available atxNv'w. oecd. oi-g'fa 
visited April 29 2002). 
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countries and regions of the globe. 03 The other two priorities of monitoring 
compliance with the forty recommendations and continuing the review of money 
laundering trends and countermeasures remained but in secondary place to this 
primary worldwide lobbying function. 
Following the September 11 th event, the FATF held an extraordinary plenary 
74 
meeting on October 31 2001 . In this meeting, the FATF expanded its mandate 
beyond money laundering to include terrorist financing. 75 The FATF's action plan as 
set in this extraordinary meeting indicate that the Task Force will extend the same set 
of activities it conducts with respect to money laundering to include terrorist 
financing. This includes developing countermeasures, monitoring compliance, 
studying trends and spreading the system worldwide. 76 
The FATF is of a fluid nature. This fluidity is even felt in the search for the 
right words to describe its operation and its actions. It does seem to express some 
form of collective will distinct from its members. It,, however, does not possess any 
constitution and, apart from a small secretariat of four individuals, it does not possess 
any permanent organs separate from the members. Its entire work is conducted 
through plenary meetings deciding by consensus and ad hoc working groups of 
experts or is distributed amongst its members and carried out through their own 
domestic institutions. It is clear from the declaration that created the FATF, from 
subsequent practice and from explicit statements in FATF reports that its members do 
not wish to secure for it any legal personality or international organisation status. This 
leads to the inevitable conclusion that the FATF is not an international organisation. 
It describes itself as an intergovernmental body defined by its purpose. 
According to the dictionary definition, a task force is: "a unit specially organised for a 
task"77 the FATF remains committed to this specific nature as it defines its mission 
78 
and role in annual mandates geared towards clear goals . This 
fluid nature of the 
FATF is something that it takes pride in. It promotes this infor7nality as one reason of 
73 FATF, Annual Report 1997-1998 (June 1998), para. 16-17, available at www. oecd. org/fatf. (last 
visited April 29 2002). 
" FATF, FA TF Cracks on Te7-7-0rist Fbiancing, Press Release (Washington, 31 October 2001), 
available at , vww. oecd. org/fatf (last visited 
April 29,2002). 
75 id. 
76 id. 
77 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (8 
1h 
ed. 1990) 
78 "In keeping with the FATF's function as a task force, this work should be directed through annual 
mandates towards clear goals in each area. " FATF, Ainnial Report 
1993-1994 (16 June 1994), at para. 
1 17, available at ý; v%vw. oecd. org/fatf (last visited April 29,2002). 
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its success in building consensus and spreading money laundering control regime all 
over the world. 
4.2. Membership 
The FATF is not an open intergovernmental body. Its membership is restrictive and 
any extension of the membership is thoroughly calculated. Created by the G7 Summit, 
its core membership consists of the members of this group: United States, Japan, 
Gen-nany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, and the Commission of the 
European Communities. Recognising the importance of wider participation in this 
effort, the Summit Participants invited a number of other countries to join the Task 
Force. The extension of the invitation was based on either the country's concern with 
the problem of money laundering or the country's special expertise in the fight against 
money laundering. 79 Accordingly the invitation was extended to Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Australia. 80 
During 1990-1991, the FATF extended the membership further by inviting the 
remaining members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) to join. This group included Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey. In addition, the FATF II invited Hong Kong, 
Singapore and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) to participate. The latter three 
invitees were chosen on basis of their importance as offshore financial centres or as 
representative of offshore financial centres. 
81 The GCC was invited to participate in 
order to reach a number of its members that are particularly important financial 
centres. 82 The membership of the GCC includes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. 
The decision to invite the GCC rather than its member countries reflects the 
measured approach that the FATF adopts towards the question of its membership. 
Including the GCC allows the FATF to reach important financial centres in the region 
such as Bahrain and the UAE while limiting their influence in the 
decision-making 
process within the TASK Force. This is also reflected in the procedure 
followed for 
admission. In order to qualify for membership countries were required to endorse the 
Forty Recommendations. An entire meeting of the TASK Force on the 17 
th of 
I 
79 FATF, Report 1990 (February 7,1990), at 2. 
80 Id. 
8' FATF, Report 1990-1991 (May 13,199 1), at 16. 
82 Id. 
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December 1990 was dedicated to briefing them in order to help them assess the 
burden that they would incur by endorsing the Recommendations. 83 
In addressing the question of membership by the FATF in 1991-1992, the 
Task Force resolved not to accept any new members at that point. It justified its 
decision on the basis that its existing membership of 28 members is nearly the 
maximum possible if the body is to maintain its ability to achieve consensus and to 
operate informally. 84 The FATF reviewed the question of membership repeatedly in 
subsequent terms of operation. While deciding to keep the question under review, the 
decision not to extend the membership any further was maintained. The basis for the 
decision were always the desire not to jeopardise the "flexibility and efficiency" 85 of 
the Task Force. 
During the comprehensive review of its future mission and programme that 
was carried out in 1997-1998, the FATF set its policy regarding future membership. It 
decided that as part of its efforts to spread the message of money laundering control 
worldwide, the FATF will consider expanding its membership to strategic countries. 
The criteria membership were set to include: (1) Having certain key anti-money 
laundering measures in place such as criminalisation, customer identification and 
suspicious or unusual transaction reporting. (2) Possessing the political determination 
to make a full commitment to implement the Forty Recommendations. (3) having the 
capacity to play a leading role in their regions in the process of combating money 
laundering. 
The FATF launched its effort to expand its membership in 1998-1999. The 
criteria set out in 1997-1998 were further tuned. Potential members were now 
required to undergo two rounds of mutual evaluations and to be active members of the 
relevant FATF-style regional body or willing to take the lead on establishing such a t) 
body where no such body exists. 
86 The FATF policy on expansion included taking t) 
into consideration the geographic balance of the Task Force and the need to re-enforce 
the FATF's representation in certain regions where it is under-represented. 
Accordingly, the FATF invited Argentina, Brazil and Mexico to become observers 4D 
during the following term of the FATF. This status was only granted upon a written 
commitment from the target countries to endorse the 
Recommendations and to 
83 id. 
84 FATF, Ammal Repoi-t 1991-1992 (June 25,1992), at para. 96. 
85 FATF, Anual Report 1993-1994 (June 16,1994), at para, 23. 
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undergo mutual evaluations. The three Latin American countries became full 
members in 2000 following one round of mutual evaluation. 87 In its Report of 2000- 
2001 , the FATF confirms its commitment to a policy of strategic expansion but it does 
not set out a specific plan. 88 
One of the features of the FATF is its multidisciplinary character. This is 
reflected in the representation of different members in the meetings of the Task Force. 
Countries are typically represented by experts from various ministries including, 
finance, justice, interior and foreign affairs, financial regulatory authorities and law 
enforcement agencies. Annual meetings of the Task Force enjoy the participation of 
up to 150 experts. This multidisciplinary character is consistent with the nature of 
money laundering law and it is one of the strengths of the FATF. 
In addition to its regular members, the FATF permits the participation of a 
number of observers from some of the main international organisations and regional 
bodies. The list currently consists of twenty organisations and bodies including the 
Asia /Pacific Group on Money Laundering (AGP), the Caribean Financial Action 
Task Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe PC-R-EV Committee, the African 
Development Bank, the Asia Development Bank, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 89 The participation of international organisations in the 
FATF meetings is again subject to its discretion and strategic calculation. 90 In 1995- 
1996, the FATF decided to increase the participation of observer bodies and 
organisations in its plenary meetings as part of its strategy for spreading anti-money 
laundering efforts worldwide. 91 
In the same round (1995-1996), another important development has taken 
place. The FATF decided to cultivate co-operation with the financial services sector 
on on-going basis. For this purpose, it organised a Forum with representatives of the 
industry, which was held on 30 January 1996. The meeting brought together 
representatives from Member Countries and delegates from national bankinc; and I 
86 FATF, Awmal Report 1998-1999 (July 2,1999), at para. 150. 
87 FATF, Annital Report 1999-2000 (June 22,2000). 
88 FATF, Annital Repon 2000-2002, (June 22,2001), at para. 18. An interesting addition to this Report 
on the question of membership is that in footnote 5 the FATF indicates that the choice of strategic 
countries for the purposes of expansion will be regardless of their level of economic development. The 
lack of access to rninutes of meetings prevents the researcher from understanding the origin and ID implications of such developments. 
89 Consult the list of "Observer Bodies and Organisations" on the FATF , veb site (wv, -w. oecd. org/f; atf). 
90 "Competent international organisations could be invited to participate as observers, at the discretion 
of the Presidency. " FATF, Report 1990-1991 (May 13,1991), at 25. 
91 FATF, Ainitial Report 1995-1996 (June 28,1996), at para. 7. 
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insurance associations as well as participants from the non-bank financial sector and 
organisations of the financial services industry. It was geared towards soliciting the 
advice and support of the financial sector. The practice of consultation with the 
financial sector continued in subsequent FATF rounds. This development is an 
illustration of the role of private parties in governance at all its levels. 
4.3. Structure of Governance 
While the FATF is not an international organisation, which suggests that the use of 
the term "governance" is probably inaccurate, the FATF is still an international body 
that expresses a fonn of collective will. Discussing the structure of the FATF in ten-ns 
of governance is useful for the clarity of subsequent analysis and evaluation. 
During the first four years of the life of the FATF (1990-1994) one could see 
an evolving structure of governance with some degree of formality, continuity and 
specialisation. In the first year of its operation (1989-1990) and for the purpose of 
developing its first report which introduced the now key Forty Recommendations on 
Money Laundering, the FATF worked through a series of plenary meetings and the 
work of three specialised ad hoc working groups. Working Group 1 worked on money 
laundering statistics and methods under the presidency of the United Kingdom; 
Working Group 2 addressed the legal questions under the presidency of the United 
States and Working Group 3 focused on administrative and financial co-operation 
under the presidency of Italy. Each Group produced reports and documentation that 
formed the background material and basis of the First Report of the FATF and the 
Forty Recommendations. None of the background material compiled by the Groups, 
however, is published. 
During the second round of the FATF in 1990-1991, the Task Force addressed 
explicitly its institutional structure. 92 One of three working groups created for the 
purposes of this round focused specifically on planning the future of the FATE 
93 
Again none of the documents produced by this Working Group, nor the minutes of its 
deliberations is published or available for inspection. On the basis of the 
recommendations of this Working Group, the FATF resolved to continue on ad hoc 
and informal basis and to maintain its flexible structure. 
94 The structure envisioned by 
92 FATF, Report 1990-1991 (May 13,1991), at 25. 
93 Id., at 4. 
94 Id., at 25. 
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the FATF at this stage involved a presidency, a steering group, a small secretariat and 
ad hoc working groups as necessary. The presidency was to be held by one of its 
members and to rotate amongst them on yearly basis. The presidency is allocated by 
the FATF, which could only mean the plenary, on basis of the geographical location 
and membership in international groupings. The Report does not elaborate on the 
exact meaning of these criteria. 95 The practice established in this Report has been 
followed in subsequent years. After the first two years of the French Presidency, the 
Presidency rotated for the first time in 1991-1992 and was passed to Switzerland. 
The steering group envisioned in the FATF's 1990-1991 plan was to be 
constituted of representative of the Presidency for the last year and the next year plus 
the Chairmen of Working Groups if any such groups are formed. 96 There is limited 
reference to the Steering Group and its operations in a subsequent reports. The 
practice of forming three Working Groups on the other hand continued in subsequent 
FATF rounds until 1994. In 1991-1992, sips of fon-nalism in the structure were 
evident in two trends: (1) the Working Groups were formed with specific mandates; 
and (2) the mandates and the reports of the Working Groups were published as 
annexes to the FATF's Annual Report. 97 This pattern persisted in 1992-1993.98 
The final limb in the FATF's institutional structure as established in 1990- 
1991 Report is the Secretariat. This is the only permanent organ in the structure of 
governance of the FATF. It is permanent in the sense that it remains in session 
throughout the year and continues for as long as the FATF is in operation. While the 
UNIDCP had offered to act as the FATF's secretariat, the FATF chose instead to 
invite the OECD to provide the secretariat services for the Task Force. According to 
the FATF's Report, this choice was made on basis of the OECD's "experience in areas 
related to those covered by the FATF, multidisciplinary nature, and compatibility with 
the aims of the of the FATF. "99 The functions of the Secretariat include "collating, co- 
ordinating and summarisinc,,, responses from FATF members and supporting FATF I 
presidency. " 100 The Secretariat could also conduct studies upon decisions by the 
9- ' Id. 
96 id. 
97 FATF, Annual Report 1991-1992 (June 25,1992), at para 
98 FATF, Annual Report 1992-1993 (June 29,1993), at para 
99 FATF, Annual Report 1990-1991 (May 13,1991) at 25. 
loo Id. 
13 and the Annexes. 
14 and Annexes 1,11 and 111. 
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FATF but it is explicitly excluded from getting involved in any enforcement 
activities. 101 The Report did not define what is meant by enforcement activities. 
These various parts of the institutional structure of the FATF are managerial in 
nature. The decision-making power of the FATF resides entirely in the Plenary acting 
by consensus. Apart from the annual reports there is no information available on the 
procedures of the plenary meetings and such meetings are as a matter of rule not open 
to the public. 
In addition to the various parts of the institutional structure of the FATF and 
its plenary meetings, the Task Force relies heavily on the endorsement of its decisions 
by the G7 Summits and by the Ministerial Meeting of the OECD. 1 02 It is a view 
repeatedly expressed in the FATF's reports that this endorsement is important to give 
the FATF's action the necessary political force. 103 It has been a regular practice for the 
G7 and the OECD to endorse the actions and decisions of the Task Force in their 
annual meetings. 104 
During the first review of the FATF's work and future mission and programme 
in 1993-1994, a major shift in the institutional arrangements has taken place. The 
FATF decided to discontinue the structure of three working groups and to strengthen 
the functions of the plenary. 105 Ad hoe working groups could be created to carry out 
specific functions. The Annual Report of that year marked the shift by not including 
in its Annex the reports of the three Working Groups, which were constituted for that 
round. The FATF also confirmed that it will continue to function as a "free-standing 
ad hoc group". 106 It is the view of the author that this decision by the FATF marks a 
shift towards stronger informality and had the effect of reducing an already meagre 
degree of transparency. 
4.4. Functions 
Since the third year of its operations, the FATF continued to organise its work into 10 
three priority areas: monitoring the implementation of the recommendations, review 
of the money laundering techniques and countermeasures and external relations. This 
101 Id. 
102 The FATF reports regularly to the G7 Summit and to the OECD Ministerial Meeting. 
103 See for example conclusion to that effect in the FATF's first report 
in 1990. FATF, Report 1990 
(February 7,1990), at 28. 
104 Seefor exaniple, FATE Awwal Report 19917-1998 (June 1998), at paras. 
22-25. 
105 FATF, Anual Report 1993-1994 (June 16,1994). at para. 25. 
106 Id., at para. 24. 
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Section translates the work of the FATF in these areas into specific functions. The 
analysis of the work of the FATF reveals that it exercises in the area of money 
laundering law the following six functions: research and analysis, rulemaking, 
enforcement, lobbying, technical assistance and co-ordination. Research and analysis 
is one of the primary functions of the FATF and one that was stipulated in its original 
mandate. It is also a function that is closely linked to its rulemaking function. The 
Recommendations advocated by the FATF are under constant review on basis of its 
findings regarding developments in money laundering typologies. 1 07 Each of these 
functions isanalysed below in terms of its scope and the FATF's method of 
implementation. 
Co-ordination, lobbying and technical assistance are all parts of what the 
FATF describes as its external relations priority area. This area, as indicated above, 
has become its priority area since 1997-1998. The FATF perforins the function of co- 
ordinating the efforts of the ever-growing number of international organisations and 
bodies that are involved in combating money laundering. 108 It does so through inviting 
such organisations as observers in its meetings and attending, to the extent possible, 
any meetings organised by them. It also avoids duplication of efforts wherever 
possible. One of the most sophisticated aspects of the FATF's external relations 
efforts is its lobbying function. The FATF uses various mechanisms to promote its 
recommendations in the area of money laundering including setting up satellite 
secretariat in different regions in the world and encouraging the creation of FATF- 
style regional bodies and participating in their operations in some capacity. The 
technical assistance function is also part of this lobbying effort. The FATF is not an 
international organisation, which means that it does not possess independent resources 
to provide technical assistance. Its efforts in this regard consist of pooling the 
resources of its Member States and co-ordinating their allocation. 
Detailed discussion of the research and analysis, co-ordination, lobb ing and Yi 21 
technical assistance is beyond the scope of this study. The next two sub-sections will 
107 Until 1997, the FATF has been publishing the findings of its research on money laundering 4: ) 
C in typologies as part of the body of its annual report. The account of findings 
has therefore been 
summary form. Since 1998, the FATF has been publishing the full report on money 
laundering 
typologies as an annex to the main report. 
108 For a summary table of the various international insn-uments in this area, current until 
1999, see 
Simn-ions, B., "International Efforts against Money Laundering", in Shelton, D. (ed. ) Coinmitinent and 
Coinpliance: The Role of Non-Binding Not-ins in the International Legal Slystein 244 (2000), Table 6.1. 
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focus on the rulemaking function and the enforcement function. It is through these 
two functions that the FATF's supranational role is exercised. 
4.4.1. Rulemaking 
The Forty Recommendations of the FATF constitute the most important and most 
comprehensive international instrument on money laundering. The Forty 
Recommendations cover all aspects of combating money laundering. The substantive 
details of the recommendations have been discusses in Section (3) of Chapter Four 
above. This Section, therefore, focuses on the features of the Recommendations that 
illustrate the nature of the rulemaking power of the FATF. 
The main feature of the Forty Recommendations is described in the first 
version of the Recommendations as published in the FATF's first Report in 1990. The 
Report states that the recommended action steps "could constitute a minimal standard 
in the fight against money laundering for the countries participating in this Task 
Force, as well as for other countries. "109 [emphasis added] Countries, therefore, are 
encouraged to go beyond the recommendations of the FATF wherever necessary. 
The FATF's Recommendations are under continuous review in view of 
developments in the money laundering trends and typologies. This review is one of 
the priority areas of the FATF. Actual changes in the core text of the 
Recommendations are kept to a minimum. Responding to the changes is normally 
implemented through minor changes, annexes to the Recommendations and 0 
interpretative notes. The decision to recommend a certain course of action is adopted 
in a plenary meeting where the consensus rule applies. As a result of the secrecy and 
informality that surrounds the operation of the FATF, little is knows about the actual 
procedure that governs these decisions. The first Report of the FATF in 1990 however 
has explicitly provided that "some of these recommendations reflect the view of a 
majority of delegates, rather than unanimity, so that they are not limited to the 
weakest existing solution in the participating countries on each topic. " 
110 
The FATF's Forty Recommendations are now under comprehensive review, 
the results of which have not yet been published. In addition to the Forty 
Recommendations, following the events of the September 11, the FATF has expanded 
its mandate to terrorist financing. On 31 October 2001, the FATF 
in an extraordinary 
109 FATF, Report 1990 (February 7,1990). 
110 FATF, Report 1990 (February 7,1990), at 16. 
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meeting adopted eight "Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. ""' This 
new set of recommendations is now subject to the same enforcement and review 
procedures as the original Forty Recommendations on money laundering. 
The Recommendations are drafted in a non-binding language such as 
"countries should consider the feasibility[... J" "Countries should further 
encourage[... J" "the appropriate national authorities should consider [... J" "wherever 
possible [ ... ]" The forms of the recommendations is also indicative of the non-binding 
nature in that they do not prescribe detailed strict rules. Instead, the rules are drafted 
with sufficient flexibility to allow for variations in national legal systems. For 
example, Recommendation 4 provides that countries should criminalise money 
laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking as stipulated in the Vienna Convention 
1988. It. however, encourages countries to extend the scope of the predicate offence 
to include serious offences more generally and grants them the discretion to decide 
which serious offences to be included in the scope of money laundering offence. 
This expression of the will of the Members of the FATF, as reflected in the 
language of the Recommendations, suggests that "r-ulemaking" is an inaccurate 
description of the function of the FATF in this regard. The description more 
consistent with the formalistic analysis of the instrument is probably standard- setting. 
This is also the reference most commonly used. It is the view of the author however 
that the elaborate and stringent character of the enforcement system that supports the 
recommendations renders this non-biding characterisation illusory. Arguing this point 
however is not possible until a description of the enforcement function and system of 
the FATF is provided. It is this description that the next Section provides. 
4.4.2. Enforcement 
Enforcement in this context means the measures taken by the FATF to pressure a 
member or non-member country to comply with the FATF's Recommendations either 
on money laundering or terrorist financing. The purpose of this 
discussion is to 
elaborate on the degree of coercion in the FATF's compliance system and to 
understand the procedural principles and safeguards that are 
followed in the process. 
The discussion will focus on the process of enforcing the Forty Recommendations as 
opposed to that of enforcing the Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing 
III FATF, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (October 
31,200 1). 
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This is because of the mature stage that the former has reached as opposed to the 
latter. The discussion of this function is organised in two parts: (1) enforcement 
against Member Countries; and (2) enforcement against non-member countries. 
Enforcement against member countries 
In order to secure compliance by its Members with the FATF's Reco=endations, the 
FATF adopts two types of evaluation mechanisms that were agreed in 1991. The first 
monitoring mechanism is based on self-assessment and is carried out on annual basis. 
Countries are required to complete a standard questionnaire that is designed to 
measure the level of their compliance. The Secretariat uses this questionnaire to 
compile reports on the level of compliance with the Recommendations and also on the 
specific successes and failures in the reporting country's system. 
The second mechanism of monitoring is one of mutual evaluation. The FATF 
has conducted two rounds of comprehensive mutual evaluation of the Forty 
Recommendations. The second round was completed in June 1999.112 The process of 
mutual evaluation is governed by four core principles: participation, 113 efficiency, 
equality, objectivity and clarity. 114 Equality was specifically and repeatedly 
emphasised in the FATF's documents. 115 Consent is another principle that could be 
added to this list. In its 1991-1992 Annual Report, the FATF emphasised "the 
116 
consensual nature of all the different stages of the evaluation process" 
The FATF has set a number of procedures in order to guarantee consistency 
and equality in the evaluation process. Primary responsibility lies on the Secretariat 
throuah its co-ordinating role. 1 
17 Further common mutual evaluation questionnaires 4ý 5 
were prepared' 18 as well as a common outline and set form for all the reports. 119 In 
February 1997, a standard checklist of all the issues to be covered was prepared and 
given to the examiners as part of the same effort to guarantee equality and 
consistency. 120 
112 FATF, Review of FA TF Anti-XIoney Laundering Systems and Mutual Evalitatioi7 Procedures 1992- 
1999 (February 16,2001), para. 4. 
113 Id., at 144. 
114 Id., para. 130. 
115 Seefor example id., paras. 4,131 & 133. 
116 FATF, Annual Report 1991-1992 (June 25,1992), at para. 57. 
117 FATF, Review of FA TFAnti-Money Laundering Systems aiid Mutual Evaluation Procedures 1992- 
1999 (February 16,200 1), para. 13 1. 
118 Id., para. 13 2. 
119 Id., para. 134. 
120 Id. 
, 
133. 
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The evaluation process is conducted by three or four examiners through 
inspection of documents provided by the examined country and on-site visits. Each 
examination team is a multidisciplinary one consisting of legal, financial and 
enforcement experts. The examiners are selected from individuals voluntarily 
nominated by the Member Countries or directly solicited by the FATF Secretariat. 
The final decision on the selection is made by the President in co-operation with the 
Secretariat. In order to guarantee the principles of objectivity, the team consists of 
examiners from different countries and their background is taken into 
consideration. 121 1n fulfillment of the principle of participation, all members are 
encouraged to provide at least one examiner. The majority of examiners, however, 
were provided by the United States in both rounds of evaluation. During the second 
round the principle of participation was satisfied, at least in token, when each member 
provided at least on examiner. 122 
The process of preparing and adopting the evaluation report is an elaborate 
one. The examiners' comments are provided to the Secretariat, which prepares the 
draft report according to a pre-set outline. The draft report is then sent to the 
examiners who provide their comments on the draft. Upon implementing the 
examiners' comments on the draft, the report is sent to the examined country for its 
comment. The country concerned communicates its comments to both the examiners 
and the Secretariat. The Secretariat prepares the final draft according to the examiners' 
advice and sends it to the delegates. Similar procedure is followed for the summary of 
the Evaluation Report, which is to be included in the FATF's Annual Report. 
During the plenary the examiners and the country concerned with the 
involvement of the Secretariat resolve any disagreement on the wording through 
negotiation. The report is then discussed in the plenary following a brief presentation 
by the examiners and an opening statement by the country. This is followed by the 
comments of two intervenor countries designated by the President and then the other 
delegates are invited to present five questions to the country concerned or the 
examiners. The report is then adopted verbally by the Plenary along with all the 
agreed amendments. The final report and summary is submitted to the following 
plenary for final adoption. 
123 
121 Id., 140. 
122 Id., para. 144. 
123 Id., paras. 163-164. 
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In 1994, the FATF agreed a formal five-step non-compliance policy. 124 The 
purpose of this policy was to secure that the FATF's members achieve a satisfactory 
degree of compliance with the procedures. The FATF perceives that failure by its own 
members to comply with its policies hinders it international mission of spreading anti- 
money laundering measures. It was also agreed that the process should be "a 
transparent one, based on a graduated approach, equality of treatment, and oversight 
by the Plenary of the various steps in the process. " 125 
Countries whose systems suffer serious failures to comply with the Forty 
Recommendations will be required to rectify the failures. Failure to do so would result 
in taking the following graduated steps as described by the FATF in its report: 126 
(1) Requiring the members to provide regular reports on their progress in 
implementing the Recommendations within a fixed timeframe; 
(2) Sending a letter from the FATF President to the relevant minister(s) in the 
member jurisdiction drawing their attention to non compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations; 
(3) Arranging a high-level mission to the member jurisdiction in question to 
reinforce this message; 
(4) In the context of the application of Recommendation 21 by its members, 
issuing a formal FATF statement to the effect that a member jurisdiction is 
insufficiently in 
compliance with the FATF Recommendations; and 
(5) Suspending the jurisdiction's membership of the FATF until the 
Recommendations have been implemented. 
This process since its inception was applied to twelve countries. In most cases the 
matter did not go beyond the submission of progress reports. In the case of Austria 
however, which was pressured with regard to its anonymous bank accounts system, 
the conflict reached a threat of suspension. Upon which and following two years of 
defiance, Austria took the initial steps to bring its law in conformity with the 
Recommendations. 127 
In conclusion, the FATF follows a strict but clearly procedural process of 
enforcement vis-a-vis its members. The core elements of the process are a procedure 
124 Id., para. 167. 
125 Id., para. 168. 
126 Id., at 168. 
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of mutual evaluation and a policy for non-compliance. The process of enforcement is 
governed by principles of transparency, equality, objectivity, clarity, efficiency and 
graduation. The procedures that govern the process are geared towards guaranteeing 
these principles. The process could be characterised as supranational to an extent. 
Although the basis of the process is consensual, once a country has joined the group, 
it is necessarily subject to accepting the enforcement mechanisms and the processes of 
mutual review. In that sense the process could be described as supranational. This is 
particularly so in view of the scope of mutual evaluation and the ways in which it 
affects the legislative autonomy of the States concerned. 
Enforcement against non-member countries 
This is the aspect in which the FATF acts truly as a supranational agency. The 
enforcement of the FATF's Recommendations against non-member countries has 
always been part of the thinking within the FATF since its inception. The system of 
anti-money laundering measures as designed by the FATF is based on an assumption 
that "any discrepancy between national measures to fight money laundering can be 
used potentially by traffickers, who would move their laundering channels to the 
countries and financial systems where no or weak regulations exist on 
thesernatters". 128 Concern for regulatory discrepancy in non-member countries have 
resulted in Recommendation 21, which proposes two special measures in dealing with 
countries that do not sufficiently apply the Forty Recommendations. The first measure 
is special due diligence to be exercised by financial institutions in their dealing with 
individuals and entities from such countries, and the second measure is special record- 
keeping and reporting requirements regarding suspicious or unusual transactions 
emanating from these countries. 
As early as 1990-1991, the FATF considered the imposition of collective 
measures against non-member countries, which do not comply with the Forty 
Recommendations. 129 The proposition was that Recommendation 21 should be 
applied collectively vis-a-vis a number of jurisdictions identified and publicly 
blacklisted. The FATF on specific advice of law enforcement experts deemed this 
exercise to be premature at that stage. Members, however, were left free to implement 
127 FATF, Animal Report 1999-2000 (June 22,2000), at paras. 89 et seq. 
128FATF, Report 1990 (February 7,1990), at 16. 
129FATF, Report 1990-1991 (May 13,1991), at 13. 
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Reconunendation 21 individually against jurisdictions they domestically deem as 
posing particular risk. 130 
It was not until 1998-1999 that the FATF started considering proposals on 
measures to be taken against countries that do not provide effective international co- 
operation in the fight against money laundering. 13 1 An ad hoc working group was 
formed to implement what was later on to be referred to as an initiative against Non- 
Co-operative Countries and Territories (NCCT). This initiative comprises of a number 
of steps: ' 32 
(1) identifying the rules and practices that are detrimental to the effective 
implementation of anti-money laundering measures and to effective 
international co-operation; 
(2) on basis of the previous exercise, determining criteria for defining the non 
co-operative countries and territories; 
(3) identifying the jurisdictions which meet the pre-set criteria; 
(4) agreeing on international action to encourage compliance; and 
(5) agreeing on protective countermeasures designed to protect the economies 
of Members against money laundering. 
In February 2000, a Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories was 
published identifying twenty-five criteria for non-cooperation. Countries were to be 
measured against these criteria in order to determine the sufficiency of their anti- 
money laundering measures. The criteria were based on the Forty Recommendations 
and were drafted in very broad terms. Each criteria is an indicator of a broader failure 
in the jurisdiction's anti-money laundering measure that renders it ineffective in 
meeting the requirements of international co-operation. The indicators or criteria 
include absence of authorisation or registration requirements for financial entities, 
133 
the existence of anonymous accounts, 
134 lack of adequate record-keeping 
130 id. 
13 1 FATF, Anniial Report 1998-1999 (July 2,1999), at paras. 153 et seq. This initiative took place in the 
context of other sirrular developments in the OECD and some of its member countries. 
During the same 
period initiatives within the OECD geared towards coercing offshore 
financial centres to align their 
policies with the OECD countries' desire to enhance the effectiveness of their tax 
laws were also taking 
place, See Hay, R., "Offshore Centre under Attack", 
6 Private Client Blisiness 345 (1999). 
132 FATF, Annual Report 1998-1999 (July 2,1999), at para. 155. 
133 Criteria Defining Non-Cooperative Cotintries or Territories, Criterion Non. 2, in FATF, Report on 
N077-Coopei-ativeCOIIntries and Tel-1*07-ies, Annex (February 14,2000). at 10. 
134 Id., Criterion No. 4. 
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requirements, 135 secrecy provisions that cannot be lifted by administrative or judicial 
authorities, 136 and failure to criminalise laundering of the proceeds from serious 
137 
crimes. 
The next step in the initiative was the identification of non-cooperative 
countries and territories on basis of the pre-set criteria. This involved first selecting 
specific jurisdictions for review and then reviewing their laws and regulations in 
terms of the twenty-five criteria in order to determine their level of compliance. The 
choice of countries for review was based on two general tests: (1) the financial 
activities of the jurisdictions should be of such size and character that shortcomings in 
their legal systems would undermine the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering 
regime 138 and (2) the use of the jurisdiction for money laundering schemes on basis of 
the data gathered on law enforcement and money laundering typologies. 139 The 
selection of a particular jurisdiction was ultimately based on a complaint of an FATF 
members against "jurisdictions, where in the recent past, there have been 
difficulties" 140 in soliciting co-operation. Members are required to explain the nature 
of these difficulties. ' 41 
In the period between 14 February and 22 June 2000, the FATF conducted a 
review of twenty-six jurisdictions. 142 The review was conducted by four regional 
review groups: Americas, Asia/Pacific, Europe and Africa and the Middle East. 143 
The exact composition of each group is not revealed in the FATF's reports. The 
review groups were required to work with the Secretariat of the FATF and allowed to 
work with the Secretariats of relevant regional groups. 
144 The process of the review 
involved gathering information on laws and regulations in the jurisdiction concerned, 
contacting the jurisdiction for further information, drafting the report and submitting it 
135 Id., Criterion No. 6. 
"6M., Criteria Nos. 8&9. 
137 Id., Criteria No. 19. 
138FATF, Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and TelTitOries (February 14,2000), at para. 38. 
139 Id., at para. 39. 
140 Id., para. 39. 
141 id. 
142 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Cook 
Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibralatar, Gurensey, the Isle of Man and Jersey, Israel, Lebanon, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Mauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, 
Samoa, Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Vincent and the Grenadines. FATF, Review to 
Identify Non- 
Cooperative Countfies or Terretories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money 
Laundering Meastires (June 22,2000), at paras. 10 et seq. 
143 FATF, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Tei-ritories: Increasilig the Worldwide 
Effectiveness ofAnti-k1oney laundering Afeasures (June 22,2000), at para. 
8. 
144 FATF, Report on Non-Cooperative Cotintries and Territories (February 
14,2000), at para. 39. 
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to the jurisdiction with an opportunity for comment. The reports and the comments 
were discussed in face-to-face meetings between the Review Group and the relevant 
jurisdiction. The Review Group drafted a report indicating its assessment of the 
jurisdiction against the twenty-five criteria. The Review Reports were then endorsed 
by the Plenary. 145 
The first review of non-member countries resulted in black-listing fifteen 
jurisdictions as "non-cooperative countries and territories" (NCCT's). 146 
Subsequently, the jurisdictions were urged to address the deficiencies identified. 
FATF expressed willingness to provide technical assistance to the identified 
jurisdiction in the design of their relevant systems. As a response to the FATF's 
action, the black-listed countries reacted by a surge of rapid legislative activity. For 
example, in the period from 22 June to 29 December 2000, the Bahamas enacted ten 
new legislative acts covering areas of prudential regulations, commercial and 
corporate law, international co-operation and criminal law. 147 
The counter-measures envisioned by the FATF for failure to comply include, 
in addition to Recommendation 2 1, blanket requirements to report transactions with 
such jurisdictions to the competent authorities in Member countries; restrictions on 
the establishment of subsidiaries, branches or representative offices of NCCT 
countries in FATF member countries, warning non-financial sector businesses against 
transaction with entities and individuals within NCCTs in view of the risk of money 
laundering. The FATF first NCCT Report also suggested that FATF members might 
consider using measures to prevent financial institutions located in NCCTs from using 
facilities located in FATF member countries, such as information technology 
facilities. 148 
As originally envisioned, the FATF initiative indicated that the identified 
NCCTs will be kept under continuous review but it did not design a procedure for de- 
145 FATF, Review to Identify Non-Coopei-ative Counti-ies oi- Tei-7-etoi-ies: Increasing the Worldwide 
Effectiveness ofAnti-Money Laundei-ing Measui-es (June 22,2000), at para. 9. 
146 Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. FATF, Review 
to Identify, Non-Coopei-ative Countries oi- Terretories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti- 
Money Laundering Measui-es (June 22,2000), at para. 64. 
147 FATF, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Counti-ies or Tei-ritoiles: Increasing the Worldwide 
Effectiveness ofAnti-Money Laiindei-ing Measto-es (June 22,2001), at para. 20. 
148 FATF, Repoi-t on Non-Cooperative Cowiti-ies and Tei-i-itories (February 14,2000), at paras. 49 et 
seq. 
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listing. This was established in June 2001 . 
149According to June 2001 Report, the test 
applied in order to remove a jurisdiction off the list of NCCTs is whether the 
jurisdiction "has taken sufficient steps to ensure continued effective implementation 
of the refon-ns. 1' 150 This test presumes that the relevant jurisdiction has enacted the 
necessary laws and regulations to meet the concerns raised by the FATE It farther 
requires evidence of sustainable effective implementation. The assessment of the 
latter requisite will depend on submissions by the concerned jurisdiction to the FATF 
of implementation plans and specific targets. 15 1 The assessment of the jurisdiction's 
eligibility for de-listing will be decided by the competent Review Group. 152 The 
decision to de-list will be taken by the Plenary on basis of the recommendation of the 
relevant Review Group. 153 The FATF's procedure requires continued monitoring of 
the de-listed jurisdiction as well as public announcement of any remaining 
concerns. 154 According to the FATF's policy, such continuous monitoring will be 
measured against the "implementation plan, specific issues raised in 2001 progress 
reports and the experience of FATF members. " 155 
In June 2001, four previously listed jurisdictions were removed off the list of 
NCCTs on the basis of extensive and rapid legislative actions. 156 Thirteen countries 
were reviewed in the second round of reviews of non-members. 157 Six of the reviewed 
jurisdictions were listed as NCCTs. 1 58 In December 2001, the FATF decided to 
impose counter-measures on Nauru for its failure to address the concerns raised by the 
FATF in June 2000.159 These counter-measures were determined to continue in the 
Plenary of February 2002.160 While the countermeasures adopted by the FATF might 
seem mild and essentially preventive, their effect on increasing the transaction cost for 
149 FATF, Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories. - Increasing the Worldwide 
Effectiveness ofAnti-Money Laundering Measures (June 22,2001), at paras. 13 et seq. 
150 FA TF Policy Concerning Impleinentation and De-listing in Relation to NCCTs, in FATF, id., 
Appendix 2, at para. 5. 
151 Id., at para. 2. 
152 Id., para. 3. 
153 Id., at para. 5. 
154 Id., at para. 7. 
155 Id., at p. 30. 
156 Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein and Panam. FATF, Review to Identify Non -Cooperative 
Countries and Territories. - Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures (June 22,200 1), at paras. 18 et seq. 
157 Czech Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Myam-nar, Nigeria, Poland, Seychelles, 
Slovak Republic, Turks and Caicos, Uruguay, and Vanuatu. Id. At paras. 57 et seq. 
158 Egypt, Guateinal, Hungry, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria. Id. Para. 88. 
159 FA TF Decides to Inipose Counterineasures on Nauru, Press Release (Paris, 5 December 200 1). 
160 FA TF Acts against Terrorist Financing, Mone 'y 
Laundering and Non-cooperative Jurisdictions, 
Press Release (Hong Kong, I February 2002). Cý 
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countries operating within a target jurisdiction could be substantial. That in addition to 
the fact that liability risk could lead financial institutions in FATF member countries 
to decline to deal with institutions from NCCT jurisdictions. Considering the reliance 
that offshore financial centres have on operating and conducting their business in 
onshore jurisdictions, such consequences could have extreme detrimental effects on 
the small economies of the offshore centres not just on the financial institutions 
operating there. 
4.6. FA TF Supranationalism. - Analysis and Critique 
In juridical terms the FATF recommendations are soft law instruments that are not, 
according to the prevailing view, legally binding. 16 1 The de facto nature of these 
instruments, however, is far from optional. The FATF has developed a sophisticated 
enforcement regime that sanctions failure to comply with its non-binding norms. This 
enforcement apparatus, as explained above, applies both to member countries and to 
non-member countries sometimes even more strictly to the latter. To the extent that 
the FATF sets norms that are defacto binding upon non-members and takes measures 
to sanction these rules, the FATF is a supranational agency. Its practices constitute a 
significant departure from the principle of consent in international law and are highly 
exceptional to State sovereignty. 
In exercising these self-proclaimed powers, the FATF relies on substantive 
legitimacy. 162 This type of legitimacy depends on the desirability of the outcome, in 
this case money laundering control, and the capacity of the measures taken to achieve 
this outcome. This argument is based on the assumption that there is such a thing as a 
self-evident global public interest. This assumption is expressed repeatedly in the 
FATF reports. Recent developments do suggest the emergence of some common 
interests that might qualify as global public interests, such as the interest in 
controlling "global warming. " The global legal order, however, still lacks legitimately 
constituted agencies vested with the task of determining the content of a global public 
161 On this question see Aust, A., "The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments", 35 
I. C. L. Q. 787 (1986); Gruchalla-Wesierski, T., "A Framework for Understanding 'Soft Law"', 30 McGill I 
Law Journal 37 (1984); Baxter, R., "International Law in'Her Infinite Variety"', 29 I. C. L. Q (1980), 
Chinkin, C., "Normative Development in the Internatioanl Legal System", in Shelden, D. (ed. ), stipra 
note 108,2. 
162 FATF, Animal Report 1991-1992 (June 25,1992), at para. 99. The FATF "substantive legitimacy 
stems from the political and moral obligations to implement the 
forty recommendations drawn in 
1990.11 
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interest. Absent notions such as natural law or divine laws, substantive legitimacy is 
not a substitute for procedural legitimacy. 
The FATF is procedurally illegitimate on all scores. In rulemaking agencies, 0 
representation of relevant interests is a procedural requisite for legitimacy. The FATF 
is an elitist organisation with highly restrictive membership policies. Its core soft law 
instrument, the Forty Recommendations, reflects the views of the carefully selected 
fifteen countries, which were the total of the FATF membership in 1990. The care 
with which the FATF protects its culture to the exclusion of others to whom its 
instruments would eventually apply was reflected in its decision to decline the UN 
offer of secretariat facilities in favour of an OECD Secretariat. The Secretariat is the 
only permanent organ. It is an influential organ in terms of shaping the culture of an 
institution despite its seemingly administrative nature. 163 Allowing the Secretariat to 
be hosted by the United Nations was likely to create for the FATF a stronger 
perception of legitimacy even if it did not actually create an imprint on its culture. ' 64 
The FATF is an amorphous and faceless body. The affairs of the FATF are 
conducted in secrecy and all public reports of FATF meetings and operations are 
carefully edited. It is the declared policy of the FATF that its meetings are not open to 
the public. It is not an international organisation and it does not possess a charter or a 
constitution. Its operations are not subject to any specific set of principles apart from 
the principle of efficiency. During the early years of the FATF there were signs of an 
emerging formal structure and some reference to fairness and objectivity as principles 
governing the FATF operations. ' 65 This trend, however, was reversed in 1994-1995 in 
favour of a flexible and informal structure. Any reference to fairness was omitted. 
Limited references to principles such as equality appear in the context of the mutual 
evaluation process. The main cost of this shift to informality is lack of 
transparency. 166 Generally, the FATF does not operate under any code of conduct. 
The legitimacy deficit is most striking in the context of the NCCT initiative. In 
this context the FATF exercises a quasi-judicial function reviewing the laws and 
163 On the role and structure of the international secretariat see Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(ed. ), The International Secretariat of the Futw-e. - Lessonsfi-oin Experience by a Group of Former 
Officials of the League of Arations (1944); Ranshofen-Wertheimer, E., The International Secretariat. - A 
Gi-eat Expei-iinent in Intemational Ad7ni7fisn-ation (1945). 
164 On the significance of the location see Royal Institute of International Affairs (ed. ), id, at 47-49. 
165 FATF, Annual Repoi-t 1991-1992 (June 25,1992), at para. 99. 
166 Zaring, D., "International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations", 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 281-330 (1998). Discussing different examples of similar 
informal institutions such as Basel Committee and their tradition of secrecy. 
259 
regulations of the non-member countries agamst so-called international standards, 
which are principally the FATF Recommendations. The process was not governed by 
any principles. The procedural requirements are meagre. They are however worth 
listing in this context: 
(1) The Review Groups are required to involve the Secretariat in the process 
as a safeguard of the consistency between the various review reports; 167 
(2) The Review Groups are required to contact the jurisdiction under review 
for further information in order to secure the objectivity of their findings; 
(3) The draft report should be sent to the relevant jurisdiction for comments; 
(4) The Review Group should hold face-to-face discussion of the findings 
with the competent authorities in the relevant jurisdiction. 
(5) In considering the de-listing of NCCTs, the chairmen of the Review 
Groups should meet , if necessary, to secure consistency in their responses 
to the NCCTs. 1 68 
The procedural failures are several: 
(1) Some of the criteria of assessment are very broad, especially those 
pertaining to the effectiveness of the regulatory system and of international 
co-operation, which gives ample opportunity for abuse; 
(2) The timeframe allocated for the review was short casting substantial doubt 
on the seriousness and reality of the process; 
(3) According to an interview with a member of the Secretariat in August 
2001 , it was confirmed that there 
is no procedure to exclude the Member 
Country of the FATF whose complaints have triggered the review of a 
jurisdiction from acting as the reviewer of that jurisdiction. This a clear 
departure from the principle of the neutrality of the arbiter as a 
requirement of legitimacy; 
(4) By contrast to the detailed procedures for the nomination and constitution 
of the examination team in the context of mutual evaluation amongst 
FATF Members, there is no reference whatsoever in the FATF documents 
167 FATF, Repon on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (February 
14,2000), at para. 39. 
[68 F4 TF Polic 
,y 
Concei-ning Implementation and De-listing in Relation to NCCTs, in FATF, Review to 
Identify Non-Cooperative Countries and Tei-ritories: Increasing the Worldwide 
Effectiveness ofAnti- 
Money LaunderingWeasia-es (June 22,2001), Appendix 2, at para. 3. 
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to the constitution of the examination team in the context of an NCCT 
review; 
(5) As explained above, the rights of the examined Member, in the context of 
a mutual evaluation process, to defend its position before the plenary and 
to influence the wording of the report are sufficiently protected by a 
lengthy negotiation process and detailed procedure for the adoption of the 
report. By contrast the reviewed country in the context of NCCT process 
does not possess any right of presentation before the Plenary. 
The pressure of the FATF sanctions and the speed with which it requires compliance 
has resulted in a spree of legislative activity within the listed jurisdictions. This 
pressure undermines the democratic processes within the affected jurisdictions. This is 
yet another illustration of the conflict between different policies in the global sphere. 
While in other contexts, developed countries and international financial institutions 
are leading campaigns for democratisation in developing countries often supported by 
sanctions, the pressures of the money laundering control regime are undermining 
these nascent democratic values. 
Finally, the FATF is an unaccountable institution. The sanctions applied by the 
FATF can be serious for the survival of a small economy. Any country that sustains 
damage by an FATF action will not have any venue for redress. These concerns are 
particularly alarming in view of the suggestion entertained by the FATF that it could 
ban NCCTs from using facilities, such as information technology services, that are 
located in FATF counthes. Considering the concentration of clearing systems such as 
SWIFT in FATF Member countries and the indispensability of access to such 
facilities for the operation of any financial system, this proposition is serious. 
Leaving the decision on access to such facilities to the whims of a group of countries 
through an unregulated process is a clear symptom of the deficiency of global 
governance. 
5. Conclusion 
Over the past three centuries, a system of international governance based on State 
sovereignty has been taking shape. Sovereignty as a core organising principle has 
meant that States are only bound by their consent and are not subject to any superior 
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authority in the organisation of thie affairs. Globalisation and the growing 
interdependence amongst States have rendered certain issues in need of collective 
governance. Environmental concerns and financial markets are two examples of such 
issues. In order to fill the governance vacuum, certain agencies have emerged 
exercising what can be described as supranational form of governance. The 
supranational feature, as understood in the discussion in this Chapter, refers to the 
departure from the principle of consent that these agencies display. Examples 
of supranational agencies exercising rulemaking, judicial and enforcement functions 
could be found. The UN Security Council, it has been argued, performs a 
supranational enforcement function of serious intrusiveness. The purpose of the UN 
Security Council is to secure global peace and security on effective and prompt terms. 
Also, recent years have witnessed the emergence of supranational judicial organs. The 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body is probably the most obvious and most promising 
example of this category. The International Criminal Court, is the youngest and 
markedly supranational member of family of international dispute resolution bodies. 
Money laundering law provided a strong case of supranational rulemaking. 
Since the creation of the Financial Action Task Force in 1989, it has assumed a 
primary role in developing anti-money laundering legal and regulatory measures. 
Since the beginning, this fluid and informal body has intended to exercise an 
aggressive enforcement function for the sake of spreading its model worldwide. In 
1998-1999, this intention was translated into reality through an initiative that aimed at 
assessing the compliance of non-members with the standards set by the FATE The 
sanctions for failure were serious and this seriousness was reflected in the rushed 
legislative response by the countries that were subjected to the process. 
In every incident of supranationalism substantial legitimacy concerns were 
raised. This stems from (1) the alien nature of such agencies to the pre-dominant 
State-based structure of governance. This has meant that existing mechanisms of 
accountability, especially democratic accountability, are absent. (2) there is a degree 
of informality in the current models of supranational enforcement and rulemaking 
governance. This informality undermines the perception of legitimacy and leaves the 
process open for abuse. 
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CONCLUSION: MONEY LAUNDERING LAW AND TRENDS IN LEGAL 
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5.2. "aggregate Accountability" 
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1. Globalisation and Money Laundering Law: An Interactive Relationship 
Writings on money laundering law often proceed from an understanding that money 
laundering is as old as crime itself and that globalisation, understood as liberalisation of 
capital markets, and the rise of powerfal and affluent criminal organisations have 
aggravated the threats of this activity. The relationship between globalisation and money 
laundering stops at justifying the legal intervention and calling for stronger control and 
prevention measures. It does not go as far as explaining the structure of money 
laundering law and defining its boundaries in terms of its rationales. 
This study has proceeded from a sense of the particularity of money laundering 
law. It was triggered by an observation that money laundering law disturbs and deviates 
from some of the most ftindamental principles and traditions of the established legal 
order. Money laundering law largely develops within international bodies of restrictive 
membership, especially the FATF, and is enforced upon non-member States through 
powerful mechanisms of coercion in contradiction to the traditional principles of 
soverei gn nt in the organisation of international affairs. 
Money laundering 
g ty and conse 
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offences, in domestic, regional and international instruments, are drafted broadly; this 
leaves ample scope for judicial and prosecutorial discretion to the detriment of the 
principles of legality, certainty and equality as fundamental principles of criminal justice. 
The presumption of innocence and the prosecutorial burden of proof as its corollary are 
disturbed by the more lenient evidential requirements in the prosecution for money 
laundering. Even the right to counsel in criminal proceedings is threatened by the broad 
prohibitions against laundering. Further, anti-money laundering regulatory measures 
transfer to the private sector one of the traditional functions of the State, namely, 
policing. These are only some of the particular aspects of money laundering law that 
instigated the analysis in this study. ' 
In order to understand these deviations and departures, to assess their legitimacy 
and delimit their scope, an understanding of the interaction between money laundering 
law and its context is necessary. This study has argued that money laundering law is a 
response to certain structural changes in the social context, often referred to collectively 
as globalisation, and its deviation from fundamental principles is only justified to the 
extent necessitated by these contextual changes. 
Globalisation is a process of social change that has two core dimensions: one is 
geographic and the other is political. In its geographic dimension it involves de- 
territorialisation of our social and economic activities. Increasingly, social and economic 
activities are transcending the boundaries of the State. This is taking place at the level of 
the individual, the small NGO and the medium-size corporation, not only at the level of 
the most affluent or the largest private actors. The other dimension of the process is 
political. The description "global" is used not only for its geographic connotation but also 
for its omission of the State. The political dimension involves a massive shift in 
economic and informational power away from the State in favour of private Parties. The 
information supremacy of the State, which gives rise to arrangements such as the 
prosecutorial burden of proof, is now a partial reality. 
2 
These shifts in the geographic and political landscapes have had troubling 
consequences for existing structures of governance. Over the past two centuries the State 
1 See supm Chapter One, Section 2. 
2 See supi-a Chapter Three, Section 2. 
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has become entrenched as the primary agency of governance and the primary performer 
of public functions. The legal order has been organised around its external and internal 
sovereignty. Territoriality is the principle that delimits the scope of the State's 
sovereignty. With the proliferation of transnational and global private actors, the State, as 
an agency of governance, has become insufficient. Territoriality as the organising 
principle of legal order has resulted in a mismatch between government's jurisdiction and 
the scope of the activities that it should govern. The supremacy of State power, which has 
bred a number of "checks -and-b alances " that sought to temper the exercise of this power, 
has become challenged by the rising power of the subjects. In very broad terms, the State 
has become too small and too under-equipped to govern some of its subjects and their 
activities. 3 
These geographic and political shifts are occurring within the legitimate as well as 
the illegitimate spheres. Some criminals are acquiring economic and informational 
powers that are unfavourably disproportional to the State. They are also taking their 
activities across borders. Their power and geographic expansion are undermining the Z 
capacity of the State to sanction and deter through its machinery of criminal justice 
4 
enforcement . It is in response to these structural changes and their effect on the 
effectiveness of legal governance that money laundering law has rapidly developed. It is 
also in terms of this function that money laundering law should be designed and 
delimited. 
2. Six Observable Responses to the Legal Problematic 
Crime for profit is proliferating and generating enormous wealth. As an economic 
organisation it operates for profit and incurs expenses. Money is therefore its lifeblood. It 
is this wisdom that led criminal justice policies to shift away from the focus on the 
offender to focus on the proceeds of the criminal activity. Hence the proliferation of 
confiscation laws that do not only take away the instrumentalities of the crime but also 
the profits that it generates directly and indirectly. In order to evade the application of 
these laws, offenders resorted to the newly liberallsed and technically sophisticated 
3 See supi-a Chapter Three, Section 6. 
4 SeeSUP7-a Chapter Three, Section 4.2. 
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capital markets to transfer their ill-gotten gains beyond the jurisdiction of the State. The 
enforcement mechanisms of the State were rendered inadequate vis-a-vis this coalition 
between powerful and transnational private actors: the financial institutions and criminal 
organisations. In response, money laundering law rapidly developed as an enforcement 
instrument with the aim of bridging the geographic gap and redressing the imbalance of 
power in favour of the State. 
The sophistication of financial transactions and the speed with which they take 
place pose the primary difficulty in the enforcement of confiscation laws. Once the 
proceeds have entered the channel of international finance, the prospects for any 
enforcement action against it becomes bleak. The policy thinking that informed money 
laundering law was based on a realisation that financial institutions are the "keepers of 
the gates" and, therefore, they are better positioned to police the transactions that are 
conducted through their institutions. This understanding has resulted in transferring the 
policing function to a growing number of private actors including banks, insurance 
companies, bureaux de change, brokers and dealers, travel agents and many others. This 
process ofprivatisation was done through the imposition of regulatory duties of reporting C) 
and record keeping. The total effect of these regulatory requirements is to enlist a 
growing number of professionals as private policemen with the task of detecting crime 
and gathering evidence on daily basis and as part of their daily business obligations. 
These obligations were enforced by criminal sanctions for failure to comply as well as for 
active involvement in attempts at placing the funds beyond the enforcement apparatus of 
the State. 5 
While "guarding the gates" is a good pre-emptive solution, it is not, despite all 
good intentions, watertight. This means that assets are likely to escape the gatekeepers 
into the enforcement spheres of other jurisdictions and hence beyond the reach of the 
State. In order to address this possibility, money laundering laws seek to establish 
channels and mechanisms of co-operation with other countries in the area of gathering 
evidence and seizing, freezing and confiscating assets .6 In order 
for such co-operation 
mechanisms to be effective, countries around the world needed to have in place 
See slipra Chapter Five, Section 5. 
6 See supra Chapter Four, Section 5.2. 
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regulatory requirements that impose upon their subjects duties of reporting and record 
keeping. Also, due to certain restrictions on international co-operation in penal matters 
such as the principle of dual criminality, the effectiveness of co-operation became 
contingent on the incrimination of money laundering in various jurisdictions. These 
considerations have led to an elaborate process of harmonisation that involved the 
approximation of criminal laws and financial regulations in the area of preventing and 
controlling money laundering. Another form of co-operation is also incorporated in 
money laundering laws. 7 
Harmonisation of national laws in this sphere relied initially on traditional 
international law instruments, such as the Vienna Convention 1988, which imposed upon 
Member Countries the duty to criminalise the laundering of drug proceeds. This 
definition of the crime of laundering was then to become the model definition of this 
crime in subsequent international, regional and national instruments. Soon after the 
Vienna Convention, harmonisation of money laundering law and its development took 
supranational dimension. Making laws at the national level was perceived by the 
countries, which were particularly alarmed by the failures of their national enforcement 
systems, as insufficient. The FATF was created for the specific purpose of developing 
anti-money laundering measures. By the mid-1990s, its seemingly "soft standards" were 
enforced coercively against countries that were not forthcoming in adopting anti-money 
laundering laws and regulations. This coercion was exercised even more forcefully 
against non-members of the FATF, which gave it its supranational characteristics. 8 
Denying or restricting access to capital markets was one instrument of coercion, 
which was readily available to the FATF and its members. Countries who failed to adopt 
necessary measures against money laundering were warned that such failure might result 
in restricting their access to the financial markets of the FATF members. Such reaction to 
the problems of enforcement is in a way an attempt to reverse the trend of globalisation in 
order to protect a national interest against the threats of this process. It is in a way a 
measure of de-globalisation. 9 
7 SeeStIP7-a Chapter Four, Section 4.2. 
8 See supra Chapter Six, Section 4. 
9 SeeSIIP7-a Chapter Four, Section 2.2. 
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Money laundering law also makes use of the traditional mechanism of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to reassert the power of the State vis-a-vis 
transnational actors. Some countries seek to impose their anti-money laundering 
regulatory requirements on foreign financial institutions and on foreign branches of their 
national financial institutions. By doing so they attempt to utilise such institutions for the 
enforcement of their national laws. Also, the breadth of the actus reus of money 
laundering offences permits countries to exercise seemingly territorial jurisdiction over 
offences that has in fact taken place outside their jurisdiction. A check drawn on a U. S. 
Bank as part of an operation of laundering the proceeds of corruption of a Nigerian public 
official through Swiss bank accounts would give the U. S. basis for assuming 
jurisdiction. 10 
Money laundering law, therefore, can be seen to utilise six modalities in order to 
bridge the territorial gap between the State and the criminals it pursues and to restore the 
balance of power in favour of the State. The purpose of money laundering law is to 
secure the effective enforcement of criminal laws against economic crime. Some of the 
modalities seek to empower the State by reversing the process of globalisation that 
threaten its authority (de-globalisation), by extending the reach of its jurisdiction beyond 
its territory (extraterritoriality), by securing the co-operation of other States in the 
enforcement of its domestic laws (enforcement co-operation) and harmonising the laws 
of these States in order to secure the effectiveness of their co-operation (harm on isation). 
The other two modalities constitute a resort to other agencies in order to perfon-n some of 
the functions of the State in rulemaking and policing. The use of private professionals in 
policing money laundering (privatisation) and the effective rulemaking and enforcement 
exercised by the FATF (supranationalisation) introduce private and supranational 
agencies in the attempt to exercise effective control against criminal enterprises. 
10 See Supra Chapter Four, Section 3.2. This feature of money laundering law was re-enforced in the legal 
responses to the September 11 events, especially in the U. S. On this point see Norton, J., and Shams, H., 
Money Laundering Law and Terrorist Financing: Post-September II Responses-Let Us Step Back and 
Take a Deep Breath", Int. Lait,. (ForthcorrUng, Spring 2002). 
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3. There is a Broader Picture 
The problems of legal governance are wider than the problem of controlling and curbing 
transnational crime. Social and economic regulation of legitimate transnational economic 
activities is equally problematic. It is beset with the same problems of geographic and 
political mismatch between the State and the actors it is seeking to regulate. Examining 
various areas of the law such as securities regulation, environmental regulation, 
international trade law, human rights, Internet regulation, utilities regulation, and 
international peace and security, has revealed that the trends towards de-globalisation, 
extraterritorialisation, harmonisation, co-operation, privatisation and supranationalisation 
are pervasive. 
International liberalisation arrangements such as the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, which seeks to stabillse the international monetary system, 
to maintain the liberalisation of current account and to encourage the liberalisation of 
capital account, include provisions that permit the resort to capital controls by State 
Parties subject to certain measures. Similarly, the GATT/WTO, which aims essentially at 
liberalising international trade, contains safeguard provisions that permit countries to 
restrict cross-border movement of goods. To the extent that liberalisation is an instrument 
of globalisation, these measures constitute limited and regulated mechanisms for 
reversing the tide of globalisation. Similar trends could be observed in the area of Internet 
regulation in some countries such as China. " 
Harmonisation of national laws is also discernible in many areas of the law. The 
intensity of harmonisation efforts is manifest in the proliferation of so-called international 
standard- setters, whose function is to develop "soft law" instruments in certain areas of 
the law for the purpose of approximating national approaches in this area. Harmonisation 
efforts are most obvious in the area of private law. Han-nonisation 
is, however, also 
evident in aspects of public law. Most obvious are the attempts at 
han-nonising national 
approaches to the control of drug trafficking and organised crime through 
international 
treaties. 12 
11 See supra Chapter Four, Section 2.2. 
12 See supra Chapter Four, Section 4.1. 
269 
The history of criminal jurisdiction is a history of the attempts at expanding the 
reach of the State beyond its territorial jurisdiction. Doctrines such the nationality 
principle, the protective principle and universality principle have emerged specifically to 
achieve this result. Recent years have seen increasing and liberal reliance on such 
principles to secure jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the territorial ambit of the 
State. It was in the area of competition law that the "effects doctrine" developed as an 
attempt to expand the territorial jurisdiction of the State to acts that merely produce an 
indirect economic effect within its territory. Similar trends could also be observed in the 
regulation of the Internet. ' 3 
The private role in public governance is probably one of the most striking features 
of legal order today. The private role pervades all three functions of the State in this 
sphere. In many areas of social and economic regulation, the State is delegating its 
prescriptive, judicial and enforcement functions to private agencies. Rulemaking is most 
evident in areas of technical regulations and professional standards. The important 
allocative effect of these exercises of rulemaking highlights their significance. 
Alternative dispute resolution is also becoming the favoured mechanism of settlement of 
business disputes and increasingly between business and consumers. This is especially 
true with regard to disputes pertaining to on-line transactions. The role of private actors 
in the enforcement of the law in all areas of economic and social regulation is substantial. 
This is directly linked to the question of State capacity as compared to its subjects. The 
pervasiveness of the private role in enforcement becomes apparent once it is observed in 
the area of criminal justice. Collection of fines, patrol police and the management of 
prisons are all areas where private enforcement has become coramon. 14 
There is also a strong presence of supranational agencies in the current legal 
landscape. The FATF's model of seemingly soft standards supported by other strong 
measures of coercion against non-members can be observed in other areas of the law. The 
use of "conditionality" by international financial institutions to impose so-called 
international standards upon borrowing countries is only one example of what could be Cý 
described as supranational trend in rulemaking. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body is I- 
13 See supra Chapter Four, Section 3.1. 
14 SeeStIP7-a Chapter Five, Sections 2-4. 
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currently hauled and attacked as a form of supranational adjudication. The youngest 
member of this category of supranational agencies is the International Criminal Court. Its 
scope of competence gives its creation significance as an evidence of the trend towards 
supranationalism. Even the most intimate function to the State, namely, enforcement, has 
been exercised and in a very aggressive manner by the UN Security Council. In the scope 
of its powers and its limited membership, the Security Council is arguably the 
supranational agencypar excellence. 15 
The examples discussed in this study are not exhaustive. They are merely signs of 
the presence of trends. The search for evidence was by no means strenuous. This was to 
the author a confirmation of the commonality of these modalities as instruments of legal 
order in a global context. 
4. Legal Order in a Global Context: Challenging Features 
1. Informalism 
As defined by a leading analyst of this phenomenon, legal institutions "are informal to the 
extent that they are nonbureaucratic in structure and relatively undifferentiated from the 
larger society, minimize the use of professionals, and eschew official law in favor of 
substantive and procedural norms that are vague, unwritten, commonsensical, flexible, ad 
hoc, and particularistic. " 16 
It has been observed throughout this study that informal legal arrangements and a 
shift away from legal procedures in favour of flexible structures and mechanisms could 
be observed in various aspects of money laundering law and the emerging legal order 
more generally. The definition of informal legal institutions cited above applies most 
accurately to the FATF as the main setter of anti-money laundering standards at a global 
level. In analysing the operations of the FATF and its nature, it became clear that the 
FATF has explicitly favoured an ad hoc and informal structure and it did so on account of 
the flexibility and efficiency that this structure might secure. 
' 7A similar trend was also 
15 See supra Chapter Six, Section 3. 
16 Abel, R., "Introduction", in Abel, R. (ed. ), The Politics of Informal Justice. - Volume] - The American 
Expe7lence 1 (1982), at 2. 
17 See supra Chapter Six, Sections 4.1. & 4.3. 
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observed in the work of the UN Security Council, which in recent years has tended to 
conduct its affair in an informal and secret manner. ' 8 
Informality could also be observed in the area of international co-operation. There 
are repeated calls amongst academics and law enforcement officers to abolish or limit the 
restrictions on international co-operation. Infort-nal mechanisms of information sharing 
both in criminal law and regulatory enforcement are now well established. In the context 
of money laundering law, informal co-operative arrangements, both bilateral and 
multilateral, are taking place amongst Financial Intelligence Units (FITJ). 19 
Informality is also characteristic of private rulemaking, adjudication and 
enforcement. The infon-nality of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes has been 
subject to detailed discussion in academic literature. The same trend also obtains in the 
context of private enforcement and private rulemaking. The case of ICANN as the private 
regulator of a scarce resource, namely, Internet Domain Names, is illustrative. 20 
Evaluating informal legal arrangements is not an easy or a conclusive exercise. 
This is evident from the amount of criticism that bureaucratic institutions have received 
over the years. For the present context, two concerns need to be raised. 21 As illustrated in 
the analysis provided by this study, there is a correlation between informality and 
secrecy. This is a cause for concern. Any exercise of power that is shrouded in secrecy is 
bound to be susceptible for abuse. The second point of concern is that informality 
essentially means abandoning procedural requirements in favour of discretionary ad hoe 
processes. Since procedures in the liberal democratic tradition are typically geared 
towards providing protection to the weaker party in a transaction, each abdication of a 
procedural requirement bears with it the risk of enforcing the advantages of the more 
powerful party. 22 This is clearly illustrated in the case of the FATF. 
18 Franck, T., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), at 230. 
19 See supra Chapter Four, Section 5.2-2. 
20 Froomkin, M., "Wrong tam in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route around the APA and the 
Constitution" 50 Duke Law Journal 17 (2000). 
21 On the conflicting evidence regarding the value of infon-nal 
legal arrangements see Abel, R., "The 
Contradiction of Informal Justice", in Abel, R. (ed. ), stepra note 16,267, 
22 Abel, R., supra note 16, at 10- 11. "Without questions, 
[formalism] remains an essential defense of the 
powerless, [ ... 
] The requirement that the be reprsented by counsel in most criminal prosecutions 
has clearly 
inhibited state control, a point on which conservatives and 
liberals agree. " 
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Concerns of this sort and especially their effect on the perception of legitimacy 
have led to the re-proceduralisation of legal arrangements and the introduction of 
alternative safeguards. For example, in the case of ICANN certain procedural 
requirements for decision making were mandated. Also, the FATF and other similar 
agencies, such as Basel Committee, seek to substitute for the lack of representation in 
their decision-making processes by relying on processes of consultation and 
dissemination of information. 23 It is important in this regard to evaluate the capacity of 
these alternatives to secure the requisite protection of the fairness of the process and 
hence its legitimacy. 
4.2. Principle v. Effectiveness 
It is a continuous thread in this argument that legal arrangements that emerged as an 
attempt to govern increasingly global context place more emphasis on efficiency and 
effectiveness at the cost of principle. It has been repeatedly indicated that principles such 
as sovereignty and consent in international law, the principle of legality in all its 
applications and derivations across the legal order, the principle of mens rea and the 
presumption of innocence in the context of criminal justice are coming under attack. It is 
almost invariably the argument that the principle is undermining the effectiveness of the 
legal order. These principles are nothing but expression of the liberal ideology of 
governance. Abandoning the principles or simply eroding them in an unrneasured way is 
alarming in terrns of the ultimate form of governance that this path might lead to. 
In more advanced democracies, this departure from the strict protection of principles 
mainly through formal procedures is done in reliance on the sound exercise of discretion 
by those who are in a position of authority, whether setting the rules, enforcing them or 
settling disputes. Such reliance could be problematic and unjustified in nascent 
democracies. Even in advanced democracies, the discretion of those in power is not 
always reliable. Civil libertarian values are not as deeply entrenched as some might like 
to believe. It is on account of these differences amongst societies that the imposition of 
23 Walker, G., Intv-lzational Bankhig Regulatioii: Law, Policy wid Practice (2000), at Part 1, Chapter 1, 
., 
ree of democratic Sections 7.5 & 7.6, The author argues that the consultation processes secure a deg, 
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money laundering law with its highly discretionary powers on less democratic societies 
can be criticised. 
4.3. Accountability Deficit 
Informalism, secrecy and departure from principles all result in loosening the structures 
and mechanisms of accountability in the society. Concern for accountability either 
through judicial processes or democratic processes has been sounded in the context of 
private order, supranational governance, and infon-nal international co-operation. This is 
compounded by the fact that over the past two centuries, structures of accountability were 
based on the State as the primary agency of governance with representative 
accountability, the separation of powers and judicial review as the primary forms and 
guarantees of accountability. 
In a highly decentralised legal order, democratic accountability in its traditional 
sense is becoming inadequate to hold the current agents of governance accountable. 
Corporations and NGOs that play now a substantial role in governance cannot be held 
accountable to the electorate through the election process. Current form of decentralised 
governance maybe more in keeping with the rationales of separation of powers and more 
conducive to social participation. Its decentralised character, however, might hinder the 
effective implementation of "checks and balances. " This was illustrated in the area of 
Internet regulation where standardised contracts are the nonn and the capacity of the user 
to assert one's rights is limited. In the context of money laundering law, the extensive 
powers exercised by the financial institutions in policing their customers and denying the 
service on basis of suspicion require careful examination. 
4.4. Policy Conflict 
Another shortfall of a highly fragmented system of governance is the problem of co- 
ordination. The resort to de-globalisation measures in order to enforce money laundering 
laws upon non-compliant countries is an illustrative example of the policy conflicts in 
global governance. As a system of governance, it is based on the assumptions of the 
virtues of liberalisation and open borders. In an attempt to avert the harms of 
inclusion. 
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globalisation in various contexts, countries have resorted to regulatory measures seeking 
to reconstruct their boundaries to shut out the threats. In the context of the WTO, such 
measures could be scrutinised through the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This structure 
provides a mechanism for policy co-ordination, i. e., co-ordinating State's desire to protect 
its interests with the collective interest, as expressed in the text of the WTO agreement 
and its annexes, in maintaining a liberal economic order. 
Such co-ordination and review mechanism is absent in other areas of the legal order. 
Money laundering law is an illustrative case. In this context, anti-money laundering 
policies conflict with other policies in the global legal order in two respects. The first is 
the aforementioned conflict between de-globalisation and liberal economic assumptions. 
The second is the conflict between the emphasis on the values of democracies and its 
transmission to less developed countries on the one hand, and money laundering law with 
its extensive discretionary structures and top-down processes of imposition on local 
democratic processes on the other. 
5. Some Signposts for the Future 
5. I. Functional Rule ofLaw 
The emphasis on the State as the agent of public order has resulted in a deeply entrenched 
public/private distinction. This distinction has meant that there are certain acts that the 
State can do while private actors cannot. It also meant that there are certain limitations on 
the exercise of power that are binding on the State and not binding on the private actors. 
Primary amongst these limitations are constitutional constraints, which bind the State and 
does not bind private parties. This dichotomy has resulted in attempts to extend to private 
agents, who are increasingly exercising prescriptive, judicial and enforcement functions 
some of the procedural and constitutional constraints that bind the State. 
This is done 
through doctrines such as the "act of state doctrine. " 
In view of the decentralisation of the functions of law and order, a case could 
be 
made for a function-based approach to the "rule of 
law. " It is not the State alone that 
should be subject to constitutional, human rights and procedural constraints. 
It is any 
agent that It) purports to exercise a prescriptive, judicial or enforcement 
function. Each of 
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these agents should be subject to rules that govern the exercise of the function performed. 
The task that lies ahead is to determine the standards that should govern each of these 
functions and to examine possibilities for holding the agents accountable in the exercise 
of their functions. There are lessons to be learnt from existing experience including the 
experience of regulating utility providers, private policemen and professional 
associations. The proliferation of supranational agencies certainly calls for such standards 
and structures of review. 
5.2. "Aggregate Accountabilit " y 
Traditional mechanisms of accountability, such as parliamentary accountability remain 
relevant to the extent that the State is still a primary and an essential agency of 
governance. In fact, such mechanisms remain the guarantee of any future reforins of the 
system of legal order. 
Such mechanisms are, however, insufficient. More innovative mechanisms of 
review are essential for the legitimacy of the emerging global legal order. The concept of 
"aggregate accountability" has been proposed by one writer as a solution to the problem 
of accountability in the context of private governance. 24 This concept is relevant in more 
general terms. Informal mechanisms such as ombudsmen arrangements, private law 
mechanisms through contractual and tort liability and mechanisms that enforce 
transparency are but some options of alternative approaches to accountability. 
5.3. Principled Revision of Principles 
The principles that underlie a certain legal order are not rules of natural law. They are 
ultimately institutions that are contingent on the context that produced them. It 
follows 
necessarily that significant changes in the context should invite a revision of the 
basic t) 4 
principles that underlie this legal order. This revision, however, should 
be guided by 
principles. 25 Revision and abdication of principles on basis of short terms consideration 
of convenience is not the course advocated in this context. 
24 Freeman, J., "The Private Role in Public Governance" 75 Ne,, v York Law Revieiv 543 
(2000). 
25 Ashworth, A., "Towards a Theory of Criminal Legislation", I Criminal 
Law- Forum 43 (1989). The 
author argues for a principled departure from principles. 
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Revision is taking place in various areas of the law. In international law, the 
principle of sovereignty is being continuously revisited. In the field of international co- 
operation in penal matters the process of revision is spanning many of its well-established 
principles and restrictions. In the area of criminal justice, mens rea and the presumption 
of innocence are but two examples of aspects of criminal justice that are undergoing 
substantial revision. While principled and systematic revisions are evident in academic 
writings, legal changes typically reflect less principled approaches. 26 It is important at 
this stage to develop alternative principles that reflect the development in the context 
without unden-nining the ideological basis of the system. 
26 Id., at 42. 
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